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SUMMARY
This study explores the subject of cross-national variations in industrial conflict, 
looking specifically at a 'matched set' of factories in Canada and Britain. The comparison 
between these two countries is intriguing.
Since 1943, Canadian governments have sought to regulate industrial conflict by a 
distinct formula whose three pillars are a) legally enforceable collective agreements 
meant to circumscribe disputable issues, b) the outlawing of strikes during the term of the 
collective agreement, and c) the substitution, for industrial action, of a well-defined 
grievance and arbitration procedure to settle the disputable issues arising during that 
term. Dispute resolution is formal, collective agreements are comprehensive and arbitral 
jurisprudence is encyclopaedic.
In Britain, on the other hand, dispute resolution has been left almost entirely to the 
parties themselves. Collective agreements are not enforceable and sketch the barest 
details of co-regulation. An ill-defined body of 'custom and practice' still governs in most 
day-to-day disputes. Strikes are legally possible for all groups of employees at any time 
on any issue related to the workplace. And arbitration, though available, is voluntary and 
widely shunned by both parties. Dispute resolution is highly informal.
While one might, from this comparison, predict a higher level of strike activity in 
Britain, Canada has equalled or surpassed Britain over the past twenty-five years in 
industrial conflict. Why might this be so?
The study reviews several sets of theories on cross-national variations in industrial 
conflict and finds that the Canada-Britain comparison does not fit any of them.
Suggesting a synthesis of the "institutional" and "political economy” theoretical 
approaches, it proposes to concentrate on the political struggle over production at the 
shop floor in a "politics of production" approach.
Defining four "political apparatuses of production" (interests, rights, adjustments and 
enforcements), the study examines how these "microinstitutions" for conflict-handling 
articulate with three key loci on the frontier of control where conflict can erupt 
(discipline, the structuring of the internal labour market and job control).
Through the use of intensive interviews in four workplaces (two in each country) in 
the brewing and aluminium fabrication industries and the analysis of general data on 
industrial relations in the two countries, the analytical framework is applied to examine 
the generation and resolution of industrial conflict.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
/. The Canadian Question
Canada has one of the most highly regulated industrial relations systems in the world. 
It also has among the highest levels of strike activity in the world. This is a paradox that 
should interest anybody in the field of industrial relations, human resource management 
or public policy. However, within Canada, few commentators have seriously attempted to 
hold the country up to international comparison to shed light on the relative seriousness 
or possible causes of the 'problem'. Likewise, few outside commentators on cross-national 
variations in industrial conflict have looked closely at the particular set of conditions 
within Canada to inform their analysis. Canada is invariably conflated into a 'North 
American' model of strike behaviour by model builders even though there is ample 
evidence that it differs considerably from the US in industrial relations characteristics 
and strike activity and that the divergence is rapidly increasing.
This thesis attempts to redress some of these omissions. It is submitted that as trade 
unionism in the U.S. plummets, it is Canada that increasingly takes on pride of place in 
the 'North American model' of union-management relations. Canada is well worth 
comparing with other countries for insight into variations in industrial conflict among 
nations, and into the link between regulation and industrial conflict.
In 1944, the Canadian federal government put into effect the Wartime Labour 
Relations Regulations, PC 1003, heralding the modern era of industrial relations in that 
country. Loosely inspired by the U.S. Wagner Act of 1935 (but far more restrictive1), the 
regulations were a response to a rising tide of strikes and the need, in the interests of 
wartime production, for labour cooperation and peace. The Regulations guaranteed 
trade union rights to organise and bargain collectively, providing for union certification 
and compelling employers to bargain'in good faith'. Unlike the Wagner Act, they also 
banned strikes during the lifetime of a collective agreement, requiring that every
I. Warrian ll«M6> argues against tha popular misconception that PC HUM »at "Canada*! Wagner Act". Ha insists that 
the Order * a i  far mora restrictive than tha U.S. legislation which did so much to help U.S. unions gain a 
foothold against employer resistance. Only in the post-war wave of industrial conflict did Canadian unions 
gain true recognition and begin to grow.
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collective agreement contain a "procedure for final settlement, without stoppage of 
work...of differences concerning its interpretation.2" (See Woods, 1973).
In the wartime emergency, the Federal Government had seized jurisdiction from the 
provinces, where it constitutionally resided. When jurisdiction was returned to the 
provinces after the war, all of them enacted similar legislation3 4* And all imposed a 
similar prohibition against "mid- term" strikes.
Canadian public policy makers, like most of their post war Western counterparts, 
recognised that industrial conflict was an endemic part of capitalism. But with the 
pluralist optimism then prevailing they, like those in many of these countries (but 
significantly not in the the U.K.) also trusted that the state, with the proper regulatory 
tools, could reduce the conflict to manageable proportions. The Canadians hoped that the 
new system of regulation would do so— in three ways. First it would remove many legal 
obstacles that had previously impeded trade unions coming to the bargaining table and 
would provide for orderly collective bargaining. Second, it would confine such industrial 
conflict as did emerge to primarily economic issues and would ensure that this conflict 
occurred onltf at regular and predictable intervals. Third, by legitimising trade unions 
and 'free' collective bargaining, the unions would be more responsible in policing the 
more militant tendencies of their members.
Implicit were two assumptions: that the process of arbitration would be an adequate 
quid pro quo for the loss of the right to strike on issues of interpretation of the collective 
agreement and that changes to pay and terms and conditions of employment, once agreed.
2. Privy Council Ord«r 1003, I 'm . Section P , quoted in Woods (1973).
3. No diicuiiion of Canadian industrial relation! would be complete without reference to the highly decentralised
nature of Canadian politics. Canadian provinces have perhaps more control over their internal affairs than 
the subnational political units in any country in the world. Included in provincial jurisdiction is control over 
the vast majority of labour relations matters within its boundaries. Thus each province has its own industrial 
relations acts, labour relations boards, department of labour, conciliation and mediation services, arbitrators 
etc. While the boilerplate labour relations legislation has been inherited from the original wartime national 
legislation mentioned above and is roughly similar across the country, there are some important ddifferences 
from province to province. Some provinces have first collective agreement interest arbitration: some have 
"anti-scab" laws; some have provisions for collective agreement "reopaners" in the case of technological 
change. Likewise, the body of decisions of the labour relations boards and arbitration hoards have taken on a 
different character in different provinces. Wherever possible, in the body of this study, major differences are 
mentioned. With these caveats carefully in mind, however, it is possible to speak of a general Canadian 
industrial relations law.
4. As will be seen, while the Canadians banned strikes entirely during the term of collective agreements, the Americans
merely structured the system of bargaining so as to discourage it.
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could wait until the next round of negotiations. Over the past forty years, Canadian 
governments have further increased their regulation of industrial relations. Most 
jurisdictions have outlawed strikes entirely for government employees. Alberta, one of 
the last provinces to allow hospital workers to strike, made that illegal in 19825- In all 
such case, compulsory interest arbitration was substituted for the right to strike.
However the late 1970 's and early 80's saw a rash of legislation (contrary to I.L.O. 
conventions Canada had signed) temporarily curtailing or removing collective bargaining 
in public services (see Panitch & Swartz, 1985), including access to interest arbitration. 
To some public policy makers, the idea seemed to be if regulation worked, more regulation 
worked even better.
But has the plethora of regulation worked? It is impossible to answer without looking 
outside Canada. Stepping back and making broad comparisons of trends in post war 
strike activity between industrialised countries, Canada certainly emerges as a world 
leader. But for reasons that will be explored shortly, such overarching theories raise 
more questions than they answer. In order to appreciate the subtleties of the variations 
in strike patterns, it is also necessary to make more limited comparisons, between sets of 
two or three countries. In the case of Canada, the choice of single other countries for 
comparison can vary in its illuminatory power.
On the one hand, a country with a very different set of industrial relations 
institutions, politics, industrial structure, and pattern of trade union organisation such as 
Sweden, Germany or France would perhaps present too broad a contrast to capture more 
than the most obvious and hence trite differences.
On the other hand, a country like the US may be too similar, especially in the legal 
regulation of industrial relations, for the comparison, per se, between them to throw up 
conspicuous insights in the first instance. While the conceptual separation of Canada 
from the US is imperative, it may best be accomplished by reflecting the two against a 
third country. The best pair of countries to choose are those where "the similarities are 
extensive enough for the differences to be instructive" (Phelps-Brown, 1986, p. 2 1).
S. It should be noted, however, thet the province of Ontario has recently been toyina with the idea of allowina public 
service employees a limited naht to strike.
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Canada and Britain may well provide such a comparison. They have many 
similarities— in language, political structure, business practices, legal foundations and, as 
far as the concept can be operationalised, in culture (to be discussed in more detail 
presently).
The two countries also have more similarities in collective bargaining than is 
generally acknowledged. Union density (defined as percentage of employees represented 
by trade unions) in both countries (40-50%) is 'mid-range', ie. between the high levels of 
the Scandinavian countries and the low levels of the U.S..
The attitude of the unions in both countries toward the mixture of 'business' and 
politics is remarkably similar. While British trade unionists like to decry the *business 
unionism' prevalent in North America, they, like their Canadian counterparts, have 
renounced the intermingling of the political and industrial spheres of activity (see Haiven 
& Terry, 1988). The vast majority of their activity as trade unionists consists of marginal 
amelioration of terms and conditions of employment. The relatively minor 'political' part 
of the activity of unions in both countries consists of supporting and advocating the 
election of social democratic parties of very similar political orientation.
In both countries, a largely adversarial system prevails , wherein unions and 
employers choose not to engage in extensive co-determination on the Northern European 
model but rather to settle major differences by periodic contests of economic power. Yet 
while unions in both countries hesitate to fully legitimise substantive work rules by 
negotiating them, they have cooperated with employers to the extent of developing a 
"semi-constitutional" (Gallie, 1978) system in the workplace, defining procedural rules 
in a fairly explicit, jointly accepted collective agreement, unlike, say, France.
While multi-employer bargaining was common in several important British industries 
until the 70's, Britain has now joined Canada in largely decentralised collective 
bargaining system centering on the workplace (see Chapter III). In both countries general 
and craft unions prevail over industrial unions. The central labour federations of both 
countries are more loose holding organisations or talking shops than coordinating bodies 
and neither has any role in carrying out or coordinating collective bargaining. And the
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labour parties, while differing somewhat in political power attained6, have both generally 
failed to erect an abiding social contract among government, unions and employers on the 
Scandinavian model.
Yet the two countries do differ in several marked respects. Perhaps the most striking 
industrial relations divergence is in the system of resolving day-to-day disputes in the 
workplace. The highly regulated nature of the Canadian system contrasts sharply with 
the 'hands off British approach.
2. Two Systems o f "Dispute Resolution "
An initial and cursory look at several characteristics of dispute resolution in Britain 
and Canada cannot help but compel the prediction of a much higher level of strike activity 
in Britain.
1. Most salient is the fact that while Canadian unions can legally strike only at the 
expiration of a collective agreement (usually every two or three years), British unions 
may do so at any time. Thus frequency of legal opportunity is greater in Britain.
2. For most public sector workers (ie. approximately 25%  of all unionised workers in 
Canada7), strikes, even at contract expiry, are entirely forbidden by law. In Britain, 
public sector workers have not generally had the right to strike legally removed. Thus a 
far greater proportion of unionised workers have the opportunity to strike in Britain, 
unfettered by legislative ban.
3. Even where and when strikes are allowed, most Canadian jurisdictions impose 
several procedures such as conciliation, mediation, disputes inquiries and statutory 
"breathing spaces" as well as strike ballots, all of which delay or prevent strike action.
In Britain, no such imposition existed until 1984 since when a strike ballot has been
A. M on  international itudie. of the electoral fortune* of the Canada'* New Democratic Party fail to take account of 
the highly decentralized nature of Canadian politic* and the power of the province* (which poanbly have 
more power than in any other federal lyitam. Wait Germany, Switzerland and Australia included). While the 
N.D.P. ha* not formed a federal government, it ha* formed laveral provincial government*. Moreover crucial 
period* of the late M)‘* and early 'O '*, the N.D.P. held the 'balance of power' in federal minority-government 
parliament*.
Thi* percentage wa* calculated from (Kumar at al.. I*>86. p. .WMI) and etclude* teacher*, who have generally 
retained the right to »trike.
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required*- Thus there are far more hurdles for Canadian unions to leap before they can 
lawfully strike.
4. While the contract of employment of British workers is considered broken when they 
strike, British employers (despite a few recent notorious examples) have not generally 
used strikes as an opportunity to dismiss. Recent legislation has rendered unions liable 
to suit when they fail to ballot their members or engage in certain industrial actions 
outside the workplace, but again employers generally seem loath to use their power to 
punish. In Canada, while employers do not have the right to automatically dismiss 
employees engaged in "timely" strikes, they can and do dismiss workers who engage in 
"untimely" strikes and arbitrators have generally upheld this practice. Moreover, 
Canadian employers can and do sue unions for damages incurred in untimely strikes.
Thus the practical penalties for striking at will are more onerous for Canadian workers 
and their unions.
5. In most unionised British workplaces, no definite system of resolving disputes, other 
than strikes or lockouts, exists when unions and management have failed to reach 
agreement. In Canada, a long-established, legally imposed, system of third- party 
arbitration exists to settle all disputes arising during the currency of all collective 
agreements. A  contingent of highly experienced arbitrators have produced an almost 
encyclopaedic body of arbitral jurisprudence over the past 4 0  years. Thus, while 
Canadian workers can argue the merits of a grievance before a learned third party 
British workers have little option but to strike to gain equity denied them by employers.
6. Canadian collective agreements are much more detailed than British, making clearer 
what rights workers have, and by their silence, what rights they do not. In arbitration, 
save for demonstrable ambiguity in the collective agreement, past practice is not 
entertained. In Britain, the written collective agreement is much less detailed and is 
supplemented with a body of "custom and practice", a set of unwritten and often ill- 
defined "agreements" between management and unions. The very indeterminacy of 
custom and practice, combined with a convention that guarantees the 'status quo' when
H. The ( onxrva iite  government of W I-4  triad to impoaa aaveral reatrictiona, but for varioua reaaona. lhaaa were 
largely ineffectual
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disputes arise, would seem to dictate a far higher number of opportunities for conflict to 
erupt.
7. Despite both being 'mid range' in union density at the present time, Britain has 
traditionally had a higher proportion of union members than Canada, with penetration 
not only greater in blue-collar and manufacturing work but also reaching well into 
private sector white collar, banking and finance and lower management sectors which 
Canadian unions have hardly touched (Bain and Price, 1980; International Labour 
Office, relevant years). If this measure acts as an indicator of intensity of collective 
bargaining activity in the two countries, then a greater number of opportunities for 
labour- management conflict potentially exist in Britain.
8. Although bargaining in both countries centres on the enterprise, compared to 
Canada, Britain's unions have devolved much more authority to lay representatives on 
the shop floor and full-time officials exert much less control on them. The power and 
organisation of shop stewards and their involvement in both shopfloor and establishment 
bargaining is the stuff of legend, and certainly (even in the 80's) greater than in Canada. 
The smaller degree of institutional control exerted by central union bodies on lower 
echelons and members would seem to bespeak (Clegg, 1976; Roomkin, 1976) a greater 
level of strike activity in Britain.
Finally, perhaps more emotively, while Canadians are aware of their high strike 
record, it is to Britain that they look as the model of conflictual labour-management 
relations. Pundits and politicians regularly wonder out loud whether Canada will catch 
"the British disease". And it is to Britain that they point when confronted with the 
heretical suggestion that deregulation might be extended to industrial relations.
And yet an examination of the actual strike statistics in the two countries suggests a 
different story.
3. A Comparison o f Strike Activity
The comparison of cross-national variations in strike statistics as an end in itself is 
an exercise fraught with difficulty and much abused. First, as several commentators have 
pointed out, not all strikes signify industrial conflict and not all industrial conflict is 
signified by strikes. (Shalev, 1978; Edwards and Scullion, 1982). Second, countries 
differ in how they measure strikes. Although Canada and Britain measure them more
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similarly than many other pairs of countries, the fact that strikes of short duration are 
not recorded can have a more distorting effect in Canada, especially when looking at 
"wildcat" or mid-term strikes which can often be shorter than a day. Even when longer, 
they may miss reporting because of their anomalous and illegitimate nature.
Third, the measurement of strikes involves several dimensions ie. number 
(frequency), workers involved (size), and number of working days lost (volume). Each says 
something different about the activity. Because of differences in population, union 
density and numbers of employers susceptible to unionisation, the best dimension for 
cross-national comparisons is volume, or more correctly working days lost per worker 
employed. However even this dimension can obscure important variations in the conduct 
of strikes.
Fourth, strikes can have somewhat different meanings in different countries. Shorter 
and Tilly (1974) attempt to show how most French strikes have a highly political flavour 
while those in other countries can have different meanings4* Some strikes which account 
for major surges in the statistics can have very special causes and consequences. The 
British miners' strike of 1984-85 and the Canadian 'day of protest' against wage controls 
in 1978 are examples.
Yet despite all these caveats, strikes are one of the few important phenomena whose 
social (rather than statistical) definition is virtually the same across countries: the 
cessation of work by paid employees. So compelling are variations in the general trends 
and patterns of strike activity, especially when viewed from an appropriate level of 
remove, that to ignore them entirely would be foolish .
The purpose here, it must be stressed, is not to treat the strike figures as definitive 
nor to engage in a sophisticated statistical exercise but rather to show general patterns 
of industrial conflict in the two countries and to use them punctuate the discussion of the 
regulation of such conflict. Moreover, when so many features of the two-country 
comparison seem to promise opposite intuitive conclusions, the figures fairly leap off the
•>. Snyder auaaeiu that prc-World War II itrike* in Canada and tha U S. »are 
aftar the war were of an economic nature.
of a political nature while tho*e
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Except for the 'size' dimension, Canada has long been among the world leaders in 
strike activity since the end of WWII. This is most evident in terms of working days lost 
relative to its working population. Canada stood highest among industrialised countries 
in the seventies and among the highest since the end of the War (see Table I ). Britain has 
stood only about mid-way in the league table, with as low as 25% and no more than 7 5%  
of Canada's loss in working days during Britain's conflictual 70's. Into the 80's, the 
divergence between Canada and Britain becomes even more pronounced (see Table 3) with 
the exception of the single year of the miner's strike, 1984.
One of the reasons cited for Canada's high number of working days lost is the greater 
length of strikes in that country, especially when compared to strikes in European 
countries. It is true that strikes, on average, involve fewer workers (see Tables I and 3) 
and last longer in Canada than most countries, including Britain. But in terms of sheer 
numbers of strikes relative to its working population, Canada again is among the highest 
(although France and Italy, which lead Canada in this regard, do so by a substantial 
amount). Compared to Britain, Canada averaged about the same in this dimension over 
the seventies, perhaps even a bit higher toward the end of the decade (see Table 2) and 
consistently ahead of Britain in the eighties.
One of the reasons traditionally given for Canada's high record of strike activity as 
compared to other countries is the inordinate reliance of the Canadian economy on 
industries subject to cyclical instability such as unprocessed or semi-processed natural 
resources (Jamieson, 1973). A recent refinement is Lacroix's (1986) information/joint 
costs approach which predicts that because of greater discrepancies of information about 
the relative power of the parties, "an economy that includes a greater number of exposed 
industries can therefore be expected to experience greater strike activity. Britain, whose 
economy is much less dependent on raw materials and has a more highly developed 
manufacturing sector presents an apt comparison. But what happens when strike activity 
in the two countries is compared in the manufacturing sector only, thereby removing the 
effects of primary industry strikes in Canada (and of mining strikes in Britain)? Canada 
clearly exceeds Britain in both incidence and volume (see Table 4).
Another of the reasons given for the greater strike activity in Canada over Britain is 
that although Canadian unions are legally prohibited from striking during the collective
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agreement, they more than make up for the ban by walking out once the agreement is 
over. While there is undoubted truth in this proposition, as high as 25% and seldom 
fewer than 10% o f  all strikes in any year have taken place within the term o f the 
collective agreement, ie. unlawful 'wildcat'strikes1.
It is impossible to compare mid-term strikes in Canada to anything similar in Britain. 
But a brief digression to consider the situation in the U.S. can serve to further dramatise 
the above figures, help bring the inquiry into Canada and Britain into sharper focus and 
help illustrate the degree of divergence between Canada and the U.S. As seen in Table I , 
throughout the 60's and 70's, the U S trailed Canada by up to 60%  in work days lost per 
worker and by up to 4 0%  in number of strikes per 1000 workers. Thus Canada seems 
moreconflictual than the conflictual U.S.
But what of mid-term strikes? Unlike the Canada-Britain contrast, in both Canada 
and the U.S. strikes can be divided between those occuring at the end of a collective 
agreement and those occurring within its term. But the law on mid-term strikes differs in 
the U.S. and Canada. In Canada, as mentioned, all mid-term strikes are forbidden and 
grievance arbitration substituted. In the U.S., mid-term strikes are not forbidden by law. 
The parties are free to fashion the disputes resolution procedure that suits them and can, 
theoretically, choose to allow for strikes within the term of the agreement. U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent holds that where a grievance and arbitration procedure to resolve 
certain issues exists, strikes and lockouts are forbidden while those issues are in 
procedure. But strikes and lockouts are theoretically lawful on issues outside the 
procedure and on issues covered by procedure once the procedure has been exhausted.
(See Wellington, 1968).
In practice, most U.S. unions and employers have chosen voluntarily to negotiate a 
peace obligation. Only about I % o f  collective agreements do not contain a grievance 
procedure and corresponding no-strike clause at all. Yet only 49% o f  collective U.S. 
agreements contain blanket prohibition o f mid-term strikes. The rest contain 
some provision, however small, fo r  the possibility o f  strikes in mid-term  (Rock,
1980). Thus, where there is virtually no possibility of mid-term strikes in Canada, such
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possibility is widespread in the U.S.. And yet, as Table 5 shows, in the 1970'slw. over 30%  
more days were lost per worker in mid term strikes in Canada than in the U.S..
Bearing in mind the caveats about comparing strike statistics, it is nevertheless 
impossible to avoid the conclusion that the tight legislative constraints on Canadian 
strike activity and the substitution of arbitration are somewhat less than effective in 
achieving the goal of reducing industrial conflict by any standard of international 
comparison. As England puts it:
’Th« relatively high incidence of illegal mid-term strikes, approximately ¿0%  of all strikes 
per year for the la»t 20 year*, demon,irate, a cleavage between the theoretical assumption of 
pluralist 'order' in the system and the realities of the workplace. The system is 'disorderly' even 
within its own framework of 'orderliness'.'' (I9H3, p. 242)
In stark contrast to what might be intuitively predicted, compared to Britain, Canada 
has a serious strike 'problem'. What do theories of industrial conflict say about why this 
might be so?
4. Problems in Comparative Theory
As interesting and potentially fruitful as the inquiry into cross-national variations in 
industrial conflict is, that inquiry is bedevilled by the problem of what theoretical 
framework to use to make sense of the many factors that may contribute to the variations. 
The problems of theory within a single country are rendered even more problematic in the 
cross-national arena, for the question is: Can we really compare countries? Hickson et 
al. are optimistic that comparisons can be done by analysing
"...a unique pattern <of scores) on a set of variables applicable across societies. The 
characteristic phenomenon of a given society are its positions on variables, not the variables'' ( IV ’V.
p. r>.
But which variables among the countries chosen will be considered? Will the analysis 
of these variables be taxonomic or will an effort be made to analyse their interaction and 
will causality be imputed? If the latter is done, which are, so to speak, independent and 
which are dependent variables? At what level of abstraction will the analysis be set? How 
many countries will be studied ?
The approach taken in this thesis is an admittedly eclectic one. No one theory or set 
of theories, no one level of abstraction, no sample size can provide a once-and-for-all 
definitive answer. The tasks here are modest and twofold— to attempt to find a way of
H). Unfortunately, th# U.S. ceased assidi data collection on work stoppages in l*Ht2.
Chapter l...page I 2
synthesising (or perhaps a better word is 'emulsifying') the various theories and to add an 
empirical data that fills in another part of the jigsaw puzzle. Three approaches have 
concentrated on different sets of cross-national variables. Those theories concentrating 
on distinct national cultures can be grouped under the "cultural" school; those theories 
concentrating on the institutions that regulate relations between capital and labour, 
particularly collective bargaining, come under the "institutionalist ” school; those 
concentrating on the political and organisational power and resources of capital and 
labour are often classified under the "political economy" school.
How do these broad-brush approaches fare in the face of the Canada-Britain 
comparison?
4.1 The 'Cultural'Approach
While not explicitly included in the major sets of theories, a nagging consideration 
is that something in the 'culture' of different countries is a major contributor to cross­
national variation in industrial conflict. Culture in this sense is most closely defined as
*«n expression of value, norms and habits which are deep-rooted within the nation" (Child, 
m i .  p. 2)
or, to use an analogy,
"Culture determines the identity of a human group in the same way as personality 
determines the identity of an individual" (Hofttede, I'<*<>. pp. 25-26»
The human group in this consideration is the nation-state. It might be suspected that 
something in the German or Swedish or American culture (and in our case, Canadian and 
British culture) predisposes workers toward or away from industrial conflict.
Research into the impact of culture is more popular among those concentrating on 
business organisations and their management, that is scholars of ‘organisational 
behaviour' and 'organisation theory' (eg. Hofstede, 1980; Hickson et al., 1979; Child, 
1981; Sorge & Warner, 1986; McMillan et al., 1973) than among those investigating 
industrial relations. This could well be due to the strong institutionalist bias of industrial 
relations. Where the concentration is on union-management relations rather than on the 
organisation as a whole, well-defined concrete institutions such as employers' 
organisations, trade unions, collective bargaining, boards, tribunals and disputes 
procedures become reified and draw attention away from the more abstract questions of 
culture. In addition, much more than business organisations, state regulation and
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national politics plays an important role in industrial relations. Thus even those 
industrial relations studies that do involve considerations of culture are unable to ignore 
institutional and political factors.
Naturally the question of culture in industrial relations becomes more salient when 
comparing countries whose cultures are quite obviously different. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in comparing Japan, with a culture uncontaminated by outside influence for 
over 300 years, to other countries. In fact, because of the success of Japan as a trading 
nation, a major point of debate is whether the 'so-called Japanese management style' is 
'culture bound' or transferable (Gow, date unknown). Dore (1973), in his famous study of 
Japanese and British electrical engineering factories takes pains to explore the role of 
distinct cultural values in predisposing management, workers and unions in the two 
countries toward certain patterns of behaviour. Nonetheless, he also includes two 
important institutional and political factors common to all industrialised societies: the 
emergence of the large corporation and the compelling effect of notions of egalitarianism 
and democracy in the world outside the factory upon the world inside the factory.
A cultural approach of sorts is also applied by Gallie (1978, 1983) to a comparison of 
industrial relations in British and French oil refineries. Although the workplaces are in 
the same industry, with the same technology, of similar size and even owned by the same 
parent company, very different patterns of industrial relations prevail in either country. 
More than comparable workplace institutions or macro-political developments among 
employers, unions, political parties and the state, Gallie concentrates his attention in the 
first instance on the attitudes of individuals at the workplace, especially workers . Both 
French managers and the French working class, he submits, have different inherent 
dispositions toward control and the relationship between the classes than their British 
counterparts. Thus an objective affront by management which might pass without 
offence in Britain arouses feelings of tremendous hostility among workers in France. 
Likewise a collective bargaining initiative by workers which might not unduly disturb 
British managers may be regarded by their French counterparts as a major challenge to 
their managerial prerogative.
However, in the second instance Gallie docs acknowledge the importance of 
institutions in shaping these attitudes. A major influence has been the role of French left-
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wing parties on the labour movement and in turn of the labour movement in determining 
how French workers see their relationship with industrial authority. Likewise, the 
organisational resources and political power of trade unions and the Communist Party 
are of key importance.
While cultural considerations cannot be ignored, there are many problems in 
adopting, or even using aspects of, such an approach and especially in applying them to 
the study at hand. First, the concept is extremely difficult to operationalise. Confronted 
with cross national variations in sets of organisations matched in several contingencies, 
researchers have grabbed for aspects of culture to explain these variations. But these 
aspects have generally been extremely vague, such as McMillan et al.'s (1973) concept of 
"traditionalism" to explain differences in formalisation between British and North 
American (U.S. and Canadian) organisations. Hofstede (1980) has undertaken by far the 
mqst ambitious and exhaustive attempt, using factor analysis, to group sets of attitudes 
that define national culture. He comes up with four dimensions: "power distance" (a 
measure of the amount of inequality tolerated); "uncertainty avoidance" (a measure of the 
toleration for uncertainty); "individualism" (the extent to which individuals in a society 
avoid or crave collectivity); and "masculinity" (an ideologically loaded and provocative 
category which purports to measure pursuit of 'masculine' goals such as advancement and 
earnings or 'feminine' goals such as caring). But aside from problems of the sample from 
which his theory was derived (a relatively small group of mainly professional and 
managerial employees of a single company in 39 countries), there is the problem of the 
questions asked, which concentrate on "values". Rosenfeld (1987), in a similar, though 
less comprehensive survey, concentrates on "job satisfaction" and obtains quite different 
scores under a dimension similar to Hofstede's "Power Distance". O f Hofstede's 
preoccupation with values. Surge and Warner say,
"valuei arc thui localised somewhere between loose preferences, ad hoc rationalisations 
after the act. and basic values which are morally charged and consciously referred to in actual 
behaviour. Values are devalued both morally and in their esplanatory function through this 
ambivalence." (I1HA, p. 411
The operationalisation of the concept of culture as as distinct area of research then, is 
still in its infancy.
Second, the study of culture, like most other inquiries that deal with business 
organisations, inevitably concentrates upon the individual. Culture at the level of the
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nation is assumed to be a simple aggregate of the attitudes of the individuals that form the 
nation. The intervening variables of groups and organisations, and in this context work 
groups and business organisations, is ignored. Yet there is ample evidence (Olson, 1965; 
Crouch, 1982) that there is a "logic of collective action" or, more correctly "two logics of 
collective action" ie. of labour and capital (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1985) quite different than 
the logic of individual action. Thus the question is not only, for example "what is the 
orientation of Japanese workers towards authority" but rather "what is the orientation of 
the Japanese work group or collectivities of Japanese managers towards authority".
While some of this may be captured in Hofstede's "power distance" dimension, his 
questions are asked of individuals in personal questionnaires. Briggs (1988) presents 
compelling evidence from a number of studies that Japanese workers express quite 
different attitudes as part of a group than they do as individuals. Moreover, if such a 
thing as a national culture can be specified, the characteristics therein contained have 
been derived from the mean of a sample. The size of the variance about the mean can be 
very important. How many Japanese, for example, exhibit "unjapanese" characteristics as 
opposed to Canadians exhibiting "uncanadian" characteristics.
Third, as mentioned above, culture will differ in its importance depending upon the 
specific cross national comparison made. Some sets of countries are closer to each other 
than other sets. Hofstede (1980), in integrating his dimensions presents clusters of 
countries with similar characteristics. For what it is worth as it applies to our study, he 
finds Canada and Britain very close in all dimensions, both countries having small power 
distance, high individualism and weak uncertainty avoidance, and both relatively mid way 
on the scale between masculinity and femininity. At best, this means that culture is, so to 
speak 'held constant' as between our two countries.
Fourth, the link between the input of cultural predispositions and the output of 
industrial conflict is not clear (if the causality invariably runs from the former to the 
latter in any case). Certainly the culture literature makes no pretensions of explaining 
industrial conflict. Does, for example, the combination of deference to authority, high 
individualism and risk attraction make for greater or lesser industrial conflict? In any 
society not in the throes of revolution or dictatorship, labour and capital do not simply 
fight it out no holds barred. They and the state have erected institutions to mediate
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conflict. It is impossible then, to say whether a set of cultural attributes contributes to 
conflict without looking at those institutions .
Fifth is the problematic relationship between culture and institutions. A good 
working definition of institutions is
"Colltctiva designs for coping with basic societal problems...culture patterns consisting of 
norms and roles, embedded in certain paramount values and offering prescriptions for dealing with 
basic problems faced by every society.' (Lammers 4  Hickson, IV'1'». p. HI
If, in fact, institutions are reasonably close to being crystallisations or concrete 
manifestations of culture, then surely it is more useful to study institutions than culture. 
Culture is a very vague set of attitudes resident in individuals. There is no reliable way of 
observing culture and of tracing its development other than administering questionnaires 
to individuals, with all the methodological problems that that entails. Institutions on the 
other hand, as in the above definition, are the responses of culture to persistent problems, 
in other words behaviours arising from the response of attitudes to contingencies. 
Moreover they are collective responses. As behaviours, they can be observed and 
described. Their development can be readily traced. And if similar persistent problems in 
various countries can be selected, then the institutions that exist allow for comparison. In 
countries such as Canada and Britain, where institutions are so important in industrial 
relations, a study of them should be especially revealing.
4.2 Institutional Approaches
Institutional theories however, have their own set of problems. Though not 
coterminous with pluralism, they have tended to share a similar outlook.
While subjected to considerable scholarly criticism over the past ten years, the 
institutional approach is still the conceptual engine that drives the thinking of 
governments, practitioners and scholars in most Western industrialised countries who see 
the question as not one of "whether regulation" but "how much". Acknowledging the 
inevitability of conflict between workers and managers, it sees them generally 
accommodating to each other through the mediating effect of institutions such as 
collective bargaining, disputes procedures, trade unions, employer associations and 
labour law.
Earlier proponents such as Kerr et al ( 1960) and Ross and Hartman ( 1960) went so 
far as to predict that the convergence of such institutions in advanced industrialised
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countries would lead to the withering away of the strike. These predictions were 
discredited by the dramatic rise in strike activity in all Western industrialised countries 
in the late sixties and early seventies and its persistence (Shalev, 1983) despite economic 
downturn. The early institutionalist theories were revealed as creatures of an era of 
unprecedented economic growth and stability which lent collective bargaining a false air 
of permanence and unimpeachability.
But other institutionalists sought to explain periodic outbreaks of industrial conflict 
in terms of the breakdown, or disfunctionality of institutions. Clegg (1976) suggests that 
cross-national strike patterns are closely linked to the various structural dimensions of 
collective bargaining (eg. extent, level, scope and depth) and disputes procedures in 
various countries. But when it comes to tracing the origins of differences in collective 
bargaining or their trajectory with references to economic and political developments, 
Clegg says little or nothing, paying the briefest lip service to the actions of employers 
without further elaboration. 'The structure and attitude of employers associations and 
management are the main direct influences" (Clegg, 1976, p. 10)
Clegg's analysis fails to explain several major problems in the Canada-Britain-US 
comparison and is sometimes contradicted by it. He claims that 'dispute procedures 
which are intended to handle, as equitably and speedily as possible, all differences which 
arise during the currency of the agreement’ (p. 74) will tend to reduce unofficial and 
unconstitutional strikes. Comparing the US with Sweden and West Germany, all of 
which have comprehensive disputes procedures, he cites plant-level bargaining and 
ensuing "factional competition" in US unions as a cause of higher numbers of unofficial 
strikes. But he does not explain why factionalism should be a necessary result of 
decentralised bargaining. While there may be some truth in his assertion, why would 
Canada, with a similar degree of plant bargaining and potential union factionalism have 
a higher level of such strikes than the US? Like all other theories, Clegg's does not 
bother to look for insights within the 'North American model'.
More importantly, though Canada has much more "comprehensive and efficient 
disputes procedures” than Britain, and both, especially as the 70's wore on, had a high 
degree of plant-level bargaining, why is this not associated with "low(er) numbers of 
unofficial and unconstitutional strikes" (p. 82) in Canada? Perhaps the answer lies in
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Clegg's assertion that disputes procedures may not only be less comprehensive and 
efficient, but "defective" (p. 82). But to leave this phrase and the previous two so poorly 
defined is to render them meaningless since they become self-fulfilling prophecies. A 
disputes procedure is defective because it is ineffective. But it is ineffective because it is 
defective. And so on. In fact, this tendency to definitionalism is a major criticism of 
Clegg's entire approach. (Shalev, 1980).
But Clegg's approach cannot be dismissed out of hand, simply because the 
constraining power of institutions on the pattern of industrial relations and industrial 
conflict is undeniable, especially in countries like Canada and Britain where the major 
institutions have remained remarkably intact over at least the past forty years and their 
influence pervades right to the shop floor.
Ingham (1974), comparing Britain to Scandinavia, proposes to take a step back from 
institutions and explain their development by analysing several dimensions of the 
development of the two economies— the extent of industrial concentration, the degree of 
product differentiation and the complexity of the production system.
While Sisson and Jackson (1976) raise serious questions about Ingham's empirical 
assertions, his approach raises more fundamental problems. Relying only on his three 
variables, the theory does not travel well to other sets of countries. A  relevant case in 
point is Canada, quite similar to Sweden in concentration and the other dimensions, yet 
with a completely different pattern of collective bargaining and a radically different 
pattern of strikes.
A key flaw here is the tendency to vulgar determinism, seeing a certain set of 
institutions as necessarily rising out of a set of infrastructural variables. Like many other 
comparative theories, its view of the state is also overly structuralist and one­
dimensional. Such criticism darkens some otherwise laudable attempts to move beyond 
institutional description to a more radical position. A recent Glasbeek (1985) article, 
attempts to explain the development and current problems of Canadian industrial 
relations institutions by referring to the structure of industrial organisation of the 
economy. Although his conclusions are significant (the high number of Canadian strikes 
reflects the need of the Canadian government to pass on the high costs of running a weak.
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resource and export-based economy to workers), they suffer from a mechanistic linking of 
industrial development, the 'needs' of capital, and the actions of government regulation.
All theories concentrating primarily on institutions at the macro-level are blind to 
the political dimension of trade union and employer activity. In several instances, 
especially Sweden, the rise and fall of strike activity simply cannot be explained in terms 
of the existence or effectiveness of institutions (Korpi & Shalev, 1979).
In fact the approach suffers from the problem of locating itself in the middle range of 
analysis, effectively ignoring both macro-political developments at the level of the state 
(as well as treating the state as unproblematic) and micro-political developments in 
production organisation and employer-employee relations at the level of the shop floor.
4.3 Political Economy Theories
The "political economy" approach seeks to explain strike activity according to the 
organisational capacities of labour and capital and their ability to mobilise and assert 
their interests in various spheres of struggle.
Shorter and Tilly (1974), taking France as their starting point, see the level and 
shape of strike activity as directly linked to variations in working class participation in 
the governmental process. The strike, they announce, is "an instrument of working-class 
political action” (p. 343) Hibbs(l976& 78), Pizzorno (1978) and then Korpi and Shalev 
(1979) have built on Shorter and Tilly to suggest that at a certain point in the 
development of working class organisations in many countries, there is a shift in the locus 
or centre of gravity of struggle from the workplace and strictly industrial issues to the 
realm of national politics ("political exchange") through labour, socialist or social 
democratic parties. Where the working class has managed to transfer the struggle for 
equity and distribution to the political forum, conflict decreases in the industrial forum.
To Shalev (1980), collective bargaining arrangements are nothing more than 
"intervening variables" that reflect "the distribution of power and the outcomes of 
conflicts between labour movements (unions and parties) and employers and the state at 
the time these arrangements came into being." (p. 29)
The "political economy" approach has its merits. It better explains explain why 
Northern European countries have less industrial conflict than others and sheds light on 
the causes of strike patterns in France and Italy. It also gives credit to workers and their
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agents for developing goals and diverse strategies to achieve those goals rather than being 
mere reactive agents to exogenous influences. But the approach runs into problems when 
looking at countries in which the levels of working-class organisational power are not 
widely divergent and where workplace struggle is still the dominant form of working class 
self-expression.
In conflating Canada and the U.S., it virtually ignores the importance of Canada 
having a labour party where the U.S. has none and that the N.D.P. has had some input 
into the governing of the nation or its constituent parts. With the influence of the N.D.P. 
and the existence of a much more extensive 'welfare state' in Canada than the U.S. taken 
into account, the theory would surely bespeak far lower levels of industrial conflict in 
Canada than the U.S. This, of course, is not the case.
The higher level of strike activity in Canada than the U.S. seems to run against the 
theory. The theory would still hold to an extent, however, when comparing levels o f 
participation in government between Canadian and British social democratic parties.
But certain key questions in this regard remain unanswered by Korpi and Shalev, 
especially about the link between worker behaviour and various macroeconomic 
outcomes such as low unemployment, economic distribution and social wage. What link is 
there between a labour party being in power and the fulfillment of working class goals? Is 
the organisational power of the working class directly reflected in the election o f leftist 
parties to government?
Cameron, in an important refinement of the Korpi and Shalev theory, answers some 
of these questions. He does so in two main ways: First, he expands the definition of 
working class mobilisation. He measures the influence of labour parties not only by 
participation in governments but by access to portfolios. But, second, he also constructs a 
separate measure of working class power resources by concentrating on the trade union 
movements themselves <ie. their 'organisational unity', central collective bargaining 
power, density of collective bargaining coverage and participation in decision making at 
shop floor and company level). Cameron finds that
"...economic militancy by labour, in the aenie of huh level* of strike activity and wage 
puih— may derive lets from the weakneaa (or non-eaiatance) of Social Democracy and ita frequent 
abience from government than from the organisational fragmentation of the labour movements, the 
multiplicity of confederation! or the enncnce of tingle major confederation! having very large 
numbers of affiliated unions organised by narrow craft and industry criteria, and finally, in the
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absence of any institutionalised form of participation in decision-making within firms.* II9W, p.
But Cameron goes further. He compares levels of strike activity not only to the 
organisational power of labour or leftist control of government but to the actual 
macroeconomic payoffs that governments, influenced by these factors, can deliver to 
workers. These payoffs include lower unemployment, redistribution of income and 
higher social wage"- While he demonstrates that labour quiescence or militancy has little 
effect on redistribution of income between capital and labour, he does show a significant 
relationship between labour peace and the other two factors and especially 
unemployment. He concludes that where a strategy of political exchange has occurred, it 
has not transformed capitalism into socialism but has resulted in a significant victory by 
guaranteeing full employment.
In light of Cameron's restatement of the theory and his criteria, Canada and Britain 
are even more alike than in Korpi and Shalev. First, the labour movements of both 
countries are similarly weak in the sense that union federations are highly decentralised 
on the basis of industry and craft, bargaining is fragmented, and there is little or no 
institutionalised participation by labour in decision making at any level of the firm. 
Second, using Cameron's criteria for success of working class parties, those of both 
countries, while differing in their levels of participation in government, have more 
importantly both failed to deliver the goods o f low unemployment as their 
Scandinavian counterparts have done.
In this light, the political economy approach takes us very little farther in explaining 
why Canada's pattern of strike activity should be significantly different from Britain's.
By treating institutions as mere intervening variables reflecting the distribution of 
forces between labour and capital (even when "they subsequently acquire a degree of 
'functional autonomy'") (Korpi & Shalev, 1980, p. 29), the theory assumes an inordinate 
fineness of tuning between the balance of power among labour and capital and/or the 
state on the one hand and the institutions of their regulation on the other.
4.4 The Interplay o f  Politics and Institutions I.
II. Weiskopff IIVHSl uses a similar approach, relating similar payoffs to productivity growth in two sets of countries: 
those following a 'class-conflict' model and thosa following a 'class harmony' modal.
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Yet it is undeniable that in many countries, institutions arose at a particular time and 
set of historical circumstances. While those circumstances cannot fail to reflect the 
balance of power between labour and capital, the connection is by no means simple. As 
in collective bargaining, institutions are the product of compromise. Compromise is 
often less than a perfect reflection of the interests of labour and capital, especially when 
the interests of a third party, the state, which itself has relatively autonomous interests 
(Edwards, 1986, pp. 143-182), are put into the equation. Moreover, institutions, once 
established, often take on a 'life of their own', constrained, but not determined, by the 
balance of forces among the parties. While the more powerful parties, especially capital 
and the state, will attempt to manipulate the institutions to their advantage, it is not 
always clear to those parties or to observers what that advantage is. Further, the parties 
will very often stick with the devil of an institution they know than they devil they don’t. 
Moreover, it is not clear that the parties responsible for establishing the institutions can 
predict the functional consequences of their creations:
”... neither s u u  officials nor corporate manage™ have any secure means of knowing in 
advance the long-term consequences of any particular concession. Economic environments may 
change and established rules give rise to new interpretations in unpredictable ways that make 
esisting agreements far more onerous for management than either party especud at the outset*
(Zeitlm. NHS. p. Ill
And, it might be added, circumstances may also conspire to make the agreements more 
onerous for labour as well.
Edwards (1983) suggests, that at its worst, the rejection of institutionalism is not as 
decisive as the political economy approach claims, that in fact it falls into the same bind 
as the earlier approach by treating certain factors as unproblematic. Thus, where the 
earlier approach concentrated on collective bargaining and disputes procedures and 
labour law without teasing apart the dynamic of these institutions, the new approach 
treats the political process and participation in the state as given. The state is, in fact, 
treated as a neutral mediator among competing interest groups. The relationship of the 
working class to the state is left undeveloped. It is merely assumed that at a certain level 
of maturity, the working class gains entry to the polity. There are also problems of how 
the working class mobilises for collective aclion. Just because the working class has 
certain organisational and power resources, does not necessarily mean those resources 
are automatically mobilised.
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Likewise, the political economy approach places too much emphasis on working class 
mobilisation and not enough on that of employers. It is necessary to look at both, 
recognising that there is a dialectical interplay between them (and the state). The exact 
way and reason they do so can only be understood by historical analysis of the 
development of employers, trade unions and the state.
Thus while the form of industrial relations institutions may be similar in several 
countries, the historical conditions for their development, the economic and political 
context in which they operate, the results they produce and, consequently, their future 
trajectory may be quite different. A case in point is Canada and the US. In both 
countries, the conduct of industrial relations is highly regulated by state or state- 
prescribed institutions which, at first, seem quite similar. But since the 1970'sthe 
industrial relations paths in the two countries have diverged significantly— in union 
density, in the vitality of collective bargaining, in the intensity of industrial conflict 
(Huxley etal, 1986; Rose & Chaison, 1984; Haiven, 1988b).
Unlike, many American observers, Huxley et al (1986) do not see the divergent paths 
of the two countries as due simply to pro- or anti-labour policies on the part of either 
government. Nor do they ascribe the differences simply to the way institutions operate—  
but rather to a complex interaction between the two. They suggest that the result of this 
interaction is two distinctive 'labour regimes' defining 'regime' as:
"'principle!, norm», rule! and decuion-making procenei around which the actor- 
eapectationi convert« m a liven issue-area' along with the constellation of power upon which the 
arrangement rests" <p. IIS)
To be sure, the balance of power among the parties has affected the working of the 
institutions. But the very weakness or robustness of the institutions have differentially 
refracted the contest of power. The word "refracted" is used above, rather than 
"reflected" indicating the complex nature of the interaction between politics and 
institutions. So, for instance, while the labour relations boards in both countries do much 
the same sort of work (ie. certifying unions, deciding unfair labour practices), the success 
of unions in Canada in gaining and maintaining bargaining rights is presently greater 
than the US. This is partly because of a more vigorous employer offensive and weaker 
union resistance in the US. But it is also partly because labour law and board practice in 
Canada is less capable of being used by employers to pursue a strategy of outright union
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busting To say that the relative strength of the institutions is merely a reflection of the 
balance of forces then, is much too simplistic, just as simplistic as saying that labour law 
or law in general is not affected by activity in the polity.
Canadian employers and the state are no less interested than their US counterparts 
in pressing their advantage against unions in a period of high unemployment. But they 
have been able to do so largely within the existing institutions (Panitch & Swartz, 1985; 
Glasbeek, 1985; Huxley etal, 1986). Likewise, changes in British labour law and 
economic recession since 1979 have made it possible for British employers to launch a 
wholesale assault on such institutions as the closed shop, the non-legally binding 
collective agreement and shop stewards. But, by and large, they have not done so 
(Millward& Stevens, 1986; Batstone, 1984, Terry, 1986; see also Chapter *). Many of 
the same institutions which abetted union power in the 60's and 70's, are of convenience 
or do not impede the growth of employer power in the 80's.
So the political economy approaches, too, are riddled with problems. In fact, macro 
theorisation in the field of comparative industrial relations and especially cross-national 
variations in industrial conflict seems to have sailed into a dead calm. New wind needs to 
be blown into the sails. But before this can happen, a new way of looking at the problem is 
needed. Ground must be cleared before macro-theorisation can resume.
5. A 'Politics o f  Production 'Approach
First it is well advised to take a step back from overarching views, narrowing the field 
to interesting pairs or triplets of countries and examining them more carefully. 
Surprisingly few such studies have been undertaken (several starts in this direction are 
Edwards, 1986; Phelps-Brown, 1986). Admittedly the risk is run that such work will be 
so particularistic as to defy generalisation to larger sets of comparator countries. But 
only in so doing can the development of the balance of power among the parties, of the 
institutions and of state intervention be fully mapped out to truly combine the best of the 
institutional and political economy approaches.
Second, an area that has received scant attention in comparative studies— the 
workplace— should be explored. It has been indicated how institutions prescribed or 
described at a higher level may play themselves out in quite unpredictable forms at the 
point of production. And political economy attempts to specify the organisational
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resources and capabilities of the working class and employers at a national level may 
ignore at peril the complexity of the balance of forces across sets of workplaces and 
sectors of the economy. Attempts have been undertaken at cross-national comparative 
case studies <Maitland, 1983; Gallie, 1978), cross-national comparative review of single 
country case studies (Burawoy, 1985; Edwards, 1986) and comparative single-country 
case studies (Lazerson, 1988; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Armstrong et al., 1981). In 
reviewing several workplace studies in Britain and the U.S., Edwards warns that:
"Given that that* studio arc generally focused on specific issues and that there ere no 
systamatic companion« o f  similar factorial in the two countrias. drawing inferences about 
differing contexts and patterns of behaviour is necessarily risky." (14116, p. I»”7, emphasis added)
But not only workplace studies are required. What are needed are workplaces in 
different countries matched along several dimensions, including product markets, size of 
work force, labour markets, technology employed and organisation of production, and 
preferably 'real-time' studies done by researchers working from a similar set of guidelines 
and purposes. Burawoy's comparison of his experiences at the American "Allied" with 
Lupton's at the British "Jay's" (Burawoy, 1985), while ambitious, suffers greatly from the 
separation between the studies of several decades and differing authors with differing 
research agendas.
Third, an attempt should be made to link developments at the level of the state to 
developments in the workplace rather than assuming the relationship. This works in both 
directions. In the direction from state to workplace: If the state intervenes, for example, 
to impose strike ballots in order to moderate the power of workplace unionism (as it has in 
Britain recently), such intervention may or may not achieve its public policy goal in the 
workplace. From workplace to state: A large upsurge in workplace conflict (such as 
resulted in Canada both in the post World War I years and during World War II) may or 
may not result in state intervention. If intervention does result, it may take different 
forms, from brutal repression to 'progressive' reform, tempered by several contingencies. 
These contingencies must be carefully considered before explanation can be offered.
Fourth, it is important to explore the generation and resolution of so-called 'day to 
day' conflict between labour and management as well as the set piece battles over pay. In 
Britain, 'pay rounds' encompass only a small proportion of disputes. In Canada, lawful 
strikes which occur at collective agreement expiry, though covering a multiplicity of
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issues, inevitably come down to a question of wages. Because of the standards of 
legitimacy (Armstrong et al., 1981), the pursuit of wages and wage-related claims will 
always be seen as more understandable.
"A  wage claim readily comprehensible to negotiators on both sides and usually offers 
ample bargaining range' within which compromise is possible ...Non-wage issues are often far less 
precisely formulable and may involve questions of principle on which compromise is difficult if not 
impossible''. IHyman. 1972. pp. 123-41
In Canada, it is especially difficult to tease out the control issues in major rounds of 
collective bargaining. It is difficult to clarify the relative importance of non-pay issues 
raised since they are ravelled up with pay demands. In fact, it is often necessary for 
unions to 'bundle' pay and non-pay issues in a 'package' to prevent management from 
reducing everything to the lowest common denominator of pay. Further, it is almost 
impossible to determine to what exact extent the whole series of non-pay irritants and the 
attendant hostility generated comes to be expressed in militancy over seemingly clear pay 
issues.
Even outside of negotiations, what begin as grievances over non-pay issues in both 
countries may often come to be expressed and, indeed, settled, by economic means, by a 
"buyout', to use a phrase well-known in workplaces on both sides of the Atlantic.
A theoretical point of departure in addressing all four issues is the work of Burawoy 
(1979, 1985). Since Braverman's (1974) resurrection of Marx's distinction between 
labour power and labour, a large body of debate has emerged about the 'labour process' le. 
how employers go about getting workers to transform the former into the latter and to 
what extent workers have resisted (cite several sources here).
Burawoy turns the debate on its head by asking a somewhat different question: not 
how capitalists get workers to work harder but why workers work as hard as they do. He 
insists the workplace is a centre of reproduction as well as production, that workers 
produce not only commodities, not only their wages and surplus value, but also help 
produce the conditions for their own subjugation to capital. Thus the means of inducing 
the output of effort is not only coercion but consent, workers actively abetting their own 
exploitation.
He suggests (1985), that the history of capitalist development in different countries is 
one of movement from 'despotic' to 'hegemonic' production regimes, wherein management 
fiat decreases and workers' participation in their exploitation increases.
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He contends that the state has intervened along two key dimensions in employment 
relations to weaken the despotic hold of capital but increase its hegemonic hold over 
workers: First, the state has intervened in the 'constitution of the social wage', that is in 
protecting employees from absolute reliance on the employer for their subsistence, by 
providing such things as unemployment insurance, medicare, welfare benefits etc..
Second, the state has intervened directly in the workplace to limit managerial discretion 
by, for instance, limiting the employer's ability to avoid unions, to discharge at will, to 
make workers redundant or to operate without regard to workers' health and safety.
Factory regimes also vary with the sector of the economy, asserts Burawoy, with the 
competitive sector tending toward despotism and the monopoly sector tending toward 
hegemony.
To begin to explain cross-national differences, he constructs a matrix using these 
dimensions of state intervention (p. 138). Britain has higher intervention in the 
reproduction of labour power and lower in regulation of factory regime. The US is 
opposite in both dimensions. The other two boxes are filled by Sweden and Japan. But 
this dichotomy is inelegant and breaks down when other countries are drawn into the 
analysis. Canada, for example, with a high degree of regulation in both dimensions, 
might improbably fit into the box with Sweden! While Burawoy's general theorisation 
breaks ground by developing new tools for the analysis of variations in industrial conflict, 
he is weakest when attempting to construct an overarching framework which can apply 
to all countries. As in other broad brush approaches, the resort to ideal-typical 
formulations and "variables" limits the applicability of the theory. Nevertheless, as will 
be seen, the twofold dichotomy is a useful one for examining the effects of state 
intervention upon the workplace.
Burawoy's work is especially useful for developing a reconciliation between the 
institutional and the political economy approaches. By situating the analysis at the level 
of the workplace and concentrating on the ' institutions that regulate and shape struggles' 
(p. 87, emphasis added), the neglect of institutions is avoided. Yet at the workplace there 
is a fineness of tuning between the labour/capital balance of power and the institutions 
that we have indicated is lacking at higher levels of analysis. It is possible for the micro 
institutions of workplace regulation to very quickly mirror changes in the workplace
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political economy. Burawoy's theoretical forays are bold ones but many are highly 
schematic. One of the most useful of his concepts but one which he treats almost 
cavalierly is that of 'political apparatuses of production'. While suggesting that they 
differ significantly in different production regimes, he makes only the most peremptory 
attempts to discuss how this may be so. Because of the breadth of the scope of his analysis, 
his view of these apparatuses is inevitably monolithic. They are treated almost as a black 
box. Burawoy effectively suggests that a certain set of inputs will result in a certain set of 
outputs. Almost invariably, according to Burawoy, the political apparatuses of 
production act to manufacture consent. To build upon Burawoy's undeniable 
contribution, it is necessary to attempt to open up the black box, to show that inputs are 
transformed in different ways, that conflict as well as consent are generated. This study 
attempts to do just that. To mention only one example, Burawoy attempts to demonstrate 
(1979 and 1985) that the highly-structured North-American-style "internal labour 
market" acts to reduce worker cohesion and hence union militancy. Our Chapter VI11, by 
carefully examining the structuring of the internal labour market in Canada and Britain, 
shows that the opposite may well be the case. The result, it is submitted, does not 
contradict Burawoy's contributions, but rather adds to them.
6. The Political Apparatuses o f Production
The link between the politics of the state and the politics of the workplace can be made 
clearer by considering theories of the capitalist state. Huxley summarises the three main 
functions proposed by theorists:
"Tha first function, that of accumulation, refer« to tha involvement by the «late in 
policiei aimed at cnauring favorable condition« for the long-tarm operation of capitalut enterpriae 
(O'Connor, IVtfch). Second the coercion function refer« to 'the u*e by the itate of iti monopoly 
over the Icgitimata u«e of force toO maintain or impo*c aocial order' (Panitch, I**"7*7:«». The«e two 
function* are, in turn, «upplemented by a third— /«fitimetior»— which refer« to policie* aimed at 
««curing the legitimacy of the «tat«." IIV79, p. Ut,. emphan* in original; >ee alao Offe. I4H4 and 
Edward*. I9K6 for diacuiaion« of the accumulation and legitimation function.)
In fact it can be said that in order to successfully carry out the accumulation 
function, the state must find the correct balance between the application of coercion and 
legitimation. Burawoy's concept of the generation of consent is, in reality, legitimation 
as it applies to the world of work.
The politics of the factory mirror, and interact with, the politics of the state in the 
following way: Employers need to get on with the business of accumulating capital. But
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the process of production throws up innumerable opportunities for conflict with workers 
and consequently, for disruption of production. Under more despotic production and 
state regimes, naked market and employer coercion usually sufficed to ensure a minimum 
of such conflict episodes. In the move to more hegemonic production and state regimes, 
the legitimation function became more prominent. Workers and the trade unions that 
represent them now participate more fully in the running of the enterprise. Conflict 
episodes are often handled by a system of negotiation that establishes, monitors and 
enforces truces all along the frontier of control.
Notwithstanding this, not all nor even most of the actions of management in running 
the modern enterprise are subject to the system of joint regulation. Armstrong ct al. 
(1981) and Storey (1977) show in that even in highly unionised workplaces, a large 
proportion of managerial action is unilateral, especially that which flows from technical 
o r  marketing decisions. Yet they take pains to point out that even such unilateral action is 
largely graced with an array of legitimising principals grouped under the general rubric 
of "managerial prerogative". It must be added that looming ominously behind the 
legitimacy of managerial prerogative is the ever-present possibility of more blatantly 
coercive measures which the employer (or employers, or employers and the state) can 
bring to bear if they need to:
"Capital can. at it were, fight (against labour) with one hand behind ita back and «till 
achieve in moat situation» a verdict it finds tolerable....Only if labour were to challenge an essential 
prop of the structure would capital need to bring into play anything approaching its full strength."
(Fos, l«T4. p. 276-80)
Legitimation has also become important in the non-union sector. Even in the absence 
of trade unions, sophisticated workplaces mirror several important features of unionised 
locations in generating consent:
"The rules which hsve developed with regard to selection, layoff and ratantion, promotion, 
and discipline and discharge have resulted in significant limitations upon the arbitrary escrcise of 
managerial prerogatives and power. These limitations ara not simply the result of trade union 
pressures through collective bargaining; they are more in the nature of »«//-rastraint which 
managements have imposed upon themselves...(T)he very system and rules they have established have 
become commitments which have tended to bind the hands of the rulemakers themselves." (Vollmer, 
quoted in Feller. 1073, p. '’40-1, emphasis in original; see also Jacoby, 1085)
But because employers often pursue individual or sectional as opposed to class 
interests and because the development of trade unions and the application of their power 
is tremendously uneven, it has been necessary for the state to intervene to universalise
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legitimation (and, it should be added in the light of the early 80’s, to universalise coercion 
if need be {see Holloway, 1987).
Burawoy's argument about consent can be rendered subtler by suggesting that the 
establishment of employer hegemony in the workplace is problematic (Edwards. ! 986). In 
fact, managers and groups of workers differentially generate both consent and conflict in 
a complex amalgam. Further, this is a dynamic process in that at any particular 
controversial situation along the frontier of control, either order or disorder, truce or 
combat may result at different stages of the labour-management negotiation process. 
Brown (1984) suggests that:
"formal procedure* bestow at least temporary legitimacy on the truces achieved. These can 
prove very durable, for perceptions of fairness usually develop on the basis of what those concerned 
have grown accustomed to. Fairness for most employees is essentially a relative matter and a 
change in what they will accept as fair is usually associated with a change in their perception of 
their relative power. Fairness is negotiable." <p. 22)
Over and above, and perhaps more important than, the substantive content of the 
truces mentioned above, the very procedure of joint regulation is in itself a potential 
anodyne, a method of attenuating conflict. This is one of the major factors distinguishing 
union from non-union factory regimes. Joint regulation is a powerful tool in eliciting 
worker consent to management's running of the enterprise. As one Canadian brewery 
manager (not from one of our case study plants) candidly insists:
"At least once in a while workers need to think they are equal to management; collective 
bargaining provides that opportunity. It's a chanca to gat off work, sometimes to dress up. to 
challengs and sometimes to insult management. It 's  quite tharapautic."
The procedure of collective bargaining can be therapeutic in three ways: First, it can 
obscure the image of the workplace as an arena of coercion, echoing (however faintly) the 
images of 'democracy' in society at large. Second, it can actually deliver a quantum of 
equity and economic improvement to workers. Third, the process can be a 'busymaking' 
exercise, consuming time and effort on the part of workers and their representatives 
which might otherwise be used in building up resentment or planning resistance.
But it should not be assumed that the procedure of collective bargaining is only a 
conflict resolution mechanism. It has a dual potential at all times: the power to 
exacérbateos well as reduce the conflict it purports to handle. In the same three ways it 
is potentially therapeutic, it can instigate conflict: First, the less it 'measures up' to 
images and notions of 'democracy' in society at large, the more potential it has to
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disappoint and frustrate worker aspirations. Second, no mater how smooth the process, it 
will always be constrained by how well it is able to deliver equity and economic 
improvement to workers. Thus, it can break down in bad economic times. Third, though 
the 'busymaking' exercise can work to distract workers, the more formal and automatist it 
becomes, the more it removes problems from the real world of the shop floor and takes 
them into a rarified atmosphere unsuited to their settlement.
The processes discussed here about seem ill-served by the term "collective 
bargaining" which often implies merely the formal negotiation of the truces referred to 
above. A more appropriate term is precisely "the political apparatuses of production", 
mentioned above, which Burawoy defines as "the institutions that regulate and shape 
struggles in the workplace" (Burawoy, 1985, p. 87) ie. the whole panoply of mechanisms 
employed by unions and employers to manage the differences between them.
It has been suggested earlier that a major problem with institutional approaches to 
industrial relations is that they assume a permanence on the part of aggregate institutions 
and are blind to the political dimension of trade union, state and employer activity, 
especially in North America, where the institutions of labour regulation have 
misleadingly appeared to be frozen and immutable. It was also suggested that one reason 
for this shortcoming was that institutional approaches ignore industrial politics at the 
level of the state and, more importantly, at the level of the workplace. But a start can be 
made to 'unfreeze' institutions by examining how they live and breathe, how they are 
constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed at the point of production. In this micro 
view, the institutions of workplace politics are temporally and spatially close enough to 
the actual balance of power between labour and capital (at least in that workplace) to pick 
up on subtle changes in this balance. Yet they have enough relative autonomy and 
permanence that we need not despair of hitting a moving target.
Constructing a framework for comparative analysis of political apparatuses of 
production across our two countries is complicated. A framework is needed that allows 
cross-national analysis rather than mere side-by-side description while at the same time 
allowing the particularities of each system to be seen. Industrial relations scholars have 
used terms to classify and analyse disputes resolution appropriate for their own domestic 
situations. North American commentators have distinguished between disputes of
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"interests" (over those substantive terms and conditions of employment which will appear 
in the collective agreement) and disputes of "rights" (over the interpretation, application 
and alleged violation of those terms and conditions, once the collective agreement has 
been negotiated). In Britain, the same distinction is seldom used because neither the law 
nor the practice of the parties divides disputes up so neatly. Yet there is much utility in 
starting with this distinction, if some care is employed in applying it in the comparative 
arena. Perhaps the word 'dispute' to indicate an institution of production politics is 
misleading here in that it presupposes overt conflict. The word 'apparatus' may well be 
more appropriate in this regard, as it indicates a mechanism or process by which the 
parties attempt to handle potential conflict and, importantly, presupposes in itself neither 
resolution nor exacerbation of the conflict, both of which are possible as outcomes of the 
process.
At the extremes, both interests and rights apparatuses can be easily identified in both 
countries. Interests apparatuses concern themselves exclusively with the setting of 
substantive terms and conditions of employment. In both countries, these apparatuses are 
fairly formal in that both parties set out deliberately to set such terms and conditions. A 
small example which can serve our discussion is the negotiation of a shift premium for 
workers on the night shift (1 2 midnight to 8 am) because of the inconvenience of working 
inhospitable hours. Employing a legal paradigm, the process here is analogous to making 
law.
At the other extreme, there are also rights apparatuses, which concern themselves 
exclusively with the implementation of those terms and conditions. These apparatuses 
may or may not be formal. An example would be a claim by a worker that he did not 
receive the shift premium when he worked one afternoon shift. The process here is 
analogous to a judicial one: first, discovering the /awdiave the parties agreed to a shift 
premium?); second, investigating to establish the facts (did the worker work the night 
shift?); third, applying the law to the facts. If the premium has been agree to and if  it is 
established that the worker indeed worked the night shift, it must follow that the shift 
premium is implemented. Clean and simple.
A  problem in both countries is that the distinction is not often so clear. For in 
between apparatuses of interests and rights, there lies a gray area, where the parties do
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not start out formally, or with mutual intention, to establish terms and conditions, but end 
up doing so, to a greater or lesser degree. An example would be where a worker begins his 
shift at, say, I I pm. The substantive agreement says nothing about this eventuality. 
Should the letter of the agreement be followed and the worker paid for one hour without 
the premium and the rest of his shift with the premium? O r should the spirit of the 
agreement be followed and the worker paid the shift premium for all hours worked, given 
that this slightly altered shift is no less inconvenient? Whatever the outcome, something 
new, something substantive, however trivial, has been added to the agreement. Another 
example of the grey area occurs where a prior agreement is unavailable for assistance in 
interpretation of a dispute but some sort of consensus is required on the spot for 
production to continue. For instance, a supervisor allows a worker to clock in a hour's 
overtime in return for her staying an emergency fifteen minutes after her shift concludes. 
The practice is repeated. O r a supervisor allows furnace workers a double coffee break to 
'cool off after a long 'pour' of metal. The practice is repeated. These latter examples are 
similar to what Gouldner (1954) calls "indulgency patterns" . All of the above are 
examples of an apparatus which can be called "adjustments". The phrase is borrowed 
from Canadian arbitrator Harry Arthurs' description of what an arbitrator does when he 
seeks to reach
"a result agreeable to both parties....a reasonable compromise* rather than '(apply) 
evidence to pre-determmed and rational standards, as does a Court of law." .
It is in the area of adjustments that political apparatuses of production in the British 
workplaces differ most dramatically from the Canadian. The scope and level of activity of 
this apparatus is much greater in Britain. But it will greatly help our discussion of 
dispute resolution in both countries to employ the concept.
Thus far the apparatuses for the establishment, interpretation, and 
implementation of the truces along the frontier of control have been discussed. There is 
yet a fourth and final apparatus, separate and distinct from the others, and that is surely 
enforcement. Herding <1972, p. 104) makes the distinction and implies in it that the 
method of enforcement is so important that it may actually alter the substance of rights.
To use the previous example of the midnight shift, assume, not that the employer fails to 12
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pay a single worker the appropriate premium on a single occasion, but that it is regularly 
remiss in paying several workers. Given the exact same provision in the collective 
agreements of two different workplaces, the combination of the vitality with which the 
claim is pursued by the union and the sanctions that it is able to apply (or threaten to 
apply) will have a tremendous effect upon whether the union (to borrow a phrase used in 
Canadian arbitration and in turn borrowed from the courts) 'stands' or 'sleeps' upon its 
rights. The union that is able to rigorously pursue violations of a negotiated right and/or 
apply effective sanctions will have a living right where the union that is able to do neither 
will have a dead or moribund right, which, in effect, is no right at all. The importance of 
this distinction will be seen in the discussion of the political apparatuses of production in 
our two countries.
7. Three Substantive Areas o f Conflict Generation and Resolution
Disputes, both formal and informal, in both countries, are indicators of the areas 
where the frontier of control is under pressure to change, ie. where the truces are 
weakening. It is at that point on the frontier where change is imminent that the chain of 
conflict logic can be found. It is where bureaucratic procedure and accepted practice no 
longer suffice, where there is a need to redefine the control of the labour process by a 
new mixture of accord and discord.
Open conflict is not presupposed when the need to renegotiate occurs, though its 
probability increases. Whether such a situation breaks into formal disagreement or 
conflictual behaviour depends on the way two phenomena interact.
The first phenomenon is the political apparatuses of production, discussed above ie. 
the set of formal or informal mechanisms through which disputes are "handled". 
Certainly, major differences in procedure between countries are important in exploring 
the reasons for variations in industrial conflict. For instance, the fact that Canadian 
disputes which enter the formal grievance procedure are ultimately subject to third- 
party arbitration while British are generally not, is an important fact in itself. But, as 
seen earlier, this reveals little on its own and may in fact mislead about the consequent 
pattern of industrial conflict. It is all very well to compare general methods of dispute 
resolution. But how well do these methods operate when confronted with a set of similar 
substantive issues in each country?
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Thus the second crucial aspect is the substance of disputes. This is the specific area 
on the frontier of control where the disputes arise. It is suggested that there are key loci 
of workplace struggle between management and labour where both consent and conflict 
are differentially generated . Further, the outcome of these struggles contributes in a 
large way to resulting levels of conflict across many workplaces.
The political apparatuses governing each substantive dispute area contain a mixture 
of consent and coercion. But in every area of contention, management is constrained to a 
greater or lesser extent between the two poles. If management allows too much consent, 
then it runs the risk of losing control in that area. If management imposes too much 
coercion, it runs the risk of inviting worker resistance and ultimately conflict. The exact 
amount of both consent and coercion allowable will depend upon the substantive area of 
dispute and upon certain conditions existing when a change in the frontier of control is 
necessitated. Those conditions would include the strategic position of the relevant 
groups of workers in the production process, the state of the national, industry and local 
labour market and their hospitality to industrial action, the profitability of the firm and 
the industry, the penalties which can be brought to bear for industrial action— in other 
words, all those factors which affect the relative ability of management and labour to 
bring about desired outcomes by force.
For our purposes, the frontier of control can be divided conceptually into three key 
loci of confrontation: discipline, the structuring o f  internal labour market and job  
control.
By discipline is meant both discharge and disciplinary measures short of discharge, 
including suspension, written warnings, disciplinary demotion etc. The ability of the 
employer to discipline employees is at the heart of the power relationship and is the 
essence of coercion. But discipline is also at the heart of consent. For not only have 
unions forced employers to temper their rasher urges, but this is one area in which states 
have intervened most heavily in to (in Burawoy's words) "regulate the factory regime". 
Legislation in most industrialised countries has supplemented whatever initiatives unions 
have taken to prescribe disciplinary processes that promise equity and due process. 
Employees now cooperate to one degree or another in their own discipline. But the 
system is imperfect and does not always deliver. So it is most interesting to observe and
Chapter I...page 36
compare the generation and resolution of conflict around this key issue in the two 
countries.
The structuring o f  the internal labour market means the way that the majority of 
employers in industrialised countries construct a system of job allocation, training, labour 
pricing and promotion that is internal to the firm and how unions participate in the 
regulation of this internal market. This substantive area is in some ways linked to state 
efforts to intervene in (again in Burawoy's words) "the reproduction of labour power". 
Aspects of the structuring of the internal labour market include the policing of the 
interface between the external and internal labour markets, the way in which workers are 
placed into positions within the firm (promotion, horizontal transfer) and the way they 
are chosen for exit from the firm when the need arises (layoffs, redundancy). State 
intervention is most apparent in this last area.
By job control is meant regulation of the content of work itself ie. how workers are 
assigned to tasks within their job classification, how hard and fast they work, and the 
'effort bargains' they make with the employer.
Obviously, these terms are not completely mutually exclusive. There is, for instance 
a gray area between placement in a position and the definition of the tasks appropriate to 
that position. Likewise, discipline may be applied to enforce decisions in the other two 
areas. But as will be discussed in Chapter IX, conceptual division is very important.
These substantive issues have been chosen for three reasons: First, they represent the 
major areas of dispute within countries and especially Britain and Canada. The first two 
issues, together, appear to comprise the vast majority (up to 80%) of disputes that arise in 
Canadian workplaces during the lifetime of collective agreements (Gandz, 1982). While 
it is more difficult to quantify the subject of disputes in Britain, the evidence that exists 
(eg. Thomson & Murray, 1976) suggests they are very important.
Second, they epitomise a key difference between Canada and Britain. Job control 
appears hardly ever to be the subject of a formal grievance in Canada, while it is a 
subject of major concern in Britain. But this is not because job control is not an issue of 
contention in Canada. Canadian collective agreements, by and large, do not contain any 
language on such issues. Because the grievance and arbitration procedure deal with 
issues omitted in the collective agreement, disputes on these issues must be buried or
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surface elsewhere. The distinct and corresponding pattern of prominence and absence of 
these three issues in Canada and Britain suggests that they will be particularly relevant 
in comparing industrial conflict in the two countries.
Third, as mentioned above, each in its own way uniquely illustrates the dialectic 
between consent and coercion and between the generation and the resolution of conflict.
8. Conclusion and Plan o f the Thesis
The plan of the thesis follows the development of the argument to this point (a more 
detailed discussion of the methodology and method employed is presented in Appendix A). 
It has been suggested that the essential focus of study must be the workplace. Chapter 11 
explains the reasons behind the selection of the workplaces for this study. It also 
describes these workplaces in terms of certain key factors: labour markets, size, 
technology, product markets management organisation and structure and union 
organisation and power. As well as description, however, the chapter considers the 
impact of these factors upon the character of industrial relations in the workplaces in 
light of theory and literature available.
It has also been suggested that the regulation of relations between employers and 
unions is done via a set of mechanisms called "the political apparatuses of production". 
Some of these are prescribed by the state; some are developed between the parties 
themselves; and some are a mixture of both. In Chapters III to VI, the four sets of 
apparatuses are considered: interests, rights, adjustments and enforcements. The pattern 
followed is to consider the development of these apparatuses on an aggregate basis 
(including how they have been prescribed at state level, where appropriate), drawing from 
the available national literatures, and then to analyse how they actuallyoperate at shop- 
floor level in the case study workplaces.
Finally, it has been suggested that the political apparatuses of production interact 
with three key loci on the frontier of control where conflict and consent are differentially 
generated. Chapters V II to IX  consider these loci: discipline, structuring of the
internal labour market and job control. The pattern in these chapters is to consider the 
theoretical literature to provide a framework for analysis, to consider the regulation of 
these substantive issues on an aggregate basis, drawing from the national literatures and
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again, to test both the theory and the aggregate data against how these issues are actually 
handled on the shop floor of our workplaces.
Throughout the thesis, perhaps somewhat more attention is paid to the consideration 
of Canada than Britain. This is for a number of reasons. First, it is necessary to unpack 
Canada from the 'North American' model that scholars have stuck it in. The literature on 
Canada itself is meagre compared to that on the U.S., so more care must be taken to make 
clear how the Canadian system operates. Second, while there is copious literature on 
workplace industrial relations in Britain (including the excellent W IRS studies eg. Daniel 
& Mill ward, 1983, Millward & Stevens, 1986), there is comparatively very little on 
North America, not to mention Canada. The bulk of information available is at the level 
of macro- or aggregate institutions, of contents of collective agreements and of the 
decisions of arbitrators. These are useful, but in themselves can be misleading about 
what actually happens at workplace level. However, used in conjunction with case studies 
of actual workplaces, much new ground can be broken. Third, while the aim of this thesis 
is to puncture conventional wisdom about industrial conflict both countries, it is about 
Canada that the greatest amount of misconception exists.
CHAPTER II; INTRODUCTION TO THE WORKPLACES
/. Introduction
The four case study workplaces, in two countries and two industries, are not a random 
sample. In  the last chapter, it was seen how comparative studies, whether cross­
establishment, cross-industry or cross-national, are fraught with theoretical and 
logistical hazard. The subject factories were chosen deliberately on several a priori 
criteria to reduce the areas of difference between them and the theoretical considerations 
necessary, to a controllable number. As far as possible, those in the same industry would 
be comparable across the two countries. O f the workplaces, it was decided beforehand 
that:
1. They would be in the private sector because considerations of product markets, 
productivity and profitability are far simpler than in the public sector. Indeed, the 
products and product markets, being in competition, invite rather than defy cross­
national comparison.
2. They would be in manufacturing because the international aspect mentioned above 
is even more pronounced in this subsector and because it is in manufacturing, with large 
numbers o f smaller workplaces of different types where the 'industry effect' would be 
most avoidable. This effect is described by Bean:
"Since there are substantial differences between industrial relations across industries 
which may be unrelated to the national contest in which they operate, what is really an 'industry' 
effect could be misinterpreted as being a 'national' effect in a a comparative study confined solely to
the national level...By comparing similar industries across countries the more industry-specific
forces of technical and market contests are held fairly constant". (IVH5. p. 13-141
3. They would concentrate on manual workers. While non-manual workers in 
manufacturing are reasonably well unionised in Britain, they are not in Canada. In our 
discussion of industrial conflict in unionised settings, it is the manual workforces that are 
most comparable.
4. They would concentrate on male workers almost exclusively. Rather than take a 
masculinist perspective by de/ou/t<FeldbergandGlenn, 1979), ignoring the important 
questions of gender in workforces of which women workers play a significant part, this 
question would be purposely sidestepped. Thus, women in the factories studied formed 
no more than about 4%  of the workforce. While such a decision no doubt adds fuel to the 
complaint that work studies ignore women, it may avoid the complaint that the analysis
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itself may be "distorted by sexist assumptions” (ibid., p. 524). By the same token, while the 
masculine pronoun is used throughout and often refers to male workers, the feminine 
pronoun should be substituted where appropriate.
5. The case study factories would be in 'stable' industries, whose basic technologies 
and product markets have not undergone fundamental changes in the past fifteen years. 
The researcher, looking at records of disputes and general industrial relations over a 
retrospective period, could have some confidence that essentially the same environment 
persisted over that period.
6. While plants within a single industry would be comparable across the two 
countries, the set of two industries would be chosen so that certain aspects of the 
"technical and market contexts" would differ significantly, furnishing contrasting 
industrial relations environments. The dimensions chosen for cross-industry variation 
were primarily a) technology, b) stability of product markets and labour costs, c) 
profitability and d) the attendant 'style' or militancy of trade unionism.
7. The case study factories would have closed shops and 100% union density for the 
manual workforce. Though not, strictly speaking, 'typical', it is not an abnormal situation 
in plants of this size in these industries, in either country1. Concentrating on plants with
100%  union density would add another constant factor across the four workplaces. By the 
same token, multi-unionism would be a minor factor in the case study plants. This is not a 
problem in Canada, where unions, by law, hold exclusive bargaining jurisdiction over 
groups of organised workers. In Britain, however, it is more complicated1 2- Nevertheless 
the British factories are not atypical. One has a single union for manual workers. The
1. Of all Canadian collective agreements in March I4H6 covering 500 employee* or more, 60% (covering " 1 *  of
employee*) had compulsory union membership or due* deduction proviaiont. In manufacturing, the 
proportion of employee* covered by *uch provmon* was 44% (Kumar at al. I486. p. 347). In the British 
Workplace Industrial Relation* Survey of 1484, only 4% of all establuhment* surveyed had IOO% union density. 
Of those with ¿00 to 444 employees. 7 *  had IOO% density. However, in manufacturing, the average union 
density for manual workers was 72%. Thirty-three percent of all establishments and ¿7%  of private 
manufacturing establishments surveyed had agreements compelling or "management strongly recommends" 
union membership for manual workers (Millward A  Stevens. I486. pp. 50-"’ll.
2. The W IRS study indicates single-unionism for manual workers in 65% of all establishments and in 58% of
manufacturing establishment* (Millward A  Stevens. I486). But the survey does not indicate the relative 
strengths of the unions in the multi-union situation i*. what proportion of workers belong to the major union. 
It is suspected that in most cates o f multi-unionism, on* union clearly predominates. The survey alto docs 
not mdicata how multi-unionism varies with sis* of establishment but Brown *t al. (1481), in their survey, 
indicate a positive correlation between sue and multi-unionism (p. 54). Thus, smaller plants such as ours 
would have lets incidence of multi-unionism and greater impart of a tingle union than large ones.
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other has three unions, but the single non-craft union dominates the others in size, in 
collective bargaining and dispute generation and resolution.
The two industries chosen, then, were brewing and aluminum fabrication. The 
Canadian and British breweries will be called C A N B R E W  and BRITBREW  respectively. 
The aluminum fabrication plants will be called C A N M E T  and BRITMET. These names 
refer to the establishments only. Where reference is made to the parent company, it will 
be explicit. What follows is a general description o f the workplaces, organised under a 
number of relevant subject areas ie. labour markets, size, technology, product markets, 
management organisation and structure, and union organisation and power.
2. Labour Markets
One potential problem affecting the comparability of the workplaces in any study is 
differences in local labour markets. At the time of the study, there were, naturally, 
differences in type of employment, level of unemployment and characteristics of the 
labour pool in the two countries and, within the two countries, between local labour 
markets. The purpose of this section is to discuss the importance of differences in local 
labour markets on industrial relations and to briefly describe the external and internal 
labour markets relevant to our case study plants.
Many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have maintained that Firms outside 
the strictly competitive sector <and, indeed, some in that sector as well) construct often 
elaborate internal labour markets (Docringer and Piore, 1971 ; Blackburn and Mann,
1979; Nolan and Brown, 1983; Osterman, 1987, to mention only a few).
Far from being passive reactants to external labour market forces, many firms,
"...have succeeded in redefining their relstionship with the esternsl labour market by 
pursuing creative employment policies which aim to secure and maintain the commitment and 
loyalty of their workers. Greater cooperation inside these firms is fostered not simply by ensuring 
that rates of pay are comparable with other firms in the locality, but rather through a package of 
different measures...screening and hiring techniques, internal job and promotion ladders and...the 
development of company-specific pay structures which try to embody employees' notions of relative 
fairness.” (Nolan and Brown, IVKJ, p. 2"’2>
In fact, Nolan and Brown make a strong case that the effect of local labour markets 
upon pay structures (and by implication other terms and conditions) in local firms is very 
small. They demonstrate substantial intra-occupational wage differentials among 
occupational groups within local labour markets despite strong similarities in job content 
and skill requirements across workplaces and conclude:
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"The»* finding» strongly suggest that employers do not respond passively to changing 
patterns of behaviour on the supply side of the market. Considerations other than those of the 
external labour market appear to affect the determination of employers' wage offers." (p. 2HI>.
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to replicate Nolan and 
Brown's study for the labour markets in which our case study plants operate, the evidence 
available corroborates their thesis. The following is a brief consideration of the external 
and internal labour markets of our case study plants.
2.1 The Canadian Plants
The Canadian plants are situated about six or seven miles from each other in a 
large metropolitan area. Canada has a highly regionalised economy and labour markets 
can differ substantially between broad regions of the country. The area of concern has 
high concentration of manufacturing industry as compared to the rest of the country.
Canada experienced its longest and deepest post-war recession in  1981 -82 when 
employment fell by a record 5  percent and unemployment rose to 12 .8%  (with a high of 
almost 20%  in some regions and sectors of the economy and a low of roughly 10%) and 
real G.N.P. dropped by 6.5%. An uneven recovery began in December 1982. The 
recovery continued on through the period when these case studies were done. In the 
particular area where these plants are located, the 1987 unemployment rate was below 
4%  with real shortages in skilled manpower and in certain key service occupations.
At the time the case studies were done, the rate of year-to-year inflation in the area 
had dropped steadily to about 4 %  (about the same as the country as a whole). The average 
annual change in average weekly earnings had slowed from 9.2% (1 975 -81) to 4.6%
(1985) and the change in real earnings had gone into negative numbers'**
The employment market was heterogeneous, with employers of all sizes and industries 
available to job seekers. In the province of the case studies, union density was 33.7% with 
37.6% of those employed covered by collective agreements (slightly lower than the 
national average on both counts.)* 4 As regards the production employees of the industries 
concerned, 9 4%  of brewery workers and 72%  of metal fabricating workers across the
i .  Much of the information on the local labour markat of the Canadian plants was taken or calculated from Kumar *t 
al., <l<MMi>.
4. However, the number is almost certainly higher in the particular region of our plants.
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country were covered by collective agreements (and coverage in the particular region of 
our plants would be the same or slightly lower than this).
Both Canadian plants have strongly defined internal labour markets though 
CANM ET, being in a less monopolised industry than CANBREW  is somewhat more 
subject to the whip of the market. The joint regulation of the internal labour markets in 
the case study plants will be discussed further in in Chapter VI11 so only a few remarks 
will suffice to sketch the nature of the internal labour markets:
In a moment of frustration over intransigence by the union, the personnel manager of 
C A N M ET  offers that:
HWc could abut thi* place down and opan it back up a«ain and pay $5 lea* an hour*
Such draconian measures are not unheard of either in Canada or Britain. But the 
evidence is solidly against him. The company has been unionised since just after World 
War II and had even before that practised 'creative employment policies' to preserve its 
workforce. Despite this outburst, the personnel manager tells of offering a handshake to 
an employee upon return from a long strike.
*Th« guy told me to fuck off...But I didn't discipline him because he's e really good worker."
The isolation of pay from external market influence was no more evident than when 
C A N M ET  came to renegotiate the collective agreement with its union in late 1986. The 
company had access to information on 22 collective bargaining settlements in the previous 
seven months in the metal fabricating industry across the country (and 19 of these were 
roughly in the same geographic labour market as CANM ET). O f the 19, the general 
labour rate paid varied between $7.25 and $1 2.00 per hour (or by 66%  of the former 
figure). The skilled labour rate varied between $12.50 and $16.00 per hour (or 28% of 
the former figure). The average first year increase for the new collective agreements 
negotiated in these workplaces ranged between no increase and 5.3% with an average of 
3.4% (calculated from Canada Labor Views, 1986, p. 2-3). At the time of negotiations, 
C A N M ET  itself paid $12.74 to its electricians and 11.25 basic labour rate and settled 
with the union for 5 %  in the first year of the collective agreement. The above is not as 
rigorous a study of a local labour market as Nolan and Brown (1983), nor is it in time- 
series. But it gives some inkling of the wide disparities of pay by unionised employers 
within a single labour market in Canada.
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As far as admittance to the internal labour market, C A N M ET  has one basic entry 
level for non craft labour. The selection process is not formal. Most recruitment is done 
by word-of-mouth within the company or from 'walk-in' applicants. After an eyeball 
screening, applicants are interviewed and former employers phoned. When the need to 
recruit is urgent, even these peremptory measures are abandoned. A new operative 
enters just below the lowest pay level. After a 60-day probation period he attains 
seniority, the 'labour grade I ' pay level and the opportunity to proceed up an elaborate 
job ladder through 16 labour grades, ranked according to skill and difficulty.
Turnover is low, about 1 %  per year in voluntary quits and almost 3 0%  of the 
employees have over 15 years seniority (and 5%  have over 20 years seniority). In the 
occasion of a compulsory redundancy, an elaborate bumping procedure comes into effect 
to protect older employees and laid off employees have the right of recall for 18 months. 
After a major layoff in 1982-83, the employer recalled many employees, some of whom 
had been off more than 1 2 months and had technically forfeited both right to recall and 
seniority (a fine example of the strength of the internal labour market concept in action).
The internal labour market in CANBREW  is even more elaborately constructed and 
is somewhat more complex. As at the aluminium plant, there are few workers who could 
not theoretically be replaced by others willing to work for $5 per hour less (and we shall 
see that the temporary workers are paid even less than that). Nevertheless, over the 
years it has come to be known as 'a good place to work', if only because pay and benefits 
are among the best in the entire country for manual workers. (Hourly wages are roughly 
4 0%  higher than the Canadian average and 16%  higher than the Canadian average 
among unionised employees (Kumar et al., 1986)). The pension plan is said to be one of 
the best in the country for manual workers. Other perquisites include share options, a 
sick leave plan, semi-private hospital plan, drug plan, dental plan including orthodontia, 
an on-site pub and vouchers for free take-home beer . Thus there is tremendous incentive 
for both management and workers to preserve employment.
Since collective agreements at all major breweries in the province have been 
negotiated simultaneously for at least ten years, there is little difference in pay between 
them and other benefits have begun to converge. Yet despite this, there is virtually no 
movement of employees between the Canadian breweries. This is because a) seniority and
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the attendant ability to move along the job ladder cannot be transferred, b) pensions and 
other benefits cannot be transferred and c) each brewery has is own 'culture' and differing 
'patterns of indulgency' (Gouldner, 1954) which command employee loyalty.
In all the breweries, there is a very pronounced dual internal labour market, divided 
between permanent and temporary workers. Temporary workers (who comprised about 
15 %  of the regular workforce at CANBREW  and up to 50%  during the summer at the 
time of the study) are hired for periods not exceeding 132 days in any I 2 month period 
and "have no rights, benefits or access to the grievance/arbitration provisions under the 
Collective Agreement, except where specifically stated". They begin at 5 2%  of the basic 
labour rate in the plant and advance a further five cents an hour after 22 days. They pay 
dues to the union but are afforded almost no protection by it. Both the personnel manager 
and the union convenor freely admit that the temporary employees are used as a 'buffer' 
against the layoff of permanent employees.
The entry procedure into the permanent internal labour market is fairly formal. 
According to the collective agreement, the company is required to "give preference to 
unemployed members of (the union) in good standing and competent to perform the work." 
Not much new permanent hiring has occurred for several years. But many of the 
permanent employees hired are chosen from among the best of the temporary workers.
So the company has had the opportunity not only to check their background at leisure, but 
also to observe their work habits and attitude for almost twice as long as the norm for 
probationary employees across the country5. Once hired, non-craft operatives enter an 
extremely flat job ladder. There is basically one wage for all non-craft workers. 
Nevertheless, a hierarchy of sorts definitely exists, with packaging jobs at the bottom and 
brewing jobs at the top, and there is a formal posting and bidding procedure for vacancies, 
"based on seniority provided that the applicants are sufficiently qualified and considering 
the efficient operation of the Company." The agreement also commits the company to 
"arrange appropriate training wherever practicable".
As is to be expected, turnover is extremely low (less than I %), and the union fights 
tenaciously against dismissals for all but the most egregious offenses. Although the plant
S. Kumar at al. (N M I ■ ndicatc that roughly ^i%  of collactiva agreements (covering 20» or more employees» have a 
probationary period of less than .1 months.
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commenced production in 1970 (there had been a smaller old plant) and thus has a much 
younger workforce than the other breweries, over 25%  of the manual workers have 
fifteen or more years seniority.
2.2 The British Plants
The British plants are located in different local labour markets, so they will be 
dealt with separately.
BRITMET. BR ITM ET  is located in a large rural town within 40 miles of a major 
metropolitan centre. The town has a collection of light industry with only two or three 
employers the size of BRITMET. BR ITM ET  is thus one of the major industrial employers 
in the town and has been since before the World War II. Its local labour market has been 
influenced by the automotive industry, since it is situated between two major automobile 
manufacturing centres, some of its production is for that industry and a significant 
number of BR ITM ET  workers who started at the plant in the seventies came from 
employment in automobiles (and left that industry at a loss of over £20 per week because 
labour problems made steady work unreliable).
Unemployment in the BR ITM ET’s region was 6.8% at the time of the study (having 
fallen by 1.6 percentage points from 1983), compared with 9.7% for Great Britain as a 
whole (having fallen by 1.8 percentage points from 1983).
While local figures are not readily available, the national rate of inflation (retail 
price increase on a year earlier) had slowed from double digits in 19 8 1 to 4.5% in the 
period of study. Nationally, the average annual change in earnings had dropped from 
double digits in 1982 to 7.9% in the period of study, while in BR ITM ET 's  immediate 
county, the average annual change in earnings was somewhat lower. Nevertheless, 
BR IT M ET ’s region followed the national trend of significantly increasing real earnings 
for those in employment running right through the period of study**-
Union density in the region, at 43%, was 15% lower than the national average 
(Millward and Stevens, 1986). Thus a lower intensity of union activity in BR ITM ET 's  
labour market compared to that of the nation as a whole can be interpolated. 6
6. All of the above figure« on unemployment, inflation and fluctuation! in real earningi are taken or calculated from 
Employment Gaxctte, IWC, various months.
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BR ITM ET  had constructed an internal labour market of some complexity, though, as 
in the Canadian case, less complex than its British brewery counterpart. Hourly earnings 
in the standard production grade in the period studied were 7%  lower than the average 
for manual workers in the county and I I %  lower than the average for manual fabricated 
metal workers in the county. However, average week/yearnings for the standard 
production grade at B R IT M E T  exceeded the county average by 23% and the fabricated 
metal figure by 18%. This is primarily because of the huge amounts of overtime worked 
by BR IT M ET  operatives (average 12 hours per week compared with 4.5 in the county.) 
Thus, despite union attempts to convince them otherwise and occasional revolts, 
B R IT M ET  workers do not generally consider themselves ill-remunerated in the local 
labour market.
Admittance to the internal labour market is quite similar to CAN M ET, with relatives 
and friends of workers occupying most of the vacancies that come up. Selection is also 
done in much the same way as CANMET.
Unlike its counterpart in Canada but like CANBREW , there is a pronounced dual 
internal labour market. Temporary workers comprise between 10 and 15 %  of the 
workforce and an agreement with the union allows the company to maintain them on 
temporary status for up to nine months. Unlike CANBREW , all but the worst temporary 
workers are usually taken on permanently. The temporary workers receive the same pay 
as permanent workers but receive none of the benefits, though they can join the sick pay 
scheme after six months.
There is one basic entry port to the non-craft work force and after a brief period on a 
training wage, workers can advance up a very shallow job ladder (three grades). Unlike at 
the Canadian plants, promotion decisions are not highly regulated and management has 
almost exclusive say.
Up to 1983, there was virtually no turnover, reflecting a stable, aging workforce. 
Since then, a fairly large group has retired and two patterns have emerged: almost zero 
turnover among the majority and up to 4%  among newer employees. Despite the 
retirement, over 15%  of the workforce has over 20 years seniority (but a full 4 0%  has 
less than five years).
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As is the norm in unionised British workplaces, there are few, if any, provisions to 
protect older employees from redundancy. However, as will be seen in more detail in 
Chapter *, there is an implicit agreement that there will be no compulsory redundancies, 
if at all avoidable. The company has a fairly generous scheme of voluntary redundancy 
payments which, combined with early retirement pension provisions, sees older workers 
comfortably and quietly out the door.
BRITBREW. The British brewery is located in a large metropolitan conurbation. Its 
labour market then, is very similar to that of the two Canadian plants ie. urban and 
industrialised. The employer market is heterogeneous, consisting of a mixture of light and 
heavy industry, with manufacturing accounting for about 4 3%  of employment compared 
with 28%  for Great Britain as a whole ([Local] Enterprise Board, 1987b). It should be 
noted, though, that over the last IS  years, the proportion of heavy industry, especially in 
the automotive trade, which dominates the region, has declined considerably here.
Unemployment in the region, as mentioned above, at 11.1 %  is higher than the 
national average at the time of the study (having fallen 3.2 percentage points from 1983). 
However, in the immediate vicinity of the plant, in the period just preceding the study, 
unemployment was as high as 16 %  ([Local] Enterprise Board, 1987a, p. 2). Thus, unlike 
the labour market of any of the other three plants, BRITBREW 's region can be called 
'economically disadvantaged', with pockets of considerable poverty and attendant inner 
city social problems and urban decay in the area immediately surrounding the plant. 
Within a mile of the plant, serious rioting occurred in 1985. In light of these conditions, 
the lack of impact of local labour market conditions on wages and terms of employment at 
BRITBREW  is particularly striking. Real average annual earnings fo r  those employed 
in BRITBREW ’s area (and, of course, at BRITBREW  itself) were increasing faster the 
national average.
Union density in the region was I 2% higher than the national average at 6 5%  
(Millward and Stevens, 1986). Thus we a higher intensity of union activity and a stronger 
union culture in this labour market than in that of any of the other plants can be 
interpolated.
Like its Canadian counterpart, BRITBREW  has erected an elaborate and complex 
internal labour market. Unlike at B R ITM ET  however, earnings among BRITBREW
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workers vary enormously because of differing payment by results earnings. Average 
weekly earnings are between 15%  and 104% higher than average gross weekly earnings of 
male manual workers in the immediate vicinity7- A member of one of the staging unit 
crews can earn up to ¿380  per week. Benefits and pension plans are also considerably 
better than national or regional norms. In addition to the pay, there is a generous pension 
plan, private medical insurance (which the union negotiated despite the opposition, in 
principle, of the trade union movement to such plans for its members), a generous sick 
leave plan, share options, and, as at CANBREW , free beer vouchers and low cost beer in 
the canteens. Needless to say, BRITBREW  is considered a very good place to work.
Since BRITBREW  has been shrinking in workforce size for the past number of years 
(33%  since 1979), admittance to the internal labour market is not a usual occurrence. 
When the company did recruit, it was done overwhelmingly by word of mouth within the 
plant. More than any of the other plants, BRITBREW  is a paternalistic]family ties are 
dense both at the upper management and the blue and white-collar employee level (though 
not as much in the middle management level). Thus BRITBREW  had effectively isolated 
itself almost entirely from its local labour market, illustrated by the salient fact that 
despite the surrounding labour market being almost half non-white, there are virtually no 
non-white faces at BRITBREW.
When hiring was done, recruits were taken on as temporary workers for a 13-week 
period, especially at peak periods. However temporary workers never formed a 
significant part of the workforce except during summer holidays. There was little 
screening of recruits and the company, in its paternalistic way, overlooked the 
shortcomings of poor employees. Of the contraction period of the early 80's, however, a 
personnel manager indicates that much of the
"bad and daad wood was cut out. but it wai dona within the culture of this place. Ramiliei 
were told to tort out their own problem! and a lot of thosa let to resigned voluntarily rathei( be 
dismissed”
As at CANBREW, there is one main entry point to the non-craft workforce ie. an 
unskilled job in the packaging or staging unit. Though, like CANBREW , there is an 
exceedingly flat job ladder in basic pay, BR ITBREW  differs substantially in that there are
7. Figures on wage comparisons were calculated from Employment Caiatta, IW ,  various months. Figures readily
available do not allow comparison with earnings in other breweries, though they are eapected to be similar.
J
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many gradations in weekly earnings due to differential payment by results schemes and 
outcomes. Most unusually, skilled craft workers are at the middle level in the earnings 
league. Though there is little movement between work units now, what little there is, 
unlike in the Canadian plants, is not highly regulated and management has almost 
exclusive say.
Turnover is naturally extremely low and the workforce is probably older than the 
other three plants. Unlike at the Canadian plants, there is no bumping procedure to 
protect older employees from layoffs. However, company and union have negotiated an 
agreement which pledges to avoid compulsory redundancy if possible (and the union 
interprets to prohibit compulsory redundancy entirely). The company has a very 
generous scheme of redundancy payments, which it claims is among the best in the 
country. This, combined with early retirement provisions, sees workers even more 
comfortably and quietly off than the one at BRITMET.
2.3 Summary
To summarise this section on labour markets: There^ are differences in the 
external labour markets in which the four plants operate but these differences defy 
systematisation. Unemployment is higher around the British plants than around the 
Canadian and is considerably higher around BRITBREW  than the other three. Yet real 
wages in the labour market around the Canadian plants are declining while real wages for 
employed people around the British plants are rising (and rising fastest in the 
disadvantaged area around BRITBREW!). All of the plants except B R IT M E T  are located 
in an urban, industrialised labour market. BRITMET, although centred in a quieter, 
more rural setting, is not isolated. The economy surrounding all four plants has recently 
emerged from severe recession and all the plants had sizable layoffs in the early 80's. 
Though the economies in both countries are in recovery, both employers and workers can 
remember considerably harder times not long ago. Yet the overall effect of external 
labour markets is indeterminate.
All four companies, together with the unions, have constructed internal labour 
markets isolating them more or less from the external labour market. The breweries have 
done so in an especially elaborate and comprehensive way. The methods used are: 
independent pay and benefit determination and compensation exceeding external norms;
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procedural barriers to instant discharge and cushioning mechanisms against redundancy; 
single entry ports for non-craft workers and internal job ladders (whose structure and 
regulation are especially sophisticated in the Canadian plants). Differences in the 
regulation of these internal labour markets will be analysed in Chapter V III.
3. Size
The workplaces chosen had an average of about 42S manual employees (BRITMET, 
550; BRITBREW , 480; CANBREW , 350; CANM ET, 318). This workforce size may 
seem small in comparison with most of the workplace study literature (eg. Edwards & 
Scullion, 1982; Gallic, 1978; Batstoneetal., 1977). While it may be seductive to study 
large, well-functioning union organisations, smaller plants are more 'typical' of actual 
workplace sizes (and the trend toward smaller sizes) in the two countries. The mean 
manufacturing workplace size in Canada in 1984 was 34 production employees with 
breweries at 2 13 and fabricated metal plants at 19 (calculated from Statistics Canada,
1984). In Britain, in 1985, mean manufacturing workplace size was approximately 24 
operatives with breweries at 88 (with only 1% employing more than 500) and fabricated 
metal plants at 10 (with only . 1 % employing more than 500) (calculated from Department 
of Trade and Industry, 1985). In both countries there has been a distinct downward trend 
since 1970.8 So the workplaces in the study are actually larger than the normv-
Nevertheless, there is a lower limit on the size of workplace capable of study in this 
type of exercise: below a certain size, the volume of union-management 'business' carried 
on is simply too small to yield significant insight. To carry out a study, it is essential to 
have access (in records and/or the memories of participants) to an adequately-sized 
chronicle of disputes and their resolution.
But a second, more important, consideration was present in the choice of size. 
Somewhere between 300 to 800 manual employees, there lies a threshold where a key 
qualitative transformation in union power takes place. For it seems that in this area a 
stable union organisation (with continuity of shop stewards, organised and regularly- *9
H. Mean manufacturing plant production workforce size in Canada in 1970 waa 37, which had dropped by H * by I9K4. 
Mean mining, manufacturings* and electricity plant production workforce *iia in Britain in I9"0 wa* 71, 
which had dropped by hb% by 19*5. (calculated from Department of Trada and Industry, I9H5; Department of 
Industry Businet* Statiitica Office, 197ft; Statistic* Canada, 1974, 19*4»
9. Although (tatiitic* are not available, it i* probable that the mean *iz# of uniomted plant* i* larger, making the 
plant* choten lomewhat more typical.
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convened shop steward committees, full-time convenors, branch and local secretaries and 
an attendant bureaucratisation) emerges.
Turner et al. (1977), looking at facilities for shop stewards, find the greatest 
variation in provision of those facilities, not in the largest or smallest plants (where they 
are provided in the former and withheld in the latter), but in those of intermediate size, 
"where hostility and acceptance...[toward stewards] are still contending" (p. 330)
So it is in our size range that key struggles seem to occur over how unions will 
exercise their power. At lower and higher sizes, the weakness or strength of the union 
respectively, are taken for granted.
Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer (1975) demonstrate how British workplace union 
branches become less dependent upon external union full-time officials as workplace size 
increases but it is Brown et al. (1978), in their study of the factors shaping shop steward 
organisation in Britain, who most carefully refine consideration of the threshold:
"It  iccmi fair to deduce that there may...be a critical nze of workplace for iteward 
continuity, with workplace* of under 500 manual employee* having a »ignificant tendency to have 
let* continuity of *ervice. (p. 142)
These authors suggest that 500 is also the magic number for such factors as senior 
stewards, executive committees, a full-time steward, regular meetings, a written 
constitution and the taking of minutes at meetings. (Marginson, 1984, confirms the effect 
of plant size on several of these dimensions and Brown, 1981, pp. 62-67 refines the 
above proposition).
To place the threshold at a specific number is somewhat crude. Where it actually lies 
is subject to a number of factors specific to the workplace and the industry, including 
technology, product markets, profit margins, and strategic location of workers in the 
production chain. While similar studies to those above have not been done in Canada, it is 
probable that the threshold there lies a bit below Britain's because the highly formalised 
nature of Canadian industrial relations builds bureaucracy more firmly into the local 
union, with less regard to its size.
The other important factor determining where the threshold lies is the attitude and 
practice of management toward the union and collective bargaining. And plant size has 
been shown to be a significant determinant here. A  wide literature (eg. Pugh et al., 1968; 
Child, 1973) has shown a connection between size and dimensions of bureaucracy such as
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specialisation, standardisation, formalisation etc. for business organisations. Turner et 
al. (1977) demonstrate that these dimensions of bureaucracy extend beyond general 
management to the management of industrial relations, with size affecting such factors as 
"formalisation in industrial relations" and the number and degree of specialisation of 
industrial relations managers. Godard and Kochan (1982), in a Canadian study, indicate:
"S i m  (of labour i«!atiom staff) and specialisation art...closely related to the number of 
unionized workers in the firm, but these relationships are by no means perfectly linear, tending to be 
characterized by economies of scale and threshold effects." (p. I.W, emphasis added).
The exact interaction among workplace size, managerial bureaucracy and threshold 
of union strength has not been well explored although the previously mentioned Turner 
et. al (1977) study indicates a connection. Marginson (1978) suggests that company size 
may be a stronger determinant in management standardisation and specialisation in 
industrial relations than plant size, given that larger companies encourage such 
bureaucratisation more than smaller ones. But again. Brown et al. (1978) make a most 
interesting (and quite complicated) observation. They suggest that it is at the 500 
workforce size threshold that the degree of management resistance to the trade union 
becomes a key determinant of union strength, especially the existence of a full-time 
steward. Where management displays continued resistance, the development of union 
strength is impeded considerably. Where management does not display continued 
resistance, the union makes a dramatic leap in strength.
Our four case studies bear out these previous observations. Although there was little 
difference in workforce size among them (in fact, the greatest difference in size was within 
the same industry but across countries), the most dramatically different patterns of union 
vitality were evident across the two industries.
As will be seen later, while the aluminum plants in both countries had long- 
established workplace union organisations, these organisations were underdeveloped, 
struggling for basic structural stability and frequently unable, under their own steam, to 
initiate and carry through disputes or to make significant gains in collective bargaining, 
or more significantly, having made such gains, to consolidate them. Neither organisation 
had the key advantage of a full-time steward, nor a regularly convening shop steward 
committee and facilities such as an office and equipment for stewards were rudimentary
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or non-existent. The state of record keeping by the union was primitive and the 
performance, nay the availability, of shop stewards spotty.
By contrast, the breweries in both countries, with roughly the same number of 
employees, had well-developed, vital and structurally stable workplace trade union 
organisations. Both had full-time convenors and permanent offices with reasonably well- 
organised records. Compared to the aluminum plants, there was a qualitatively higher 
degree of steward continuity and experience.
Although there were important differences between the brewery unions in the two 
countries, both were far better able than the aluminium plant unions to initiate, pursue 
and carry through disputes, to make gains in collective bargaining and to consolidate those 
gains.
At this point, it should be stressed, no simple connections between size and levels of 
industrial conflict are postulated. The aim is merely to underline that in the workforce 
size domain of the plants studied, certain very dramatic differences in union organisation 
and strength (and in employer attitudes and policies to trade unions) begin to emerge.
Next to be examined are some of the other factors that may impinge on where the 
threshold lies.
4. Technology
4.1 Introduction
By technology is meant both the level of automation of work and the technical 
organisation of work (ie. the placement of workers and decisions as to what work they will 
do), bearing in mind that both aspects of technology are essentially "human products in 
the sense that they have been consciously designed" (Hill, 1981, p. 86).10
It is undeniable that the type of technology employed in a workplace will affect the 
relations between management and labour. Industrial relations between ditch diggers and 
their bosses will differ substantially from industrial relations in computer software 
development. A more important question is, just how important is technology in 
determining the type of industrial relations? Authors such as Blauner (1964), Mallet 
(1963) and Woodward (1965) and, to an extent, Braverman (1974) see a trend to ever
10. To Hill's contention, however, it mint be added that manager, are not neccarily  fully aware of the conaequence, 
of the technology they introduce.
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increasing sophistication of technology (as defined above) in the hands of management. 
While they differ as to whether such trend will have a salutary or malign effect on 
industrial relations and worker freedom and dignity, they all see this trend as exercising 
an inexorable effect upon worker-employer relations, especially on the nature of the 
control system within the factory.
Gallie (1978), on the other hand, suggests that technology is highly overrated as a 
determinant of the industrial relations climate. In his study of "high technology" 
petroleum refineries in Britain and France (two in each country), he finds large 
differences in managerial control systems and worker attitudes despite virtual similarity 
in technology across his case studies. He suggests that historical patterns of workers' 
aspirations and institutional patterns of power among unions and management in the two 
countries hold the key. Certainly Gallie's effort erodes notions of technological 
determinism in industrial relations. But his case is only suggestive, not conclusive. A key 
fault is that Gallie concentrates on one particular technology and does not compare 
industries of quite different technology in the two countries to see whether managerial 
control systems and worker attitudes vary more across industry and technology than 
they do across country. He does admit that employers in both countries in this advanced 
sector "represent relatively progressive versions of two quite distinct national patterns." 
(p. 315) As compared to less advanced sectors in both countries, technology may well 
have played a significant part in this.
It is as erroneous to speak of technology as a relentlessly wielded tool of management 
control (Braverman 1974; Marglin, 1974) as it is to employ technological determinism or 
treat technology as value free (Woodward 1965; Blauner, 1963) as it is to imply that 
technology is "of very little importance....for the social integration of the work force 
within the capitalist enterprise" (Gallie, 1978, p. 295) As in all other questions of social 
factors and outcomes that are not quantifiable, it is somewhat sterile to talk of whether 
or to what extent factors determine outcomes or, in fact, whether the causation is 
unidirectional in any case. It is far more useful to talk of how factors constrain or shape 
outcomes. In discussing technology, it may be more useful to accept that management 
control imperatives both affect and are affected by the technology employed and that 
technology plays a part in constraining industrial relations outcomes and that some types
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of technology constrain the industrial relations outcomes more than others. It may well 
be that in Gal lie's advanced sector, more than in less technically complex sectors, the 
outcomes were affected by factors other than technology.
This appears to be borne out in our case studies. In the 'less advanced' technology 
sector (the aluminum plants), the industrial relations outcomes varied far less than they 
did in the 'more advanced' sector (the breweries), allowing other factors to impact upon 
industrial relations to a greater extent.
Unlike the neat theories, the case studies (and in fact most manufacturing plants in 
the real world) comprise a multiplicity of technologies since the manufacturing process in 
all of them consists of a number of distinct stages. Nevertheless, the bundleof 
technologies within each industry studied varies about a central core and is distinct from 
that of the other industry. What is more, each industry contains what can be catled a 
driving technology, which is the key aspect of its technology that impinges on its 
character. Technologies employed other than the driving can be called ancillary 
technologies. The production stage using the driving technology may not employ the 
most workers nor may the most strategically placed workers be employed here. Nor may 
it be the locus of most industrial conflict. It is, however, the stage where the specific 
quality of the product that makes it unique is most highly defined and it is the stage 
where the company makes its highest investment in equipment and production control. It 
determines, as in Woodward (1965, pp. 125-181), the overall sequence and weightings of 
the manufacturing functions of development, production and marketing. It also has the 
greatest overall impact upon industrial relations.
In addition to the driving technology, the range o f variation between the driving 
technology and the ancillary technologies is an important factor affecting industrial 
relations, as can be seen in the description of the case study plants below.
The technology used at each of these stages (or 'units' of production) will be described 
by a) employing Woodward's (1958) classification of systems of production, b) gauging the 
control system somewhere along the continuum between 'responsible autonomy' and 
'direct control' (Friedman, 1977)", c) stating the span of control (ratio of supervisors to I.
II. Edward»' 1191**! taxonomy of »itnplt. («clinical and buraaucratic conlrol loo hiitorically parioditad to be uaaful 
bar«. Alao, hit typai of control can and do coamt in tha tame workplace at the tame time.
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workers), d) indicating how quantity, quality and pace of work are set, and e) outlining the 
potential discretion available to manual workers within each unit.
4.2 The aluminum plants
In both aluminum plants, the span of control across all stages of production is 
fairly constant, with an average of about 20 workers per supervisor. The aluminum 
fabricating plants in both countries have four distinct stages of production.
Casting. The first or casting stage is where aluminum ingots and scrap are melted down 
in furnaces, sometimes mixed with other chemicals to form alloys and then cast in a form 
(billets or sheets or rolls) which can be used in the next stage. In both plants, the third 
greatest number of manual workers is employed at this stage.
The system of production can be classified as between large batch and mass 
production. The quality and quantity of the pieces produced are built into the process 
primarily by the expertise of the professional metallurgists (and the procedures they have 
devised) and the design, maintenance and repair of the furnaces and machines by the few 
craft workers who service them. Yet molten metal is a volatile substance. There is a 
occupational hazard of occasional disastrous explosions. Also, once the furnace is tapped 
and the metal is flowing, disruption in the casting process can result in great messes and 
losses. So the manual workers need no small amount of training and experience and must 
exercise no small amount of care to avoid such eventuality.
In the casting units, the ratio is slightly lower than average and the control system is 
just past the midway point of the control continuum toward 'responsible autonomy'. Yet 
despite the quantity and quality being built into the process, where the casting machinery 
and furnaces are old, experienced workers learn how to 'coax' them into performing at 
higher efficiency.
Unique to this stage in both plants is a very distinctive mystique, which can be called 
the culture of 'men of molten metal’12. Compared to workers at other stages, it comprises 
an attitude of pride in dealing with a dangerous substance in infernal conditions, a sense 
of being different than all other workers, a strong sense of comradeship among workers 
and a cameraderie between workers and supervisors. Once employed at this stage.
12. Th* nun* of on* of th* early »teel-making union* in th* United State*. 'United Son* of Vulcan” (Elbaum 4  
Wilkimon. If 1», p. 2H5I reflect* thu culture.
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workers seldom transfer out and are certainly not helped by management if they do. An 
experienced worker in the Canadian casting area who attempted such a transfer was 
refused by management 'until such time as another employee (can) be trained.
The pace of work is determined primarily by machine in that the furnace takes a 
specified amount of time to prepare the proper amount and chemical composition of the 
alloy. The workers, then, work on a cycle determined by 'pour' times, over which they 
hold some control.
Fabrication. At the second or fabrication stage, the aluminum cast at the first 
stage is either milled, stamped, formed or extruded (or a combination of these processes 
and then sometimes annealed or heat treated) into an almost-finished product. In both 
plants, the greatest number of manual workers is employed at this stage. It is also the 
driving stage of technology in these plants. The move is further back in the scale of 
technical complexity to somewhere between small and medium batch production.
In the British fabrication unit, all the work is done by teams of seven workers centred 
around seven extrusion presses. Each press produces a certain range of product sizes and 
complexities and press runs vary in quantity but most last no more than a few hours.
The quality and quantity of product extruded is mainly determined by the shape of the 
product and corresponding complexity of the die required and the extrusive qualities of 
the alloy used. The quality can vary somewhat depending on the requirements of the 
product market. The range of discretion available to the workers once a job is up and 
running is minimal. But because job lots change so often, giving rise to dead cycle time, 
and because there is a certain amount of handling necessary after the product is extruded, 
there is some discretion available. As with the casting machinery, special worker skills 
can help 'coax' the process along. Nevertheless, because the machine is the centre of this 
stage, it can be and is electronically monitored for down times. Also, defective product 
can be traced back quite readily to the press crew. Management finds control of the 
fabrication process relatively easy.
The Canadian fabrication unit is somewhat more diverse. There are four distinct 
subunits, ranging from a custom assembly of single orders to medium batch production of 
'commodity' (almost undifferentiable) objects.
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However, the heart of the fabrication unit (employing the most workers) produces 
medium size batches of a distinctive product through a patented process to which few 
other firms in the country or the world, have access. Clusters of workers guide the 
material through a  sequence of mills, furnaces and presses, some of which are engineered 
together to form a more continuous assembly process (the management would like to 
standardise the product and the technology to move the process more toward an assembly 
line). Much of the quality and quantity is built into the process by the company engineers 
and the mechanical craftsmen. But there is still a certain degree of discretion which can 
be exercised by the workers precisely because production process is in a state of flux and 
there are so many discontinuities. It is difficult to trace scrap problems back to particular 
workers or machines so management must rely more on worker motivation and/or good 
supervision. While the pace of discrete substages may be controlled by the particular 
machines used, work is still frequently transported from one work station to another as it 
wends its way to completion and processes must be started and stopped. Thus the pace of 
the production process can be subject to dispute. During a long strike at the plant, in 
order to maintain production of this particular product, staff and supervisors performed 
the jobs of manual workers. As well as experimenting with new methods, managers jacked 
up the speed of the process and discovered that previous calculations of upper limits were 
incorrect. Some of the increase in pace was undoubtedly due to a sense of novelty and 
adventure. But even when the workers returned from the strike, the pace was set higher 
and continued higher than pre-strike with commensurate leaps in productivity.
While the British and Canadian fabrication units have many overall similarities in 
technology, the central Canadian process, as described above, does allow somewhat more 
potential worker discretion in the quality and pace of work. As will be observed later, this 
docs not necessarily translate into a higher degree of worker control.
Finishing. At the third stage or finishing stage, the almost-finished products are 
prepared for packaging. There can be some minimal light assembly here but the 
operations performed are mostly painting (or other treatment of the surface) of the 
products. In both plants, the second greatest number of workers is employed at this stage 
(and the number is close to those employed at stage two).
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The finishing stage in both plants is somewhat similar to the fabrication stage, except 
that even smaller batches of product are processed. Sometimes a semi-automated process 
is used (such as painting lines); sometimes short run assembly. At this stage there is less 
standardisation as individual customer preference is taken into consideration in the type 
of finishing and final assembly (if any) applied to the product. The span of control is 
somewhat shorter than the plant average and workers can have a fair amount of potential 
discretion, especially in the assembly areas (the painting process, being semi-automated is 
more routine and machine-paced).
Packing. At the fourth or packing stage, the finished products are packed and 
prepared to be transported to the customer. In both plants, the fourth greatest number of 
manual workers is employed at this stage. In  neither aluminum plant do direct employees 
play a major part in transporting the product to the customer (although B R IT M ET  had a 
crew of transport drivers up to a few years ago and they do figure in a major dispute 
which will be discussed later).
In both plants this stage involves the least technical complexity and is most labour 
intensive. Here the batches prepared are very small, basically individual customer orders 
and the work is mostly manual, with very few machines (other than hand-held simple 
ones) used. The amount of potential discretion available to the individual worker is high. 
The packing unit is not of great importance in  the overall production process of the 
Canadian plant. But it is of some importance in the British plant, especially where the 
product market requires a high quality of finish. In this case, the product must be handled 
and packed quite carefully, often employing special packing material.
It is in this area that many control problems emerge because it is difficult for 
management to pin down the source of problems. Management is not sure whether the 
workers are not working fast enough whether the cause is the mismanagement of 
materials. The plant was not designed for its present function and so there are logistical 
problems with throughput. In fact, on occasion, batches of material from fabrication 
simply disappear, forcing a rescheduling of fabrication runs. Then, after the second run 
has been shipped, the original batch reappears and must be scrapped.
Craft Work. In addition to the workers directly involved in these four stages, both 
aluminum plants have a body of skilled mechanical and electrical craftsmen who
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service, repair and sometimes participate in building plant, equipment and machinery. In 
both plants a small number of skilled craftsmen also work on designing, building and 
repairing tools, dies and jigs used in some of the machinery. (Many of these latter are 
considered 'manual' workers in the British plant and thus are in a manual union while 
those in the Canadian plant are all considered 'non-manual' and are non-union).
Not much needs be said of the technology involved in their work, which is close to the 
lower end of technical complexity (unit production). They produce very small units, 
determining the quality, quantity and pace themselves or in a collegial manner with their 
supervisors. The span of control is small (one supervisor to about 10  workers) and, 
naturally the system is one of responsible autonomy. At the time the study began, there 
were demarcations between mechanical and electrical craftsmen in  both plants. As the 
study was ending, however, there was a move at BR ITM ET toward multi-skilling of 
craftsmen. All in all, the craftsmen played a much more important role in the industrial 
relations of the breweries than in the aluminum plants.
Finally, in both plants, a very small number of employees perform unskilled 
maintenance, cleaning and miscellaneous tasks.
In summary, then, the driving technology of the two aluminum plants is small to 
medium batch production, with a span of control of about I supervisor to 20 workers, 
machine-paced, with little potential discretion afforded to the workers and a control 
system about midway on the continuum between direct control and responsible autonomy. 
The ancillary technology varies only slightly from this norm.
4.3 The breweries
The breweries in both countries have four distinct stages o f production.
Brewing. The first stage or brewing stage is similar in the two countries, consisting of 
three substages: brewing, fermentation and conditioning/filtration. For our purposes it is 
not necessary to go into great detail about the process of beer-making. It is reasonably 
well-known and has been well-described in several recent industrial relations studies 
(Batstone etal., 1987; Ghobadian, 1986; Davis, 1986) Various natural products are 
combined and then put through a process of cooking, mixing, fermentation, and filtration 
to produce an alcoholic beverage. This beverage is stored in large quantities, ready for
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packaging. The brewing stage houses the driving technology of the industry, yet a very 
small percentage (about 8%  in both countries) of the brewery workforce works here.
The technology employed is process production of large batches ie. extremely large 
batches of product are produced and the entire process is mechanised but there is starting 
and stopping while different ingredients are added to make up discrete batches (it is 
difficult to make brewing a completely continuous process because dry ingredients must be 
added in discrete amounts).
The quality and quantity of the batch is determined by a fairly complicated 
combination of factors: a) a written recipe prepared by the head brewer, b) electronic 
monitoring devices, sometimes feeding into a central computer, which can be programmed 
to direct or stop flow of product, detect faults and even intervene in specified situations, c) 
skilled craftsmen who maintain the machinery, d) a combination of supervisors, process 
workers and quality control workers who intervene at key points in the process and/or 
override the electronic monitors to add ingredients, drain the batch from one substage to 
another, take samples and test the product. As Woodward (1965) says of this type of 
technology, there is "a close association of planning, execution and control elements in the 
production function" (p. 161 ).
The impetus in both countries over the past fifteen years has been to remove, as much 
as possible, the fourth factor (human intervention) mentioned above. Woodward (1958) 
describes this imperative as an attempt to increase
"...the extant to which the production proce«« it controllable and ita retulta predictable 
For example, target« can be tet more eauly in a chemical plant than in even the moat up-to-date 
maia-production engineering thopa, and the factor! limiting production are known more definitely 
to that continual productivity drivet are not needed." (p. 12)
Yet neither brewery has been able to to make the production process entirely 
controllable and a fairly high amount of discretion still resides in the hands of the process 
workers (and their supervisors). While they need not watch the process continuously, they 
must be ready to intervene or summon more skilled intervention in crises and to 
intervene in non-crisis situations (to add ingredients or drain product) or they may 
themselves precipitate a crisis. Occasionally, automatic systems break down and manual 
work is necessary.
Workers in both countries are better-trained and more highly motivated here than 
the norm and there is more comradely interplay between and their supervisors than in the
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rest of the plants, because they share a set of skills and commitment to product quality. 
The working conditions are not onerous (noise, warmth and humidity being the major 
complaints) and the pace is fairly mild. The span of control in both countries is much 
lower than the plant average, with roughly 1 supervisor to 3.5 employees. The type of 
control is far toward the 'responsible autonomy'.
Packaging. At the second or packaging stage, the alcoholic beverage is decanted into 
various smaller containers for distribution to customers. A  large proportion of both 
brewery workforce (40% in Canada and 17% in Britain) works in this unit.
The technology in both countries can be characterised as production of large batches 
in assembly line operation. The main difference between the countries is in the package 
used. In Britain, the vast majority of beer is decanted into aluminium barrels of different 
sizes. In Canada, the vast majority of beer is decanted into bottles holding approximately 
1/2 pint.
A t CANBREW , the packaging unit is somewhat more mechanised than its British 
counterpart13- Bottles move at a feverish pace (the most high-tech bottle line churns out 
1400 bottles per minute). As the bottles progress through the machines, they are 
recycled: unloaded from used cartons, washed and sterilised, inspected for flaws, filled 
with beer, inspected again, crowned with a cap. labelled, packed into cases of different 
configurations, the cases sealed and then moved on to the staging area. Workers sit or 
stand at key points in the process and intervene occasionally to ensure the line runs 
smoothly. A few engage in more physical labour (unpacking cases, picking out filled 
bottles which don't pass inspection). But the quality, quantity and pace of the packaging is 
primarily machine-led. And the quality of the machines is determined by the engineers 
who designed them and the skilled craftsmen who maintain them.
The span of control in CANBREW 's main packaging area is roughly I supervisor to 
35 workers and veers distinctly toward direct control. Workers have virtually no 
individual discretion for both workers and supervisors are at the mercy of the machines 
and constantly under pressure. One supervisor describes the situation: I.
II. Thar« are two imall, peripheral 'low-tech' aubunita oft to the aida of tha main packaging unit at CANBREW: a
carton makaup unit and racking room where matai keg* are filled for distribution to tavern*. Both subunit* 
have medium batch production.
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It is no wonder then, that this is the area of the plant with the worst industrial 
relations problems.
At BRITBREW , the assembly line is less infernal. The individual containers are 
physically much larger than bottles and the machinery and technology is fairly old and 
cumbersome. Used kegs are received, sorted and stored for short periods of time. Then 
they are recycled: washed, sterilised, filled, labelled, inspected and then passed on to the 
staging unit.
The span of control in the BRITBREW  packaging unit is roughly one supervisor to 20 
workers and, though much more direct than brewing, a bit farther toward responsible 
autonomy than the Canadian packaging unit. Though the quality, quantity and pace is set 
by machines on the keg line, the machines are not relentless and the process often needs to 
be 'coaxed' by the workers.
Staging. In the third or staging stage, the containers are assembled for shipment. A 
smaller percentage of the workforces (Canada 16%, Britain 5% ) work here. In both 
countries, the technology is medium batch production. The containers (or containers of 
containers in Canada) are collected from packaging, put onto pallets for ease of storage 
and movement, stored for short periods of time and then moved up to be loaded on lorries. 
The main instruments used are fork lift trucks, hand trucks and muscles. The muscle 
aspect is more prominent at BRITBREW  because the barrels are depalletised before they 
are brought up to the lorries. The quantity, quality and pace of the work is determined by 
the workers and their supervisors. The span of control in both plants is about I 
supervisor to 20 workers and tends toward direct control.
The staging units would seem like insignificant backwaters in the production process 
except for a major fact: the perishability of the product. Because the life of the product is 
so short, stock cannot be inventoried. The staging process is a highly logistical operation, 
in which batches of product are assembled and routed continually to keep distribution 
outlets freshly stocked. So the turnover of product must be quick. Control is of the 
essence yet lead times are short. Yet, unlike previous stages, there is much less 
controllability by management of the production process. It is the bottleneck of 
production throughput and the workers concerned are concentrated in discrete locations 
(two, at CANBREW , which has a remote as well as onsite warehouse; three, at
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BRITBREW, which has separate warehouses for casks, kegs and bottles/cans). Because of 
their strategic placement in the product flow, workers here in both countries can 
potentially exercise a great amount of control.
Distribution. In the fourth or distribution stage the containers of beer are carried by 
lorry drivers (called truck drivers in Canada and draymen in Britain) to downmarket 
dispensers of the product. The lorry drivers make up the greatest proportion of the 
British workforce (42%) and a significant proportion of the Canadian (I 2%). In Canada, 
the company ends its direct control of the process here. In Britain, the company may 
continue direct involvement in the process of distribution of the product to the public but 
the workers at this further stage are members of a different bargaining and financial 
control unit and thus irrelevant to this study.
The technology at this stage can best be described as small batch production. Directed 
by a system of load summaries prepared by a dispatch or forwarding office, drivers 
(sometimes with the help of staging employees) load predetermined quantities of various 
products onto their lorries. They drive the product to various delivery points within the 
geographical area served by their depot. Then, mixing groups of products according to 
waybills (also prepared by the dispatch or forwarding office), they make the delivery to 
the distribution outlet.
The distribution outlets differ somewhat in the two countries. In Britain, they are 
mainly individual pubs and clubs, and secondarily, 'off-licence' retail shops and 
supermarkets. In Canada, distribution outlets are either state-run or regulated retail 
beer stores. The greater number of distribution outlets in Britain accounts for the larger 
workforce in this unit.
Because the Canadian loads remain palletised and because distribution outlets are 
purpose-built to receive the pallets where the lorry backs into a shipping bay, a single 
driver, using a hand truck, can do the job himself in a relatively short time with a 
moderate amount of effort. In Britain, most pubs are quite old and kegs and casks are 
stored in cellars. In crowded urban areas, the lorry must often be parked at some distance 
from the pub. The barrels required are then heaved over the side of the lorry onto rope 
cushions, transported manually from the lorry to the cellar door, lowered by a primitive 
system of ropes to the cellar, moved to the racks and finally loaded into the rack for
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tapping. The work is demanding physically and thus a crew of draymen (2 or 3) man each 
lorry.
In both countries the quality and pace of production at this stage is very much in the 
hands of the individual workers. They have a considerable degree of control over quantity 
but this is constrained by the loads they are assigned. A process of explicit or implicit 
negotiation and a sense of 'fairness' determines the loads. The span of control is 
extremely large, with one supervisor 'supervising' all of the deliverymen (at BRITBREW , 
the supervisor is assisted by several functional staff in charge of such things as driver 
training, customer relations etc.). The control system is quite definitely 'responsible 
autonomy'.
In both countries, a distinctive culture exists among brewery driver/deliverymen and 
is especially pronounced in Britain. According to a BRITBREW  personnel manager:
"Thara's a great aura percaivad in tha job. It'« the culture of rippling mutclei and the 
uniform ii a badge of office. It can alio be a menage of intent to the opposite sex. But they have 
tremendous loyalty to the company."
This occupational pride and ethos of public service is also strong among Canadian 
drivers. For over half a century, Canadian brewery lorry drivers have been trained in 
first aid and simple automobile mechanics, furnished with equipment to assist motorists 
who are injured or whose vehicles have broken down, and paid a bonus for doing so.
In both countries, however.these workers insist that the culture has been slowly dying 
out as the beer industry declines, and as 'modern management' techniques take over. 
Nevertheless, it is as strong or stronger than the molten metal culture.
Cruf t Work. In addition to the workers directly involved with the four stages above, 
both breweries have a good sized body of skilled craftsmen (14%  at BRITBREW , 16 %  at 
CANBREW). The technology here is obvious. However, because of the technical 
complexity of the driving technology in the breweries, the engineering units are larger 
than in most manufacturing plants. Most of their efforts are spent at the first two stages 
of production, with the emphasis on brewing in the British plant and the emphasis on both 
brewing and the high technology packaging lines in Canada. As in the aluminum plants, 
we move from technologies of greater to lesser technical complexity and the pace and flow 
of work becomes ever less dependent upon machines.
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As in the aluminium plants, there is a small body of unskilled maintenance and service 
workers in both countries.
To summarise the breweries, then, the driving technology is continuous process 
production in batches , with a small span of control and control system responsible 
autonomy. However, the ancillary technologies vary greatly from this norm. Although 
millions of Pounds (and Dollars) are spent in improving technological complexity to 
achieve control of the production process at the top end, a small group of workers 
operating with simple machines and muscle power sit at the bottleneck of production flow, 
at the bottom end.
4.4 Summary
To summarise the consideration of technology in our case studies: it can be said 
with some confidence that despite a few differences, the bundle of technologies employed 
in each industry is very comparable across the two countries. Within each country, the 
demarcation in the bundle of technologies between the industries is clear and wide and 
some of the industrial relations implications of this demarcation can al ready be drawn 
together.
Moreover, the range of variation between the driving and the ancillary technologies 
differs quite substantially between the two industries in both countries. From our modest 
case study observations, some speculation about the industrial relations implications of 
this is in order.
The effect of size upon union organisation and strength and industrial relations 
climate of a workplace has already been discussed. It has been suggested that in the 
workforce size domain of the workplaces studied here, dramatic differences occur. It was 
proposed to look at other factors that might impact upon where the threshold lies. In 
studies of the relationship between size and technology and their differential impact upon 
organisation structure, Hickson et al. (1969) have concluded:
"The «mailer the organization, the wider the structural effect« of technology" (Hickaon et
•I.. I'«>'<, p. .m i
In other words, the larger the organisation, the more difficult it is to define an overall 
technology and to read off structure from technology. This may help explain why attempts 
by industrial relations commentators to link industrial relations outcomes with the 
technology of large organisations raise so many problems. Rather than concentrate (he
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discussion of technology on the organisation as a whole, it may be best to concentrate, at 
the outset upon the work units within the organisation. The technology employed in any 
work unit does have great implications for the control of labour in that unit. Each 
distinct type of technology in a work unit has its own system of labour control or 
industrial relations 'culture' built around it. To borrow a concept from Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1969), a differentiation between the cultures of production units occurs. The 
greater the degree of differentiation across a workplace, the more difficult it becomes to 
integrate the overall industrial relations culture of the workplace.
Because the amount of investment in equipment and production control is greatest in 
the driving technology, its industrial relations 'culture' will naturally exert the strongest 
magnetic force upon the industrial relations 'culture' of the entire workplace. Managers 
will become more adept at applying that style of labour control to the entire workplace. 
This is not a problem where the variation in cultures is small. But if the ancillary 
technologies vary greatly from this norm, then it will be more difficult for management to 
coordinate a particular 'style' of labour control on the operation. This will be especially 
exacerbated if groups of workers in ancillary units can exert undue pressure on the whole 
production process, as is the case in the breweries.
As with size, no simple connections between technology and levels of industrial 
conflict are postulated. But at the beginning of this section, it was suggested that 
technology constrains industrial relations outcomes more than others. Certainly the 
industrial relations outcomes varied more between the breweries than between the 
aluminum plants. What is being suggested in the context of these case studies, is that the 
high differentiation apparent in the breweries makes technology less constraining a factor 
in industrial relations than in the aluminum plants, that is, it allows other factors, and 
perhaps distinctive national factors, to have more impact.
5. Product Markets
Unfortunately, there is no plethora of theoretical frameworks to analyse the effect of 
product market variations on industrial relations as there is for size, technology or labour 
markets. Brown (1973) suggests that five aspects of the product market combine with 
several aspects of production technology to affect the degree of management control 
exercised at a workplace. Yet as seen, technology can not so easily be defined over an
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entire workplace. The impact of the product market, however, does remain constant over 
the workplace. The five aspects of product market Brown looks at are: a) the importance 
of price competition, b) the relative importance of production being on schedule, c) the 
relative importance of quality vs. price, d) the fluctuation of demand and/or costliness of 
inventory and e) labour cost as a proportion of value-added (1973, p. 170). While these 
factors might suffer somewhat from multicollinearity if put to a rigid statistical test, and 
Brown cautions that they are impressionistic, he seems headed in the right direction. He 
suggests that relative unimportance of price competition, production being on schedule, 
quality vs. price and relatively low labour cost as a proportion of value-added may all 
contribute to hinder strong management control. But Brown is looking only at 
engineering plants. In comparing quite different industries, the significance of the first 
three might be modi fed somewhat to inject the element of control. Thus the difference 
between the aluminium plants' and the breweries' product markets lies not so much in the 
importance of price competition, scheduling of production and quality vs. price as in the 
controllability of these things. Thus the aluminium plants have more problems in 
controlling, standardising and basically getting the pricing, product quality and product 
delivery schedules right. The breweries have much more control over them.
Woodward (1965) gives a hint in the same direction when she looks at the relative 
importance of the three phases of manufacture: marketing, development and production, 
in her three broad types of production system. Given our caveats about imputing 
technologies over entire workplaces, her production systems might be redefined as special 
features of the product embedded at the stage of the driving technology. Woodward 
argues that for each production system, one of the three (marketing, development or 
production) is the "critical function". In unit and small batch production, development is 
critical (because the product is made to order and must meet customer specifications 
before it is produced); in large batch and mass production, production is critical 
(because a demand for the product is assumed and the concentration is then on how to 
coordinate the manufacture of many of the the items); in process production, marketing 
is critical (because the product is produced so efficiently and because of difficulties in 
storing or perishability of the product, markets must be secured).
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Simplifying Woodward's analysis somewhat, in analysing our case study plants, they 
can be divided clearly into production driven and market driven depending on the 
nature of the product market. The aluminium plants, producing medium batches of goods 
mainly to specification are definitely production-driven. The breweries, producing 
continuous large batches of a perishable substance, are market-driven. As the production 
coordinator of the Canadian brewery puts it:
"This buainoi 2 0 *  conuitency and quality of product and HU* marketing"
As with Brown, above, the key issue becomes control, but control of four key 
variables that impact upon industrial relations: the production process, labour costs, 
pricing, and secular demand. Greater control of the first two frees management (and the 
workers) from high degrees of vigilance; greater control of the second two allows for more 
stability, more evenness of profit flows, which, in turn provide for higher wages and 
benefits and greater leeway for indulgence.
Between our case study industries, there are quite dramatic differences in control of 
these variables.
5.1 The breweries
The product market story is remarkably similar in Canada and Britain. Beer 
producers combine in a classic oligopoly (with only three major, and few minor brewers in 
Canada and ten major and several more minor in Britain, although the long-term trend in 
Britain is to further concentration). While producers may attempt to differentiate their 
product and may succeed through advertising and packaging, in creating an 'image' of 
their drinker, the products are really substitutes of each other, with a high cross­
elasticity of demand.
Consumer loyalty to a particular brand is volatile, especially in Canada, where 
brands are national and taste differences less acute. Somewhat more than in Britain, a 
change in price (without a corresponding change in quality) or temporary unavailability 
of one brand, will mean a long-term desertion of that brand. Before Canadian brewers 
teamed up in an industrial relations cartel, a strike of more than a week against one 
brewery could mean an almost instantaneous drop in its market share which would take
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many years to recoup14* Likewise, a long strike and subsequent plant closing at one of 
BRITBREW 's regional competitors led to its almost total annihilation in that market 
within a short time.
Up until recently, brewers in both countries, acutely aware of this volatility, have 
colluded in reducing the ferocity of their competition and a sort of 'gentleman's club' grew 
up. In Britain, price, though unregulated, has varied little. In Canada, government has 
closely regulated the price of beer. In fact, in both countries, governments have a high 
financial stake in beer sales, with about a third of the price of beer in Britain and over 
half in Canada being taxes (ICC Business Ratios, 198S; Brewers Association of Canada,
1983). In both countries, brewing companies have formed highly professional and 
cohesive industrial associations for lobbying (and, in Canada, less formally, for industrial 
relations) purposes. Like all oligopolies, the pressure to cartelise prices is almost 
irresistible. Customers are so atomised that they have no control over the price of the 
product as a whole. For all the above reasons, then, in brewing, the 'price is right' ie. 
there is a high degree of control over pricing the product.
The collusion was possible first, because, like mafia families, the consequences of all- 
out war were unthinkable, not least to government revenues, and second, because the 
market seemed ever growing. For despite the volatility between brands, the market as a 
whole was marked by profound stability. For many years, in both countries, "drinking, 
for many people, [has been] social activity which has a high claim on available funds, come 
what may" (ICC Business Ratios, 1985). Beer has been primarily a 'working-man's' drink 
in both countries, and beer consumption has traditionally been among the last to fall in a 
recession and the first to recover. In a classic Galbraithian formula (Galbraith, 1958), 
the brewing industry has been among the biggest spenders on advertising and marketing, 
to stimulate and regularise demand.
After a long and steady increase, however, the market peaked around 1979, 
stagnating during the early 80's recession and has not recovered . Industry experts now
14. While brewing com pinm  are loath to reveal figures, the full-time officer of the union at CANBREW animate, that 
a strike againat another Canadian brewing company in another province in IV7I led almost immediately to ita 
relegation from top to bottom in market ihare and that it took 10 year* for it to regain the pre-strike volume of 
•ales. A senior brewing esccutive cites a five month strike in another province in IV76 which resulted in a .»5* 
drop in market share for the company. Tha company has not made a profit to this day.
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predict a slow worldwide secular decline in beer consumption for a number of reasons, 
primarily industrial and social demographics.
Because of this decline, brewers in both countries have embarked on a number of 
protective strategies: 1. They have moved to buy up smaller breweries in their own 
countries and are looking abroad to purchase brewers or brewing groups in other 
countries and they have diversified into a wider range of companies and products, 
including foods, other alcoholic beverages and leisure services; 2. They have taken the 
gloves off in the search to increase market share. They have done the latter by a number 
of means, including a) further segmenting the market by developing premium and discount 
brands and distinctive containers, b) increasing the already high intensity of media 
advertising, c) developing 'national brands' where the opportunity exists, and also 
developing 'international brands' which can sell in many countries. Coincidentally, the 
development of international brands is especially salient in both Canada and Britain, as 
free trade looms on the horizon, in the former case with the US, in the latter case with the 
EEC.
The above tactics and exigencies have resulted in an imperative to rationalise, 
including riding the wake of a consumer trend to the more-easily produced lagers15, 
increasing the pace of technological change in brewing and packaging, and belatedly 
following international trends to tighten organisational slack in all areas, and especially 
industrial relations.
Despite the recent changes in the product market, brewing has been remarkably 
consistent in a number of key business ratios. Wage and salary costs as a percentage of 
value added are remarkably low and stable (Department of Trade and Industry, 1986). 
Profit margins (profit before tax as a percentage of sales) and return on capital are high 
and, more important, strongly consistent (ICC Business Ratios, I98S).
Thus it can be seen that breweries exercise a high degree of control over the 
production process, labour costs, pricing and secular demand. The aluminium plants fare 
less well in this regard.
5.2 The aluminium plants
IS. Despita the general (rend to standardisation, Britiah brewer, have responded to a small but vocal consumar 
uprising and ara making money producing 'raal ala'. Esploiting a small market segment while pursuing a 
general rationaliaation strategy is not at all unusual in the annals of marketing.
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Somewhat the reverse of the brewery product market situation characterises metal 
fabrication. While competition between companies within the market is not as volatile 
as in brewing, the market as a whole fluctuates much more . It is to the end user that 
the bulk of the breweries' marketing drive is directed. The aluminium plants, on the other 
hand, sell almost exclusively to industrial customers, who process the product further (and 
may in turn pass the product on to another industrial customer) before it reaches the end 
user. Thus production, not marketing becomes key.
The market here is closer to monopolistic competition. While the barriers to entry 
are not insubstantial, they are a great deal lower than in the breweries. The products are 
more highly differentiated from firm to firm. Cross elasticity is much lower than in 
brewing and customers will remain loyal for longer in a supply crisis and return more 
readily afterward. Strikes at both C A N M E T  and BR ITM ET  did not as quickly become 
disastrous affairs as those in brewing generally do. Customers either stockpiled inventory 
before the strike, or looked for supply elsewhere temporarily, and in many cases, returned 
after the strike was over. Long-term relationships between the aluminium plants and 
their industrial customers are highly valued and not easily abandoned (although business 
is business and this bond has its limits).
Accordingly, relationships between the aluminium plants and their competitors is not 
nearly as close as among the brewers.
The demand for fabricated aluminium products as a whole, however, follows a 
volatile pattern and is highly sensitive to economic conditions. Since most of the products 
of both C A N M ET  and BR ITM ET  are destined for the building, transportation or 
consumer durables trade and the products of all these industries are highly income elastic, 
demand for the products of our case study plants is greatly affected by the state of the 
economy. But the effects of the economy cannot be read off easily. There are lags and 
complex ambushes that make it difficult to predict demand even when the state of the 
economy can be predicted.
Pricing is also very difficult to control and get right. This is partially because of the 
volatile nature of the aluminum commodity market, so that the cost of the main 
component fluctuates.
Chapter II...page 74
The difficulty in achieving price control is also partially because the aluminum plants 
deal with a discrete number of larger customers. When the number of customers for a 
product is small and the orders large, the customer becomes a price setter. This fact 
makes it difficult to read off profitability from productivity16.
Like beer, fabricated aluminum goods are a mature product in terms of market 
growth. Nevertheless, both the aluminium marketers and their downmarket customers 
are developing new uses for the product which seem to regularly revive the fortunes of the 
product when they are flagging.
Unlike brewing, the metal fabrication industry is marked by wide fluctuation in key 
business ratios. Wage and salary costs as a percentage of value added appreciably higher 
and more inconsistent compared to brewing (Department of Trade and Industry, 1986). 
Profit margins and return on capital also swing wildly (ICC Business Ratios, 1986a, b, c, 
1984).
5.3 Summary
In summary then, there are dramatically different patterns between the two case 
study industries in both countries yet strong similarities between Canadian and 
British plants within the same industry.
While breweries can exercise a high degree of control over the production process 
(quality and delivery time), labour costs, pricing and secular demand, the metal 
fabrication industry cannot. The effect of these constraints upon industrial relations will 
emerge in discipline, in structuring of the internal labour market, and especially in the 
amount of job control which work groups can have.
6. Management organisation and structure
To a surprising extent, management organisation and structure in  all four case study 
plants was similar. All are part of larger, multi-divisional companies so it is within that
IS. For instance, BRITMET '»  main Italian compatitor i* far more productive than BR ITMET. Ona ranon for this 
productivity diffarantial it the fact that tha Italian plant produces a much »mailer variety of item» 
(necessitating less numerous switches of dies and subsequent down time on presses!. Yet this smaller variety 
is destined for a smaller array of customers than is the case at BRITMET. Because o f the reliance upon these 
few customers, the Italian plant is subject to a high degree of customer dictation of prices. Because the prices 
are lower than they might otherwise be. the Italian plant, though more productive, is /ess p r o / ifb lt  then 
the Britiih. But the BR ITMET managers admit that they also find it difficult to price correctly. Likewise, 
although CANM ET has cornered the technology for its mam product and has few competitors in the world, it 
is limited in its ability to esploit this factor by the large size and small number of its customers for the
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context that management organisation and structure is discussed. Corporate 
concentration is a way of attempting to exercise control over an uncertain external 
environment. In our discussion of our cases studies so far, it has been seen that vertical 
integration within a company of the various stages of production can reduce uncertainties 
in the price and supply of strategic inputs at one end and of markets at the other. But 
there is a further way of dealing with uncertainty: Horizontal integration within a 
company across a range of different products and even industries provides a portfolio of 
intracorporate investment to reduce uncertainties in the employment of and return on 
capital. The key questions for industrial relations will be the relationship between the 
highest authority of the company and the lower divisions and manufacturing units— in 
decision-making on both production and collective bargaining issues. A constant theme 
among multi-divisional companies is the dialectical interplay between the the efficiencies 
obtained by central control and the flexibility obtained by autonomy of the divisions and 
units, between the looseness and tightness of the organisation and structure of 
management.
There are many similarities among our case study plants in this regard. Encouraged 
by the recent recession in both countries, the imperative has been toward a reduction in 
number of vertical levels between headquarters and the divisions and toward greater 
autonomy in production and industrial relations decision-making (and greater 
responsibility for profit) of the peripheral units. Yet paradoxically, the move toward 
autonomy has been accompanied by greater efforts by head offices (and the units 
themselves) to coordinate their activities and closely monitor results. What once may 
have been a directive from on high is now a strong recommendation or persuasive pull 
from the majority of one's colleagues. And the 'new regime' may, in fact, be even more 
compelling than the old.
Edwards (1987) indicates that this is a general trend among British firms according to 
his survey of factory managers:
’Autonomy...was U r from illusory. Not only was the actual running of tha plant, a duty 
whose responsibilities should not ba minimized, left to them with littla outside interference. They 
wara also abla to taka decisions which potentially had important ramifications for tha rest of their 
firms. It is vary unlikely that they would hava Ukan such decisions without reference to what was 
going on elsawhera or to company guidelines, hut it is also true that they were not merely following 
out orders from above.* (Edwards, IVH7, p. ||||
Yet Edwards cautions that the degree of autonomy was constrained by certain limits:
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"The monitoring of the plant)' performance was substantial and the result) of the 
monitoring arc likely to have affected corporate perceptions of a plant and hence its ability to 
attract investment funds and even its chances of remaining open. This fact must have had a powerful 
effect on how the factory managers conducted themselves." (p. Ill)
This phenomenon was visible in all four case study plants, but BR IT M ET  provides a 
good example of how it operates. Its parent company holds a mid-year personnel 
conference where the company's chief executives and its small corporate personnel team 
meet with personnel managers of all plants. The personnel officers give reports on their 
collective bargaining activities and upcoming negotiations. The information from this 
meeting is distilled into a report for the corporate board (the corporate managing director 
and the managing directors of the divisional companies), who, after consideration and 
perhaps some change, endorse it.
While the majority of units in the group have autonomy, some are 'controlled' more 
than others. The degree of control exercised depends upon whether there are "significant 
departures from the norm in the corporate review process'7"- These departures may be in 
the areas of economic performance, capital investment, compensation and the possibility 
of industrial conflict. If, for example, a plant is performing poorly, or proposes to spend a 
large amount of money on plant or equipment, or foresees a major strike on the horizon 
or predicts it will not be able to avoid a strike without a massive increase in pay, then that 
plant will be monitored much more closely. But chances are high that its management will 
already have (and is expected to have) voluntarily flagged these issues to colleagues and 
higher management at the communal mecting(s). If local management foresees a strike 
and presents a good argument as to why the company should 'take on' the strike, it is very 
likely to receive the funds or allowances sought from head office.
On the other hand, the BR ITM ET 's parent company's personnel group will, on 
occasion, attempt initiatives in bringing the plants into compliance with legal or 
industrial relations standards. In areas such as equal opportunities, health and safety, 
recruitment and 'good' or T>est’ personnel practices, head office will conduct audits of 
existing provisions in the plants and then circulate guidelines on these issues.
In all our case studies, the loose-tight relationship between headquarters and 
divisional units operates in a remarkably similar way to that described above.
P. Conversatic nth ■  senior inner of BRITMRT's parent
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All of our case study plants have discrete personnel departments with small staffs 
(usually I or 2 senior personnel managers who oversee personnel as a whole as well as 
conduct negotiations with the trade unions; and 2 or 3 staff assistants who specialise in 
combinations of areas such as pay and benefits, selection, recruitment, training, health 
and safety). Perhaps the greatest difference between the two countries is in the length of 
job tenure of personnel managers. The personnel managers and their predecessors in the 
British plants had been or were expected to be in that position for upwards of ten years.
In neither of the Canadian plants had the personnel managers been in the job more than 
three or four years.
In all four plants, the role of the personnel managers vis-a-vis the production 
managers suffered from the same types of problems of ambiguity. As experts in industrial 
relations, the former would be looked to by production managers to play a major role in 
disciplining, providing information to, and solving disputes from, the workers. In Canada 
a body of law has long affected relations between workers and their superiors; in Britain, 
that body of law, once small, is growing. The body of law has been supplemented by 
intraenterprise regulation to protect the company. Production supervisors and managers 
in both countries tend to lack confidence in their ability to deal with this body of 
regulation. If allowed, they would abdicate these matters to personnel.
But the personnel managers can only perform their role effectively if they are seen, to 
some extent, as 'honest brokers', sometimes intervening on behalf of the beleaguered 
employee against the supervisor. The Canadian personnel managers seem slightly better 
at this, partially because the grievance procedure is so formalised and simplified and 
partly because Canadian shopfloor supervisors are used to exercising more discretion in 
disciplinary matters than their British counterparts.
7. Union Organisation and Power
7.1 Introduction
The purpose thus far has been to examine several important contextual factors 
which may divide or homologise our case study plants across industry or country. In this 
section, an attempt is made to tackle a more intrinsic factor. Before launching into 
detailed discussion in the coming chapters, the beginnings of an analysis of differences in 
industrial relations is assayed by comparing union organisation and power among the
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plants. This will also serve as a general introduction to the climate of industrial relations 
in the plants.
Up to this point, it has been possible to group the case study plants together, either by 
country or by industry, for discussion of each topic. In union organisation and power, 
however, the field widens. There is a clear hierarchy among the unions studied in the 
degree of power they are able to wield.
Strangely, there is one common complaint that the managements in each of the four 
plants have about the unions they deal with. Despite differences in union power 
conspicuous to the outside observer, all the personnel managers interviewed wished that 
the the union representatives in their plant could exhibit more 'leadership' over the 
workers. What does this mean?
It is important to remember that in all four plants, management has, to a greater or 
lesser extent 'accepted' the union and incorporated this acceptance into its management 
style. It has done so partly because the costs of operating union-free are judged too high, 
but also because the union can potentially be very useful in expressing the complaints, 
desires and aspirations of the work force. Management wants the union to be able to 
express this unrest in a coherent, authoritative way, to suggest possible solutions, to 
negotiate and then to 'strike a deal' that will settle the unrest, if not permanently, then at 
least long enough that management can get on with the business of managing. It wants the 
union to be able to 'deliver' its members. For this ability to 'deliver', all the managements 
indicated their willingness to pay a higher price. As General and Municipal Workers 
General Secretary John Edmonds says:
"Moat employer* went e quiet life. They went negotiation* about pay and condition* to be 
completed quickly with little or no trouble....If a negotiator can offer an employer a quiet life often 
that negotiator, whatever hi* or her accountability, can get a little bit more in term* of the offer’
(Edmond*. 1986, p.2>
But union leaders cannot always deliver so easily, because they must deliver not only 
to management, but to the workers as well. And they must not only deliver to the workers 
but 'be seen' to deliver. The two delivery systems are inseparable and mutually additive.
“A itrong bargaining relationship re*t* upon a broad balance of power between the two 
peraon* involved. Unle** the other peraon ha* a degree of power, there i* little attraction in giving 
him confidence* and lupport, for little will be gained in return...For, if a atrong bargaining 
relatiomhip fails to bring advantage* to both parties, then there is little attraction in maintaining 
it." (Batatone at al.. IfTT, p. |7|>
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In order to establish some sort of ordinal ranking of union power, it is necessary to 
look not only at how leaders persuade members to follow, how they initiate and direct 
issues for the members and how they establish a dominant perspective among those 
members (Batstone et al., 1978), we must also look at how they can effect compromise and 
make the compromise stick.
So union power in our workplaces will be analysed by examining the unions' 
capabilities to not only: control and direct the effort bargain, defend its members against 
arbitrary measures, wage bargain successfully, articulate its members' interests 
coherently and mobilise discontent; but to also: 'sort its members out', obtain cohesion 
among disparate interest groups, contain the centrifugal forces that can scuttle deal­
making and exert control over the timing of disruption and industrial action.
According to this set of indices, the ranking of our case study plants clearly has the 
breweries far ahead of the aluminium plants. At the top of union power is BRITBREW , 
followed by CANBREW . The Canadian brewery is followed by the Canadian aluminium 
factory CANM ET. And lowest in union power comes its British counterpart BR ITM ET. 
Each will be discussed in turn, contrasting the two extremes first18 19*
7.2 BRITBREW
All the manual workers in this plant are represented by a large general union, 
which has been the active bargaining agent for some thirty years14*
The convenor works full time in his position20 and is paid by the company at a salary 
commensurate with that paid in his former department (in the packaging unit)21* Both the 
assistant convenor and the branch secretary are paid by the company for what amounts to 
permanent part-time work for the domestic organisation. The union is afforded a suite of
IH. To denote the union a* it exists at the workplace, the term ‘domeitic organiaation' (Batitone et al.. I97f) or 'union* 
will be employed. To denote the union at it exists outaide the workplace, the term 'external ortanuation'. 
'external union' or 'parent union' will be employed. For convenience, the top union official in the domestic 
organisation is always referred to as the 'convenor' (though that term is not used in Canada). Full time 
officers from the external union servicing the domestic organisations will be referred to as 'staff officers'.
19. The single general union represents everyone at BRITBREW, including skilled crafts workers. While these workers
were at one time members of craft unions, and some still retain membership in those unions, the craft unions 
were supplanted in the early 1960's by a vigorous organising campaign on the part of the general union.
20. Full time convenors are present in approximately 3611 of the British establishments in BRITBREW 's sue range and
in only 3 *  of private manufacturing establishments (Millward & Stevens. I9K6, p. 79-MO).
21. The salary paid to the convenor also tries, within its flat rate, to take account of the bonus and overtime earnings
current in his former department.
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offices on the plant premises and has access to telephones on the plant system, 
photocopying and other services at the expense of the company22. At the time of the study, 
there were fourteen stewards recognised by the company (on average one for every 34 
workers)23- However, discounting the transport steward, who represents all 209 
draymen24, there is one steward for every 21 members, slightly lower than the average for 
that size of British establishment. The stewards are reimbursed for time lost on union 
business, including monthly shop stewards' committee meetings. While some stewards 
spend very little of their work time on union duties, others (such as keg staging unit 
steward) spend a majority of their work day on union affairs. The amount of time spent 
depends upon the climate of industrial relations in the department and management 
indulgency.
Monthly shop stewards' committee meetings are held in the company social club and 
generally last half a day. They are well organised, with a prepared agenda, including a 
report from each steward on activities in his area, followed by critical comments from the 
other participants. Other than a very general provision in the collective agreement 
recognising shop stewards, all of the above facilities and provisions for domestic union 
officials are by unwritten agreement between company and union, ie. custom and practice.
Records of the domestic organisation are extensive but in disarray, reflecting not so 
much poor organisation but rather the reliance on the 'savvy' of the convenor and the 
shop stewards in conducting their relations with management. The domestic organisation 
chooses to seldom, if ever, conduct mass meetings of its memberships, preferring to rely 
on a combination of representative democracy (members meet informally with shop 
stewards who report to steward committee meetings) for day to day business and ballot 
referenda for key decisions.
Since the external union represents most of the brewery workers across the country, 
intraunion organisations of plant representatives exist to coordinate the union's activities
i i .  The union representing staff is a branch of an autonomous section of tha general union. This branch is also 
afforded an office, and similar facilities, in the tame building at the manual workers' general union.
23. In British establishments of BR ITBREW 's size, there it an average of 2V manual union members per steward
(Millward *  Stevens. IVH6. p. IP )
24. In recognition of the heavy rapretenution load for the transport shop steward, the company, somewhat
reluctantly, allows that steward to consult with a 'fleet committee' of five draymen representatives every sis 
to eight weeks.
J
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in this industry generally and in the network of plants owned by BR ITBREW 's parent 
company in particular. While bargaining is conducted at the establishment level across 
the industry, the officials taking part in these organisations have erected a fairly 
sophisticated but informal system aimed, in the event of a strike at one plant, to prevent 
or slow down supply in the area by neighbouring plants. The system works better in those 
parts of the country with stronger union culture (such as that near BR ITBREW ) and 
where 'national brands' are not involved (where beer can be brought from very far away). 
Such tactics (secondary action and blacking) are technically illegal according to the 
Employment Act 1982, but strikes in the industry are generally so short that they are 
over before employers can reasonably take any action and before the union can mount a 
recognisable campaign of blacking.
BRITBREW  is serviced by a staff officer working out of the union's regional office, 
whb is responsible for branches involving brewery and pub workers. Although he is 
formally supposed to be involved at the last stage of every grievance and pay negotiation 
(ie. prior to a strike), he is seldom involved in union-management affairs at BRITBREW . 
Work stoppages frequently occur without his prior involvement and sometimes without 
his involvement entirely (though this is not the case in longer disputes where the external 
organisation is dragged into the matter by legal considerations). This is partially because 
the convenor prefers to keep the officer at arm's length and partially because grievances 
and pay negotiations so seldom formally reach the last stage, as will be seen in later 
chapters. Nevertheless, the convenor cannily involves the officer in disputes on an 
instrumental basis, such as when a particular dispute threatens to prove embarrassing for 
the convenor25-
The convenor had, at the time of the study, been in his position for six years, with 
some three previous years' experience as a shop steward. He has more education (to 18 
years of age) than the average manual worker (though this phenomenon is less unusual in 
breweries). Much of his time is spent in informal meetings with shop stewards and 
individual workers and with the personnel managers (he estimates that he spends an
25. Eaamplea of auch occasion» art: whan branch politica put tha convenor in a petition of chooung one group again,! 
another; when union member! disagree with the convenor; when the convenor feelt may loae credibility with
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average of two hours per day in discussions with the personnel managers). The personnel 
manager indicated respect and admiration for the convenor, which is reciprocated.
Immediately striking, compared to the other three case study plants, is the immense 
self-confidence of the convenor and many of the shop stewards at B R IT B R EW  in their 
ability to accomplish both systems of delivery. They form what Batstone et al. (1977) call 
a "quasi-elite" and conform to the "leader" type of shop steward depicted in that book.
In addition to the union's confident assertiveness toward the company, it also is 
confident in 'sorting out' its members and has a strong sense of what is and is not 'fair'. If 
the union feels a member has misbehaved and deserves the discipline imposed, it will 
simply refuse to carry his case further, sometimes attempting to persuade him to accept 
the discipline. And the convenor admits readily that "a deal can and will be often be 
struck over the head of the individual worker who, for example is caught fiddling. 
Someone has to take a decision in the best interests of the branch". Fights between 
members and jurisdictional disputes are handled by the union exclusively:
'Somebody's tot to make a daemon in those matters. Better the union than the company.
That's acceptable to the members’.
Finally, the union has the confidence to suggest that
^  'In  disputes, we don't always insist on winning; we sometimes look to give management an
Whether the above is absolutely true or not, the attitude expressed suggests that the 
union feels secure enough about its power in the workplace to be open about compromise. 
In none of the other case study plants is the union nearly so secure.
7.3 B R ITM ET
In contrast to the strength and self-confidence of the BR IT BR EW  union, that at 
B R IT M E T  displays incertitude and obstinacy and a serious failure in delivering 'the 
goods' to either its own members or to management.
The majority (84%) of the manual workers at this plant are represented by a large 
general union (different than the one at BRITBREW ) which has been the active 
bargaining agent at least since the War. Mechanical tradesmen (13% ) and electrical 
tradesmen (3%) are each represented by their own craft unions. From hereon, comments 
will be directed at the general union, unless otherwise specified. 26
26. Conversation with deputy convenor.
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The convenor is not full-time and works three shifts in rotation in the packaging unit 
of the plant. Although management allows him fairly liberal paid time off for union 
business (and allows him to assume the day shift for this purpose when working shifts), his 
availability for union business on a particular shift is not assured unless he has advance 
notice of being required. Likewise, because he is a regular member of the production 
team, his supervisors sometimes are reluctant to release him on short notice. Though 
theoretically able to get all the time necessary for his position, the difference between his 
freedom to do the convenor's job and that of the BRITBREW  convenor is enormous.
Although the deputy convenor works on a different shift, the company refuses to 
formally recognise him in this position unless the convenor is away from work entirely (on 
vacation or ill). Even then, the deputy convenor is not afforded the time off available to 
the convenor. Both craft unions have their own convenors but they are afforded few more 
privileges than ordinary stewards.
Despite several requests over the years, the company has refused to afford the unions 
dedicated office space, filing cabinet or telephone (although upon request, it will allow the 
unions to use rooms for specific meetings, access to company telephones and photocopying 
facilities). Though such facilities are usually available if, when and for the time 
requested, there is again an enormous difference from the situation at BRITBREW .
At the time of the study, there were 20 stewards for the general union (I per 27 
workers), higher than the national average, and nine and two respectively for the craft 
unions (roughly I per 8 in both cases). The craft stewards are reimbursed for work time 
spent on union business and allowed to assume the day shift on the same basis as the 
general union convenor but with absence more tightly controlled. There are few, if any, 
regular shop stewards' committee meetings (in the sense that they exist at BR ITBREW ) or 
mass membership meetings except for the period immediately surrounding annual pay 
negotiations. What facilities and provisions exist for union activities are by unwritten 
agreement.
BR ITM ET  is serviced by a staff officer working out of a sub-regional office in the 
same town, who is responsible for a wide array of industrial establishments in the vicinity. 
As at BRITBREW, though formally required at the final stage of procedure and 
negotiations, he is seldom involved in union-management affairs. But this is not due to as
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conscious a decision on the part of the convenor as is the case at BRITBREW. In general, 
British union staff officers simply do not intervene unless called upon to do so. And he is 
not called upon to do so very much at BR ITM ET . As much as possible, personnel officials 
attempt to keep their dealings with the union to the domestic organisation. Atone point, 
they refused to allow an external union safety officer on the premises for inspection in a 
matter which they felt had been handled adequately in plant. Domestic union officers 
themselves do not have a high regard for staff officers:
'The  lent four organneri have been no good. Once you call the union official in, you've lost.
The mam reaaon for the final stage 1 1 1 0  you can blame somebody else. I guess that's what's called 
passing the buck.*
The convenor, at the time of the study, had worked at BR ITM ET  since 1956 and had 
been involved in the union for most of that time. He had been convenor for all but one of 
the previous seven years. He is a dedicated but not aggressive trade unionist, a smoother 
rather than a confronter, who readily fits the image of the "populist" steward (Batstone et 
al., 1977). An example of his attitude is evidenced in his preference for the night shift:
'Fawar paopla bother you. I don't rush off looking for trouble— it comas to you. If you 
causa unnecessary problems, soma day you gat your right arte kicked*
Union members at BR IT M ET  seemed to look upon the convenor with some affection 
but realism:
’He's not bad. He tries to do his best, more like a minder than anything else.*
While company personnel officers make a pro forma attempt to hear the convenor out 
when he presents his (admittedly somewhat rambling and convoluted) complaints, it is 
clear they are impatient with him. They are positively annoyed at the deputy convenor. If 
the company is looking for 'leadership' from domestic union officers, he is BR ITM ET 's  
manifestation of it. Yet he is anathema to management. More in the mould of the 
"leader" type of steward (Batstone et al., 1977), he is a much more aggressive trade 
unionist than the convenor. He goes looking for trouble and, finding it, attempts to 
mobilise discontent around the issue. But, because the workforce and the other stewards 
are less aggressive than he, these mobilisation attempts frequently flounder. The culture 
of the place simply does not support his style.
The only other centre of union aggressiveness in the plant is in the casting unit. But 
because of their distinct culture of 'men of molten metal', the workers and their stewards 
have as little to do with the domestic organisation as possible, preferring to settle matters
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with their supervisors and then report back to the central union and management 
authorities.
Just as at BRITBREW , one is struck by a lasting impression of the domestic 
organisation at BRITM ET. Both management and workers, from different perspectives, 
seemed disappointed with the union's inability to deliver what they think it should.
Several workers express this disappointment, not only in the union, but in the lack of 
solidarity among the workers:
"The union is not militant enough. The firm manipulate» the union...When they had the 
ballot on the pay offer, the union didn't eiplam anything. In the pait two or more yean, the union'* 
only had two meeting*, both on Saturday morning* but people are too bu*y working
overtime."....-..-.....................
"We get poor repreientation. We might a* well not even have the union for the good it 
doea"..........
" I believe in a moderate union but thi* one itn't even moderate; it '* very (lack."
Despite the self-deprecation, the work force has not been quiescent. In the 70's, the 
union was considerably stronger. Notwithstanding union strength, management avers 
that for years the workforce has been obstinate and unpredictable, with quiet periods 
jarred by short but acrimonious bouts of industrial action. Paradoxically, while the 
workers often are indifferent, as above, to exhortations to action by union officials, 
sometimes the opposite occurs— as when the workers rejected a recommendation for 
acceptance of a pay settlement to the surprise of the negotiating committee. Management 
representatives express concern that the union is
"out of touch with it* member*. The union i* repreiented mainly by older worker* but 
there'* a growing group of younger worker* out there. It '* bad enough when managemcni doe»n't 
know what'* happening on the *hop floor; it'* wor*e when the union doein't know".
Management also frets about the inability to engage with the union domestic 
organisation about any kind of change. Unlike the BR ITBREW  union which has some idea 
of the consequences of and readily negotiates payment for change, the BR ITM ET  union 
resists engagement.
"We can never get into a constructive decision with the union. They always say 'no ' to cover 
themselves. The union is not confident, so they simply *ay 'no ' in the hope that it will mean no 
change, and no change is more comfortable."*7
Worst for the union, management suggests that because of their incompetence and 
lack of feeling for the membership, union negotiators regularly come away from 27
27. Conversation with senior production manager.
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negotiations with several percentage points less in wage rises than the company is 
prepared to concede, if pushed.
BR ITM ET 's  management is in an uncomfortable position in managing its industrial 
relations. Because the workers are not quiescent, management can take nothing for 
granted about the way it handles them. But because it is so ineffectual, the union is a 
highly imperfect channel through which to obtain peace and predictability, even at a 
price. To a certain extent, then, management must grope its way around as if it were 
blind, hoping that it has got things right.
These then, are two extremes along the continuum of trade union power in our case 
study plants. The unions in the Canadian plants, though they differ between themselves in 
power, are firmly situated mid-range in this continuum in that they can both deliver 'the 
goods' with some predictability to both the employer and their members but are severely 
limited in so doing.
7.4 CANBREW
All the manual workers in this plant (with the exception of the 14 power engineers, 
who belong to their own craft union) are represented by a general union. All of further 
remarks are addressed to this group.
The parent union has been riven by political turmoil throughout its history. The 
domestic organisation, though affected by this turmoil, had not been unduly affected over 
the fourteen year period except for the relative absence of strong higher syndical 
authority . The convenor is full time and is paid by the company at the salary he would 
have received in his old job in the packaging department (with some compensation for loss 
of overtime). There are no other full-time officers. The domestic organisation is afforded 
an office with a telephone on the plant premises and access to photocopy facilities at the 
expense of the company.
At the time of the study, there were eight stewards recognised by the company, with 
alternate stewards recognised in their absence (an average of one steward for every 44 
workers28- The stewards are reimbursed for "reasonable time off from their regular 
jobs....providing that they receive permission from their Supervisor". Such permission 
"will not be unreasonably withheld". This includes time off for regular stewards
number of member« per «leward are not available for Canada.
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committee meetings which are held on an irregular basis. The amount of time taken off by 
stewards is negligible compared to their British brewery counterparts. Time off 
provisions for the stewards are written into the collective agreement. But full-time status 
for the convenor, office and other facilities and the exact amount of steward time off 
considered 'reasonable' are all by unwritten agreement.
There are few, if any, mass membership meetings except immediately surrounding the 
triennial collective agreement renegotiations. Few CANBREW  workers attend the 
monthly membership meetings of the composite branch (where little business specific to 
CAN BREW  is discussed). Most of the communication between the union and the members 
is done through shop stewards or newsletters.
A s mentioned earlier, an informal employer industrial relations cartel pulls all of the 
major brewery plants in the province into coordinated negotiations. In contrast to the 
unity of the employers in this setup, the unions are divided by their history. Nevertheless, 
there is some coordination evident among the disparate unions and attempts are being 
made to increase cohesion.
CAN BREW  is serviced by one main staff officer (and his absence, one of the other two 
staff officers) working out of the branch's business office in the same city. The staff 
officer (as is the Canadian norm) plays a major role in the affairs of the domestic 
organisation. Not only does he attend all of the grievance procedure final step meetings 
and act as spokesman in negotiations, he also presents the union's case at arbitration 
hearings. His relationship with the convenor is very close, almost symbiotic (as is the 
Canadian norm). The convenor is in touch with him nearly every day by phone and 
several times a week in person (either at the plant or at the union's external office). The 
staff officers are proactive and aggressive at testing the limits of the collective agreement. 
Nevertheless, the CANBREW  union membership is volatile and can give staff officers a 
rocky time
The convenor had, at the time of the study, been working at CANBREW  for 11 years, 
with four years as a shop steward and five subsequent years as convenor. Like a high 
proportion of Canadian trade union activists, he is an immigrant from the British Isles, 
with trade union experience in his native country. Known as a plant militant, he 
supplanted a more conciliatory convenor. Though not as self-assertive, subtle and
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tactically versatile as the BR ITBREW  convenor, he is a tenacious businesslike and laconic 
and is well-respected by the plant management.
Among domestic organisations in brewing, that at CANBREW  is known as one of the 
most militant, having been responsible for 'shutting down' the industry in the past two sets 
of negotiations and having been responsible for several wildcat walkouts or threats of 
such in previous years. This domestic organisation had a high degree of self confidence 
though in a class far below BRITBREW . Evidence of the self confidence is the way in 
which the domestic organisation, despite its militant reputation, boldly took part in an 
employee survey, in the firm belief that it would not co-opt its members but rather 
underline complaints that the union had been making for years.
The records of the domestic organisation are well-kept, with documents and 
correspondence relating to all disputes in files and with a careful system to keep track of 
the progress of disputes (failure to observe time limits can be fatal to a grievance). As at 
BRITBREW , the convenor and stewards claim to handle on their own most fights between 
members and complaints of racial and sexual harassment.
Yet the union is more hesitant to 'straighten its members out' when they are 
disciplined by the company. Nearly all cases are put into the grievance procedure and 
seldom conceded by the union before the final step (a meeting attended by the union staff 
officer and a high company official) and some 'losers' are taken to arbitration. As will be 
seen in Chapter VII, the union employs more devious methods of abandoning a member's 
cause than is the case at BRITBREW . In the Canadian context then, for its size, the 
domestic organisation is a powerful one.
7.5 CANM ET
All the manual workers in this plant are represented by a large "international" 
union with headquarters in the US, and have been since before the War2**-
The convenor is not full-time in his position. Though the fabrication unit in which he 
works operates on a multi-shift system, he is assigned, as per the collective agreement, to
2V. Up to IV75. more than 1/2 of tha unionised worker* in Canada war* member* of US-bated union*. The trend, 
however, ha* bean reversing *o that U S union* in IW S claimed only 3<M% of union member* in Canada 
(Kumar at a., IVB6, p. 2VI). The Canadian lection of thi* 'international' union ha* a certain degree of 
functional autonomy, including a Canadian director. Canadian publication*, retearch, education and 
organisation department* and an annual Canadian policy conference to set collective bargaining agenda*.
The itrik* fund i* homed in the U S headquarter* and the parent union retain* the right to withhold the** 
fundi, discipline members und impose trusteeship* on branches.
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day shifts and is allowed time off for union activities. When approached by a steward or 
worker with a problem, he is expected to notify the appropriate foreman or lead hand. He 
estimates the average time per day spent on union business as two hours. Nevertheless, 
several managers indicate they feel he takes too much time for union business. The 
convenor too suspects that the company will be cracking down.
The union is afforded a rudimentary office with a telephone and a filing cabinet on 
company premises. While the office is supposed to be private and does have a lock, it is 
very noisy and is on a route to a storage area so that company staff wander through on a 
regular basis. At the time of the study, there were five stewards recognised by the 
company (on average one for every 63 workers). The stewards are reimbursed for time 
spent on union business. They spend quite a bit less time than the convenor. The stewards 
and convenor meet with each other on an irregular and informal basis. The amount of 
time spent on union activity and the office and facilities provided are by unwritten 
agreement. Fearful of changes in management's attitude to the trade union, the convenor 
intends to attempt to get these provisions into the collective agreement on the next 
bargaining round. The domestic organisation holds regular mass membership meetings 
but fewer than 3%  of the members attend, save for the period immediately surrounding 
collective agreement negotiations. Nonetheless, the branch has a fairly sizable executive, 
the convenor claiming about 7 %  participation in active positions.
Since the parent union represents the greatest number of workers in the metal 
fabrication industry, several loose and informal committees of branch representatives 
exist to exchange information. The convenor is in the aluminium council.
C A N M ET  is serviced by a staff officer working out of a regional office in the same 
city, who is responsible for a large number of small manufacturing plants similar to it.
The staff officer's relationship to the domestic organisation is similar to that in effect at 
CANBREW . However, the parent is a long-standing, stable industrial union unlike that 
at CANBREW , and the staff officers display a heavier hand if need be. During a long 
strike, intervention by top regional officers with company officials was instrumental in 
bringing the strike to a conclusion. While this intervention was subtle and sophisticated 
and no compulsion was employed, it was effective nonetheless. The convenor and his shop 
steward committee are strong-willed and the staff officer (at the time of the study) was
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less aggressive than the norm, so the domestic organisation had a fair amount of 
autonomy. Nevertheless, the convenor tells of many domestic organisations at other 
plants (especially in composite branches) who are bullied by their staff officers, especially 
when it comes to the internal politics of the external union:
"In  (mailer plant», the repa have complete control of the local leaderihip...they intimidate 
the union eaecutivea, the ataff man attenda all the local meeting» and tella you who to endorae.
There'» even aome phyaical violence. They uae union achoola and aeminara to put preaaure on the 
rank and file".
The convenor, at the time of the study, had worked for C AN M ET  for 15 years and 
had been a shop steward and member of the branch executive for some seven years before 
becoming convenor for a short time. Defeated by a more conciliatory opponent, he stood 
again two years later and won. At the time of the study he had been convenor for one and 
a half years.
The convenor is highly politically motivated and unlike any of the other case study 
convenors, sees his union leadership position as means to the end of radical politics. 
Managers would complain that he used grievance and other meetings to inveigh against 
imperialism, racism and the capitalist system rather than the business at hand30*
The convenor and all of steward committee are "leader" stewards who form a "quasi-  
elite" as in Batstone et. al (1979). Significantly, the convenor and a majority of the 
stewards are non-white in a domestic organisation whose members are about 9 0%  white. 
Yet despite the assertiveness of the convenor and his steward committee, and despite their 
ability to run a four month strike with an impressive degree of solidarity, the work force 
is not particularly militant and the domestic organisation has several weaknesses in 
delivering the goods.
While the strike built up an esprit de corps and a new level of participation among the 
workers, this had already begun to dissipate a few months after the strike had ended. 
Having risen to the occasion in the crisis of the strike, the convenor was finding it much 
harder to handle the day to day industrial relations of the shop. Left with a legacy of
JO. It ia auapccted that manager» eaaggarated the convenor'» radical political preoccupation» while performing union 
dutiea. In converaationa with the author, a more hoapiteble liatener, he kept auch talk to a minimum. 
Management attitude» toward the convenor are miaed but moat regard him with uneaae. unaure of hia 
motivation and political agenda. They know the worker» voted him in, conacioua of hi» political »unce. 
Heving gone through a long atnke in which the convenor waa the prime driving force, manager» reaped hi» 
idealiam and ability to lead the worker». But aome eapreaa a deaire to 'break' him and make way for a more 
conciliatory convenor, if the opportunity aroae.
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many years of union slackness and lacking full-time status, he is at a disadvantage. The 
housekeeping and record keeping is rudimentary compared to that at CANBREW . There 
are several outstanding grievances or grievable situations languishing in limbo which the 
union does not push or take up because of apathy, ignorance or simply because of lack of 
time. The union also does not have the self-confidence to participate fully in 
consultations with management outside the rigid boundaries of collective bargaining or 
the grievance procedure. In fact, it does not press its advantage where it can. The 
external organisation is little help here.
In short, the domestic organisation at C A N M E T  has the desire to assert itself but not 
the tools.
7.6 Summary
To summarise the comparison of trade union organisation and power in the case 
study plants, it has been suggested that the indices of union power include the union's 
ability to deliver to both the company and its own members and that the two delivery 
systems are synergistic. In this sense, the British plants lie at opposite extremes of the 
continuum while the Canadian plants lie at mid range. Why might this be so?
8. Concluding Remarks
One purpose of this chapter has been to provide background information on the 
external and internal environments of our case study plants to assess the "comparability” 
of the plants across countries and the extent of differentiation in the climate of industrial 
relations across industries. And indeed, it has been seen that the plants within the same 
industry are, for our purposes, comparable and that significant differences in industrial 
relations climate exist between the industries in the countries.
While all of the plants are of the same size range, it is within this range that 
qualitative differences in union strength and power can emerge. Several factors which 
contribute to the union power differential have been explored. While it is argued that 
technology is not a determining factor in the climate of industrial relations, technology 
does act to constrain and shape this outcome. A neglected issue in discussions of 
technology to date is the fact that a "bundle" of technologies characterises most 
workplaces and that the variance between the "driving" and "ancillary" technologies may 
affect the scope for variation in industrial relations climate. Our breweries have a far
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wider variance in this regard than our aluminium plants and it is postulated that this, as 
much as the technology itself, contributes significantly to differences in that climate which 
exist between breweries in the two countries. Another feature of both technology and 
product markets that emerges as important is the extent of controllability, the ability of 
the industry to maintain a degree of technical control over the labour process and control 
over labour costs, secular demand, interfirm competition, pricing and profits. The higher 
the degree of controllability over these factors, the greater the potential for indulgence 
of workers and their trade union. But, it is suggested, the above factors merely set the 
stage for different types of factory regimes.
Accordingly, a tentative suggestion about the effects of national systems of labour 
regulation might be made. In the British system, despite recent legislation, there seems to 
be far fewer and far less powerful external influencesconstraining the exercise of union 
power. Industry by industry, union and management themselves seem to be almost the 
sole determinants of how efficiently the union will be able to deliver to the employer and 
to its members. So in some industries, like brewing, union power can be very high; in 
other industries, like metal fabrication, it can be very low.
But in Canada, the state-prescribed and rigid system of work regulation forms a grid 
within which the parties must operate. They cannot operate outside of it. And it is the 
system itself and not the union which delivers. It is the tightly constrained system of 
interest mediation, allowing strikes at definite times and the grievance and arbitration 
system, allowing disputes to be framed in precise and cataloguable form, that delivers 
predictability and labour piece to the employer, not the union. It is the same system 
which delivers a measure of protection, equity and financial remuneration to the 
workers, not the union. Accordingly, the leeway for the exercise of union power is 
greatly reduced.
It is to these differing national systems of job regulation or 'political apparatuses of 
production' that we now turn.
CHAPTER III: INTERESTS
/. Introduction
In the previous chapter, the process involved in the interests apparatus was compared 
to the making of law. Clegg sets out two models of collective bargaining, a statute law 
model and a common law model (1979, pp. I 16-1 17) and places collective bargaining 
styles along a continuum between these two. While the Canadian style would approximate 
the former model and the British style the latter, in fact the systems in both countries 
have elements of both in differing proportions. It is certain, however, that the making of 
"statutes", or the formalised setting of terms and conditions of employment into 
documentary form is an important part of joint regulation in both countries.
In both countries and in all four plants, employers and unions meet after distinct and 
regular intervals, between one and three years, with the intention of negotiating to 
establish or modify terms and conditions which they expect to remain in effect until the 
next such round of negotiations.
2. The Canadian plants
The essential point about interests bargaining in Canada is that the collective 
agreement that emerges from it is designed to contain the sum total of terms and 
conditions to which the parties mutually agree. This includes both substantive issues (pay 
and non-pay) and procedural issues (such as the grievance and arbitration procedures).
The collective agreement is for a fixed term, usually two or three years' (CANMET 's 
are two years, CANBREW 's are three). In Canada, it is legally impossible for one party 
to force the other to sit down at the bargaining table at any time except the expiry of the 
collective agreement. This set of negotiations will be called expiry negotiations and the 
strikes associated with them expiry strikes. So, in the runup to expiry negotiations, the 
parties do a complete review of the old collective agreement, to decide which terms and 
conditions invite revision and also review current economic factors and industrial surveys 
to determine the range in which to 'pitch' their proposals on 'pay issues'. The more I.
I. Of Canadian collactiva agreement» covering S00 employee* or more surveyed in l*NU, 6 7 *  war* of three year*'. M)% 
were of two year*' and i%  were of on* year'* duration (Kumar et al.. I9H6. p. 40.1) During time* of high 
inflation, *uch a* the late IV70'». Canadian agreement* revert revert to *hort*r term*.
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diligent among unions will review lost grievances to see if collective agreement language 
can be improved.
At collective agreement expiry, once either side (but, in practice, usually the union) 
'gives notice' that it wishes to amend the collective agreement, the parties are legally 
obliged to "bargain in good faith and make every reasonable effort to make a collective 
agreement"2- This obligation can be enforced at the labour relations board and 
subsequently in the courts. Although its definition is not precise, it basically forces the 
parties to meet and exchange information and enjoins them from deliberately avoiding 
collective bargaining3- It is important to note, however, that this Canadian legislative 
encouragement, as in the U.S., supports only the procedure of collective bargaining. 
Courts and labour relations boards, in Canada, as in the United States, have obsessively 
prevented the use of this provision to further any particular substantive content of 
collective agreements in the furtherance of public policy. Some argue that this has caused 
a deradicalisation of collective bargaining and the preservation of the status quo (Klare,
1978; Stone, 19 8 1) in North American industrial relations. While the contention has 
merit, these authors probably overstate the contribution of the courts and understate the 
contribution of large employers and conservative trade unions in bringing about this state 
of affairs.
Another legislative emollient to expiry negotiations is a freeze on all terms and 
conditions of employment, jointly negotiated or otherwise, until a new agreement is 
reached or until a strike or lockout is in effect.
In practically all collective agreement negotiations in Canada, including those of the 
largest bargaining units, staff officers are the major spokespeople for the union from 
beginning to end. They are present at meetings to draw up bargaining proposals and 
usually draft them for forwarding to the employer. At negotiations, they are 'backed up' 
by a negotiating committee of elected worker representatives, usually shop stewards, who 
say very little. Because of his heavy involvement in expiry negotiations and because so 
much rides on their outcome, the staff officer takes a highly partisan role in 'selling' the
2. Labour Relations Act of tha provinca where tha two Canadian planU ara located.
3. For roora information on this, »ee Cartar. I'*HJ Tha pood faith obligation doae not enjoin 'hard bargaining' by
aithar eida. Tha distinction between tha two is continually beina challenged and redefined labour relations 
boards and the courts across tha country.
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results of expiry negotiations— pushing either ratification of a settlement or rejection of 
an unacceptable employer offer and a positive strike vote. The 'best' staff officers, then, 
are manipulative politicians. Nevertheless, because of their 'otherness' from the 
workplace, they often meet resistance and resentment from the shop floor and rowdy 
meetings are frequent at expiry time.
Though most bargaining is plant-level, the union-management negotiating sessions, 
for even the smallest bargaining units, are fairly formal affairs. They generally take 
place off employer premises, usually at a hotel. The atmosphere is far removed from 
'work'. At these meetings, comprehensive positions are read out to the other party and 
some minimal proforma debate goes on. But it is at the 'caucus' meetings of both parties, 
where these formal positions are hammered out, that the real "bargaming' takes place 
('interorganisational bargaining' in the words of Walton & McKersie, 1965). The latter 
take up a far greater proportion of negotiating time than the former. As they negotiate, 
the parties move in a step-like fashion from their initial bargaining positions to a strike 
and/or to ultimate settlement, both ceding demands and proposals in an orderly and 
reciprocal fashion until a settlement is reached. Negotiations usually take place over 
several months as the parties work their way laboriously through the items in dispute.
Having bargained, presumably in good faith, the parties eventually settle all issues in 
dispute and customarily sign a memorandum o f settlementoutlining the terms agreed 
to and obliging each party to seek ratification by its principles (its members, in the case of 
the union and its board of directors, in the case of the employer). If ratified, the 
memorandum and the consequently revised collective agreement become legally binding.
If the parties reach an impasse and cannot achieve a memorandum, or having 
achieved one, cannot obtain ratification, either party can set in motion a series of legally- 
prescribed procedures, informally known as the 'countdown', leading to a legally- 
sanctioned strike or lockout (to be discussed in more detail under 'enforcements'.
By far the vast majority of collective bargaining of this type in Canada takes place at 
plant level between a single company and a single union which, by law, has been certified 
as the exclusive bargaining agent for a standard 'bargaining unit', typically all manual 
employees in that plant (Thompson, 1987, p. 89). Our two Canadian plants are no
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exception. All interests issues at CAN M ET  are negotiated between representatives of 
local management and the local union.
Interests negotiations at CANBREW, are somewhat more complicated. Because of 
the problems of interfirm market volatility, the three major Canadian breweries have 
formed an industrial relations cartel, a voluntary agreement to negotiate and settle 
agreements in each province jointly, so that no brewery will suffer industrial action on its 
own.
Bargaining proposals are formulated and discussed initially at plant level. They are 
divided into 'local issues' (those pertaining to the plant alone) and 'central issues' (those 
that affect all breweries, primarily compensation-related). Local issues are handled by 
local management plant by plant. Failing resolution, they become 'central' issues.
However, it would be incorrect to classify the negotiation of central issues as 'multi­
employer' or 'company-level' bargaining. They might be called, rather, 'coordinated 
plant-level bargaining'. Formally, plant-level negotiations continue, but at the same 
place and within the same time period as those of all other plants of the three major 
breweries in the province. A single person (usually a lawyer jointly hired by the 
breweries) speaks for management in all these sets of negotiations, assisted by the national 
corporate industrial relations managers of the breweries (with selected plant-level 
managers on hand nearby for consultation). All of these negotiations are coordinated 
carefully by management so that virtually the same offer is made to all the participating 
unions and the companies sign no memorandum of settlement until all the participating 
unions individually sign, agreeing to recommend acceptance to their members.
If a memorandum is not achieved, the companies shut down all of their plants across 
the province, locking the workers out and drying up the beer supply. If a memorandum is 
achieved, ratification by workers is carried out plant by plant. If ratification in every 
plant is not achieved, a lockout, as above, ensues4- The above procedure is followed 
sequentially, and in a deliberate manner, province by province across the country.
Though the above process of interests bargaining is somewhat anomalous in Canada, 
the exception here proves the rule. Though the circumstances favour multi-employer,
4. If only a few plant« refute to ratify, and the employer« faal they can maintain «ufficiant production at the
remaining plant«, thay may lock out or allow a «trike at the diaaenting planta only, thereby 'hanging them out 
to dry'. Thia ha» happened on a couple of occaaiona, both involving CANBREW.
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company-level bargaining (the multiplicity of unions, though a hindrance, could be 
overcome if the desire on both sides of the table were great enough), the companies have 
studiously avoided the abandonment o f plant-level bargaining. In essence, they 
have 'finessed' the loose-tight paradigm in multi-divisional companies examined in the 
last chapter, modifying it to meet the particular needs of their industry.
While collective agreement negotiations are by far the dominant interests apparatus 
in Canada, there are other methods of achieving interests agreements, a) It is not 
unknown for the parties to agree to a 'wage reopener' or some other provision to discuss 
substantive terms and conditions while the agreement is in force. But the strike/lockout 
ban proscribes work stoppage as a sanction, rendering this method almost meaningless 
and hence unpopular, b) The labour relations law in several jurisdictions allows the 
union, upon the introduction of 'new technology' by the employer during term, to open 
negotiations and, failing agreement, to submit unsettled issues to arbitration. But none of 
these jurisdictions allows a strike or lockout to ensue. To date, trade unions have had 
many problems in using these provisions to deal with technological change introduced 
during the term of the agreement (see McDermott, 1987). c) Occasionally agreements 
contain provisions for the parties to discuss novel situations introduced during the term of 
the collective agreement such wage rates for new work classifications, and failing 
agreement, to submit the substantive issue to arbitration. However, such provisions are 
highly constrained and specific, d) Sometimes, faced with an issue unforeseen in expiry 
negotiations, the parties simply negotiate a new provision. CAN BREW  and its union 
negotiated an agreement regarding an apprenticeship programme in this way. But such 
agreements rely entirely upon the good will of the employer. If the parties reach an 
agreement, arbitration is only possible if mutually agreed and strikes, of course, are 
illegal. Finally, d) parties sometimes find it impossible to continue during term without 
agreeing to add something to the collective agreement or clarify an unworkable provision 
in it. This is usually done by way of a 'letter of understanding' from the company, 
countersigned by the union. But arbitrators differ on whether such documents are
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enforceable after the expiry of the collective agreement during whose term they were 
signed5 6, on the principle
’that a tide agreement or letter of understanding doe» not continue from collective 
aireement to collective agreement unle»» in ionic way incorporated into or attached to the 
subsequent collective agreement”*1
Thus letters of understanding are ephemeral unless formally incorporated into the 
agreement at expiry. The CANBREW  collective agreement current at the time of the 
study contained eight letters of understanding. The letters were agreed to within the term 
of the previous agreement and would have expired had they not been incorporated by 
explicit negotiation.
It should be clear, however, that the above ancillary interests apparatuses form only 
the most marginal adjuncts to traditional expiry negotiations.
Because expiry negotiations are almost the only opportunity for the parties to set 
major terms and conditions, they are heavily burdened, volatile, and ominous in their 
significance to industrial relations. Unions inevitably carry a great number of proposals 
for change into negotiations, not to mention all the residual frustration built up over two 
or three years of not being able to strike. For instance, in the set of negotiations most 
recent to this study (1986), the C AN M ET  union, whose collective agreement is a 'mature' 
one (over 40  years old), still tabled no fewer than SO proposals for its amendment 
including, to mention a few: 'a substantial wage increase'; increases toother 'monetary' 
provisions such as shift premia, relief premia, overtime meal subsidies, overtime premia, 
vacation entitlement, tool allowance and welfare benefits; and 'non-monetary' 
improvements in such areas as seniority, leaves of absence, bulletin boards, the use of 
disciplinary records against employees, and health and safety. The memorandum of 
settlement was 13 pages long, with more than 30 items. This submission did not include 
any attempts to 'clean up' the several 'time bombs' (ambiguous and clumsily worded 
clauses in the collective agreement, to be discussed later), any changes to the grievance 
procedure or any bid to clear up residual grievances remaining from the life of the
5. During the life of the collective agreement. iuch letter* may be enforceable by way of the doctrine of ettoppel (tee
the diacuaaion of 'pa*t practice').
6. Hobart Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (IV7()>, 21 L.A.C. 141 (Johnston) at p. 145. Alto tee Brown and Beatty (IWU, pp.
|7U-|73 for a ditcuttion of this usue.
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collective agreement (which Gandz, 1978, in his survey, indicates up to 40%  of 
negotiating parties do).
Yet the major issue in the negotiations, which eventually pushed all others to the side, 
confronted the union when it reached the table. The employer proposed changing the 
standard work week (eight hours a day, five days a week) to a more flexible schedule, to 
overcome the problem of overtime in excess of statutory limits in several overtaxed 
departments. This proposal became the focal point of union resistance at the bargaining 
table and eventually of an I I -week strike.
Here is another example of an exception proving the rule. Canadian companies 
seldom table proposals at negotiations, preferring to rely on their managerial prerogative 
to effect changes in the course of the agreement. But so important to the company was the 
extended work week that it dared not leave the issue to the period outside negotiations. 
One manager describes the problem:
‘W* consulted our lawyer and asked him if we could introduce the new working week within 
the term of the agreement. He said there was a possibility of doing so but a risk that the union could 
seize on some clause in the agreement to take the cate to arbitration. We couldn't take that risk, no 
matter how small, because of the high costs of a negative arbitration daemon...a union win at 
arbitration would have made them harder necked. We decided to have it out with the union at 
negotiations.''
Bringing such a contentious issue to a negotiating table already loaded with 
contentious issues, in retrospect, made a strike almost unavoidable. But the company had 
no choice if it wished to exercise some control over the outcome of the issue. The presence 
of such an important issue at the bargaining table meant that other important issues were 
not fully discussed, not settled and presumably left to fester for another two years. Yet in 
Britain, as will be seen, such an issue would almost certainly have been raised as a 
separate issue outside of the main set of negotiations and probably only with employees of 
the direct departments concerned. While perhaps no less contentious in the British 
setting, the issue could have been isolated more effectively and freed from the complicated 
baggage of other issues.
The negotiations most recent to the study at CANBREW  (1985), followed a similar 
logic. In addition to the usual multiplicity of proposals, the union introduced a proposal 
for a radical job security and redundancy package to safeguard its members against the 
expected substitution of canned for bottled beer (the union doomsday estimate of the effect 
of cans was a 50%  slash in its membership). The highly emotive nature of this issue made
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a work stoppage almost inevitable. The CANBREW  union bargaining committee barely 
agreed to sign the memorandum and the membership raucously rejected ratification, 
plunging the entire province into a lockout.
But these particular strike-provoking issues are by no means anomalous in our 
Canadian plants. The CAN BREW  workers struck in the preceding set of negotiations on 
another set of issues and the C AN M ET  workers have struck about once every decade on a 
variety of issues. The point, however, is not the issues over which the strikes occur in 
this forum but the interests apparatus itself which first, like a too-small vessel, invites 
overloading so that a few crucial issues can tip it over entirely into the sea of industrial 
conflict, and second, leaves many important issues to fester unresolved.
The 'deal' that eventually settled the CAN M ET  dispute over extended working hours 
(a deal that made both parties very happy) had actually been bruited about the bargaining 
table before the strike. But the solution was not 'taken seriously' by the parties until 
after a strike had begun. Both union and management admit that there were other, 
residual, issues, most of which were not on the table, nor could hardly be given concrete 
expression, issues relating back to the hurly burly of the shop floor, that lurked behind the 
hardening positions of the parties in negotiations and their refusal to grasp at obvious 
solutions.
Likewise at CANBREW , much of the animosity behind both the 1985 and the 1983 
strikes traces back to a wildcat walkout in 1980 by workers in the packaging and staging 
units and the subsequent suspension of 25 of them. This walkout in turn related farther 
back to the volatile industrial relations climate of these units. Both the convenor and the 
staff officer indicate that these disciplined workers and their friends have acted as a core 
ginger group in inciting subsequent industrial action.
With so many items on the table at expiry negotiations and so much at stake, it is 
hardly surprising that they are highly conflictual. Among the union demands are many 
dear to the hearts of the workers in one department or another. It is inevitable that many 
such cherished demands are 'traded away' in the rundown to a settlement, not because 
they are unworthy for the union or unawardable for the employer, but simply out of a 
sense of priorities. In addition, in an overloaded process, many of the particularistic, 
non-monctary, proposals tend to be *bought out' with the general, but short-lasting.
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palliative of a few cents more money. It is the steel-nerved and often politically naive 
staff representative who will even attempt to hold up a settlement for some piece of 
contract 'language' or for a pay rise for one small group of workers. Thus, there is much 
inherent in the Canadian interests apparatus itself, over and above the specific issues it 
purports to handle, that invites conflict as much as dissipates it, especially in comparison 
to the British interests apparatuses, to which we now turn.
3. The British plants
In contrast to the Canadian interests apparatuses, so highly dominated by the 
collective agreement and the negotiations at its expiry, the British apparatuses are looser 
and more diverse. The plant-wide collective agreement is much narrower in scope than 
its Canadian cousin, its impact much more amorphous, and negotiations for its 
amendment much less important among all the political apparatuses of production 
operating in the plant.
British collective agreements do not have a fixed term and generally continue from 
year to year unless specifically amended. Unlike in Canada, British law contains no 
prescription for the procedure of collective bargaining. There is no legal obligation for 
the employer to bargain with the trade union in good faith or otherwise. But by mutual 
agreement the parties meet (usually once a year, a custom which our British plants follow) 
in the 'pay round'.
The issues discussed here are far fewer than in Canada, relating mostly to pay, but 
may include a few non-pay issues as well. In contrast to the multiplicity of issues in the 
C A N M ET  expiry negotiations, at the BRITBREW  pay round most recent to the study 
(1987), the union tabled a mere seven proposals, all of them monetary. The company, in 
a rare display of initiative (like the Canadians, British employers prefer only to respond 
to union proposals) tabled three proposals, all but one of them monetary. The non­
monetary proposal was a long overdue overhaul of the grievance and disciplinary 
procedure, which was eventually settled after and outside the pay round).
At the shop stewards' committee meeting preceding negotiations, the seven union 
proposals were distilled from a mere thirteen suggested. Yet despite this paucity of 
proposals, several shop stewards complained that the company was forcing the union to
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"bring too many issues to the central table where we used to be able to negotiate them 
ourselves [between stewards and managers, by department]".
Plant-level pay bargaining for manual workers is now more and more the norm in 
Britain, especially in the size range of our plants and beyond (Millward & Stevens, 1984) 
and our plants are no exception. Pay round negotiations at both plants are much more 
informal than at the Canadian plants. They invariably take place on employer premises 
between plant management and a domestic union committee (usually shop stewards, led by 
the convenor). With so few issues on the table, the parties do not tend to spend as long a 
time on pay rounds as their Canadian counterparts do in expiry talks. Negotiations at 
BR ITBREW  last a few weeks. Though those at BR IT M ET  have been known in the past to 
drag on for several months (mainly because of the stubborn passiveness of the union), the 
negotiations most recent to the study (in 1987 for 1988) were concluded in one week.
Unlike Canadian negotiations, where both management and union proceed in an 
orderly step-wise process of reciprocal concessions, British unions tend to keep their list 
of demands intact until the eleventh hour. Up to that point, negotiations usually consist of 
management making successively more generous offers. Only at the final stages, are 
serious concessions made by the union.
The process of agreement and ratification is somewhat similar to that in Canada, 
except that it is less formal. Because so few items are in dispute, elaborate memoranda of 
settlement are not prepared. The union negotiating committee is less emphatic in its 
recommendation to the union members than its Canadian counterpart. Management at 
both B R IT M E T  and BR ITBREW  insist, as a condition of their agreeing to a final pay 
settlement, that the union committee promise to recommend acceptance to their members. 
And the committees comply. But they do not set out to 'sell' acceptance in the same 
partisan way as the Canadians. And they are even more reluctant to 'sell' to the 
membership rejection of an unacceptable employer offer, preferring merely to 'present' it 
without recommendation. The process of ratification is an altogether less 
straightforward, more devious affair in the British plants than in the Canadian ones.
This is no doubt because the ratification of a particular pay offer is only one of several 
opportunities that British trade unionists may get in the course of two or three years to
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express their disapproval of management, whereas in Canada, the ratification of expiry 
settlement is the only such opportunity.
Staff officers are not involved in pay rounds unless a major breakdown of talks 
threatens industrial action. The union staff officer for BRITBREW  has not been 
summoned in recent memory. The staff officer for BR IT M ET  has often put in an 
appearance at the end of negotiations, but was not involved in the most recent set. Even 
where he does appear, he is obviously not as well briefed in the intricacies nor as wrapped 
up in the partisanship of the pay claim as his Canadian counterpart. At BR ITM ET, he 
usually acts as a brake on any tendency to strike action, reminding the workers that 
company offers are, as one shop steward disdainfully paraphrases, "not bad compared to 
what workers around the country are getting".
With such informality and relatively low consequence, it should not be surprising to 
learn that pay rounds at both British plants have not been the subject of strikes within the 
memory of any of the participants. One of the more militant BR ITM ET  shop stewards 
reminisces with some satisfaction:
"In  17 years, I've never lost e day in a «trike over pay....The question of wanes is very 
important so management and workers prepare very carefully. It's so very ritualised and we have the 
same basic mandate every year. It's all very predicUble....No, it's usually little things that cause 
strikes, not the bit things."
Pay rounds are only one of the plant-wide interests apparatuses employed in the 
British workplace. Negotiations on other, usually non-pay, issues may be taken up by the 
company and union at any time outside of pay rounds. For example, changes to the 
disciplinary and grievance procedures put forward by BRITBREW  management at the 
1987 pay round were not debated seriously at the time and did not form part of the 
settlement. The parties saw that the complexity of the discussions might clutter up the pay 
round and agreed to form a working party to discuss the issue after settlement. This they 
proceeded to do at their leisure, without other, unconnected, issues confusing the matter, 
and finally came to a separate agreement. The same apparatus has been used to negotiate 
other thematic mini-agreements on issues such as sick pay and absenteeism, and 
redundancy.
This apparatus is alive and well at BR IT M ET  also. In the 1987 pay round, the union 
committee raised an issue concerning temporary employees. A member of the 
management team violently disagreed. The convenor tactfully withdrew the issue.
Chapter 111...page 104
indicating he would raise it again outside of the pay round. This he did (in the absence of 
the querulous manager) and a settlement was reached. In Canada, there would be no such 
flexibility. Such an issue would have to be included in expiry negotiations. If omitted, or 
if lost among the welter of other proposals and abandoned, it would doubtless fester for a 
further two or three years.
The process works in the other direction too. An embittered group of B R IT M E T  fork 
lift drivers had long been pushing for a pay reclassification for extra duties required of 
them. Management did not agree with their claim, fearing it would upset pay 
differentials, and stalled until the next pay round (which was relatively easy, as pay 
rounds are never more than I 2 months away). There the issue was wrapped up in a 
general question of ’buying' the wider skilling of production employees, and settled in the 
context of the pay deal without differentials being altered. In a similar situation in 
Canada, such flexibility would be less available. The next round of negotiations could be 
as long as three years away, so the only way to settle the issue would be to grieve formally. 
Unless there were fairly explicit language in the collective agreement allowing the 
arbitrator to make an 'adjustment' (see Chapter V), the onus would be on the union to 
prove its case and establish that the grievor's "ability and work are beyond his present job 
description [and that he is] squarely within the description he seeks both as to ability and 
responsibility"7-
Given the comments of Brown & Beatty ( 1984, pp. 233-238), and the language of 
both the CANBREW  and CANMET, it is unlikely the grievors would have won this 
particular case at arbitration in either Canadian plant. Thus the outcome is inevitably 
zero sum.
The point here, though, is not the substance of the issues but the comparative 
flexibility of the Canadian and British sets of interests apparatuses to handle them.
"Pay rounds" and negotiations on non-pay-round agreements then, are two plant­
wide interests apparatuses. The British plants have yet a third kind, in common with 
much of British industry— departmental or sectional interests apparatuses. These are not 
the low-level, informal, sectional bargaining that goes on from day to day in many British 
plants. That will be discussed under 'adjustments' apparatuses, although the boundary
T  John In fill Co. Ltd. (WftO. IS  LA.C. lift (Macdonald). at p. I*»; quoted in (Brown and Baatty. I*MU. p. ¿M l.
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between the two is somewhat fuzzy. These are fairly formal negotiations that are carried 
on at a departmental level to establish departmental agreements, the more elaborate of 
which are written or printed and distributed.
Of our British plants, sectional interests bargaining is especially developed at 
BRITBREW , where most departments and some sub-departments have a written 
agreement, separate and distinct from the plant-wide document. Like the collective 
agreement, these do not have a fixed term. But unlike the former, they are renegotiated 
only when the parties feel a pressing need to do so, such as when a change in product 
demand or new working practices necessitates revision. They are negotiated by the 
sectional steward and supervisor, with some tacit assistance from higher stewards and the 
convenor on the union side and higher managers and the personnel department, on the 
employer side.
Although less frequently, the parties at BR ITM ET  tactically make use of this 
apparatus too, especially in the casting unit. A redundancy agreement and an agreement 
to reimburse furnace operators for pouring metal through their shift change are 
examples. In both cases, the convenor and the personnel manager ’ran alongside' (to 
borrow a term A C AS conciliators use) the negotiations but the initiative was in the hands 
of the parties at departmental level. The BR ITM ET  collective agreement stipulates that 
all such sectional agreements must be ratified finally by the plant-wide union and 
employer representatives, so theoretically a veto is available at the higher level. But 
presented with a fait accompli that the departmental people enthusiastically endorse, the 
higher level people are unlikely to disagree.
At BR ITBREW , the involvement of the convenor and the personnel department and 
the writing and printing of these agreements has evolved from earlier days (in some cases 
only 8 or 9  years ago) when such agreements were, according to the convenor "done by a 
nod and a wink or pencilled in on fag packs" between the steward and the supervisor. The 
recent trend to written sectional agreements is part of an employer initiative to further 
centralisation and bureaucratisation of these agreements. To a certain extent, it has the 
convenor's blessing: "It's forced the union to become more professional”.
However, the trend has its drawbacks as both management and the union are caught 
in a contradiction. Greater formalisation and involvement of higher authority provides
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for greater control. But it removes a flexibility that both sides cherish. According to the 
convenor:
" If  a manager wanta to pay additional money to a claaaification for the efficiency of hia 
department, he may not be able to if peraonnel haa to acrutimae the deal every atep of the way".
As we mentioned in the last chapter, the BRITBREW  convenor is firmly at the wheel 
most of the time but is able cannily to use the system, by deferring either to departmental 
stewards or the staff officer, to opt out of responsibility in some uncomfortable situations, 
only to regain the initiative at the appropriate time. In addition, by allowing some issues 
to be decided departmentally, he is less likely to be caught in the crossfire between 
contending groups of workers with contradictory aims, one of the curses for the convenors 
in the Canadian plants. To a lesser extent, and less consciously, his counterpart at 
BR IT M ET  is able to do the same. Acknowledging the above contradiction, the 
BR ITBREW  convenor avers, "the pendulum swings back and forth on the question of 
centralisation of agreements".
Notwithstanding this contradiction in the British plants, the very fact that both plant­
wide and sectional interests bargaining exist alongside each other adds yet another 
dimension of flexibility to disputes resolution in the British workplace that is not 
available in the Canadian ones.
While there are no strikes at pay rounds in our British plants, several of the longer 
work stoppages (those lasting more than a few hours) at BRITBREW  have occurred 
around the renegotiation of sectional agreements. But because these strikes involve such 
circumscribed issues and small groups of workers, they are much easier for both 
management and union to keep under control and resolve than expiry strikes in Canada.
One such strike occurred over the renegotiation of the BRITBREW  distribution unit 
incentive scheme, the substance of which will be examined in later chapters. It was a 
bitter strike and a major test of strength between the parties, lasting an unprecedented 
(for Britain) two weeks and stopping the flow of beer from BRITBREW. But it never 
involved more than 40% of the workforce and both union and employer took pains not to 
involve the other 60%  in the strike. Because the collective agreement clause ensures 
seven days notice of layoff, a cushion of work existed for non-striking employees. This 
meant that the strike did not emerge full blown. Neither party had played its entire hand 
and each had the opportunity, at various stages of the strike's progress, to test the water.
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as it were, to either escalate the struggle or to withdraw without losing too much face.
The dispute ended with a compromise which satisfied both sides reasonably well, although 
the power of the draymen as a distinct force within the domestic organisation had been 
diminished.
The visible issue of the strike— the ability of draymen to maintain their comparatively 
high bonus earnings— was not an inherently popular one among the rest of the workforce. 
Yet a sense of union solidarity obliged union members to implicitly support the draymen 
out of principle. As one worker in the brewing unit says:
" I and the other worker» regarded the draymen a* greedy and the company a» bloody- 
minded. But if puih came to «hove, the bloke* I work with would have reluctantly »upported the 
draymen out of union loyalty-1*
Luckily for the union, it never became necessary to put that sense of principle seriously to 
the test. The actions of the convenor are instructive. Mindful of the divisive potential of 
the dispute, he tactfully distanced himself from the fray as it moved to a work stoppage, 
leaving the staff officer and the departmental steward to sort it out with management. As 
the dispute concluded, he once more asserted his authority. Both management and union 
commentators agree that he emerged with greater stature than before and that the power 
of the site-wide union domestic organisation had been enhanced.
Three highly flexible interests apparatuses then, are in active use in the British plants 
as opposed to the single, comparatively rigid apparatus in the Canadian plants. Thus far 
though, only the processes by which they set out to reach substantive agreements have 
been examined. Before moving on to examine other types of political apparatuses it is 
necessary to explore the interests agreements themselves a bit more thoroughly, asking 
the questions: what is their content; who uses them; what do they use them for?
4. Interests Agreements
Because the Canadian collective agreement is the distillation of the overwhelmingly 
dominant interests apparatus and because arbitrators are so hesitant to look beyond the 
wording of the collective agreement in interpreting it, the agreement takes on a 
preternatural importance in Canadian industrial relations.
H. Phillip» A  While.id* IIVHSI detcribe thi» phenomenon among another atrong union group, docker». Worker» will not 
nece»»arily agree with tha claim of ona group but accapt tha right of that group to pur»ua it» own damand».
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A particularly telling clue to the relative importance of the collective agreement in 
the two countries is obtained by tracing its currency and distribution. In Canadian 
unionised workplaces, and certainly in both our plants, as soon as the memorandum of 
settlement is ratified, the parties invariably type up a completely new document, updating 
the expired agreement by incorporating all of the revisions and additions agreed to in 
negotiations. Once prepared, the new document is formally signed and more often than 
not is printed in small, pocket-sized booklets. The booklets are then distributed to every 
worker covered by the agreement and every manager who could possibly have cause to 
deal with a grievance from one of these workers.
Of the above recipients, all of the managers, all of the shop stewards and many of the 
workers will keep their copy of the agreement close at hand throughout the working day, 
in a desk or a hip pocket. Among the workforce, barrack-room lawyers abound, keeping 
shop stewards on their toes. It is not uncommon for companies, immediately after the 
printing of the new agreement, to hold seminars for first line managers, taking them 
through the intricacies of the document. CANBREW  has unsystematically attempted to 
do this in the past and intends to do it systematically in the future. At grievance meetings, 
it is common for all participants, including the grievor, to have their agreements open in 
front of them.
The situation in the British plants could hardly be more different. Pay round 
settlements and other changes to the collective agreement are seldom reduced to 
memoranda of settlement before ratification. The terms agreed to are eventually 
reproduced onto several A4 sheets of paper. But incorporation into the collective 
agreement is lax. A request for a ’current' collective agreement at the beginning of the 
study (early 1987) produced a document dated 1985 for BRITBREW  and 1984 for 
BR ITM ET, neither document incorporating the several changes negotiated in the interim. 
The BR ITM ET  document was cleverly assembled in a hip pocket sized ring binder with 
loose leaf pages suitable for replacement with updated material. The BRITBREW  
document is A4 size and thus not appropriate for the hip pocket. As well as this 'central' 
agreement at BRITBREW, procedural agreements on such topics as redundancy, 
grievances and absenteeism as well as sectional agreements appear after settlement, also 
rough on A4 paper.
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Notwithstanding their compatibility with hip pockets, none of the above documents 
receives wide distribution. At both plants, manual workers do not generally have them 
and several shop stewards (though supplied) do not usually have them in hand. Managers 
dealing with worker complaints receive them but, except for personnel managers, do not 
use them regularly. Even the personnel staff do not jump for a collective agreement when 
confronted with a worker complaint as do their Canadian counterparts, looking at the 
document as an unlikely aid to most of the problems with which they are confronted.
One BRITBREW  manager defended the non-issuance of collective agreements to 
manual workers:
"There't a risk of miunterpretation became of a lack of comprehention on tha part of the 
hourly paid workers if the collective agreement were readily available."
Given the complexity of the Canadian agreement and its distribution, this is most 
ironic.
The Canadian agreement has become quite complex. Comparing the collective 
agreements of the two breweries'*, the Canadian document at 30,000 words is more than 
four times the size of the British one. Yet the substantive content of the two is very 
similar. The British agreement consists mostly of monetary clauses including sections on 
working hours, overtime and shift premia, vacations and holidays, special allowances, 
welfare benefits and of course, wage rates. It also contains several procedural 
agreements (which, as mentioned above, are often renegotiated outside of pay rounds) 
such as grievance procedure, disciplinary procedure, lateness and unauthorised absence 
procedure and guidelines for the appointment and functioning of shop stewards.
By and large the Canadian agreement follows the same pattern of subjects. The only 
large substantive area of difference is the application of seniority, missing in the British 
agreement (which will be discussed more fully in Chapter V III), which accounts for 
approximately 3000 words. This still leaves the Canadian agreement more than three 
times larger on the same subjects as the British one, dealing with the same general topics. 
Herding describes the evolution of US collective agreements:
"...contract. become more detailed, more .pacified; the book limply get. thicker....Yet. the 
.ub.tentive right, it li.t* have hardly increaaed >ince I'M So r W50. A. compania. become more 
bureaucratic, their labor policie. are more and more .pelled out in the agreement. The contracti are
ment, according to a top personnel officer, it mo.t unu.ual among Britith collective agreement. 
At 11,000 word., it it at long at the CANM ET agreement
V. The BRITMET docur
Chapter III...page 1 10
ambitious to approach reality, (they attempt to provide for many eventualities] [but] leave less 
leeway for local give-and-take..." (1972, p. 140»
He suggests that this trend toward "legalism" aids both management and the union. It 
aids management in times when labour is in a strong labour-market position because it is 
a brake on how far labour can go in translating its informal power into formal power. It 
aids the union when labour is in a weak labour market position by protecting "some rights 
of good standing" which might otherwise be eroded by an aggressive employer. When a 
right exists in a written document and is potentially enforceable by law, management 
cannot ignore it easily. This is a very important point, and one which will be elaborated 
on later.
Yet, given the overriding importance of the collective agreement in the North 
American political apparatuses of production. Herding may be overstating his case. What 
is really surprising is not that the agreement is so detailed but that it is not more detailed. 
For another small but powerful difference in content between Canadian and British 
collective agreements that impinges heavily on this issue is the presence in the former of a 
"management's rights" clause. They are important enough to warrant quoting those 
operating in our case study plants in full:
CANBREW M A N A G E M E N TS R IGHT CLAUSE 
".01. The Union acknowledges that it •• tha «elusive function of tho Company to:
a. Maintain order, discipline and efficiancy.
b. Hire, discharge, transfer, promote, demote or discipline employees provided that the 
claim that a seniority or probationary employee hat been discharged, transferred, demoted or 
disciplined without just cause may be dealt with at hereinafter provided.
.02. It is understood that in csercismg these functions the Company mutt conform to all other 
clauses of this Agreement."
C ANM ET M ANAGEM ENT 'S R IGHTS CLAUSE
"Subject only to any specific provision contained herein, for which a grievance may be filed, the 
Company may etarcise all of the rights, powers, authority, and regular and customary functions of 
Management, and without limiting tha generality of the foregoing, these nghu  shall include the right 
to introduce technical improvements and methods of operation, and changes in the methods of 
operation, tha attention, limitation, curtailment, orcessation of operations and the right to engage, 
layoff, promote, demote, transfer, reprimand, suspend, or discharge for just cause".
A similar clause appears in the vast majority of collective agreements in Canada. The 
debate over how strictly this clause should be interpreted has raged among arbitrators 
and in the courts for over forty years. The pendulum swings back and forth and there has
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been some progress in weakening the potential force of the clause. Presently to be 
discussed are some of the collective agreement areas where arbitrators do make 
'adjustments'. But the "reserved rights" approach still stands as a touchstone of 
agreement interpretation, against which all more liberal attitudes must test themselves. 
It is expressed emphatically in an early but frequently-quoted arbitration case:
"The company has the right to manage its business to the best of its ability in every respect, 
except to the extent that its rights are cut down by voluntary abrogation of some of these rights 
through contract with the union. The (Management's Rights) clause which appears in most contracts 
is nothing but a gratuitous acknowledgment by the union o f  this fundamental right If the 
(arbitration) board is unable to find anything in the contract between the parties which takes away 
from the company's rights to conduct its own business, then it cannot be concerned with the quality 
of the action taken by the company nor whether it results in loss of jobs for employees of the 
company, nor whether the action which produced such results was exercised inside the four walls of 
a plant or elsewhere."(emphasis added) u
Simply put, in the absence of a collective agreement clause expressly forbidding a 
management action, such action is permitted and cannot be challenged. Moreover, 
according to the emphasised portion of the above quote, this right accrues to management 
whether o r not the collective agreement contains a management's rights clause. 
As a philosophical principal of workplace life, the attitude is expressed baldly by a more 
recent arbitrator:
"The industrial relations community is not a democracy. It is a relationship crested and 
governed by contract. The respective rights and obligations of the parties are expected to be set 
forth in a collective agreement. In that contractual relationship, management retains all the rights 
that are not bargained away to the union in the course of collective bargaining..
" In  particular, civil rights or democratic rights or any of the other terms applied to define 
the concept of a body of inherent rights having application to society generally have no place in the 
industrial relations community."1*
More liberal arbitrators would no doubt modify harshness of this edict. But were the 
situation only half as restrictive as this, it is a wonder that Canadian collective 
agreements are not longer and more complex than they already are. Shulman and 
Chamberlain suggest some reasons why "the collective agreement cannot prescribe an 
indisputable rule of thumb for every dispute, difference, dissatisfaction or situation that 
may arise during its term"12- First, they suggest, it is humanly impossible for the parties 
to anticipate every eventuality. Second, even if they could, it would curtail their freedom 10
10. ft«. Ela ctnc  ftuto-f.it«, I IW ’l, *» L.A.C. .Ul (Thom«.), at XU
11. Briti.h Columbia Arbitrator Allan Hop«, quoted in Public Employer, of Briti.h Columbia (IVMO).
IX  Shulman, Harry 4  Neil Chamberlain, excerpt from Casas on Labor Relations, quoted in Labour Relation. Law 
Ca.ebook Croup, 1974, p. ¿40.
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to act. Moreover, attempts to prescribe every possible problem in advance would make 
negotiations endlessly protracted and make it more, not less, difficult to apply collective 
agreement language to concrete situations. Such an abundance of detail would indeed put 
the agreement beyond the ken of the union membership (and, it must be added, of most 
first line managers). Shulman and Chamberlain put forward another, more intriguing 
objection, however:
"Abundance of detail and minutiae may ducover independent, individual objection! of 
minor importance which may be aggregated (intentionally or otherwise) into a quite unwarranted 
total hostility. Like a political platform, a collective aareeinent may need to avoid ‘red flats'" (ibid.)
Thus, by being toodetailed, the agreement may invite more conflict than it purports 
to assuage. They conclude that
"the collective labour agreement mutt leave much to silence, to inference or to a teneral 
statement. Like modern legislation in comples affairs, it must rely on administration to fill in the 
details and provide the needed adjuttmantt. This requires continuous joint consideration of 
problems with the collective agreement at one aid to their solution." (ihid.)
But Shulman and Chamberlain are far too sanguine about the leeway afforded by the 
system of dispute resolution to achieve this end. This is the essential paradox of the 
North American collective agreement, which the above authors do, to their credit 
acknowledge, (although their position as liberal pluralist academics leads them ultimately 
to confuse what is, and what they think should be, the real conduct of the parties).
"•■•the collective agreement also looses forces tending toward rigidity and unreasonableness.
These arc the temptation» to refer all questions to the agreement; to argue about what the agreement 
provides and not about what the problem it and how it can best be met; to insist upon literal 
compliance without proper consideration of need, purpose and spirit; to couch requests and answers 
in terms of the agreement even when doing so conceals the parties' real concerns; in short, to think 
in terms of the agreement alone and not in terms of the problems or needs of the enterprise and 
those engaged in i t "  (ibid.)
Examples of this rigidity in our Canadian plants abound and some will be examined 
presently. But for our purposes here, one clause from the CANBREW  agreement 
epitomises the situation:
"Clause 'A': The Company shall supply adequate manpower in all operations in all 
departments at all timet to that an employee will not be required to perform more then a fair day's 
work.
"Clause 'B': Clause 'A ' shall not be construed to mean that the manning of all operations it 
at present exactly adequate or that all employees are presently assigned esactly e fair day's work and 
accordingly changes in an employee's work load may be made so long as the resulting situation it not 
a violation of Clause 'A '."
While the substantive issues surrounding this clause will be discussed more fully in the 
chapter on 'Job Control', here is a truly unique provision among Canadian collective
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agreements. Its uniqueness, to paraphrase a familiar aphorism, is not how well it delves 
into the area of job control, but that it does so at all. Its existence is tribute to the 
advanced and sophisticated status of industrial relations between the breweries and their 
unions. It seems to open up unlimited opportunities for the union to grieve manning and 
effort levels.
Yet the provision has caused no end of trouble for the union. The provision is not 
new. It has been in the agreement for more years than anyone in the plant can remember. 
But, says the convenor:
"In  on« word, thi* dame 1» uaeleai. B take» away what A give». We've juat had an 
arbitration on thia and w«'ve loat again."
The personnel manager refuses to make a similar value judgment nor to talk much 
about the clause, preferring to refer to the same arbitration case, as if to complacently 
say, "We've got it under control", secure in the knowledge that in this, more than any 
other area, an arbitrator would find it exceedingly difficult, and thus hesitate, to second 
guess management.
In the 9 years previous to the study, the clause was used to launch a grievance 13 
times. On most occasions, it was hesitatingly employed by the union, to initiate discussion 
rather than as a serious attempt to win at arbitration, as if it were afraid of pushing it to 
its limits. In nearly all those instances, the grievance was dropped without achieving the 
union's objective. As a way of raising the issue as a legitimate grievance and putting it on 
the table for discussion, the clause has value, but only as that.
The difficulty surrounding this clause illustrates well the paradox of the Canadian 
collective agreement. As the solitary reservoir of the products of joint regulation and the 
main map to guide the parties' actions, it invites attention like a vacuum. But for the 
same reason, it is singularly incapable of prescribing solutions to most of the real 
problems that arise.
By contrast, the British interests agreements are not nearly so supercharged. Not 
only are non-monetary issues often separated from monetary ones, but the negotiation of 
monetary issues is spread out over a variety of loci-plant-wide pay rounds, plant-wide 
occasional negotiations, sectional negotiations (and day-to-day adjustments, which will be 
discussed presently).
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While the British collective agreement does not purport to be the repository of the all 
the products of joint regulation, neither do the parties feel constrained to vouch for 
everything in the collective agreement. Agreements to disagree over its contents abound. 
The BR ITM ET  agreement contains a rough-hewn seniority clause governing promotions 
(which will be examined more closely in the Chapter on 'Structuring of Internal Labour 
Market'). While the union insists the clause is 'non negotiable', the company refuses even 
to acknowledge its legitimacy. How then did it ever get in the agreement and why is it still 
there? Says a personnel manager:
*1 don't know how it over tot in th« agreement, but if we gave the union notice that we 
wanted to take this clause out, we would have a major i.r. problem. Practically, we just ignore it most 
of the time. Luckily it hasn't been a big problem up to now."
Since the agreement is not legally binding, the clause is of quite limited use to the 
union in the pinch anyway. Likewise, the BR ITM ET  agreement booklet contains Works 
Rules which the union refuses to recognise as legitimate but which stay in the agreement 
for much the same reason as above.
In the same vein, BRITBREW  has a pension plan and several fringe benefits such as a 
sickness and accident pay scheme, some of which are in the agreement, some not, but all of 
which Personnel insists are 'non-negotiable'. Rather than argue with this contention, the 
convenor laughs and points out concrete examples where these provisions have been 
altered (or have been prevented from alteration) by union intervention.
As opposed to the inelegance of the CANBREW  manning clause referred to above, 
BRITBREW 's sectional agreements nonchalantly deal with manning and effort levels and 
also specify task responsibilities and can run to more than 10 pages each. But unlike the 
Canadian case, the parties rely only on each other to interpret these agreements and 
acknowledge a body of 'custom and practice' to help them in interpretation.
Finally, perhaps more significantly, because of the legally non-binding nature of the 
British agreements and the self-reliance of the parties in their interpretation, the 
agreement is sometimes taken to mean something it patently does not. A fine example of 
this is the BRITBREW  redundancy agreement Which pledges the company and union to 
make every possible effort to avoid compulsory redundancy. But, carefully drafted, it 
nowhere commits the company to a policy of no voluntary redundancies. The union, for 
its part, vehemently insists that the agreement contains such a commitment. At one point.
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faced with possible involuntary redundancies, the union proceeded to ballot its members 
on a strike. In so doing, it neatly portrayed itself as the victim of company treachery to 
undermine a legitimate agreement. In the words of one steward, "the Company forced us 
to defend the [redundancy] procedure". The ballot question simply:
I am not prepared to accept the principle of compuliory redundancy.
I am prepared to accept the principle of compulaory redundancy.
Needless to say, the ballot was unanimous. So cynical was the company that it did not 
even ask the union for the result. As the particulars of the case made both parties eager 
to avoid a strike on the issue, it was resolved quietly and efficiently in a manner 
acceptable to both sides. What became preeminent, then, was not what the 
agreement actually said, but what one party, with sitfficient motivation and 
aggressiveness, took it to say. While this should not be taken as a norm in British 
agreement interpretation, it exemplifies the limits to which such interpretation can be 
stretched. So, as well as flexibility in the process of making the British agreement, there 
is considerable flexibility in its use.
5. Concluding Remarks
Although this study is meant to concentrate on the hidden, day-to-day world of 
workplace relations, it has been impossible to ignore the more formal mechanisms 
employed in each country. Even though these are the apparatuses most visible to cross­
national analysts, much of the subtlety is often missed. Moreover, it is difficult to draw 
firm lines between industrial conflict which ostensibly arises out of interests disputes (as 
they are defined here) and that which arises from day-to-day.
A  single dominating Canadian interests apparatus, expiry negotiations, which 
occurs once every two or three years, has been contrasted with the several interests 
apparatuses at work at more frequent intervals in the British plants. The potential 
rigidity of the first can only be appreciated when considering the potential flexibility of 
the second. Yet the indeterminacy of the second can only be appreciated when considering 
the circumscription of the first. While major conflict can be seen as a natural outcome of 
the single Canadian interests apparatus, the very number of British interests apparatuses 
may well bespeak numerous opportunities for conflict.
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To a certain extent, a process of convergence is taking place. On the Canadian side, 
several interests apparatuses other than expiry negotiations have been noted. The fact 
that public policy makers in several Canadian jurisdictions have allowed for collective 
agreements to be opened up during term for discussions on technological change shows a 
glimmering of acknowledgment that the rigidity of the Canadian system may act as a 
cause, and not a solution to conflict. On the British side, there has been a definite trend in 
the past fifteen years to increasing formalisation in collective agreements. As mentioned, 
what might once have been verbally agreed between steward and supervisor or written on 
a fags pack is now often typed up on A4 paper, signed and even distributed to others.
However, the change has been one degree and not of kind. Attempts by Canadian 
unions to seriously challenge technological changes or any other changes within the term 
of the collective agreement are still severely hampered. The parties to British agreements 
will chuck those agreements away or deliberately interpret them as they see fit if the need 
arises. The habits of many decades do not die easily.
Nonetheless, compared to the possible frequency of skirmishes along the frontier of 
control, interests apparatuses in neither country occur often enough to handle the vast 
majority of problems that require joint regulation. To ignore this apparatus would be 
foolish. But, as promised in the previous chapter, the bulk of our task is to examine the 
day-to-day generation and resolution of conflict. How are the interests settlements 
interpreted? What of'interstitial rule-making'(Feller, 1973, p. 745). And 
notwithstanding the flexibility and multiplicity of opportunities for rule-making, how are 
the rules and interpretations enforced? To these questions we now turn.
CHAPTER IV; RIGHTS
/. Introduction
The basic prescribed rights apparatuses in Canada and Britain are the grievance 
procedure and the disputes procedure respectively. They may appear fairly similar at 
first blush, but their operations, their role and importance in industrial relations in the 
two countries differ greatly.
Studying grievance procedures, quantifying them and making definitive statements 
about their use in Canada is a precarious exercise. First, although the grievance 
procedure is more sophisticated and bureaucratic in North America than anywhere else 
in the world, the files and records of both unions and employers are often less than 
meticulously kept after (and sometimes during) their currency. Upon settlement or 
abandonment of grievances, few employers use grievance incidence reports as an 
indicator of industrial relations climate or problems (Gandz, 1978). Given, as will be 
seen, that unions abandon so many grievances or settle them on terms less than 
satisfactory to the grievors, there is little incentive for unions to keep such records 
carefully. Thus union and management records may differ on how many grievances were 
filed, at which step they were resolved, how they were resolved and even on the subject 
matter of the same grievance. The original grievance documents themselves, if not 
missing entirely, may be incomplete (ie. fail to record, on their face, the disposition of the 
parties at various steps and at resolution).
Second, grievance filing and disposition rates may vary enormously from workplace 
to workplace (even within similar industries), from year to year within the same 
workplace, and from subject to subject. Gandz (1978), in a study of grievance incidence 
and patterns of resolution in I 18 Ontario bargaining units, finds such variation (although 
a large part of it may be due to the fact that he studies grievances only through the span of 
one collective agreement). He ascribes the variation to differences among organisations 
in the actual mechanics of grievance procedures (including the number of steps involved), 
in the steps at which they preferred to settle grievances and in how they classified and 
introduced grievances.
Third, the ostensible subject of a grievance may mask its real intent.
"Labor students »re fond of classifying grievance issues...and seldom do they warn their 
readers of the unreliability of the titles used for classification. Shop grievances appear in 
conventionalized forms appropriate to the particular agreement in force. If a worker cannot grieve 
over "down time" when a machine is broken, the matter becomes a legitimate issue of health and 
safety..." (Kuhn. 1961. p. II)
Are grievances really about what they say they are about? Gandz (1982), perhaps 
overemphasizes ulterior motives behind grievances, indicating that grievances may arise 
as a form of communications, as general challenges to management, from characteristics 
of the work environment, the jobs and the grievors and from intra-union conflict. 
However, his attempt to link grievances to background conditions is inconclusive. Kuhn 
(1961) accepts that most grievances may be taken at their face value. Our case studies 
reveal that although several of the above factors may impinge upon the rate and 
aggressiveness of grievance submission, most grievances reflect the union's pragmatic 
attempt to come to terms with the limitations of the collective agreement. Union stewards 
and convenors can easily lose credibility if they cannot identify a particular affront for 
the grievance they are arguing. And Canadian shop stewards have little power within the 
term of the collective agreement other than their credibility.
Yet even accepting the manifestness of grievances, their quantification may be 
seriously skewed by the presence of agreement language or shop practice unique to a 
workplace. Grievances on piece rates will abound only where an incentive scheme exists. 
Grievances on manning and effort levels appear at CANBREW, not because workers 
there are necessarily more concerned about the issue than other workplaces but because 
of the unique "fair day's work" provision in the agreement.
These reservations are much more serious in an aggregate study which seeks to 
quantify grievance information from many workplaces, than in our more qualitative and 
detailed study of a small number of workplaces, where local peculiarities can be more 
readily accounted for. Nevertheless care must still be taken in comparing across 
workplaces in the same country because errors are not averaged out.
Having said that about grievances in Canada, researching grievances in Britain is 
infinitely more difficult. Because the eventual settlement of a disagreement (except a 
discipline case which proceeds to a tribunal) relies much lesson the procedure that 
preceded it than in the Canadian case, employer and trade union records are even less 
well organised and susceptible to quantification.
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2. The Canadian plants
Since the 1944 Order in Council, Canadian labour relations law has required that all 
collective agreements contain a clause providing "for the final and binding settlement by 
arbitration of all differences between the parties arising from the interpretation, 
application, administration or alleged violation of the agreement1"- A grievance 
procedure preceding arbitration is not specifically prescribed, although pioneering 
legislation provided an employee the entitlement "to present his personal grievance to his 
employer at any time"1 2- The provision of an internal grievance procedure, with or 
without provision for arbitration, was a common feature of North American collective 
agreements long before arbitration became compulsory (Warrian, 1986, p. 16 1 -66). 
Since that time, grievance procedures have become universal in Canadian collective 
agreements and usually appear as the initial steps of a process in which arbitration is the 
end. Thus the grievance procedure and arbitration are an essential , nay central, feature 
of Canadian industrial relations.
In order to get to arbitration, a grievance must follow the procedure outlined in the 
collective agreement. While arbitrators in most provinces3 can proceed to adjudicate a 
case despite minor technical irregularities, and to relieve against minor breaches of the 
time limits, they have no power to relieve against a major failure to comply with the 
grievance procedure (Brown & Beatty, 1984, p. 100).
While management has the right to file grievances, this is most uncommon, as the 
collective agreement generally contains provisions to challenge, rather than establish, 
specific management rights. In fact, filing grievances can set a dangerous precedent for 
management as it can erode its sovereignty. The grievance procedure, then, is the union's 
tool.
While a collective agreement may allow individual employees or groups of employees 
to initiate grievances, unless the agreement says otherwise, it is the union, and not the 
individual employee or group of employees, that "owns" the grievance from the time of
1. Labour Relations Act of the province where the Canadian plants are located.
2. (Federal) Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act. llMM, Section 26. quoted in Woods.
2. Arbitrators in some provinces do not have jurisdiction to hear grievances where time limits have not been adhered
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initiation right up to and including arbitration. Thus, so long as it avoids acting in a 
manner that is "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith"4 in representing a bargaining 
unit employee, the union has the power to settle, prolong or even abandon a grievance 
without the specific consent of the grievor. That said, a grievance will seldom proceed 
without the consent of the grievor. Stronger unions generally attempt to negotiate 
provisions allowing the union to initiate grievances themselves (the CANBREW  union has 
succeeded, but not the C AN M ET  union). This permits the union to avoid dropping 
important grievances simply because the grievor is easily intimidated or apathetic.
2.1 Grievance Procedures
Customarily, Canadian grievance procedures have three or four steps (Gandz, 1978), 
usually starting with the grievor bringing the complaint to the attention of his immediate 
supervisor and proceeding upwards through meetings between ever higher 
representatives of union and management. Our plants are no exception here.
Gandz's (1978) study reveals a mean grievance rate (grievances per 1000 employees 
per year) of 108.2 for manual industrial workers in 98 workplaces (but with a very large 
standard deviation). Using the same method of calculation, CANBREW  is near this mean 
at I0S.6 and C AN M ET  considerably below at 30.7. Gandz finds the grievance rate for 
non-disciplinary grievances to be approximately four times that for disciplinary 
grievances. In our plants, the rate of non-disciplinary grievances is higher than 
disciplinary, but only by 40 to 60 percent.
It is impossible to measure what proportion of the total universe of worker 
complaints these formal grievances represent. But their importance can be inferred by 
looking at a number of factors. As seen in the section on interests apparatuses above, the 
Canadian collective agreement circumscribes the disputable issues. Arbitrators have no 
jurisdiction by law to rule on questions outside the agreement. While some employers do 
entertain grievances on such issues, especially at the earlier stages of the grievance 
procedure, Gandz found more than 2/3 of the employers in his study did not generally 
entertain them (Gandz, 1978, p. 137). Most union grievance forms (and certainly those 
at our two Canadian plants) specify the article of the collective agreement violated,
4. Labour Relations Act of tha province where the Canadian plants are located. For more on "unfair rapratentation", 
•ee Adell Il'Wh).
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forcing grievors almost automatically into testing their complaint against the agreement. 
Thus there are few incentives for the parties to work outside the collective agreement and 
the grievance procedure and many incentives for them to work within it.
While C A N M E T ’s collective agreement is actually worded so that any complaint 
might be entertained, the personnel manager insists that only matters of interpretation of 
the agreement are legitimate for the grievance procedure. The convenor too, is highly 
suspicious of any deviation from the straight and narrow.
" I don't lik* to ice myielf negotiating outside of formal 'bible changing time* (espiry 
bargaining]. It could work to our detriment. I know management would use it to negotiate away the
Both managements and unions are skittish about discussions outside the grievance 
procedure (except for a narrowly-specified group of issues 'unrelated to collective 
bargaining' at infrequent labour-management meetings). Gandz (1978, p. 137) indicates 
that while 10 %  of his respondents did not take the procedure "too literally", 4 2 %  insisted 
on always following procedure.
The parties at CANBREW  are a bit less rigid on adhering to the issues and procedure 
of the grievance process than those at CANM ET. The convenor (who, incidentally, is an 
immigrant from the British Isles and has had exposure to the that style of industrial 
relations) sees the grievance procedure as particularly frustrating:
"Once an item geti to a grievance, it drag« on for week* and month«...non di«ciplmary 
grievance» now take more than a year to work their way through the iy iu a *
He gives an example of a recent case where a discussion with management saved both 
parties from a messy fight. The company wanted a particular mechanic to work overtime 
against his will and insisted it had the right to do so under managerial prerogative. The 
convenor intervened and argued the mechanic's case. Finally, management relented and 
found another, less provocative solution. Why didn't the convenor use the grievance 
procedure for this particular problem?
"That would hava formalnad it. Tha man would hava had to work and grieva the alignm ent 
or he would hava had to outright rafuaa to work and invita discipline, which ha would hava grieved.
Either way, tha queition wouldn't be resolved till mOch later. Juitice after the fact ■« no juitice at 
all.
"Once a grievance ia filed, the company ‘lock« up «hop'.
But this kind of informality is most unusual. The convenor submits he would like to 
increase the number of times things are handled this way but doesn't hold out much hope.
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The company's willingness to 'horse trade' either before or during the grievance 
procedure is severely limited by fear of what this would do to the power relationship.
"The company docin't want to agree to union-proposed compromiaea. They would rather be 
the author themielvei of whatever compromise* are reached. 10 that they look good."
In other words, management does not mind occasionally acting benificent of its own 
initiative. This it does during the grievance procedure when it reduces a suspension to a 
letter of warning or offers an employee deprived of overtime the next available 
opportunity. But there is no "horse trading" to speak of and the employer is very leery of 
allowing the union to take the initiative in settling grievances outside of procedure for 
fear that the union will begin to erode management's rights. This mirror image of the 
situation at CANM ET, illustrates the great reluctance of both parties in Canada to treat 
outside the bounds of procedure.
Very few grievances in Canada are pursued to arbitration. In Gandz's study (1978), 
the mean arbitration rate is 1.3 or approximately 1.2% of the mean grievance rate. Our 
plants have a considerably higher arbitration rate than Gandz's sample, at 9 .1 and 2.3 
(8.5% and 7.5% of the grievance rate) for the brewery and the aluminum plant 
respectively. But this still means that more than 9 0%  of all grievances do not reach 
arbitration. What happens to them in the interim?
2.2 Patterns o f  Grievance Resolution
Much can be learned by observing the patterns of grievance resolution. While the 
caveats mentioned above about difficulties in tracking grievances apply doubly here, there 
is some sketchy evidence available. Gandz's (1978) study reveals very little concession by 
cither management or unions in the early stages of the grievance procedure. As the 
grievance moves along, management becomes slightly more willing to concede a few non- 
disciplinary grievances but retains an unwillingness to settle discipline cases. Our study 
indicates a similar pattern, with non-disci pi inary grievances being settled, or abandoned 
by the union, at an earlier stage than disciplinary ones. Gandz suggests that management 
is reluctant to settle disciplinary grievances at early stages because appeal is to the same 
manager who imposed the discipline. Only at higher stages, especially where the 
industrial relations department enters the scene, is the discipline likely to be reversed.
Our evidence indicates a definite difference in patterns of resolution between 
C A N M ET  and CANBREW . First, the grievance rate is much lower at C A N M ET  than at
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CANBREW  especially in the non-disciplinary area. This is possibly because, in its 
relative weakness, the union does not perceive affronts nor respond readily to them when 
perceived, unless such affronts include the suspension or dismissal of a member. At 
CAN  MET, very few grievances are conceded by management at any stage. But many 
grievances are dropped by the union (or seem to run out of steam) by the second step of the 
grievance procedure. The union has a definite problem in carrying its grievances forward 
through procedure. This is both a result and a cause of its weakness.
In CANBREW, a similar reluctance by management to concede at early stages exists, 
but a far greater number of grievances are carried by the union to the third and final step. 
At this point, there is some management concession, especially in minor discipline cases. 
But there is also a great deal of concession by the union. It is interesting to examine this 
stage more closely. The union is assiduous in carrying grievances as far as it can in order 
to squeeze as much review as possible by involving higher management.
The third step meeting is a serious affair, attended by the staff representative from 
the union and a senior ex-plant management official. Both of these representatives are 
formally briefed by their in-plant colleagues before the meeting. Long discussions ensue 
and the company gives a formal and often elaborate reply in writing, usually about a third 
of an A4 sheet reply for each grievance a few days later. A typical example of the length 
and care taken in such a reply appears in the management representative's final 
disposition in the case of the discipline of two employees for drinking beer on the 
premises:
"The Plant Management group haa attempted to control in-plant beer consumption that ta 
contrary to our policy. I am hentant to do anything that may jeopardize the established practice of a 
one day suspension for these violations.
"It  is obvious that the beer found in the Electrical Shop was placed there for consumption 
contrary to our policy. Hence, someone was planning to drink the beer. The facta are not such to 
lead me to believe that two people were drinking. So, on the face of it, at fees tone innocent man 
was diaciplmad.
"The two employees were in the room with an open bottle of beer, either as a result of their 
own action, or due to the actions of another. This esposed them to the attention of the Supervisor, 
and the obvious conclusion of the Supervisor.
"Without prejudice and precedence (sic), I am prepared to reduce the suspensions to 
written Notices of Discipline. It is hoped that neither (Mr. A. nor Mr. B.l will be found in the 
possession of a beer in an unauthorized area within the period the letters are active on file."
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If management is willing to relent at this stage or offer a compromise, it will do so 
"without prejudice", cautioning the union that the decision is entirely gratuitous and no 
precedent should be assumed.
If management is unwilling to relent, the union has two choices: proceed to 
arbitration or drop the case. While the union has a high arbitration rate, it nonetheless 
drops most of its grievances at step 3. It does so in a letter summarising its disposition to 
management's 3rd stage letter:
Dear Mr. X (Company Representative)
The Union response to dispositions received as a result of 3rd step (rievance meetings held
on July 20th and August 2. IY84:
THE FOLLOWING:
—  84-06 POLICY G R IEVANCE (GARAGE) NOT ACCEPTED 
84-07 G. WHITE ARBITRATION
—  84-11 G. BLACK NOT ACCEPTED
*“  84-13C. G REEN  NOT ACCEPTED
84-15 N. R ED  ACCEPTED
84-20 POLICY GR IEVANCE (GARAGE) NOT ACCEPTED 
84-20 J. GOLD ACCEPTED
—  GRIEVANCES. WE ARE NOT PURSUING ANY FURTHER
As can be seen above, the union presents three dispositions: "Accepted", which 
invariably responds to a compromise suggested in management's 3rd step letter (such as 
the one in the beer on the premises case); "Not accepted" accompanied by asterisks 
indicating the union will pursue the issue no further; and "Arbitration", giving the 
company notice, as per the collective agreement, that the union intends to proceed to 
arbitration.
Approximately 15%  of the union dispositions at this step are for acceptance and 15%  
for arbitration. The rest and majority (approximately 70%) are for non-acceptance with 
no further action. The union is signaling to the company and, more importantly, to the 
grievor(s), that it has gone as far as it can. The grievor has 'had his day in court' but the 
union will proceed no further. Thus, in their third step dispositions, both the union and 
the company have gone through a sort of face saving exercise, primarily meant to allow 
the union to drop unwanted grievances. But it is often the first time the grievor is 
informed that he his grievance is a 'non mover'. Up to that point, the union has given 
every indication that it has taken the grievance seriously.
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This relatively sophisticated process (especially as compared to that at C AN M ET ) is 
meant to assuage conflict by allowing the full airing of complaints. But given that so few 
of them are really 'settled' as opposed to abandoned by the union, its success is 
questionable. Students of the grievance procedure (SI ichter et al., I960; Kuhn, 1961; 
Gandz, 1978) assume that the process somehow 'works' because there is a pattern of 
settlement, but this is not necessarily so. It is not possible to make a definitive link 
between the pattern of grievance settlement and the pattern of industrial conflict either 
in a workplace or across the system as a whole, but some of the network of threads linking 
expiry strikes, wildcat strikes and disaffected work groups at CANBREW  have already 
been considered. The convenor suggests the link is more than tenuous:
"Once we let boned down in procedure, it actually prevent« compromise. The worker« and 
I let fruitrated durini the term of the collective aireement. The grievance lyitcm doein't live ui our 
due durini the collective agreement *o it'« no turprue that people are ready to buit out when the 
contract eipirei."
Examining the processes at work more carefully, how this happens can be more 
readily seen. For reasons mentioned earlier, the grievance procedure is a vacuum cleaner 
that scoops very low, picking up even the smallest complaints and elevating them into the 
formal arena of 'procedure'. Once into procedure, the original complaint becomes 
something different, as Slichter et al (1960) say:
"Many gricvancaa change in character a« they move through the grievance procedure— a fact 
not alwayi realized...A«..a grievance advance* up the grievance procedure, it loiei it» operating flavor 
and content. It become« a 'paper grievance'..." (p. 7131
These authors cite some of the negative fallout from this situation:
"Ducuo ion  and «cttlement of a large proportion of grievance« in their operating 
environment by tho«e moit immediately concerned in the outcome go much further to create a 
«atiifictory employee relation* environment than do higher-«tep «ettlementa. A top-«tep «ettlement 
of an individual employee grievance, no matter which aide win«, create* no meeting of mind* of thoie 
moat immediately concerned." <p. 733-3«)
But 'the system' seems to work against settlement at a lower level. At the early stages 
of the procedure, it is not in the interests of supervisors to concede on grievances. For 
all the attempts by CANBREW  higher management to get first-line managers to take 
more responsibility for answering grievances, these managers hesitate to do so. They 
want higher management to hand down standard plant-wide policies on issues involving 
disputes with employees and they attempt to get the personnel department to help them in 
their replies to the union at the early stages of the grievance procedure.
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The CAN BREW  personnel department has attempted to impress upon the first-line 
supervisors the importance of getting the first responses to grievances right by selectively 
taking them along to arbitration hearings. Other supervisors have experienced 
arbitration at first hand as witnesses. But instead of encouraging them to take more 
responsibility in answering grievances, this exercise has induced a (quite unjustified) 
fatalism, and often fear, among the supervisors and a preference to 'play it safe’ by 
passing grievances on up the ladder. Confronted with arbitrators who do not take a crude 
pro-management line, many supervisors rashly jump to the conclusion that the whole 
process is 'stacked against us'. "Why can't we be left alone to just manage?" they ask 
plaintively. The effect of arbitration on management will be discussed in more detail in 
the chapter on "Enforcements". Also discussed in that chapter are the reasons for the 
differences in the pursuit of grievances between the two Canadian plants.
At the later stages of the grievance procedure, it is the union whose interests are not 
served by conceding on grievances. Unlike in the British situation, the political costs of 
'sorting out' the membership are quite high while the costs of forcing the issue to the final 
step are quite low. After the final step, the costs become higher and this is where unions 
become a little more discriminating. While most non-disciplinarycases are abandoned 
at this stage, most disciplinary cases are taken on to arbitration. In a sense, disciplinary 
cases are 'safe' in that most do not challenge managerial prerogative per se.
Thus the grievance procedure at CANBREW  (and, by extrapolation, most Canadian 
bargaining units which pursue grievances with a minimum of vigour) is like an escalator, 
easy to get on, hard to get off until the very end. At the end, however, it can let union 
members down with a nasty bump.
2.3 The E ffe c t o f  Arbitral Jurisprudence on Grievance Resolution
The imagery of automatism is reinforced by the fact that from the earliest stages of 
the grievance procedure, both parties are heavily influenced by the arbitral 
jurisprudence. Forty-five years of Canadian arbitration have probably produced more 
than 100,000 awards. Like court decisions, they are gathered and the 'leading cases' 
(those that break new ground) edited and reported just as court cases in volumes of 
arbitral jurisprudence. Several comprehensive reviews of this jurisprudence (Brown & 
Beatty, 1984; Palmer, 1983) have been published and are updated periodically. As well.
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commentaries on the arbitration scene are distributed by reporting services to employers 
and to unions. Personnel managers and convenors in both of our Canadian plants indicate 
that they use these reviews and commentaries. They also make a special point of being 
familiar with arbitration awards of other bargaining units in their industry (the 
approximately 40  breweries across the country are especially keen on sharing arbitration 
awards). As C A N BREW 's personnel manager says:
"Jurisprudence enters my consideration before we move to the second step of the grievance 
procedure. I try to get the supervisors to act at if every grievance is going to arbitration."
The convenor at CAN  M E T  admits:
"Jurisprudence becomes important to us by the third step. I've taken 
union courses on arbitration and it's drilled into people to look at their 
Brown and Beatty during the grievance procedure."
In addition to consulting books and reports on arbitral jurisprudence, unions and 
companies sometimes consult outside experts even while the case is in the grievance 
stages. CANBREW 's personnel department is authorised to occasionally consult the 
company lawyer before arbitration on matters of great importance. Convenors at both of 
our Canadian plants consult staff officers on jurisprudence from the very beginning of 
some important cases.
Predictability in arbitration is highly valued by all parties, but especially by 
management and its lawyers and for the most part they are not disappointed. While 
individual arbitration awards do not set legal precedents, a strong line of similar awards 
on similar material facts will almost inevitably lead to an issue being settled and so 
comprehensive is the jurisprudence that even the most esoteric situations find their way 
into print. Thus, given a set of circumstances, practitioners can almost predict the 
arbitral outcome. Two American scholars have gone so far as to develop a computerised 
simulation of the arbitral decision making process in arbitration. They claim,
“A * the model 1» further developed and refined, a uaer could decide the probability of a 
'win' or 'lose' outcome for a given caae, to be ruled on by a specific arbitrator or by arbitrator in 
general." (Oullett 4  Goff, IWUI. p. M>a’>
But since arbitrators are mere human beings and not computers, some, especially 
those who are just beginning their careers, are less predictable than others. Commenting 
on one such 'loose cannon', a Canadian corporate labour lawyer expresses his distaste:
" I won't appaar before har. It'a not that aha'a conaiatantly pro-union. Actually, aha rulaa 
as oftan for management as for uniona. It'a just that aha hat no understanding of the ahop floor. (Ha 
than describes a cate where this lack of understanding led to an undeserved management win.)...This
kind of caic destroys her predictability. And I look like a jerk to my client* if I can't predict a result 
from arbitration. None of us want unpredictable arbitrators.”
Corporate industrial relations lawyers use this predictability not only to argue 
arbitration cases but to advise their clients on what action to take in a situation. Most 
respond on an ad hoc basis to queries by their clients and then become more involved as 
cases near arbitration, but some take a more interventionist approach, especially with 
smaller firms that do not have highly specialised industrial relations departments. One 
such lawyer insists:
"We have a better record at arbitration than most law firms because we are more proactive.
We encourage our client* to call us earlier in the grievance procedure. We get them to line up the 
circumstances so they get the best result if the case goes to arbitration. For instance, in the case of 
termination for absenteeism, there is a definite set of preliminaries that they should follow so that it 
will stand up at arbitration.”
In this way, he claims that the client can "shape the event to fit the approach of 
arbitrators".
Because of the importance of the arbitral jurisprudence on grievance resolution, it 
should not be surprising that experienced practitioners on both sides learn to spot 
'winners' and 'losers' among grievances quite early on in the procedure. Inevitably, this 
shapes their way of thinking about grievances and about worker complaints in general. If 
a case is a clear 'winner' for the union, management will often give way before the case 
goes to arbitration. As one company lawyer says:
'Law  firms can spot a loser a milt off. Thara arc considerable costa to losing an arbitration, 
mainly in loaa of face to the company. I always say to a client if ha’s got a loser, for instance in a 
discharge caae, ‘if we don't give in on this grievance now, then the guy will wave his $10,(100 cheque 
around the plant'. Even if the arbitrator reinstates him with no back pay, it looks like a victory for 
the union.”
This echoes the CANBREW  convenor's remarks about the importance to the company 
of monopolising the initiation of concessions. As will be seen presently, arbitral 'losers' 
for employers occur most frequently in discipline cases. More often than not the case is 
an arbitral 'loser' for the union. Though it may have arisen as a perfectly legitimate 
worker complaint, once into procedure a grievance's disposition is more and more framed 
by arbitral considerations. It is nonetheless important that the union carry on, at least 
until the final stages of the grievance procedure and possibly to arbitration, lest the entire 
system be brought into disrepute. However, the vigour employed depends greatly on the 
subject matter of the grievance. Unions are very good at cynically pursuing 'losers' in 
discipline so that the grievor has, and is seen to have, his 'day in court' and that a third
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party, not the union, makes the final decision. Ross (as quoted in Brecher, 1972, p. 254) 
describes this process as "the vigorous prosecution of lost causes" and suggests that 
employers have learnt to be tolerant of it:
HEmployeri frequently understood thet union officials are required to support improbable 
demands, and develop a spirit of tolerance toward the practice if it is  not carried too far. If it is 
politically impossible for the (union) officials to accept a refusal, the issue may be carried to 
arbitration, atain without eapectation of success. All of these procedures are part of the equipment 
of successful trade union leaders"
Yet, while admittedly pursuing lost causes and hesitating to 'sort out' its members, a 
more subtle method of 'filtering' grievances operates to keep the number of lost causes 
lower than they might otherwise be. The subject matter of grievances initiated is 
inevitably constrained by the question of arbitrability.
2.4 The Subject Matter o f Grievances
What are the subjects of grievances? Bearing in mind warnings about mixed and 
disguised motives, what evidence exists is worth considering, more for broad patterns than 
for details. Gandz's (1978) study is not able to divide grievances from his large sample 
into anything more detailed than 'disciplinary' and 'non-disciplinary'. However he does 
look more closely at the pattern of grievances over a fifteen-month period in a basic 
steelworks and finds the following information: The largest discrete group of grievances 
is disciplinary, comprising more than half of the total, with discharges at roughly 8 %  of 
the group. The second highest group, at about 25%, consists of issues concerning the 
structuring of the internal labour market (ie. who shall be in  o r  out of the bargaining unit, 
application of seniority, job postings etc.). The third largest group, at about 7%, concerns 
pay, overtime and work scheduling. Only a very small group of grievances (no more than 
3% ) concerns itself with the performance of work itself, its speed, its direction and 
relations between workers and their supervisors (such as harassment by foremen), or 'job 
control'.
Our two case study plants follow roughly the same pattern, but with discipline 
forming a slightly lower majority and pay forming a much larger minority proportion 
than in the earlier study (most of the pay grievances are over alleged unfair distribution 
of overtime opportunities).
Internal labour market grievances are only 10%  of the total at CANBREW. But, 
given the absolute flatness of the job hierarchy in this plant, it is surprising that the
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grievance rate should be even this high— proving even more conclusively the importance 
of this substantive area in Canadian grievance procedure. Although still a very low 
proportion, job control grievances are somewhat more numerous at CANBREW , but this 
is due to the presence of the aforementioned unique 'fair day's work' clause.
Why are there so few grievances on job control issues? Could it be that these are not 
of importance? Given their importance in the grievances of British workers, this is 
doubtful. Yet their relative absence, even taking into account the scarceness of 
appropriate language in the collective agreement on which to base such grievances, 
indicates a filtering mechanism at work, operated not only by the convenor and the 
stewards, but possibly by the workers themselves, who sense that using the grievance 
procedure for such complaints may be worse than a waste of time.
3. The British plants
Unlike in Canada, the British state has not intervened in workplace industrial 
relations to specify how the parties should go about resolving disputes. The presence of 
disputes procedures for the processing of complaints from workers, therefore, has been 
much less uniform and comprehensive. The Donovan Report commented on the relative 
poverty, to that point, of workplace-based disputes procedures, and recommended that 
boards of companies take steps:
"to develop, together with unions representative of their employees, joint procedures for 
the rapid and equitable settlement of grievances in a manner consistent with relevant collective 
agreements.* (Donovan. 1968, p. 45»
Up to the time of the Donovan Report, much of the collective bargaining on the 
employer side was dominated by several large employers' federations eg. the Engineering 
Employers' Federation, the National Federation of Building Trade Employers and the 
Association of Chemical and Allied Employers, to name some of the largest. These 
federations had industry-wide disputes procedures but domestic procedures in individual 
plants were embryonic. In 1968, more than a third of federated employers and about a 
quarter of non-federated employers in manufacturing surveyed had no formal plant 
procedure (Government Social Survey, 1968).
The industry wide procedures were subject to much criticism by trade unions. It was 
the Engineering disputes procedure that came in for the greatest criticism, but it 
epitomised the problems of the others. Designed to settle disputes over the interpretation
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of the industry-wide substantive agreement, it consisted of three stages, a Works 
Conference at the workplace, a Local Conference involving regional union and federation 
representatives, and a Central Conference, held invariably at York, involving national 
officials (Hyman, 1972). The procedure suffered from many deficiencies: it was too long; 
it failed to dispose of complaints effectively; it failed to stop a rise in unconstitutional 
work stoppages and it was overloaded above works level and yet unable to effectively 
handle disputes at works level (Marsh & McCarthy, 1968a, p. 18).
So discredited among unions was the procedure that former Transport and General 
Workers Union General Secretary Jack Jones comments:
" I shared «he view of the old lad «ho said that ovar the entrance to the Royal Hotel at York, 
where the monthly conference! were held...aa the last state in the [disputes) procedure, there should 
have been a banner erected to read 'Abandon Hope All Ye Who Enter Here'. The procedure..-was 
long-winded, with inbuilt delays calculated to cause frustration." (Jones, IW6, p. III).
This state of affairs, which lasted at least half a century, nurtured a legacy of distrust 
of formal procedure, especially among general unions like the T&G, that persists to this 
day when industry procedures are no longer the norm.
But it was not only the unions that disparaged procedure. Management, while 
complaining that unions had scant respect for procedure, was as guilty itself. Tolliday 
describes the evidence given by Amalgamated Engineering Union head Bill Carron's to the 
Donovan Commission:
"Tht shop floor [msnstersl had decided that the way to succeed was not to to through 
Procedure but to 'turn on the heat': the motor manufacturers had developed a habit of conceding 
only under pressure. "They refuse through all the levels of Procedure and then at a certain point, 
there is the threat of action or something similar and then they concede. This', he concluded, 'is 
making nonsense of Procedure.' Employers were conceding under pressure what they would not 
concede through reason." (I9H5. p. I3S, emphasis in the original)
Whether they were responding to the Donovan Report or to trends and pressures 
building up before, many British employers (mostly with union blessing) abandoned 
industry disputes procedures very quickly in the early 1970's. One of our British plants, 
BR ITM ET, belonged to the Engineering Employers' Federation until 1971, when it 
disaffiliated. Left with little or no domestic procedure, those companies that dropped out 
of industry arrangements, those whose federations abandoned industry procedures and 
even many of those who still participated in industry procedures , started to introduce 
more elaborate procedures at plant level. By 1984 ,9 1 %  of private sector establishments 
surveyed had some sort of disputes procedure (Millward & Stevens, 1986, p. 170).
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3.1 A Multiplicity o f  Prescribed Procedures
Actually, the term disputes procedure implies a single procedure while, in fact, 
British workplaces have several different types, some running conjointly, making 
procedure somewhat more complicated than in their Canadian counterparts. Some of the 
distinct types of procedure are 'pay and conditions', 'disciplinary', 'individual grievances' 
and 'health and safety' (Millward & Stevens, 1986). Our plants have combinations of 
these.
BR IT M ET  has an 'individual grievance procedure' and a 'disciplinary procedure'. It 
also has subsets of these: a 'collective issues' procedure which plugs into the 'individual 
grievance procedure' at its third stage; and 'serious misconduct' which plugs into the 
'disciplinary procedure' at its third stage; both of these latter plug into the 'collective 
issues procedure' at its third stage. BRITBREW  has a 'grievance procedure' and a 
'disciplinary procedure' distinct from one another.
Given that the formal and sophisticated Canadian system suffices with only one 
procedure, why is it that the British system has so many separate ones? One reason is the 
relative novelty of domestic procedures. Collective bargaining had existed for at least a 
hundred years before they became widespread, so they have been added on in a patchwork 
(unlike Canada, where disputes procedure was prescribed at the dawn of mass collective 
bargaining). A second, and important reason is that since 1970, several laws have been 
passed which either directly or indirectly force employers to set up procedures. The 
Industrial Relations Act (1971) gave employees the statutory right not to be unfairly 
dismissed. In light of the Act and its amendments, both A C AS and various personnel 
management organisations encouraged (union and non-union) employers, both for their 
own protection and that of employees, to establish a formal procedure to follow when 
disciplining. This is why many employers, and our two case study plants, have disciplinary 
procedures distinct from others.
Discipline and its procedures will be discussed more fully in Chapter VII. It is 
important to note here, however, that the disciplinary procedure differs from other 
procedures in one important way: the initiative is taken by the employer. In Canada, the 
employer imposes discipline and then sits back to wait for the union to respond. If no 
grievance is launched against the discipline, then the discipline sticks The only way for
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the union to gain access to arbitration is to follow the grievance procedure, so a fair 
hearing and right to appeal at the workplace is presupposed. In Britain, an individual 
discharged employee, with or without the help of his union (in fact even a non-union 
employee), can take the employer to a disciplinary tribunal, whether or not he launched a 
grievance at the workplace. Yet an employer at a tribunal is judged, among other things, 
on its procedural fairness (Anderman, 1985, p. 422), ie. whether the employee was given 
adequate warnings (in cases short of gross misconduct) as well as a fair hearing and the 
right of appeal. Thus the employer is well advised to set the appeal procedure in motion 
himself, rather than wait for the employee or the union to do it.
Disciplinary procedures aside, as in Canada, the grievance procedure, although 
theoretically available to the employer, really belongs to the union. There is no provision 
in British law obliging the union to represent employees fairly as there is in Canada. The 
union, then, is free to decide which cases it wishes to bring to procedure, or whether to use 
procedure at all.
There is no restriction, whether explicitly or implicitly as there is in Canada, on the 
subject matter of the grievance procedure. The B R ITM ET  procedure invites "problems 
of any kind". The BRITBREW  procedure can be used for "any matter in which [the 
grievor] is directly concerned". Since, as has been seen, the collective agreement is 
neither comprehensive nor circumscribes the disputable issues, grievance topics vary 
widely.
Thomson and Murray's study (1976) of grievances in 35 British workplaces sheds 
some light on the question of subject matter (p. 78). As in the Canadian plants, minor pay 
and overtime issues are common. Discipline is also common but not nearly as much as in 
Canada5. Grievances about promotion and redundancy (structuring of the internal 
labour market), very common in the Canadian plants, are conspicuous by their absence in 
Britain. By far the most frequent types of grievance they found were on "working 
conditions" (complaints about the physical arrangements of production) and "work 
allocation" (resistance to being transferred within the workplace). These are issues that 3
3. It thould be noted that tha Thornton and Murray study (WT»> was carriad out bafora tha advant of disciplinary 
tribunals.
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Canadian collective agreements and grievances touch on very infrequently and 
tangentially, in that they impinge on the area which we have called 'job control'.
British disputes procedures usually prescribe three or four steps (BR ITM ET  has four 
steps, BR ITBREW  three), advancing from a discussion between the grievor(s) and the 
appropriate first-line supervisor (both of our plants invite the attendance of the shop 
steward), through higher levels of management. As in Canada, the procedure finally 
prescribes the involvement of the highest industrial relations managers in the company 
and the staff officer of the union.
After the final stage at plant level is exhausted, a significant minority of British 
grievance procedures (approximately a quarter) specify the use of a third party, other 
than an employers' association or trade union, to settle disputes (Brown, 1981; Millward 
& Stevens, 1986). Such provision is usually voluntary, although some are compulsory. At 
BR ITM ET, the collective agreement indicates that disputes after the final stage "can be 
referred to A C AS if jointly desired". The BR ITBREW  procedure provides that the 
matter will be referred to ACAS for conciliation and that failing resolution there, it may 
be referred to an independent arbitrator for final and binding settlement.
3.2 Appearance vs. Reality
So much for appearances. The reality o f  disputes procedures in Britain is quite 
different. Their actual use is much less common that their formal inclusion in 
agreements would indicate. To start at the end of procedure, conciliation is rare and 
arbitration rarer, even where specified in procedure. Brown (1981. p. 48) indicates 
that of the minority of workplaces in his sample with provision for third party 
intervention, more than 3/4 had not used it for pay and conditions disputes, 9 2%  had not 
used it for discipline and dismissal disputes and 95%  had not used it for individual 
disputes, in the two years prior to the study.
Compared with approximately 2000 arbitration cases a year in Canada, in Britain (a 
country with more than double the working population), A C AS and the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC) now handle fewer than 200 a year (ACAS, 1986, p. 44; 
ACAS, 1987, p. 29).
At BR ITM ET, despite the provision for reference to ACAS in the agreement, the 
parties have only agreed to refer a dispute to arbitration once in memory (approximately
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15 years). Its outcome is highly instructive about the use of arbitration in Britain. The 
reference, in 1979, concerned whether tax free allowances would be included in the pay of 
transport drivers. The arbitrator's award was a compromise between the stated positions 
of both parties. But both union and management disagreed with the award and decided to 
ignore it despite prior mutual agreement (but no legal obligation) to be bound by it. Says a 
personnel manager:
"Thera was no rationale that we could see for the decision. Both the union and the 
company were angry at him. It left such a bad impression of arbitration that we never want to use 
ACAS again. There would have to be a major strike over an issue that seemed insoluble for us even to 
consider it."
The union concurs in this assessment. The point here is not the substance of the 
award nor even the parties' dislike of it, but rather the way their reaction highlights their 
attitude to the process. Because it is so common a mechanism in Canada, the parties there 
accept, at least outwardly, the occasional unpopular award. In Britain, where it is 
exceptional, such an unpopular award often works to drastically discredit arbitration.
Some five years after the above incident came the only other mention of arbitration. 
Having exhausted the disciplinary procedure for an employee fired for theft and fighting, 
the union wrote to the company appealing the case to ACAS for arbitration. The company 
refused outright and a senior manager wrote to the union:
"...Tha Company firmly baliavas that any rafaranca to ACAS could only be made if jointly 
denred. The wording 'if  »0 desired' hai been part of our Agreement since IV7I and this is tha first 
time there has bean any difference of interpretation...
"The Company has also discussed the situation with ACAS emphasising that it was not 
prepared either to be bound by arbitration or be involved in conciliation...The ACAS Regional 
Officer was not prepared to become involved in the case on that basis"
Realising a lost cause by this route, and feeling its chances to be worse at a statutory 
tribunal, the union abandoned the case. The company, for its part, had nothing to gain by 
arbitration. Both of these examples typify the attitude of deep distrust on both sides for 
third-party intervention.
A similar attitude exists at BRITBREW. Despite a mandatory provision for ACAS 
conciliation and a directory provision for arbitration in the disputes procedure, 
arbitration has, in fact, never been used and a conciliator consulted only once in the 
memqry of the parties.
The truth is that the parties in British industrial relations by and large do not take 
procedure nearly as seriously as their Canadian counterparts— nor, of course, do they
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have to. Because third party intervention to resolve disputes is neither required nor 
especially desired, the use of formal procedure to unlock access to it is unnecessary. Our 
investigation of procedure in the two British case study plants reveals that there really 
exist two procedures— a formal one, which follows the steps laid out in the agreement, and 
an informal one, which actually handles most of the disputes which arise. What is more, 
the parties slip back and forth between the two comfortably according to their needs.
This fact is particularly well-mirrored in the grievance documentation (or actually its 
absence) of the two plants. BRITMETcan actually boast some grievance documentation, 
especially in discipline cases, since it is in the company's interest to maintain it as a hedge 
against a possible disciplinary tribunal. But for the most part, evidence on other 
grievances is sparse and confusing. BRITBREW ’s grievance documentation, both 
disciplinary and other, is, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. A personnel 
manager indicates that what few documents on grievances do exist are filed in the 
personnel files on individual workers. As for the union, the convenor says that "records 
only begin when a shop steward is not able to handle a grievance". The union's documents 
on grievances are in the files of individual shop stewards. But it is impossible to follow 
the progress of even a single discrete grievance in this way. Records of grievances may 
begin or end at any stage in the procedure and bear no relation to the eventual outcome or 
to the actual process of resolution that took place. Thomson and Murray (1976, p. 59) 
describe the same difficulty in their study of British grievance procedures:
"■••the factual esisUnce of tuch thins* *• standard practical i* difficult to dutinguiih 
empirically from actual processes. In addition to obtaining copia* of formal procedure*, we asked 
top and middle management re*pondent* what the 'usual' practice wa* for handling grievance*. If 
several respondents Undid to give the same or highly iim ilar answers we assumed that a standard 
practice eaisud. If manager* said there were no 'usual' way* of handling things or if we obuined 
highly varied response* as to what was usual we assumed no sUndard practices canted. As with the 
formal writun procedures, however, these general su u m e n u  of 'usual' were not necessarily the 
actual process by which grievances were handled..."
The fact that they carry on with their study dealing almost exclusively with formal 
processes after acknowledging the high degree of formality is all the more questionable.
As can be seen in our case study plants, informality is still the rule, with the formal 
procedure being, as one personnel manager put it, a mere "location point in a dispute".
3.3 The Persistence o f Informality
While the informal procedure is the significant method of disputes resolution in both 
British plants, it is in BRITBREW  that it has reached its fullest flower. What makes this
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fact all the more ironic is the evident pains to which the parties seem to have gone to 
build in quite unique incentives for adhering to procedure.
The BR IT BR EW  collective agreement states quite clearly that:
"Any dispute arising from the application of this Agreement will be resolved through the 
procedure for resolving disputes contained in the Plant Agreement. No strike, lockout or any 
other action will ba takan by either party until this procedure has been exhausted '. (emphasis 
added)
What is more, by agreement between union and management, the following 
clause appears in every individual contract of employment:
"The employee agrees that he shall not take part in any strike or any other industrial action 
until any issue or dispute causing or contributing to such strike or other industrial action shall have 
been dealt with through the appropriate procedures agreed between the Company and the Union and 
those procedures have been cahausted."
To back up these admonishments, the collective agreement contains what the parties 
call a 'procedural bonus', described as follows:
PAYMENT FOR ADHERENCE TO G R IEVANCE PROCEDURE 
The Company will make a payment of U h  per eight-weekly period in arrears to all full-time hourly 
paid employees in the defined work group when no unofficial action hat been taken in breach of 
their Procedural Agreement..
The BR ITBREW  case is an almost perfect example of the robustness, despite 
prescription to the contrary, of informality. In the face of all of these explicit reminders 
and incentives, not only is procedure seldom followed in its prescribed form but work 
stoppages are common during procedure. But what is even more remarkable is that while 
both parties explicitly acknowledge and accept industrial action as the ultimate step once 
procedure has been exhausted, there has never been a strike within the memory o f 
the participants (15 years) which came about as a result o f  the exhausting o f  the 
procedure. " If  an issue is emotive enough to cause a dispute," says the convenor, 'Then a 
strike may happen at any step no matter what the agreement says."
It is worthwhile briefly examining the workings of the above-noted procedural bonus 
provision at B R ITBREW  because it tells so much about the flavour of shop floor 
industrial relations in this plant and, by implication, in British workplaces with strong 
unions. The provision was negotiated into the collective agreements of BR ITBREW  and 
its sister plants across the country in the late 60 'sor early 70's. In those other plants, it 
has long disappeared by being consolidated into general pay. But it remains at 
BRITBREW  because management still sees it as useful and the union finds it relatively 
easy to ignore. Its initial objective and subsequent effect have been watered down by a
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number of factors: First, its amount has remained £38 for some time, reducing its real 
value and incentive power; Second, aggressive, fractious work groups who are prepared 
to strike out of procedure are willing to forfeit the payment if need be; Third, sometimes 
the bonus is actually paid after a non-procedural work stoppage because such payment is 
bargained as part o f  the settlement o f  the strike. The fourth factor is that, perversely, 
the provision can often work to encourage flouting of, rather than adherance to, 
procedure. This depends on when the non-procedural strike occurs. The bonus is paid 
department by department in the ninth week for the preceding complete eight-week 
strike-free period. The departmental scope is designed to encourage peaceable workers to 
rein in their more obstreperous brothers and also to avoid the difficulty of singling out the 
renegades. Yet if a strike occurs near the beginning of the eight week period and results 
in forfeit of the bonus, even if the strike is by a small group of workers, it can often lead 
the whole group to feel it "might as well be hanged for a Pound as a Penny", and be more 
willing to strike in the remaining weeks. Because of this, management must think very 
carefully about whether it wishes to withhold the bonus in any particular work stoppage.
If the dispute is precipitated by a manager acting 'foolishly' and the strike is 'his own 
damn fault', it may well make the situation worse for the compary to withhold the bonus. 
Thus withholding of the bonus is reserved for those occasions when the shop steward and 
work group involved flout the procedure gratuitously or continuously. In such cases, the 
company may not only withhold the bonus but also express its displeasure by threatening 
to remove the shop steward, discipline the strikers and withhold other 'favours' from the 
union. These are intended as signals to the convenor that the offending work group and 
shop steward have stepped over the line of acceptability, threatening to tip the entire 
delicate mechanism of dispute resolution over. The convenor is then expected to 'sort out' 
the delinquents and in most cases at BR ITBREW , he does.
The above example shows a number of things. First, it illustrates that when a system 
of workplace industrial relations is geared to and thrives on informality, no amount of 
prescription and incentive will bring about formality. Second, it demonstrates that 
despite the informality, the system has definitive but unspoken limits of acceptability. 
Third, it indicates how misleading prescribed procedures can be to a researcher if not 
investigated more deeply.
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While it is difficult to specify a 'typical' dispute at BR ITBREW , the following 
composite reflects a common type of approach at this plant: While the grievance 
procedure specifies that the first stage may involve discussions between the employee and 
his direct supervisor, it is realistic enough to acknowledge that the discussion usually 
takes place between the shop steward and the department head, bypassing the grievor and 
supervisor entirely. Both union members and managers indicate that first-line 
supervisors are often too close to the shop floor and have too little real authority to be 
worth talking to about grievances. Likewise, bypassing the individual worker can be 
expeditious since the steward is often able to express the complaint more succinctly and 
less emotionally than the grievor, can make connections between the instant complaint 
and other related problems, and sometimes will 'filter' frivolous or strategically unsound 
grievances out of the system before they become caught up in the system.
The vast majority of disputes at BR ITBREW  are handled between the shop steward 
and the department head without the convenor or the personnel department being 
involved. Neither party considers the dispute at this stage to be 'in procedure' partly 
because it is discussion only and partly because both sides may wish to 'do a deal' without 
any formal documentation or formal notification of those higher up. Not many such 
agreements completely escape the notice of higher union or company officials and 
outrageous arrangements are sometimes vetoed by either management or union, but as 
long as the agreement is within the bounds of acceptability, both convenor and personnel 
are content to pretend they do not know its substance. The exact proportion of disputes 
settled at this stage depend on the strength and confidence of the shop steward and the 
manager involved.
Failing settlement at this stage, the shop steward informs the convenor who either 
instructs the steward to register a formal 'failure to agree' or, if the problem is very 
important, goes directly to the department head or the personnel manager for an informal 
chat. If a 'failure to agree' is registered, it consists of a short note, often written by the 
convenor, setting out the 'terms of reference' of the dispute. A meeting between the 
convenor and the department manager follows. In any case, the convenor is invariably in 
touch with the personnel manager to inform him of the failure to agree, even if the 
department head does not.
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The convenor describes what goes on at the second step:
" If  we decide to formalise things at this step, we argue from entrenched positions on points 
of principle. We only do that if we know the issue can't be resolved here and must go higher. It 's 
most difficult to resolve a dispute here and I feel we've failed if it gets to this level. In fact, before 
we go to the third sup, the shop steward may have got back with the manager to try to solve the 
problem. Everyone is trying to find a solution to prevent it from getting higher in procedure."
At the same time, the convenor may be holding informal talks with the personnel 
manager. If the dispute does go to a higher step, it is usually because one party or the 
other wishes to stall for time. Time is important at BRITBREW  for two reasons: First, a 
'status quo' agreement ensures that once an issue is in dispute, conditions may not change 
until the parties have resolved it. Depending on the issue, time may favour one party or 
the other. Where management wants to introduce change, status quo is usually on the 
union side. Where the union finds itself in a temporarily advantageous position and 
wishes to press its advantage, status quo is on the employer side. Second, because of the 
seasonal nature of the beer industry, some parts of the year, such as the runup to 
Christmas and the Summer are more sensitive to conflict than others. So, for instance, in 
the month preceding Christmas, the employer strenuously attempts to keep issues from 
coming to a boil while the union strenuously attempts the opposite.
The parties can delay as much as they wish up to the third step because there are no 
time limits. The third step specifies a meeting between the union staff officer and the 
personnel manager within seven days but, if requested, the staff officer, whom everyone 
knows is a very busy man, will make himself unavailable.
If one side is eager to resolve a dispute, delay by the other side will inevitably bring 
about informal, non-procedural talks which will almost inevitably settle the dispute.
4. Concluding Remarks
This then is a taste of the complexity, tractability and mixture of formality and 
informality of the British disputes procedure at its fullest flower. Given a pair of parties 
with a reasonably mature relationship, some measure of self-confidence, a reasonably 
clear sense of objectives, and a degree of tolerance for low-level work stoppage, as is the 
case at BRITBREW, it can be a surprisingly effective system of conflict resolution. Unlike 
the Canadian system, where disputes become rigidly 'locked in' to procedure and the 
parties retreat to fixed and intractable positions almost immediately, there is plenty of 
room for informal discussion and for resolution of the dispute both before procedure is
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initiated and while it is running. What is more important, once a dispute issue is raised, 
procedure does not take on a logic of its own, unconnected with the real substance of the 
dispute or the real wishes of the parties, as it does in Canada. There are many 
opportunities for both parties to give way without losing face and to win without making 
the other party lose face. There are a myriad of ways of 'fudging' or 'massaging' the issues 
if the parties wish to avoid trouble. Yet, if one or both parties wish, there are ways to 
bring things to a head quickly.
This type of system works best in strong bargaining relationships such as exist 
between management and union at BRITBREW. In fact, as Batstone et al (1977, p. 175- 
76) point out, "in certain respects, the mere existence of strong bargaining relationships 
suggests the breaking of certain procedural rules". These authors suggest that such a 
relationship both requires and ensures that substantive rules and agreements be broken 
too. In fact, they suggest that "rule breaking is a means to success", for both sides, for the 
union because it results in greater 'goods' for the members and for management because 
the union prevents trivial problems from clogging up the disputes machinery and taking 
up management's time and allows production to continue with minimal disruption.
The system, however, does not work as well where weaker bargaining relationships 
are the norm, such as at BR ITM ET. As seen earlier, the union has trouble both 
articulating its members' concerns and desires to the company and 'delivering' compliance 
by its members in return for deals. In this type of situation, ironically, procedure becomes 
much more important to the union than is the case at BR ITBREW . But it is important as 
the lamppost is to the drunk: more for support than enlightenment. The most aggressive 
shop steward at BR IT M ET  attempts valiantly to bring member concerns to the fore, but 
in the context of industrial relations at this plant, hisjwas of doing so is by incessant 
reference of issues to procedure. It can only be concluded that the formal disputes 
procedure is not really meant to work, at least in the same way as the Canadian 
procedure.
Several company officials express impatience with this continual reliance on 
procedure and maintain they wish he would sit down and haggle informally. However, 
they fail to realise that he is more often than not short on the necessary goods to trade 
with— the support of his members and their willingness to back him up with industrial
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action. In this case, neither Formal reliance on procedure nor non-procedural 
informality are of much help to the union. Procedure is of little help because there is 
nothing at the end of it, such as compulsory and binding arbitration, than can enforce a 
claim. Informality is of little help because the union members are not consistently willing 
to take industrial action to enforce a claim. If anything, procedure is merely a way of 
forcing the employer to listen to the union. But sitting and listening to a half desperate 
earful from the union is not guaranteed to improve the relationship. This idea will be 
discussed further in the section on enforcements. What is most interesting is that this 
state of affairs reverses the situation in Canada. In that country, the strong union is the 
one that most conscientiously uses procedure, that is vigilant for breaches of the collective 
agreement and advances them up the grievance procedure, and employs ingenuity in using 
arbitration to defend the agreement and, if possible, widen its scope.
In Chapter I it was suggested that, in relation to industrial conflict, the political 
apparatuses of production themselves are potentially either therapeutic or provocative.
A picture seems to be forming wherein the flexibility of the interests apparatuses and the 
tractability of the rights apparatuses in Britain (especially in plants like BR ITBREW ) 
work to assuage industrial conflict whereas the rigidity and narrowness of their 
counterparts in Canada are seriously hampered in their conflict resolution role.
CHAPTER V: ADJUSTMENTS
/. Introduction
Adjustment has been defined as an apparatus which operates in the 'gray area' 
between interests and rights. It is an informal apparatus in that the parties do not set out 
deliberately to formulate substantive terms and conditions of employment. But they end 
up doing so, though such terms may be minor ones and of fleeting duration.
Granted, some interests apparatuses are less consequential and more evanescent than 
others and might therefore seem like adjustments. Canadian letters of understanding and 
the British sectional agreements are two such examples. Yet they have been committed to 
writing. Accordingly, adjustments must be redefined as unwritten understandings. The 
essential difference then, is one of codification. This is not a trivial distinction. There is a 
difference in kind and not just degree between the two in terms of the complex problems of 
'deliverability' they raise. At the interface between written and unwritten apparatuses 
lies a unique dialectic that marks a key difference in dispute resolution between the two 
countries. Codified provisions have permanence and are not easy to ignore. But they risk 
rigidity, narrowness of interpretation and inapplicability to many concrete situations. 
Uncodified provisions are open to wide interpretation and applicability. But, unless 
enforced continuously and vigilantly, they can disappear when one party wishes them to.
2. The Canadian plants
There is nothing in Canadian labour law that prevents the parties from formulating 
unwritten agreements on any matter concerning relations between them1 and there is 
nothing preventing a party from offering concessions outside, or ignoring rights it has 
inside, the written collective agreement. Such unwritten provisions exist in all unionised 
Canadian workplaces. The trouble arises when good will ceases or when management 
decides to 'claw back' concessions, and the union wishes redress. Unless the collective 
agreement is due to expire soon, making the interests apparatus available, the only 
recourse is to arbitration. As will be seen presently, while arbitrators do, under some 
circumstances, consider 'past practice' and their willingness to do so is widening, 
arbitration is still a most unreliable forum in which to protect such unwritten provisions.
I. Theoretically, the parties can agree to anything a* long aa it doei not break a criminal law. One eaceplion is that 
the parties cannot agree to waive the atrike/lockout ban while the collective agreement is in effect.
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Thus the vibrancy of 'custom and practice' as a method of ordering the relationship 
between the parties is, as one might expect, quite minimal compared to the British 
workplace.
2.1 Unwritten provisions
On the Canadian shop floor, unwritten provisions fall into a few distinct 
groupings. The first surrounds pay and perquisites. One generator of unwritten 
provisions that did not appear in our two plants is piece work or incentive systems of 
payment. Tacit understandings, some directly contradicting written rules, are said to 
abound in this environment (Burawoy, 1979; Roy, 1954). Yet, compared to Britain, piece 
working and direct payment by results systems (as opposed to broader incentive schemes) 
are quite rare in Canada and those that do exist are much more rigorously controlled by 
management and much less subject to formal or informal union bargaining than is the case 
in Britain (see Chapter IX  for a more detailed discussion).
Another source of pay adjustments is welfare plans. They are often ill-documented in 
the collective agreement as negotiation of the subtler points would be an endless activity. 
The parties often agree to the broadest outlines of, say, a dental insurance plan or pension 
plan and leave the details. Likewise, while the parties may agree that safety clothing will 
be provided to appropriate employees, the minutiae are often unspecified. Ex gratia gifts 
from the employer such as Christmas turkeys are, of course, never stipulated in the 
collective agreement nor even subject to informal negotiation.
A  second area of shop floor adjustments includes provisions on the activity of and 
facilities for domestic union representatives. The full-time status of the CANBREW  
convenor, for instance, is a tacit employer concession. The provision of an office and its 
furnishings appears in the collective agreement of neither Canadian plant. The 
C A N BR EW  collective agreement (as do the vast majority across the country) allows 
"reasonable time off" for shop stewards to perform union functions as long as they obtain 
permission from supervisors. Such permission, the document reads, "shall not 
unreasonably be withheld". But the amount of reasonable time is an unwritten practice 
honed by many years of activity. Managers at CANM ET express concern over a long­
standing practice whereby the three permanent members of the union safety committee 
take one Friday afternoon off to meet outside work each month (the union paying their
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lost wages). "We don't know how it got started but we do know it's got to end" says a 
senior manager signaling the employer's intention to claw back the practice.
The third area is in the timing and scheduling of work and work breaks. Agreements 
between workers to trade shifts or to ’borrow’ time from each other at the beginning or 
end of shifts are often tolerated by the employers so long as there are no 'screw-ups’ or 
claims for overtime and other premia. While there are seemingly strict rules about the 
amount of vacation and unpaid leave time that can be taken during the Summer and/or in 
one block , supervisors are known to allow favoured workers, especially those with 
relatives overseas, to break these rules. Rotas and sometimes elaborate sets of unwritten 
rules within departments govern distribution of overtime. Prescribed time limits for 
lunches and breaks are frequently allowed to relax by supervisors, sometimes in return 
for 'a little extra effort' in the pinch from workers, but often only through management 
indulgence, negligence or simple inability to police.
The fourth area is in the structuring of the internal labour market. For example, 
certain "cushy" jobs involving days-only and/or relatively unstrenuous work are often 
reserved for older and/or injured workers in both plants. Unwritten understandings also 
govern transferability between production units or subunits. At CANBREW , employees 
of the brewing unit may bid to transfer only once to another section within the unit even 
though the collective agreement seems to allow unlimited opportunities.
At both plants, as in most Canadian workplaces, management contracts out a certain 
amount of work. While egregious contracting out elicits protest and challenge from the 
union, there are tacit limits of acceptability and sweetener deals to ease the insult. A 
practice which grew up at CANBREW  illustrates this well. On major capital projects, for 
which outside contractors were hired, bargaining unit members were allowed to make 
overtime earnings by helping in a labouring capacity. On one occasion, CANBREW  
workers complained that contract workers were 'taking their jobs' by operating a fork lift 
truck. The company determined that considerations of damage and potential liability 
made it advisable for the contractor to do this particular work. It put the union on 
written notice that it was clawing back the practice. Thenceforth union members could 
not automatically expect to work with contractors. Management would assess each capital 
project on its merits and decide the appropriate proportions of union and contract labour.
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The final area is that of discipline. The employer sets written and unwritten rules 
whose infraction courts discipline. The union usually remains agnostic to these rules until 
a concrete instance of their application arises. Yet the employer will frequently be lax in 
their enforcement. Further, the management of different departments often has 
contradictory standards of rule enforcement. This creates a problem, as one supervisor 
describes it:
"They don't do a food job of disciplina in X  department. There's little follow-up and great 
inconsistency. You can't tell workers exactly when to go on lunches and breaks and when to come 
back. So staying late [staying beyond allowed times on work breaks! becomes custom and practice.
Then management needs to challenge these practices and claw them back. We have to generate 
enough discipline on these issues to prevent them becoming custom and practice, just keep it to a 
dull roar."
The difficulty for management is not so much in clawing back the custom of 'staying 
late', for workers generally and certainly their unions will not cast dilatoriness in the 
language of legitimacy (see Armstrong et al., 1981). The problem for management is in 
consistency and fairness of treatment. Any attempt to restore punctuality is bedevilled by 
problems of favouritism and forbearance.
These then are the major areas in which custom and practice operates in the 
Canadian plants. Despite their existence, however, several features combine to seriously 
limit their versatility and robustness as adjustment apparatuses.
2.2 Limitations on unwritten provisions
First is their content. It might be thought that unwritten provisions would cover 
areas which have traditionally resisted codification in Canadian collective agreements, 
such as manning, job content, effort levels, and work demarcations— in other words, what 
we have called 'job control'. However our case studies show that this is not the case. The 
vast majority of unwritten provisions are in areas that would otherwise fall comfortably 
within the scope of the collective agreement. Indeed, in many cases, they merely 
supplement provisions that appear in the collective agreement. The CANBREW  
personnel manager prefers to call these 'guidelines'. Very seldom are any of the 
unwritten provisions used to seriously threaten managerial prerogative.
Second, when a dispute arises over alteration of an unwritten workplace adjustment, 
management is under noobligation to delay the change while the dispute continues. 
Arbitrator Paul Weiler enunciates the doctrine as it applies to one aspect of workplace 
arrangements:
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"...there it no implied oblisation, inferred from the 'climate of collective bargaining', to 
maintain, in whole or in part, the statue quo at far at the assignment of work tasks it concerned"^
Third, while some of the unwritten provisions have come about as a result of 
management error or omission, most have resulted from conscious concessions or 
indulgences on the part of management, which, as per the CAN BREW  convenor's 
complaint in chapter *, are more often granted gratuitously than in response to union deal 
proposals or coercion. In other words, there is precious little 'fractional bargaining' as 
Kuhn (1961) uses it or 'shopfloor bargaining' asTolliday and Zeitlin (1982) use it, and 
what little there is is contained at a very low level of activity. What unwritten provisions 
exist do not, as they frequently might in Britain, come about "without any conscious 
decision by management” (Clegg, 1970, p. 249). The union, then, has few instances where 
it can claim to have wrested a concession from the employer. Management has a far 
greater degree of control over the unwritten practices. It giveth, and by the same token, it 
taketh away, which leads to the fourth point.
While shop floor adjustments are indispensable in smoothing the relationship between 
the parties, from time to time management feels the need to 'claw back' some of these 
provisions. Several examples have just been given. Canadian management, particularly 
as evidenced in our two plants, is vigilant that things 'not get out of hand', that the union 
does not build up any areas of informal control. So they frequently set off into the 
frontier of control on claw back missions. In clawing back adjustments, they seldom, if 
ever, resort to 'buying out' the workers with money (such as they might occasionally do in 
expiry negotiations over a cherished union demand). Their tactics are to increase 
discipline in cases where they have been lax with plant rules or to put the union on notice 
that a certain standing practice is due to end, in other words, reasserting and being seen 
to reassert their managerial prerogative. Arbitrators may occasionally intervene to 
ensure that the procedure of such clawbacks is fair, but do not restrain the act per se.
A  fifth feature of adjustments in Canada comes about in light of just such recent 
arbitral jurisprudence where employers have been enjoined from peremptorily ending 
unwritten practices of longstanding, the details of which will be explained presently. For 
example, spurred by what seemed an alarming trend in the jurisprudence, CAN BREW ’s
i. Re. A!goma Steel 19 L.A.C. 236 (Weilcr, 1968)
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personnel department conducted what might be called a custom and practice audit. By 
a specified date, all supervisors were required to send in a list of all "agreements and 
arrangements" operating in their departments, no matter how trivial. Personnel 
professed "shock" at some practices (such as not requiring employees with more than 25 
years seniority to clock in), especially where conditions giving rise to those privileges had 
long since disappeared (in one case, Fifteen years earlier). Personnel intended to compile 
all of these practices into a "Book of Practices and Guidelines". Higher management 
would then assess the contents and take one of two steps: if management felt the practice 
was still relevant and useful it would be codified (not necessarily in a collective document 
but in management's records); if management felt the practice was not relevant or 
desirable, the union would be given notice of its termination. By diligent housekeeping 
then, management checked the proliferation of adjustments—either elevating them to the 
status of interests apparatuses by codification or eliminating them entirely. The key here 
is strong management control over what adjustments do exist.
Sixth, Canadian unions themselves are exceedingly uneasy about custom and practice 
and do their best to discourage it on the shop floor, even while some of them find novel 
ways to hold employers to it in arbitration. There is a feeling, as the C A N M ET  convenor 
puts it, that "management doesn't give something for nothing". Unlike his British 
counterpart, who often relishes horse-trading, he is fatalistic about the union being 
'fleeced' in any transaction that is not codified and enforceable.
Thus, although shop-floor adjustments abound in Canadian workplaces, they are 
contained and constrained by managerial action, union complacency and timidity and the 
limits of the disputes resolution system so that they neither proliferate nor impinge upon 
managerial prerogative in a serious way.
2.3 Arbitration as an Arena fo r  Adjustment
As might be expected the other great arena for the handling of adjustments is 
arbitration. As noted in the last chapter, less than 2% of grievances ever find their way to 
arbitration. Yet, as also noted, even where the parties decline to proceed to arbitration, 
the arbitral jurisprudence is tremendously pervasive and influential upon their 
dispute resolution activity and consequently upon all o f their relations in the 
workplace.
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Parts of that jurisprudence will be reviewed in this and future chapters. Arbitration 
decisions can be quite lengthy and their language highly legalistic. But the reader would 
be mistaken to think that they are remote from and irrelevant to Canadian workplace 
industrial relations. To union and management representatives they are the very meat of 
their existence as practitioners (although their increasing complexity has taken them 
beyond the ken of most workers and first-line managers). Despite the inoperability of 
stare decisis (binding precedent) in arbitration, certain arbitral decisions, some dating as 
far back as the 1940's and 50's, have become 'leading cases' in arbitral thought and in the 
minds of practitioners and industrial relations managers and union staff officers will talk 
about classic cases such as Port Arthur Shipbuildingor KVPor Council o f  Printing 
Industries, or of current controversial cases almost as a shorthand.
The jurisprudence is obviously important at arbitration. Yet even when the parties 
decline to to proceed to arbitration, it is often because the jurisprudence has marked the 
case is a clear winner or a clear loser. Active parties like CANBREW  and its union also 
have their own mini-jurisprudence, a body of arbitration cases arising from their own 
workplace or other workplaces in the industry. Both the larger and smaller bodies of 
jurisprudence profoundly affect the day-to-day actions of the parties and is as much part 
of workplace industrial relations as their own practices. Further, most arbitrators 
presume that the parties have knowledge of the jurisprudence, not only when they 
formally argue a case, but also when they negotiate the collective agreement and that they 
must live with the consequences of failing to so do. A claim of ignorance by either party is 
not suffered gladly. One arbitrator, presented with a claim by the union against 
contracting out, in the absence of contract language forbidding it, bluntly chided the 
applicant:
"That was the law Ithc «late of arbitral juriaprudcncal a« it stood at the time when 
these...collective agreement« were entered into. This must have been known to the parties and 
they must accordingly ba takan to have contracted in accordance therewith— *
Thus reference to the relevant jurisprudence is essential as a living backdrop to any 
discussion of Canadian dispute resolution.
Arbitral Approaches to Adjustment. Weiler (1969) has described a schizophrenia of 
arbitral roles between "judge" and "labour relations physician". While the formal remit
J. Re Kennedy Lodge Nurttng Home M  I..A.C. (.ldi -VM» (Brunner. NMN
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of the arbitrator is to act as a rights adjudicator only, even the most conservative 
Canadian employer spokesmen allow that arbitrators must have some "equitable 
jurisdiction". One arbitrator has put it well:
"...'precise, clear and unambiguoui language' seldom find* ita way to arbitration. More 
commonly, the contract clause provides only a partial answer to the problem, because it is 
imprecise, unclear or ambiguous. The point at issue between the parties may be one which could not 
have been contemplated when the agreement was signed; provisions of the contract may conflict with 
each other; absurdities and injustices may result from insistence upon one of several possible 
interpretations. Thus, the job of the arbitrator is often to construe the agreement in an imaginative 
way so that it copes with the unforeseen, accommodates the inconsistent, and preserves a fair and 
harmonious relationship"4
Inevitably arbitrators are called upon to either make adjustments where the facts 
before them do not fit the language of the agreement or to compel adherence to 
adjustments which the parties have constructed themselves prior to arbitration. But 
arbitrators are severely restricted in their ability to do so by the enabling legislation that 
establishes their jurisdiction, by the courts which rule on their exercise of that 
jurisdiction, by the notions of acceptability of the parties that choose them (for most 
arbitrators are chosen by agreement by unions and employers) and by their own cautious 
attitudes on what constitutes ’good industrial relations'.
Exactly how restricted they are is the subject of some debate. In Fox's (1966) 
trichotomy of perspectives, all arbitrators are pluralists (as opposed to 'unitarists' or 
'radicals') in that they accept the inevitability of conflict and antagonism between workers 
and managers, see unions as legitimate organs for the expression of such conflict and see 
third party intervention as a legitimate mechanism for regulating such conflict. The 
debate, then, is between liberal pluralists and conservative pluralists. The former hold 
to a 'shared rights' theory, best enunciated by former arbitrator and Supreme Court of 
Canada Chief Justice the late Bora Laskin:
"...it is ■  very superficial generalization to contend that a collective agreement muat be read 
as limiting an employer's pracollective bargaining prerogatives only to the extent eapresaly 
stipulated. Such a generalization ignores completely the climate of employer-employee relations 
under a collective agreement. The change from individual to collective bargaining is a changs in kind 
and not merely a difference in degree. The introduction of a collective bargaining regime involves 
the acceptance by the parties of assumptions which are entirely alien to an era of individual 
bargaining"5.
4. Rt. C ity o f  Toronto, Id L A  C. V i .  at M l  (Arthurs. W67».
5. Rt. Falconbridgt Niektl M in ti H L.A.C. 2~h ll.askin. W38), at 282
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The latter adhere to a 'reserved rights' theory of management's rights, explored in the 
last chapter (management can do what it wishes subject only to the express provisions of 
the collective agreement). While the reserved rights approach has clearly held sway for 
most of the 45 year life of Canadian arbitration, the shared rights approach has shown 
variable signs of resurgence in the past fifteen years. The leading contemporary 
Canadian standard-bearer of the liberal approach is arbitrator and legal scholar David 
Beatty. In the essay 'The Role of the Arbitrator: A  Liberal Version" (Beatty, 1984), he 
positions himself between the conservative pluralists and the radical scholars of the 
'critical legal studies' school (eg. Van Wesel Stone, 1981; Klare, 1978) who see the 
inability of arbitrators and the courts to overcome legal impediments to a shared rights 
approach as "paradigmatic proof of the incoherence and indeed illegitimacy of our 
conventional, liberal-democratic theories of law and our system or model of collective 
bargaining which is derived from them”(Beatty, 1984, p. 139).
Beatty insists, on the other hand, that Canadian arbitrators (and the courts that 
oversee them) "have the legal tools to avoid the confusion and conflict which has so far 
clouded this issue". Further, he proposes that arbitration can be
"/nor* appropriate than negotiation or bargaining at a way of achieving a •ynlhaiu of 
our competing allegiance* to procedural juitice and substantive fairness* (ibid., p. 142, emphasis 
added)
His overall project is nothing less than to "establish the legitimacy and viability of 
arbitration as a procedure to resolve this confounding issue of managerial discretion" 
(ibid., p. 142). Given that arbitration is the ostensible North American quid pro quo for 
the denial of the mid-term opportunity to strike, Beatty's position is that arbitrators can 
potentially deliver as much as or more than that which has been denied.
Beatty's optimism is centred on three key areas of arbitral decision making where, he 
claims, the hegemony of managerial prerogative has been breached. The first two concern 
the arbitrator's ability to consider the past practice of the parties in fashioning an 
award. The third involves considerations of fairness. Because Beatty's thesis stakes 
the highest claim fo r  arbitration, becauie it proposes that the liberal' arbitrator 
can surpass even collective bargaining in equitable power and because it posits 
not only what should be but what can be and is, it requires answering fro m  a
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radical perspective. To do so, it is important to consider those three areas in more 
detail.
2.4 The Consideration o f Past Practice in Arbitration
Past practice becomes an issue in arbitration in two ways: first, as a possible guide 
to the interpretation of a collective agreement (what the parties intended when they 
negotiated a provision or how they interpreted the provision once it was negotiated), ie. 
'extrinsic evidence' and second, as a question of whether unwritten provisions that have 
been in effect for some time can be enforced if withdrawn, ie. 'estoppel'.
Extrinsic Evidence. A s far as interpretation of the collective agreement is concerned, it 
is a fundament of common law that administrative tribunals such as arbitration panels do 
not have the jurisdiction to use extrinsic evidence to "contradict, vary, add to or subtract 
from the terms of an agreement reduced to writing" (Brown & Beatty, 1984, p. 152). If, 
however, the words of an agreement are ambiguous, the arbitrator can use extrinsic 
evidence to solve the problem presented by the ambiguity. However, if the words of the 
collective agreement are unambiguous, they will settle the dispute conclusively, even i f  
the parties intended or have practiced exactly the opposite o f  those words.
There are some good reasons for this rule, especially as it relates to intention. 
Without it, arbitrations could easily degenerate into fruitless rehashings of old union- 
employer arguments. The parties could also be encouraged to creatively misconstrue or 
embellish their original intent to wriggle out of their failures or mistakes in interests 
bargaining. But the rule leaves little scope for arbitrators to acknowledge and enshrine 
the creativity of the parties in their day-to-day interpretation of the agreement. Not 
even the most liberal arbitrators will allow the practice of the parties to take precedence 
over clear agreement language, except for the special condition of estoppel, discussed 
below.
Some, more liberal, arbitrators have widened the scope of ambiguity. Where once 
extrinsic evidence was accepted only in cases of patent ambiguity (apparent on the face of 
the agreement), it is now frequently also accepted in cases of latent ambiguity (ie. 
ambiguous in its applicability to the facts). And in such cases, the evidence can be used not 
only to solve the ambiguity but to disclose it in the first place. As in many areas of 
industrial relations, the province of British Columbia seems to allow the most leeway
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here. Its Labour Relations Act charges arbitrators to have regard for "the real 
substance" of the collective agreement rather than its strict interpretation and some 
recent arbitration awards have widened the scope of admissability of past practice and 
bargaining history6-
Yet the consideration of past practice sits uneasily with even the most liberal 
Canadian arbitrators. Paul Weiler, one of the strongest advocates of adjustment, explains 
why in a passage of some significance:
"...the best evidence of the meaning moat consilient with the agreement is that mutually 
accepted by the parties. (Yeti such a doctrine, while uaeful, should be quite carefully employed. 
Indiscriminate recourse to past practice has been said to rigidity industrial relations at the plant 
level, or in the lower reaches of the grievance process. It does so by forcing higher management or 
union officials to prohibit (without their clearance) the settling of grievances in a sensible fashion, 
and a spirit of mutual accommodation, fo r Jeer o f  setting precedentt which may plague either side 
in unforeseen ways in future arbitration deciaiona. A party should not be forced unnecessarily to run 
the risk of losing by its conduct its opportunity to have a neutral interpretation of the terms of the 
agreement which it bargained for. (Emphasis added)
When looked at only within the bounds of the Canadian dispute resolution system, this 
makes good sense. But when looked at in the context of our comparison of the Canadian 
and British systems of dispute resolution, what Weiler is really saying is that a system o f  
arbitral dispute resolution is fundamentally incompatible with workplace dispute 
resolution. If the parties want to get the most out of the arbitration system ("a neutral 
interpretation of the terms of the agreement"), they dare not burden the arbitrator with 
evidence of their past practice. For, if past practice were to really count for something in 
arbitration, it would force the parties to pay much more attention to the settlements they 
make "in the lower reaches of the grievance procedure". Weiler claims this would make 
the parties less willing to make such settlements. But would this really "rigidify" 
industrial relations at plant level? As long as the parties have recourse to a third party to 
decide their differences, it does. Given the existence of arbitration as the inevitable last 
step in disputes procedure, and given the strong impact of the arbitral jurisprudence upon 
the dispute resolution behaviour of the parties, Weiler's and other arbitrators' otherwise 
prudent position on acceptance of past practice actually has the opposite effect to 
that which he suggests. In effect, a kind of "chilling effect" and "narcotic effect", (a *7
6 Sc« Palmer, 1483, p. 85; Brown *  Beatty, 1484. p. 156.
7. Re. John Bertram 4  Som, 18 L.A.C. 362 at 36"’-368 (Weiler. 1467). It should be noted that although thu quote it
from a 1467 arbitration and might appear 'dated', it it considered by Canadian arbitrators to be a 'leading case' 
in the area of past practice and thus retains an evergreen quality.
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reluctance to engage in true prearbitral settlement activity and an overreliance on 
arbitration) theorised to operate in interest arbitration (Downie, 1979), is at work in 
grievance arbitration as well. Arb tration discourages the parties from settling 
things on their own, from taking responsibility for those settlements and from establishing 
precedents thereby. One needs to only note, in illustration, the near obsession by both 
parties, but especially management, to make what settlements they do 'without prejudice'. 
This has the effect of furthering the rigidification of the rights apparatuses which we saw 
in the last chapter.
Estoppel. Another major vehicle through which arbitrators may entertain evidence of 
past practice is the common law equitable doctrine of estoppel. To apply this doctrine, 
the arbitrator need not be confronted with ambiguity in collective agreement language. 
Rather, there must be evidence that one party, by its word or action, lead the other party 
to believe, to its detriment, that the first party would not assert its rights under the 
collective agreement. In such a case, the first party is said to be estopped from asserting 
such rights. In other words, you cannot entice someone onto a branch only to cut it off 
from under him.
A good example appears in a leading arbitration on this question, the Canadian 
National Railways case8- A collective agreement provided for sick benefits to be paid 
after a three day waiting period. In spite of this provision, the employer for many years 
paid the benefits to some employees without a waiting period. The arbitrator ruled that 
the employer could not unilaterally withdraw the practice. The doctrine of estoppel had 
been used successfully in arbitration before this case to bar a party from withdrawing 
such a practice without ample notice. In this case the employer harfgiven such notice. 
Yet the arbitrator nonetheless ruled the withdrawal unacceptable. He did so precisely in 
acknowledgement of the length of Canadian collective agreements and the inability of a 
party to change that agreement when taken by surprise during its term:
"The detrimental reliance then of aiauming the practice would continue. Iiet in the union'* 
inability to require the employer to negotiate it* chanpe in it* practice during the l i f t  o f  the 
agreement. After a practice of thi* duration, if the employer anticipated changing it. it had an 
'affirmative duty' to alert the union of it* intention in order to aiva it an opportunity to negotiate..."
(empham added) *
H. Me C .N.K . i t  •!. and Beatty at al. f/W/l. U  C .L .L .C . I4.I6J
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Thus the practice would have to remain in effect at least until the next round of 
collective bargaining. The courts upheld the decision.
Yet as far as this case seems to go in protecting the party relying on past practice, the 
doctrine of estoppel is a seriously limited vehicle to enforce adjustments. First, the mere 
existence of an unwritten provision does not invite its protection by estoppel. There must 
exist, as there did in this case, a collective agreement provision which has been ignored. 
In the absenceof such a written provision on which to hang the case (for example, if the 
employer had allowed some sick employees to claim a benefit or pay not mentioned in the 
agreement), the doctrine of estoppel would be much less likely to apply. The difference 
between these two has been likened to using the doctrine as a "shield" (in the former case) 
as opposed to a "sword" (in the latter) (Palmer, 1983, p. I SO.). Therefore the union is 
always at a disadvantage. It is not enough to have a past practice; it must be one that flics 
in the face of the collective agreement. Since, as noted, the collective agreement seldom if 
ever contains language on 'job control' issues, adjustments in this area cannot be protected 
by estoppel.
Second, as discussed earlier, arbitration cases are not legally binding on other 
arbitrators. Far from being a 'settled' area, estoppel is one of the most controversial, 
with the mainstream of arbitrators considerably more conservative than the one (Beatty, 
incidentally) in the above case. Four years after Canadian National Railways, another 
arbitrator, in almost the exact same circumstances, made the exact opposite decision. He 
lambasted both the arbitrator and the court in the C.N.R. case, saying:
"With all respect, that opinion is not correct....(and) is unsound as a matter of labour 
relations policy....It approves arbitrators' enforcement of what are amendments to the agreement 
never neaotiated and never reduced to mutually agreed language by the discipline of writing.
Moreover...the award permits apparently unfair favouritism for a certain group of employees, a 
matter not subject to the pressures of the bargaining table....It may also be that the failure of both 
the arbitrator and the court to esamine the significance of the statutory definition of 'collective 
agreement' as 'an agreement in writing' weakens the force of the reasoning in both award (of the 
arbitrator) and reasons for judgment (of the court). 9
9. Be. Monarch Fma Food, Co. Ltd. and Milk A  Braad Driver», Local 647, IK L.A.C. (.Ml 257. at 262-63 (Schiff. 
I9K5I
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Given the nature of privative 10 clauses in Canadian labour legislation, the courts 
would be likely to find both arbitrators well within their jurisdiction to make these 
diametrically opposite decisions. What is more, Canada's industrial relations system is 
highly decentralised and arbitrators and courts in other provinces are not as liberal as 
those in Ontario and British Columbia. An Alberta court has ruled that arbitrators do 
not have the equitable jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of estoppel at all11-
Third, even where arbitrators are sympathetic to estoppel, they apply harsh tests to 
the facts at hand and do not use the doctrine lightly. A good example comes in an 
unreported arbitration case involving our case study plant CANBREW . Due to a decline 
in sales of keg beer, kegging had become a one-shift operation and, according to a long­
standing practice and a clause in the collective agreement allowing senior employees to 
claim 'days only* assignments, older workers had been given the work. After six years, 
further decline in keg beer demand had led the employer to decide to eliminate kegging as 
a distinct operation and combine it with a larger operation working two shifts. The older 
workers were transferred to two shifts and subsequently grieved.
The union disclaimed any reliance on the collective agreement clause, agreeing that 
the company had the right, as the arbitrator interpreted the management's rights clause, 
to "organise crews, schedule work, and assign employees to jobs". It based its case on the 
doctrine of estoppel claiming that the grievors had relied to their detriment on a company 
undertaking and long practice to pass up the opportunity for 'days-only' work elsewhere.
The arbitrator dismissed the grievance for a number of reasons. First, he said, "there 
is no compelling evidence of clear undertakings being given [by the company]" (Emphasis 
added). Second, even if such undertaking were given, or that the grievors believed they 
had received one, "the company would nonetheless be free subsequently to alter the 
scheduling of the job— for bona fide business reasons" (Emphasis in the original). Third, 10
10. Dacmona by administrative tribunal» in both Canada and Britain ara lubjact to judicial review (by way of certiorari
or prohibition! on jurndictional (rounds or because of an error on the face of the record. To prevent undue 
interference by the courts in the arbitration forum; legislatures across Canada have included in labour 
relations acts privative clauses which seriously restrict the (rounds on which arbitral decisions can be legally 
challenged. The Supreme Court of Canada itself, under the late Chief Justice Bora Laskin (a former labour 
arbitrator) further restricted the scope of judicial review by formulating a 'patently unreasonable' test for 
errors in law. Thus two diametrically opposite arbitral decisions can potentially pats this test. Few judicial 
reviews of arbitrations are attempted and few succeed. Mott deal with matters on the 'cutting edge' of 
arbitration such as fairness and estoppel.
11. Re. Smoky R iver Cool Limited v. United Steelworkers o f Amence. Loeel 7621 el el. IIVK4I M A R .  ISO
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if the promise was made to all the grievors, and enforceable, it would be ridiculous for 
"changes in scheduling and work assignments to be blocked...by the presence of a single 
surviving [grievor].".
The case is significant for a number of reasons. First, it indicates a 'Catch 22' 
situation at work: Unwritten provisions are by definition informal. But the very 
tacitness of unwritten provisions can be their undoing when tested at arbitration, 
begging the question— just how compelling must the evidence of an understanding be for it 
to be taken seriously be the arbitrator? The stronger the understanding, the less utility in 
keeping it 'unwritten'. Second, the arbitration uses the well-worn test of "bona fide 
business reasons", a wall which arbitral reasoning seldom dares breach (and which will be 
seen many more times in the course of this thesis). And third, it underlines the awesome 
regard that both the parties and arbitrators have for "managerial prerogative”.
Thus, even though some breakthroughs have been made in widening arbitral 
jurisdiction in the use of extrinsic evidence and in estoppel, it must be concluded that 
Beatty's faith is not well placed, that arbitration not only remains an unreliable forum for 
a party to enforce adjustments made at shopfloor level, but that further, it effectively 
discourages such adjustments. Moreover, if estoppel is a sword, it cuts both ways. 
Management can and does use the doctrine to preclude the union from challenging 
practices which its members have complied with for some time. In a dispute over truck 
drivers washing their trucks (discussed in more detail in Chapter •), CANBREW  claimed 
the union's case was fatally weakened by the fact that the drivers had 'always done it'. 
Combined with the 'obey now, grieve later' rule, estoppel can be a powerful weapon in the 
hands of the employer.
The Doctrine o f 'FairnessWhat of adjustments by the arbitrator himself in the 
absence of significant past practice? Later chapters will explore further the ability and 
willingness of arbitrators to make adjustments in particular substantive areas of 
industrial relations. However, for an overall view that neatly epitomises the problem, it 
is useful to look at the third area for which Beatty professes some hope and a question of 
some current controversy in Canadian arbitration— the so-called 'doctrine of fairness'. 
Can the arbitrator hold an employer to exercise its managerial prerogatives in a manner 
that is not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith? Does the existence of a collective
Chapter V...page 158
agreement in and of itself confer upon the employer a general duty to be fair? O r do the 
parties actually have to negotiate it? Again, while some, more liberal, arbitrators have 
affirmed such a duty, others have vehemently rejected it.
Two leading court cases in Ontario provide seemingly contradictory attitudes to the 
question. In the Metropolitan Toronto Police Commission case, the employer was 
accused by the union of being unfair in its assignment of overtime for inventory-taking. 
The arbitrator upheld the union's complaint but the courts quashed the decision, saying,
*...wc »ee no nccassity in this case to imply a term that the management right! clause will be 
applied fairly and without discrimination. If such a term were to be implied, it would mean that 
every decision of management made under the esclusive authority of the management rights clause 
would be liable to challenge on the grounds that it was esercised unfairly or discrim inatory. In our 
opinion, this would be contrary to the spirit and intent of the collective agreement"* 12
Not long after, the Council o f  Printing Industries case seemed to reverse this 
decision. It involved an industry subject to fluctuation of the work force, where the 
collective agreement allowed some employees to be classified as "permanent" and thus 
immune to cyclical layoff. The employer had discretion to so classify and, in the grievance 
in question, did so without regard to the seniority of the grievors in spite of another 
collective agreement provision, not directly applicable, which provided promotion by 
seniority. The arbitrator ruled that the employer's use of its discretion in this case made a 
mockery of the spirit of the agreement which included the important principle of 
seniority, and upheld the grievance. When the award was taken by the employer to 
judicial review, the court refused to overturn the decision, ruling that it was not "patently 
unreasonable”13- Yet as far as Council o f  Printing Industries seems to go in 
constructing a duty of fairness, its practical impact is negligible, leaving the arbitral 
intervention in managerial prerogative still quite limited.
First, as can be seen by the contradictory court cases above, even in the most liberal 
provinces, arbitrators vary widely in their willingness to read a duty of fairness into 
collective agreements and the courts vary in their willingness to let them. Even the same 
arbitrator has been known to step back and forth across the line in different cases. And in
12. Re. Metropolitan Toronto Board o f Commissionari o f Police vs. Metropolitan Toronto Police Anociation  
at el. (IVHI) 124 D.LR. (.Ml MU st 6N7-6HH
12. Re. Cou n cil o f  Printing Induttrici o f  Canada and Toronto Printing and A ttin e n ti  Union IIVM l 149 D.L.R.
<3dl 5.1 at 60.
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the less liberal provinces, 'fairness' is still virtually a dead issue. As one senior 
commentator and arbitrator says regretfully:
"...in light of...recent cases, it would seem that the introduction of the duty to act fairly in 
the csercise of management'» right« may amount to only a brief impontion of thi* doctrine which 11 
already coming to an end. and will be replaced by a return to the prior traditional view of 
management'« rights.
"The traditional view is one which placed extreme limitations on unions and oftan 
resulted in injustice. As well it was conducive to increasing the specificity <and hence size) of 
collective agreements to escape such results: As a collective agreement is meant to cover a wide 
variety of changing events over a long period of time, the deficiencies of the traditional approach are 
manifest, though no doubt satisfactory to employers in the short run." (Palmer. WM. pp. 5V4-V5, 
emphasis added)
Second, it can be argued that the Council o f  Printing Industries case itself is no 
momentous breakthrough. The arbitrator found a clause in the collective agreement (the 
seniority clause) that served as a hook upon which he could 'hang' his argument, a hook 
strong enough for the court to subsequently support him. Thus, at best, an employer's 
duty of fairness cannot be implied from the mere existence of a collective agreement but 
must take its cue from more specific language in that agreement, albeit that language 
may not apply directly to the case at hand. Or, as one arbitrator has put it more broadly, 
"the language of the clause, when read in a labour relations context and in the context of 
agreement as a whole, could support an implied requirement to act in a 'bona fide' 
fashion."14 Metropolitan Toronto Police Commission had no such language and so it 
failed.
Third, what kind of 'fairness' is it that even the most 'progressive' arbitrators are 
attempting to impose upon management? Beatty himself gives us a hint:
"Arbitration should be seen as an esercise in the sensitive development of a common law of 
the shop, as a result of which the procedural fairness of the negotiation process is itself enhanced, 
carries with it an immediate and obvious corollary for courts and arbitrators alike. To act 
consistently with liberal democratic principles of law arbitrators must be vigilant to ensure that 
management, no lest than unions, eaercises fairly and reasonably the discretion and responsibility 
the parties delegate to it. And where arbitrators respond to their mandate, the courts must 
not...equivocate in their endorsement." (Beatty, IVH4, p. I6T)
So it is procedural fairness that liberal arbitrators are really talking about. To be 
more explicit, procedural fairness eschews any policy role, ie. that management must 
treat workers fairly in a general sense by, for instance, paying them a decent wage or 
providing them with day care centres or retraining them rather than laying them off.
M. Re. Toronto East Oenerel Hospital end Service Employees Union, Local 204 13 L.A.C. (3d) 333. (Burkett,
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That must be left to the parties to negotiate in the context of the status quo power balance 
that exists between them. Fairness means that, given a negotiated collective agreement, 
management must not act in a capricious or malicious manner which has the effect of 
'sneaking around' or avoiding the implications of that agreement. Some arbitrators have 
constructed a test for implying a term into a collective agreement, consisting of two 
conditions:
"(I) if it it decenary to imply a term 10 order to give 'business or collective agreement efficacy' to the 
contract, in other word«, in order to make the collective agreement work; and
(2) if. having been made aware of the omission of the term, both parties to the agreement would have 
agreed without hesitation to its insertion" 3
In other words, what procedural fairness will do at best, is help the parties make the 
collective agreement work when one party (usually management), by its actions, is 
attempting to pervert it. If the offending party is using omissions in the agreement 
language, then the arbitrator will fill in those gaps if the arbitrator feels the offending 
party could not honestly object, if he feels the offender, caught red-handed, would be 
ashamed, and admit "Yes, you're absolutely right". While this is a definite improvement 
over the strict interpretations of traditionalist arbitrators, it is by no means a 
revolutionary step and the controversy surrounding it speaks volumes about the 
limitations of arbitration.
Fourth, the phrase "legitimate business interests" or "bona-fide business reasons" 
recurs with numbing regularity throughout the arbitral jurisprudence on the question of 
adjustments. It is another important test to which the exercise of managerial prerogative 
is put. As one respected liberal arbitrator puts it:
" In  our view the employer'! decmon-making should be assessed against the requirement to 
act fo r  business reason, and the requirement not to single out any employee or group for special 
treatment which cannot be justified in tarmt o f  root benefit to the employer.'
He acknowledges that when the parties agree to leave certain matters to the 
discretion of management, they
"do so in the knowledge that management's decision-making in these areas will be made in 
management's self-interest landl may adversely affect individual employees, and/or may not impact 
on all employees equally. However, it is not contemplated as part of the bargain that the employer 
will esercue his authority in these areas for reasons unrelated to the betterment o f  hit 
business...’ IS. 16 (emphasis added)
IS. Re. M cKallar General Hoipitel end Ontario N u rte ,’ A hoc i at ion 24 LA.C. (Id) 47, (Saltman, l4Hb), at I07
lb. Re. United Perce! Service Canada Ltd. 24 L.A.C. (2d) 202 (Burkett. I4hl>, at 21.1
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To take the unavoidable corollary, it the employer can show, or the arbitrator can 
find, that management action was taken fo r  reasons related to the betterment o f 
business, then the action cannot be questioned unless a provision in the collective 
agreement expressly and precisely prohibits it. "Legitimate business reasons" is a 
highly elastic term. There are short-term business considerations and long-term ones. 
The argument can easily be made that practically every advance ever made by trade 
unions has been at the expense of legitimate business interests in the long or short term. 
Unsophisticated employers may get caught from time to time because they simply do not 
take the care to build a business utility case for a particular affront (although in the 
sectors where such employers operate, unions are often too weak to pursue them to 
arbitration). But sophisticated employers can learn quickly and without much difficulty 
to put the gloss of l>usiness betterment' on almost any action they wish to take.
Fifth, it has long been held by arbitrators that in the absence of specific collective 
agreement language to the contrary, management has the right to make rules for 
employees to follow, both formal written rules and 'on the spot' directions from 
supervisors. Employees and their unions also have the right to challenge such rules and it 
has long been held that they must be 'reasonable'17 ie. the standard applied is
"the extent to which the rule necestary to protect the employer'* interest in operating 
the plant, in preserving its property, and generally in carrying out its operations in a reasonably 
safe, efficient and orderly manner" (Brown & Beatty, 1984, p. 181)
So, though rules must be 'reasonable', the same limitations to reasonableness apply 
here as in the more general point about "legitimate business interests". But in the whole 
area of rule-making by employers and rule-challenging by unions, fu rth e r  restrictive 
conventions or what might be called 'iron rules of arbitration' operate to severely curtail 
the adjustment-making limits of arbitration. The first of these is the adage "obey now, 
grieve later" so steeped in arbitral history that its exact origin is not known. This adage is 
often coupled with its companion "the industrial plant is not a debating society"1"- 
Together they stand in diametric opposition to the British workplace convention of status 
quo (whose operation will be examined presently ). Canadian employees who raise all but
P. R*. K V P C o . Ltd. I6L.A.C. T» (Robinson, 1965»
IH. This saying is attributed to tha US arbitrator and industrial ralations law scholar Harry Shulman in Ro Ford 
M otor Co. 3 L.A. TW, quoted in Brown A Beatty (I9H4I.
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the most cursory objections to all but the most outrageous management edicts19 will 
readily find themselves guilty of insubordination and subject to discipline. These iron 
rules are not seen by arbitrators as detrimental to employee interests:
"Arbitrators have taken the poaition that their recognition of the employer's right to 
maintain production and to preserve its symbolic authority is neither inconsistent with, nor 
prejudicial to. the legitimate contractual rights of the employees because in the vast majority of 
circumstances they can secure adequate redress for any abuse of authority by the employer through 
the grievance and arbitration process". (Brown A  Beatty. ISM. p. 435, emphasis added)
But how adequate is such redress and to what extent does it actually succeed in 
'maintaining production' in the long run? As noted earlier, unions prefer to remain 
agnostic to company rule-making and for good reason. Arbitral challenges to rules tend 
to be highly hypothetical exercises and invite long, tortured written decisions which 
seldom back the union's claim20 • It is only in the application and enforcement o f  a 
rule that its real meaning becomes evident. Thus, for instance, a general challenge to an 
employer's absenteeism control programme based on that employer's inconsistency of 
enforcement failed because
"conmtency of enforcement it not e matter that goea to the efficacy of the policy but to ita 
application in particular circumstances. In othar words, were ditciplina to ba imposed fo r  
breach o f  the policy, consistency would ba a relevant consideration in assessing the 
propriety o f  the discipline imposed. (Emphaiu added)
A similar, unreported, decision was given at a sister plant of CANBREW 's, causing 
the CAN BREW  convenor to express his frustration at the necessity to wait for the axe to 
fall.
The time period for resolution of a challenge to a rule is another major consideration 
in judging whether 'adequate redress' can be achieved. Non-disciplinary grievances may 
take an average of eight or nine months from the time they are filed to the time an 
arbitration award is given and delays of up to a year and a half are not uncommon 
(Goldblatt, 1974). At CANBREW , the average time in non-disciplinary cases is nine and 
a half months (with an eight and a half month average wait for all arbitrations). At IV.
IV. Eiceptiont to the 'obey now. griava later' rule include only iniUncei where health and tafety are threatened,
illegality would remit or where a union official it refuted permitiion to attend to mattert where 'irreparable 
harm' would come to the intereits of othar employee! 'Brown 4  Beatty, p. 43V)
30. Such a daemon occurt in Re. Me Keller General Hospital 24 L.A.C. (3d) V7 (Saltman, IVKA).
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CANM ET, even several serious disciplinary cases had not been heard a year and a half 
after they were initiated.
Justice thus delayed may, at least to the employees directly concerned, be justice 
denied. Given that the 'obey now, grieve later' rule applies not only where the employer 
devises rules outside the scope of the collective agreement but even where a manager 
has clearly violated a provision o f  the agreement, it is not surprising that Canadian 
workers often take more expeditious, albeit desperate, action when confronted with 
unpopular management action.
As seen above, unions have learned that hypothetical challenges to company rules 
are very difficult. The most effective challenge comes when an employee has been 
disciplined for a concrete infraction of those rules. In fact, the arbitral regime may 
encourage rather than discourage insubordination and disruption where the 
circumstances are serious enough. This is due to another iron rule which states that the 
burden of proof in all arbitration cases, except those involving discipline, lies with the 
grieving party ie. the union. Thus, if the union challenges a rule on its merits, the onus is 
on the union to prove the rule unreasonable. If an employee disobeys the rule and is 
disciplined, the onus is on the employer to prove the application of the rule was 
reasonable. Thus, where they strongly oppose a management action, employees may 
consider themselves in for a penny, in for a pound.
Sixth, examining more carefully the array of arbitral issues, one detects a differential 
application of the *business considerations' test depending on the issue at hand. On a few 
select issues, arbitrators seem to t>end over backwards' to give the grievor the benefit of 
the doubt. But on most others, they will do the opposite.
Evidence comes from an exhaustive survey of the reported decisions of Ontario 
arbitrators from April, 1977 to April 1986 dealing with almost 10,000 issues in that 
period22* In this survey, a union 'win' is considered any arbitral decision which upholds a 
grievance in whole or in part. The overall 'win' rate for unions is 45.8%, less than half
¿2. The survey, in rough form. was compiled from the Ontario Ministry of Labour's Offics of Arbitration Monthly 
Bullatin by tha Ontario Fadaration of Labour, assistad by tha United Steelworkers of America (District M. 
The analysis was done by the author. The arbitration decisions were those submitted to the Office of 
Arbitration, which comprise at least 1(1 to 1 JS  of those heard in the province over those years. Given that a 
union 'win' is considered a decision upholding a union grievance in wholt or in port the survey, if anything, 
tends to overstate union success at arbitration.
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the issues23- The distinct arbitral area with by far the highest union 'win' rate (and the 
only one over 50%) is discipline with 5 1.2%. (Discharge has an even higher union 'win' 
rate of 52.7%.) Yet discipline is also by far the most arbitrated subject taking up a full 
4 1.5% of the issues.
Straightforward issues of pay (including errors in pay, expense allowances, holiday 
and vacation entitlement and sick leave), accounting for 15.4% of the issues, yield a union 
'win' rate of 48.3%. Structuring of the internal labour market (such topics as protection 
of the bargaining unit, job postings, seniority and redundancy), accounting for 19.7%  of 
the issues, yield a union 'win' rate of 37.8%. The above three areas, together, account for 
the vast majority of arbitrated issues (76.6%) with a union 'win' rate of 47%.
On the other hand, the area of 'job control’ and 'working conditions' (including 
classifications, management's rights, technological change and work assignments) accounts 
for only 7.6% of the issues and has a union 'win' rate of 34.4%.
This breakdown shows that on issues of discipline (and especially discharge, where a 
union 'win' may include reinstatement without back pay, which is really tantamount to an 
upheld suspension), arbitrators are only barely more likely to rule for the union than for 
the employer. Yet compared to other arbitral subjects, this is a high union success rate. 
On issues of pay, most of which are straightforward, unions also have a fair success rate. 
Not surprisingly, a large majority of the issues submitted to arbitration (two thirds) are in 
these more or less 'winnable' areas. On issues of structuring the internal labour market, 
the union is also relatively prepared to submit to arbitration. Yet the success rate hardly 
warrants the optimism. In the area of job control, the success rate is barely one in three. 
The low number of arbitration issues submitted under this heading reflects not only the 
low success rate but the previously-mentioned paucity of 'grievable' language in the 
collective agreement.
The success rates and submission rate in these arbitral areas reflect both the clarity of 
the collective agreement language in the area and, where the language is not clear, the 
amount of adjustment which the arbitrator is allowed to make. Disciplinary clauses, as
23. Stanton (I9H2), with a database of 3,2‘7h arbitrated issues in British Columbia from IV66 to 1981. (hows an overall 
union 'win* rata of 45.2*. Ha count! "drawl” (8.9%) ai "iop i to the umoni. being flaccid when compared to 
what the uniom had sought" (p. 91. H u  breakdown by mue is somewhat different than that above but the 
general thruat 11 the tame.
\
\
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will be seen in the chapter devoted to that issue, contain no more explicit an arbitral 
mandate than to consider 'just cause'. Yet arbitrators have been allowed and have 
assumed a tremendous amount of interpretive leeway. The high submission and success 
rates reflect this fact. Pay and perquisite language is usually quite clear. The moderate 
submission yet high success rate reflects this. Job allocation language is generally muddy. 
There is often a clash between considerations of seniority and qualification and some 
incertitude about what constitutes 'bargaining unit' work. The moderate submission rate 
and moderate success rate reflect this. Job control language is either sketchy or non­
existent. The low submission and success rate reflect this.
To summarise, arbitrators have traditionally gained leeway to limit managerial 
discretion only in those areas such as discipline and structuring the internal labour 
market, where the potential damage to employee interests f o r  outweighs potential 
damage to managerial prerogative. This and the other five constraints upon arbitral 
ability to imply a duty of fairness, would seem to reduce considerably the revolutionary 
potential of the doctrine upon Canadian industrial relations.
Beatty himself concedes that,
"R««li»tically...th« recant daemon» of tha court» in Ontario and the divmon of opinion in 
the arbitral community do not provide cauie to be optimiitic that theie adjudicative process«« have 
tha will to work tha law pure. Thu hutory of confunon and contradiction which diitinguuha» their 
collective treatment of the i»»ue »uaaeat» that a legit lative amendment will he nece»»ary for the 
liberal theory of arbitration to be fully realiaed" (Beatty. I<NU, p. 167)
Several provinces have enacted just such an amendment. The British Columbia act 
requires arbitrators to have regard to the "real substance" of the collective agreement. 
The Manitoba act enjoins management to "act reasonably, fairly, in good faith and in a 
manner consistent with the collective agreement as a whole." But such clauses could 
backfire. An old legal maxim expressio unius, exc/usio a/terius, holds that where a 
legal provision is expressly mentioned in one place but not another, it does not apply in 
the second place. The very fact that these two provinces have legislatively required some 
degree of fairness on the part of employers renders the situation in all other jurisdictions 
automatically worse. A clever management lawyer in those jurisdictions could make a 
convincing argument as follows: "The B.C. and Manitoba legislatures, in their wisdom, 
chose to make a fairness provision explicit. Our legislature, in its wisdom, chose not to.
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In the absence of such a provision, we must assume our legislature did not want such a 
provision to apply. Thus arbitrators have no right to imply one."
2.5 Summary
Thus, after looking in some detail at the three areas where Beatty contends that 
arbitration has shown promise of making inroads upon managerial discretion, it must be 
concluded that the vitality of arbitration as a forum for the making of adjustments is not 
only severely limited but severely limits the ability of the parties to fashion such remedies 
of their own accord. Far from being a vehicle superior to collective bargaining for the 
achievement of workplace equity, the arbitral forum is a hothouse of reaction and a 
quagmi re of lost hopes.
As one noted commentator has said of the substitution of arbitration for the strike in 
the US:
"The no-strike provmoni of...collective agreement* constitute a quo considerably in escess 
of the quid of the agreement to arbitrate.* (Feller. 1973. p. 760, emphasis in the original!
3. The British Plants
Comparing adjustments in Canada and Britain, two sets of important axioms form 
mirror images of each other. If, in Canada they are: "in the absence of collective 
agreement language to the contrary, management's rights prevail" and "obey now, grieve 
later", then in Britain they are: "everything is negotiable" and "status quo". Together, the 
Canadian axioms tightly constrict the viability of custom and practice as an adjustment 
apparatus. Together the British axioms ensure it.
To examine the British axioms in more detail: Even at BR ITM ET  where, in reality, 
union power is relatively weak and the union's ability to enforce adjustments 
inconsistent, both parties agree that negotiability is not a rigid concept. A steward 
explains that:
"Ths union is concsrnsd whenever Ihere is ■  change in working procedures. We expect to be 
informed by the company and consulted in every such change.*
A  personnel manager there also ingenuously avows that
*The union sees all changes in working practices as negotiable. The company takas pains to 
inform the union of all such changes and then sit* back to see if the union will object.*
Somewhat more cannily he suggests that just how negotiable a change is depends upon 
the circumstances, including how loudly the union objects and "whether we want to pay 
attention to what the union says or not". The instrumentalism of his response echoes that
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of his union counterpart and both parties at BRITBREW , for whom the difference 
between 'negotiable' and 'non-negotiable' is the intensity of struggle over an issue, not its 
existence or preclusion, as is the case over a wide range of issues in Canada.
3.1 Status Quo
'Status quo', the other key axiom, is a principle widespread throughout British 
industrial relations. It may be explicit, as in the BR ITM ET  collective agreement:
Statui quo: In caM of a dispute, tha conditions to be applied during procedure are those prevailing 
by established practice.
or implicit as described by a manager at BRITBREW :
"It  ia understood that no new practice will come into operation until agreement has been 
reached".
The status quo provision does not invariably, as might be expected, work to the 
union's benefit. Any industrial action by the union before the exhaustion of either 
interests or rights procedure is considered a violation of the status quo and management 
in both plants (but especially BRITMET) will resist 'negotiating out of procedure'or 
'under duress'. Yet, as noted in chapter IV, this concept is a flexible one. As Marsh says, 
such remonstration may often be an indicator of the need for:
"informal talk» between tha officials of both sides. The use of the technique of ‘no 
negotiation under duress' is, ia fact a tactical matter and frequently succeeds, not from the 
eacellence of the idea itself, but because it enables forces of time and circumstance to be applied to 
the situation." (Marsh, 1966, p.T-M
Indeed, at both of our British plants, union industrial action out of procedure is often 
a way of underlining the seriousness of a grievance while management recourse to status 
quo is often a method of bringing the union back to the table, albeit informally.
Status quo can also work to the employer's benefit when, all other things remaining 
the same, the union wants to exploit a temporary advantage (eg. seasonal ones at 
BR ITBREW ) to introduce a change, like a rate increase, and management wishes to resist. 
Management can drag out talks until the advantage has passed.
But it is the union to whom this principle most often redounds and the industrial plant 
can indeed sometimes become a 'debating society', although the managers in neither of our 
British plants feel that such shop-floor debates per se present a major problem of 
disruption.
To invoke the status quo provision, the union need only launch a dispute. Since it is 
management that most often wishes to initiate change, and delay in implementing change
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can often cost money, the status quo provision can be a powerful union lever, in and of 
itself, for wresting concessions from managers where they must make quick or marginal 
changes.
On the other hand, the status quo provision can have the effect of forcing management 
to plan important changes carefully in advance if it feels it necessary to 'take on' the 
union. For instance, in the dispute over the BRITBREW  draymen's incentive scheme, 
mentioned in Chapter III, the company laid plans for changing the scheme a full two years 
before the eventual strike and hired a new manager with suitable 'hatchet man' 
qualifications. Feeling a strike might eventually result, management submitted a report 
to head office, indicating how important the desired change was, warning that a strike 
might result, estimating the losses that would be incurred, and requesting a 'bail out' if 
necessary. Head office agreed to the plan and estimated strike costs were built into the 
BR ITBREW 's budget.
The dispute was ostensibly over change to a written departmental agreement. Yet 
like an unseaworthy ship, the old agreement was unsatisfactory to the company not only 
because of internal weakness but because of the mass of unwritten adjustments which had 
grown onto it like barnacles over more than a decade....items like delivery routes, 
procedure if a load could not be delivered, the amount of assistance given by draymen to 
publicans, whether signatures were required on delivery notes. A ll of the above were 
important to the company to control costs and service and to the workers to maintain 
earnings and some amount of job discretion. As mentioned earlier, the ability to isolate 
this dispute in time and place from other issues in the plant helped both parties, to their 
independent benefit, keep it containable. The existence of cushioning body of unwritten 
adjustments means that both sides could settle earlier, without losing face, in the 
confidence that even the most Draconian settlement could be adjusted at the point of 
production to meet their day-to-day needs.
In Canada, managements also plan in advance for showdowns with the union over 
change, but only if they involve amendment to the collective agreement. For other small 
and large changes under the umbrella of 'management's rights', industrial relations 
implications are often blithely ignored. Where change must be negotiated in Canada, the 
relative absence of a cushioning body of custom and practice makes any proposed
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agreement all the more drastic for both parties, witness the extended work week dispute
at CANM ET.
3.2 Custom and Practice
What is it that status quo preserves in the British workplace? It is most often 
called 'custom and practice' (or C  & P). The BR ITBREW  union's Shop Steward's 
Handbook indicates how important it is amid the political apparatuses of production:
INFORMAL AGREEMENT'S. CUSTOM A N D  PRACTICE
Emurc that you know all tha different rataa and condition! of the worker! for whom you arc 
reiponaible. There may be all kindi of variation! depending on how the job n  orgamied, typei of 
machinery, and method! of luffing. Theie may be recorded in icparate agreements, but often 
cuitom and practice n  the only guide ai to how jobi are done, how they are graded and paid. There 
may alio be agreement! about matter! like the amount of work to be done. Theie individual 
condition! of working ere no lait important fo r  you to know than tha mam agraamant. (p. V. 
emphaiii added!
But the exact content of custom and practice is not easy to pin down. It is a paradox: 
both highly tangible in its existence yet highly abstract in its substance. Ask union or 
management representatives to define custom and practice and they are hard pressed; 
they are unable and unwilling to recite a list. Yet, they are ready enough to raise the 
concept under concrete circumstances. Brown (1972) describes the phenomenon aptly:
’The liable dog wai important in the Sherlock Holmei itory not became it barked at the 
time of the crime but became it remained ulent. Similarly the C  k  P itatui of tome practice! only 
aruei when they are challenged, queitioned or broken.” <p. 44)
There has been some debate about the origin of custom and practice. Brown (1972,
1973), in perhaps the major British examination of custom and practice, criticises 
Flanders and Fox for succumbing to the notion that C  & P is unilaterally worker regulated 
and salutes Clegg for showing that management "can play a key part in establishing and 
maintaining it although infringements will be guarded against primarily by workers and 
their representatives" (1972, p. 44). Brown shows that it is not enough for workers to 
have a practice but that to become custom and practice, a way of doing things must in some 
way have been condoned by management. He also concedes that management may actively 
collude, for its own (Brown implies usually short-sighted) purposes in the development of 
C  &  P. Yet he comes to the conclusion that the rules of custom and practice "are the 
product of management error and worker power" (p. 59).
The investigations of C &  P behind Brown's conclusions were carried out mainly in the 
engineering industry and in a period of high general union power in Britain (late 60's and
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early 70's), a place and time in which it was hard not to see C  & P as an almost 
uncontrollable 'problem' fo - management. Yet to be fully understood, the phenomenon 
needs to be viewed also as it operates in workplaces such as those investigated by 
Armstrong & Goodman (1979), and Armstrong et al. (1981) "in which advanced systems 
of shop-steward organisation characteristic of the engineering, vehicle and printing 
industries are absent." (ibid., p. 20) and under the conditions of union power after several 
years of Thatcherism. Armstrong et al., examining plastics, light electrical fabrication 
and footwear factories in the late 70's, found not only that managers can take a less 
passive role in the development of C & P than in the Brown-type plants, but that they can 
often "co-opt this principle for their own use" to legitimise, and elevate to the status of 
rules, practices which are detrimental to worker interests but which have gone 
unchallenged by those workers (p. 171). This phenomenon is called "managerial and 
supervisory custom and practice" (Armstrong & Goodman, 1979).
Custom and practice in our plants is examined after at least eight years of heavy 
unemployment, anti-union legislation and union decline. They reveal that custom and 
practice is not merely a creature of powerful unions in good economic times nor of union 
capitalising on management error and omission (though this fertile soil may have been 
necessary for its growth). It is now an assuredly bilateral process, comfortably and 
opportunistically employed by both parties as a full-fledged adjustment apparatus.
While it is most often raised by the union and in the presence of an explicit challenge 
by management to a long-standing practice, our research reveals that custom and practice 
can also be anticipated by thoughtful and careful managers before it is a gleam in a shop 
steward's eye. Both of these would be aspects of what Armstrong and Goodman (1979) 
call "worker custom and practice" in that they work to the benefit of the workers.
At a BR ITM ET departmental production meeting, supervisors discussed the efficacy 
of requiring fork lift truck drivers from the fabrication unit to dump empty bins deep in 
the premises of the casting unit. Current practice was for the drivers to drop the bins at 
the demarcation line between the two units for casting unit drivers to pick up, resulting in 
two separate operations. While reduction to a single operation would have been more 
efficient, the production meeting decided without even breathing the idea to the 
union, that the old method was "custom and practice" and change was not worth
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"upsetting the union". The decision in this case was not the product of temerity but of 
hard-headed rationality. Thus the principle of past practice can be so powerful as to be 
upheld by management even in the absence o f  the union.
Far from being ignorant of custom and practice until it is incanted by the union, 
management is often keenly aware of its operation. Not only do managers "rely on the 
silences of the labor contract as much as do workers....to benefit from unspoken 
assumptions when they have the chance" (Armstrong et a l 1981, p. 25) but also often 
cooperate with workers in "fiddles" either to meet or surpass production quotas or to 
hide deficiencies in their own management. The pattern of collusion and conflict in such 
fiddles will be examined in detail in the chapter on job control.
It is only when these adjustments turn perverse that a 'clawback' is seen as necessary 
by the employer. Perversity arises either when conditions change so that fiddles no longer 
produce such great output to cost advantages or when earnings threaten to seriously 
disrupt internal pay differentials and site-wide harmony. In retrospect, it may be easy to 
accuse managers of short-term opportunism, but in light of the results achieved, it is a 
highly rational, even economically efficient, activity.
Also evident to some extent is "managerial and supervisory custom and practice", 
especially at BR ITM ET, where managers, by their practice, subvert written (or what the 
unions regard as long standing verbal) arrangements. Such a case is where the seniority 
clause in the B R IT M E T  collective agreement is ignored by managers. This incident is 
explored in more detail at the end of this chapter. Nonetheless, although the BR ITM ET  
union is weaker than that at BRITBREW, it does not compare to the situation in 
Armstrong & Goodman's (1979) and Armstrong et al.'s (198 1) case study plants where 
union organisation and resistance is minimal. Because of the volatility of the BR IT M ET  
workforce, management rides roughshod over established norms at its peril.
3.3 Differences between Britain and Canada in the Operation o f Adjustments 
What then, are the major differences between Britain and Canada in the operation 
of adjustment as a political apparatus of production? First, there is considerable 
divergence in the subject matter of adjustments. To be sure, they mirror the subject areas 
outlined in the Canadian plants (ie. activity of and facilities for union representatives; 
timing and scheduling of work and breaks; job allocation; aspects of compensation; the
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enforcement of work rules). But, in addition, they cover many areas not covered in 
Canadian adjustments, particularly in what we have called 'job control'. Storey (1977) 
asked a sample of British ship stewards and managers what issues they negotiated on and 
found that they very frequently negotiated on the expected issues of overtime, discipline, 
dismissal, redundancy and shifts, issues which would be quite familiar to their Canadian 
counterparts. But they also negotiated on manning, job content, production techniques, 
demarcation, quality standards, scheduling of operations, layout of equipment, level of 
output and speed of work, subjects which would be particularly taboo in Canadian plants. 
Given the limited size and breadth of British collective agreements and the inapplicability 
of codification to many of these issues in any case, it is likely that they would be negotiated 
under adjustments apparatuses, employing the concept of custom and practice. In 
addition to the above, there were several issues almost never negotiated such as type of 
product, price of product, source of materials, investment and ownership. While 
management would strenuously resist negotiating on such issues, by and large British 
unions, like Canadian unions, have chosen to leave them entirely to management 
discretion anyway.24
Another major area of negotiation in British industrial relations and a wellspring of 
adjustments is payment by results systems, especially for small work groups in strategic 
positions. As noted earlier, such payment systems are less common in Canada and where 
they exist, more tightly controlled by management, less dependent upon the efforts of 
small groups. The differential operation of such schemes will be explored in Chapter IX. 
Suffice it to say that they are a fecund source of adjustments.
Second, while adjustments enjoy much more management initiative than an earlier 
generation of British commentators believed, compared to the Canadian plants where 
gratuituous concessions and indulgences by management are the norm, it is the unions in 
Britain that are the main architects and policemen of custom and practice.
Third, for this reason, the 'clawing back' of custom and practice by management is far 
more difficult and less employed in the British plant. Unions will defend that which they
24. Significantly, promotion is an issue which both parties rank vary low in negotiability, lift of the shop stewards
and only Ift of the managers in Storey's survey listed promotion as an item negotiated. In Chapter V III it will 
be seen that promotion is an item of seemingly low importance to workplace industrial relations in Britain 
compared to its almost universal importance in Canada.
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feel they have constructed. British managements do not set off on clawback expeditions on 
principle, but rather opportunistically, as and when practice becomes obstructive and 
where the benefit to be derived from the change is 'worth' taking on the union.
When such clawbacks are found necessary, British managements are still prone to *buy 
out' the work group involved. While BR1TBREW managers express their intention to 
reduce the instances of 'payment for change' and BR IT M ET  managers deplore the idea for 
the record, this activity is ill-concealed in both plants. The practice of compensation 
(usually two years worth of estimated lost income) when any change (not related to sales) 
threatens total earnings is well established at BRITBREW . Strong work groups will 
sometimes even take on additional bits of work so that their bargaining position is 
enhanced in this regard. At BR ITM ET, a group of furnace operators in the casting unit 
negotiated a continuous bonus for the inconvenience of occasionally working through 
their cleanup time and shift change. In another case at the aluminium plant, the company, 
in order to introduce automatic machine monitoring equipment, was prepared to 
compensate maintenance mechanics for dropping a standby allowance. What makes such 
buyouts palatable for both companies is the belief that it will be a 'once and for all' 
payment (although, as seen in Chapter IX, this is not always the case). For the purposes of 
this chapter, it is a common and accepted method of clawing back custom and practice in 
British plants.
Fourth, unlike in the Canadian plants, the British managements are not so obsessed 
with auditing past practices and moving to remove them from the sphere of adjustments 
by codifying or eliminating them. While there is a notable move toward greater 
codification in general, managers at all levels appreciate the benefits of adjustment.
Unlike the personnel department at CANBREW that was 'shocked' by some of the (in 
comparison, fairly tame) practices they encountered in their custom and practice audit, 
their counterparts at BRITBREW , when confronted by the researcher with evidence of 
custom and practice contrary to general company policy in some departments, show no 
alarm. As a personnel manager says when informed by the researcher of a group of 
workers blacking a certain process:
"That'a an ambarraieina problam for lower laval manaaamant. But wa'ra not toina to act on 
it. Paraonnal can't taka on all of that a minor problama and thara moil ba many of tham. Wa have a 
delicate path to tread."
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Fifth, the concept of 'legitimate business reasons ' which so tightly constrains the 
scope of Canadian arbitral adjustment, is not a blanket impediment to adjustment in 
British workplaces. Because the apparatuses of interests, rights and adjustments are not 
strictly segregated as in Canada, the zero-sum nature of bargaining is implicitly 
acknowledged in all of them. An advantage for the workers or their union may well be a 
disadvantage to the business interests, legitimate or otherwise, of the employer. If what 
goes on at BR1TBREW is not entirely atypical, and it is submitted that it is not, then even 
in the eighties, it is common in British workplaces with strong unions and appropriate 
profit levels, for even the most commercially rational changes to be delayed, at least 
temporarily, while the parties haggle.
In one such case, BR ITBREW  began the installation of a new yeast plant. The union 
fully agreed that the plant was desperately needed to increase quality and efficiency but 
was worried about one job loss and the effect of changes in working practices to their 
incentive earnings. Working amid construction was also problematic. The union initiated 
a dispute and claimed status quo ie. no work on the new machinery could be done until the 
dispute was resolved. The company refused to consider 'buying out' the changes until 
after the equipment was installed and a thorough work study carried out. Yet 'status quo' 
and non-cooperation by the workers was holding up construction and implementation of 
the machinery. So the parties settled by 'temporarily' building one hour overtime into 
each day, whether it was worked or not (it usually wasn't). The arrangement, meant to 
last a few weeks, lasted five months. By this time, the workers had become accustomed to 
the £20 per week extra from 'overtime'. Again the union insisted on status quo. The 
eventual settlement had to take account of this payment.
Yet, as in everything, notions of 'acceptability' do prevail and the workers at 
BRITBREW , militant as they are, have quite definite views on legitimate and illegitimate 
resistance. The union will seldom resist patently obvious business rationality. The 
employer proposed to eliminate a 'floating' crew whose actual work did not justify its 
existence and to transfer the workers in the crew to other jobs. The workers involved, 
used to being paid for doing very little, protested loudly and resisted dispersal. While the 
union attempted to get the best 'deal' for them in the transfer, it acknowledged the need 
for change. Says the convenor
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"We did the best we could for the blokea. but we came cloaa to fistfishu on a few occanona.
Their own »hop steward refused to represent them after a while. They had no support from the 
other workers. Both we and the company had to pretend the dispute was serious.”
The main difference between this and the Canadian situation, then, is that the 
legitimacy of change is socially constructed by the parties themselves rather than rigidly, 
with regard to the ideas of a third party. As with the concept of 'negotiability', it is a 
question of intensity of struggle rather than of preclusion.
Thus custom and practice, and adjustments in general, are the political apparatuses of 
production which most clearly distinguish Canadian from British industrial conflict 
management.
What of the difference between our two British plants in the operation of custom 
and practice? Recalling the B R ITM ET  managers meeting and the problem of fork lift 
truck drivers dropping bins discussed earlier, and remembering what has been said in 
Chapter 11 about the weakness of the union and the volatility of the workforce, it must be 
stressed that management could probably hove driven such a change through without 
serious challenge by the union. But it could not have presupposed the acquiescence of the 
workers. Had management called union representatives in for discussions on the issue, 
they may well have stubbornly resisted or commenced procedure, yet not had the self- 
confidence to either bargain a settlement or back up their resistance with action. The 
response of the workers would remain a wild card. As mentioned earlier, negotiating 
change with the union at BR ITM ET  is an extremely frustrating experience. Management 
must do much of the thinking about the consequences of change out of range of the union.
A  similar situation would proceed quite differently at BRITBREW. In the first 
instance, of course, management would also have to consider whether a change might 
upset the workers. But managers would be far more sanguine about the possibilities of 
'working a deal' with the union. And the union, being more self confident than the one at 
B R ITM ET , would be, on the one hand, less bloody minded about conceding 'small stuff 
and on the other, more willing to bargain over *big stuff. The BRITBREW  union shop 
stewards handbook, indeed, invites stewards,in pursuing a grievance, to
’Bear in mind tha manacamant fraquantly offari lome compromise. A« far aa you can. 
dacide in advanca what ara tba minimum tarmi you ara prapared to accapt*. (p. Wl
In fact, an agreement by union representatives to allow some 'small stuff can often 
mean that the managers involved 'owe' them future consideration. Thus proposals for
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adjustments are taken up by the union in a highly selective and instrumental way, in light 
of the whole context of labour-management relations. According to the convenor,
"The union ii obliged to represent, not defend. If a worker's complaint putt into jeopardy 
what we've achieved, then it 's a non-starter."
4. Concluding Remarks
To summarise, given the importance of custom and practice and its attendant concepts 
of status quo and negotiability, the task for British managements in implementing change 
is to weigh immediately the benefits to be gained from the change against the industrial 
relations implications of the change. The response from the workers and their union will 
also be immediate. In a plant with high union power, like BRITBREW, those 
implications, while perhaps more costly, are also more predictable than at a plant with 
low union power, like BR ITM ET. In both plants, however, personnel and production 
managers have a finely honed sense of what will 'carry' on the shop floor and what will 
not. If resistance is expected, they (and especially those at BRITBREW ) have fairly clear 
ideas on how such resistance can be overcome.
In the Canadian plants, in a similar situation so securely within the ambit of 
managerial rights, management would doubtless introduce the change without 
compunctions about the necessity of securing union agreement, (other than perhaps 
informing the union out of courtesy). What is more, seeking union agreement for such 
change would be seen as an unacceptable precedent. A classic expression of this danger 
appears in a pamphlet issued in 1956 by the US National Association of Manufacturers:
" If  foremen in their dey-to-dey performance ere allowed to adminiiter the contract in a 
tlipahod faihion, the vital authority of management is drained away. In fact it is perfectly possible 
for supervisors to give away in daily operations the management rights fought so hard for in 
negotiations." (quoted in Bakke at el.. 196'’. pp. ¿Mh-2J3)
Yet, given the greater apparent ease of introducing change in the Canadian plants, 
Canadian managers have much less intuitive sense about what can and cannot carry on the 
shop floor. They may well be more easily lulled into a false sense of security about the 
long-term effects of their actions, to be "caught by surprise" (as one C A N M ET  manager 
described his reaction to the long 1986-87 strike), by the intensity of worker and union 
opposition and bloody-mindedness at the bargaining table when it is often too late to avoid 
all-out industrial conflict.
CHAPTER VI: ENFORCEMENTS
1. Introduction
Thus far, the exploration has been of potentiality. Some tentative probes of the 
relative power of the parties in our workplaces have been attempted and the mechanisms 
of dispute resolution available to the them have been more thoroughly canvassed. It is 
now time to explore actuality. Between potential power and the mechanisms available on 
the one hand and the results, the actual power, achieved on the other, lies an 
intermediating apparatus, called enforcement.
By enforcement is meant both the efficacy of pursuing and resisting claims and the 
sanctions that may be applied in so doing. It is here that intra-national dissimilarities 
between our sets of workplaces become clearer and more analysable. It is here also that 
the differential cross-national ability of the two 'systems' to allow these dissimilarities 
comes into focus.
The question asked at this juncture is: how does the potential power of the union 
interact with mechanisms available to produce the concrete expression of that power? 
Earlier, union power was defined as the ability of the union to 'deliver the goods' both to 
its members and to management. So the question becomes: what exactly is the 'delivery 
system' through which this is accomplished?
The ultimate sanction or enforcement method for unions is the strike. While it is by 
no means the only, nor necessarily the most effective sanction of itself, the strike or its 
threat is the inevitable counterpoint to all other forms of enforcement. Thus it is 
necessary to briefly review the availability and the use of strikes and strike threats in the 
two countries in conjunction with other available methods.
2. The Canadian Plants
2.1 Strike enforcements
The strike (and lockout1) weapon is legally available to the parties in Canada only 
at the expiry of a collective agreement and after bargaining in good faith for a new one.
In most jurisdictions, including the province housing our two plants, strikes are also only
I. Hereinafter, only »trike» will be mentioned. Firit. lockout! ere not nearly ae common at atrikei. Second, moat 
lockout» come about at the end of a chain of event» which would otherwise have led to a »trike. Thu», at 
CANBREW, although the ihutdown of brewerie» 1» technically a lockout, fo r  our p u rp o m  the difference
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'timely' after the parties have submitted to the intervention of a government-appointed 
third party (conciliator and/or mediator), after the third party reports his inability to 
resolve the dispute, after a 'countdown' period from the report has elapsed and after a 
strike vote has been held.
In the province where our plants are located, the Labour Relations Act broadly 
defines a strike to include:
"a  cesiation of work, a refusal to work or to continua to work by employee« in combination 
or in concert or in accordance with a common understanding, or a «low-down or other concerted 
activity on the part of employee« designed to rettrict or limit output*
Although an explicit subjective component like 'in furtherance of a trade dispute' is 
missing2 3, it is presupposed by the fact that strikes can only take place at agreement expiry 
and that striking or threatening to strike on an 'extraneous issue' (any issue other than 
that which directly concerns the parties to the agreement) is 'bargaining in bad faith'.
Timely' strikes are further limited in their effectiveness by the way Labour Relations 
Boards atomise bargaining units by 'certifying' unions to represent groups only large 
enough to encompass workers with a narrow 'community of interest', by the way the 
boards thus limit the ability of bargaining units to legally combine into 'negotiating units' 
(see Forrest, 1988) and by the practical difficulties of bargaining units in coordinating 
simultaneous 'timely' strikes to increase economic leverage. Thus multi-plant o r  industry 
or coordinated plant level bargaining can really take place on/y with management consent 
(which, for obvious reasons is seldom given, except, as is the case at CANBREW , where it 
is to the employer's advantage).
Only a small minority of collective agreements have provisions giving workers the 
right to refuse to cross picket lines or handle hot goods (known in Britain as 'blacking')'* 
and it is questionable whether such provisions can override the blanket strike ban in any 
case.
Another constraint on timely strikes is the effective ban (by both statute law and 
common law torts) on secondary picketing, blacking and refusing to cross picket lines (see
2. A few jurisdiction« do apply apply a ‘subjective' component le. that a strike is work stoppage designed to elicit an
economic response from the employer. However this has had the ironic effect of esempting 'political' strikes 
from the strike ban. ISee England. l**H3a. p. 24.«»
3. Only II.5% of collective agreements covering 300 employees or more
397».
have such provisions IKui
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England, 1983b). Even primary picketing is highly restricted by a sometimes bewildering 
combination of civil, criminal and common law on such issues as trespass, nuisance, 
watching and besetting, assault, battery, property damage, obstruction of traffic, 
obstruction of police and defamation.
As will be seen, a multiplicity of restrictions on picketing is also available to British 
employers. But there is a great difference in the way they are used in the two countries.
In the UK, the aggressive use of police and the law against picketers has been the 
exception and not the rule. The miners' strike, Wapping, and other celebrated cases in the 
'North American style' may or may not be harbingers of a future trend, but the British 
picket line has long been a more genteel affair than the Canadian. The fact that strikes 
are generally much shorter than Canadian ones is both a cause and a result of the above. 
Because timely Canadian strikes are long affairs, it is not uncommon for employers to 
continue operations with managerial and non-union labour4. C A N M ET  continued its 
most important fabrication operation using managerial and white collar employees during 
the I I -week 1986-87 strike. Managers claim they were prepared, had the strike lasted 
longer, to bring outside strikebreakers through the picket lines. For reasons outlined 
earlier in Chapter III, the breweries choose to shut themselves down during a 
strikc/lockout. Yet when they 'hang a plant out to dry', they will supply beer from other, 
working plants.
The police are highly involved in Canadian strikes and arrests on picket lines are 
common as union members attempt to impede the ingress of managers, non-bargaining 
unit workers (who may be in other bargaining units but not in a 'timely' strike position) 
and 'scabs'. If direct use of the law by police is insufficient, then courts will award 
injunctions limiting picketing and other acts, making offenders liable to contempt of 
court. A group of prominent Canadian legal scholars conclude a review of picketing law 
with the understatement: "the [Canadian] picket line is not a tea party" (Labour Law 
Casebook Group, 1986, p. 330)
A further legislative intervention into the conduct of strikes is the 'once-and-for-all' 
opportunity of a strike-bound employer to unilaterally call upon the Labour Relations
4. Of all the jurisdictions. only Quabcc law prohibit! the hiring of ‘scabs' tie. paopla who ware not employees before 
the strike) during a strike. The Quebec law does not prohibit the employer from operating with managerial 
personnel from the site, however.
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Board to impose a 'supervised ballot' on its last offer. Such a provision exists in the 
province where our plants are located and CANBREW  made effective use of it in the 
strike/lockout most recent to the study. The union-conducted ratification ballot had been 
close. When the employer applied for a supervised vote a few days into the work stoppage, 
the governmental authorities moved with breathtaking swiftness. Says the staff officer,
"It wai very impremvely organised Before we knew what wai happening, the government 
had served all employees with official papers at their homes. The time and place of the new vote had 
been set. We didn't hold a meeting because everybody knew the issues, but there would have been 
very little time to do so had we wanted to."
The new vote resulted in a bare majority in favour of the company offer. The 
employer had gauged the situation correctly and achieved its objective. Although 
supervised votes are not used often by employers (because they have learned that the 
action often offends workers and solidariscs, rather than breaks, a strike), C AN BREW 's 
behaviour is typical of Canadian employer behaviour during strikes. They will readily use 
the legal means at their disposal and unions have come to accept it as normal.
Perhaps the best characterisation of North American 'timely' strikes is that of a US 
commentator who describes them as "rituals of polite attrition" (Kuttner, 1984). Unless 
fortune puts the union in a position of great economic leverage precisely at the point of 
collective agreement expiry, the timely strike is a sanction of limited usefulness. Given 
what has been said in the previous chapter about the difficulties inherent in the Canadian 
interests apparatus, ie. the long interval between bargaining sessions, the multiplicity and 
complexity of issues weighing down the bargaining table, the tendency to reduce all 
demands to the lowest common denominator of money, neither the mechanism nor the 
sanction allow much leeway for a union to exercise its power.
What of strikes within the term of the collective agreement? As mentioned earlier, 
over the past 25 years, illegal or 'untimely' strikes have accounted for about a fifth of all 
strike days lost in Canada. The figure is all the more remarkable given the variety and 
Draconian nature of the remedies available to employers and their readiness to use them. 
Faced with an untimely strike, the employer may do the following, singly or in 
combination (see England, 1983a):
i) He may fire or suspend the strikers. While Canadian law does not deem the 
contract of employment automatically forfeited by a refusal to work, arbitrators are quite 
rigorous in holding that striking unlawfully is 'just cause' for discipline and leading such a
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strike is just cause for dismissal, ii) He may go to the labour relations board5 for a 
declaration of an illegal strike (or arbitration for a declaration of violation of the 'no 
strike' clause o f the agreement) and a 'cease and desist' order, enforceable, by contempt 
proceedings in the courts. The labour relations board route, being quicker, is usually used 
to end an ongoing strike; the arbitration route is more often used if a strike is over, iii)
He may seek damages from the individuals through the labour relations board or 
arbitration for lost production and incidental expenses. Employers do not do this as often 
as disciplining the individuals concerned but damages are frequently obtained and not 
enforced, in order to hold a 'sword of Damocles' over the head of the workers or trade for 
a union concession, iv) He may seek damages against the union and possibly its officers 
rather than the individual workers concerned. This is sometimes more effective because it 
puts the onus on the union to 'control' its members, v) In cases of outrageous flouting of 
the law (usually after an injunction), strikers and union leaders can be criminally liable 
and subject to jail sentences. This remedy is seldom used by employers but may be 
considered by state agencies if the challenge to the law is egregious.
The liability of the union for the illegal strike actions of its members makes it highly 
unlikely that such strikes will receive open or even tacit support from union officials. In 
fact, in order to escape liability, union officials are expected to instruct the membership to 
return to work, in no way encourage, instigate or participate in the walk-out and further, 
"take prompt and affirmative action to bring it to an end". The holding of a meeting of 
union members in which union officials are dilatory in denouncing the strike and do not 
threaten members with disciplinary action has resulted in the union being held 
'vicariously responsible' for the strike. The onus in proving that reasonable steps were 
taken is on the union. (See Brown & Beatty, 1984, pp. 664-668).
The experience in our Canadian plants illustrates the firmness with which untimely 
strikes are handled in that country. As part of a campaign to crack down on illegal 
stoppages in its plants across the country, CANBREW 's parent company's corporate 
industrial relations manager sent a memo to all plant industrial relations managers 3
3. Injunctive relief can be obtained from the court! in n o il jurisdiction*, but because of the delay factor and because 
the courts often defer to ihe labour relations boards, few employers use this avenue.
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outlining the company's position. In it he indicates that even short stoppages can (and 
should) be successfully prosecuted:
"We are now advised that (one of our competitor breweriea) are processing a company- 
initiated grievance against the union for an illegal work stoppage of two hours duration. The damages 
pursued are in the amount of $4000 (approximately £.2000) for resultant losses...*
With the memo, he enclosed a recent arbitration and court case in which a company 
was awarded damages for loss of 'overhead' even though the strike had caused no eventual 
loss of production. He also enclosed a document compiled by the company's firm of 
lawyers entitled "Procedures in the Event of an Unlawful Strike". This latter document is 
instructive in the way Canadian employers are expected to handle illegal strikes. All 
employees, it advises, must be told that their refusal to work constitutes an illegal strike. 
The police should be called immediately and asked to disperse the picketers, even if they 
are peaceful. This, it says "is an extremely important step for unsuccessful police 
involvement is a prerequisite to any injunction order"
The document advises management to contact the union office by telephone and 
follow-up telegram, indicating that
"the company holds the union responublc to taka avary available (U p  to gat the men to 
return to work. Alio, the immediate attendance of a union officer ihould be requeiud for the 
purpose of ordering the employeei back to work.*
A telegram should be sent to all striking employees' homes, advising that they are on 
illegal strike and liable to discipline and prosecution. And the employer should
*reaiat attempts by employees to negotiau a settlement of the issue or issues while 
employees are still on strike.*
Finally, all aspects of the strike should be carefully recorded and particularly
*the effect of the strika and picket line on the business. It is especially imporUnt to 
mdicau the irreparable damage, that which cannot be compensated for in money eg. missed 
deadlines, poUntial loss of customers, physical harm, etc.*
CANBREW  has become more aggressive in pursuing the sanctions available to it 
against wildcat strikes in reaction to a series of walkouts in the late 70's where the 
company employed a softer 'talk it out' approach. Managers concur that the latter 
approach "only encouraged more of the same" and that swift retribution and its threat is 
the only way of avoiding wildcats. Pursuit of illegal work stoppages has extended even to 
concerted overtime avoidance. In one such case, CANBREW  commenced a case against 
the union at the Labour Relations Board but dropped it when the overtime ban dissipated.
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C AN M ET  has an even more Draconian, albeit spontaneous approach to illegal 
stoppages. When fabrication employees walked off the job over a long standing safety 
issue, several of them, including their shop steward, were immediately suspended. On 
another occasion, when another group temporarily left their work stations because smoke 
in the air made it difficult to breath, managers began automatically to prepare discipline, 
only to learn later the true facts of the case. Workers have come to expect that in such 
situations the company will shoot first and ask questions later.
Given the state of the law and employer aggressiveness in untimely strikes, it is little 
wonder that these tend to be desperate and emotional affairs. While most of them are 
sparked by a particular critical issue, they soon disclose a litany of complaints and pent up 
frustrations. Because of the liability of union officers, few are consciously planned in 
advance and fewer are instrumentally directed at winning particular concessions from 
management. While most start in a particular department, if they last more than a short 
period, they inevitably spread to others as fellow workers, impelled by solidaristic notions 
and their own private gripes, fail to consider whatever particularity the walkout may 
have initially possessed. While some such strikes are settled by a promise of amnesty for 
the strikers, very few result in substantive concessions and, being so emotionally charged, 
last no longer than it takes for the workers involved to 'cool down' and take stock of their 
tenuous position. In most cases, after a few hours, the workers and certainly their union, 
devoutly wish to return to work.
A rare and notable exception to this rule occurred in 1976  at a plant in British 
Columbia. Paul Weiler, then chairman of the provincial labour relations board, into 
whose hands attempts to end the strike fell, describes the circumstances:
"Th is was not a flash wildcat strike precipitated by a grievance, such as a safety issue or the 
firing of a popular union steward. Rather it was a planned attempt to force the re-negotiation of a 
collective agreement and to achieve a new contract espiry date which would facilitate common front 
bargaining with the employees of (plants owned by the same company I. As such it was a deliberate 
challenge to the fundamental principles of the Labour Code...
The illegal action was massive in character. Of the ANMI employees of the smelter, most 
remained away from work for two and a half week!, and notwithstanding the issuance of Board orders 
which were filed with the Supreme Court and sarved personally on the strike leaders." (Weiler. IV'1'7,
p. *61
Weiler explains that because the union and the vast majority of workers were 
determined to defy the law, the customary remedies available simply broke down. And the 
union leaders seemed only too glad to go to jail on principle. The board devised a new
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remedy which, along with time, helped end the strike peacefully (the union did not achieve 
its objective). The point of this example is that in the vast majority of small, uncontrolled 
wildcats, the remedies and employer willingness to use them are enough for the employer 
to make short work of the disturbance without any concessions. In the case o f an 
instrumental and determined wildcat, the stoppage soon escalates into a challenge to the 
system as a whole, involving the state or its agencies, and is thus taken beyond the 
workplace, a situation deeply inimical to the union achieving its objectives. Pace Kuhn 
(1961), the availability of the strike weapon and hence, of the threat of same, as a 
sanction to back up 'fractional bargaining' in Canada, is almost non-existent.
2.2 Non-strike enforcements
In  the absence of the strike weapon, what enforcements does the union have 
available to make its claims? Other than very low level 'You scratch my back; I'll scratch 
yours' deals between workers and their supervisors (described as shop floor adjustments 
earlier in this chapter and practically unenforceable), the parties must rely on the 
wording of the collective agreement and the arbitral jurisprudence in making their 
claims. Thus the main enforcement apparatus is the grievance and arbitration 
procedure6-
Yet even the 'settling' of an issue by arbitration and its formal acceptance by the 
employer does not guarantee actual compliance. Nor does it allow the union to take 
enforcement into its own hands. For example, an employer was found by arbitration to 
have improperly contracted out a small part of its operation. On several occasions over 
the subsequent year, the employer continued to do so. The union, worried about 
acquiescing, instructed its members to refuse to cooperate. These members were 
disciplined and the discipline upheld by another arbitration, which ruled they must 'obey 
now, grieve later*. In other words, the violation o f a previous arbitration award 
must be the subject o f a new arbitration7. Given the previously-noted delay of non- 
discipiinary arbitrations, 'grieving later' in this case demonstrates the limitations of
A. Like daemon» of labour relation» board», thoia of arbitrator» are anforcaabla by raaiaterina them in the court» and 
than iuina for contampt. Yat »uch i» the durability and raputa of arbitration amona employer* that »uch 
recourae 1» virtually unnace»»ary. A» mentioned earlier, the court» have limited power of review of 
arbitration award*. Thu» the daemon of tha Canadian arbitrator, unlike that of hi» counterpart in Britain, 1» 
final and bindina and, moreover, accepted at auch.
7. R t British Columbia Talaphona Co. Ltd. 13 L.A.C. (2d» JU  (MacIntyre. I9"AI
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arbitration as an enforcement apparatus. That is not to say that all employers similarly 
flout arbitral decisions, yet the frustration of the workers confronted by this eventuality 
can be easily imagined.
A s  for collective agreement language, naturally, some collective agreements will 
provide greater scope for claims than others. For example, CANBREW 's agreement, 
among other things, provides for seniority as the criterion in promotion 'provided that the 
candidates are sufficiently qualified', contains the unique 'fair day's work' clause, provides 
for three weeks's vacation after three years, double time and a half for all hours worked 
over eight on a Sunday and up to a year and a half of income supplement in case of layoff. 
C A N M E T 's  agreement, on the other hand, provides for seniority as the criterion in 
promotion 'where skill, knowledge etc...are relatively equal" (a somewhat inferior clause 
to CANBREW 's), contains no 'fair day’s work' clause, provides for three week's vacation 
after five years, double time for all hours worked on a Sunday and no income supplement 
in case of layoff. So, it can be said that the agreement at CANBREW  is marginally 'better' 
than the one at CAN  MET. But not qualitatively better. Aside from clear monetary 
provisions (eg. Plant A gets $X per hour while plant B gets $Y per hour), the variation in 
scope for claims is actually quite narrow. As has been and will be seen, the apparent 
superiority of the promotion clause and the 'fair day's work' clause have been whittled 
down by arbitrators. In fact, arbitration has a 'levelling' effect upon the differences that 
do exist among Canadian collective agreements.
In  their main contents the majority of Canadian agreements are remarkably similar. 
Discipline is almost universally covered by the sole 'just cause' provision. Promotion and 
layoff are nearly always governed by some mixture of seniority and qualification. The 
grievance procedures are virtually boilerplated. The union generally has the right to post 
notices on a bulletin board and employees can request leaves of absence. It is because of 
this relative uniformity of agreement language that the arbitral jurisprudence, full of 
interpretations of agreements in thousands of workplaces, makes sense to anybody.
But if strikes are of limited use as enforcements during the term of the agreement, if 
collective agreements are quite similar and if, as has been noted earlier, the arbitration 
system is so predictable, what, if anything, provides for variation in the application of 
union power? There are two answers. First, compared to the British system, the
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variation in power application between weak and strong Canadian unions is indeed quite 
small. Weak unions are defended by the predictability and reliability of arbitration. 
Strong unions are constrained by the its inherent conservatism and the limitations of its 
purview. As mentioned at the end of Chapter II, more than the union, it is perhaps the 
system o f  dispute resolution itself that acts to ’deliver the goods' to both union 
members and management. It is the grid that overlays everything, both protective and 
restrictive.
The system is automatistic in the sense that a grievance pursued up the procedure and 
taken on to arbitration, as analogised, is on an escalator. But therein lies the difference. 
For, it is in the vitality with which the union pursues grievances, prosecutes arbitrations 
and uses other laws and regulations available to it that is able to translate what power it 
has into results.
This vitality does not necessarily translate directly into numbers of grievances filed or 
taken to arbitration, for a union that calculatedly chooses its challenges for impact and 
winnability may well have fewer than one that does not. This is one reason that Gandz's 
(1978) correlation of grievance rates against several variables such as technology, size of 
plant, workforce characteristics, 'industrial relations climate' and union political 
instability may have yielded such inconclusive results (the correlation to 'industrial 
relations climate' is a particularly spurious one). The number of grievances launched is 
merely one indicator. Certainly, in our two Canadian plants, the grievance rates do differ 
considerably. Yet looking more deeply, two distinct patterns of grievance activity can be 
observed.
At CANM ET, as noted earlier, not only does the union not push the limits of the 
collective agreement, it is also seriously inconsistent, in fact negligent in pursuing cases 
that seem likely to succeed or to organise its members so they have the best chance to 
succeed8- A former convenor typifies the attitude that characterised the union for many
H. Criticism of the CANM ET union does nol necessarily imply any overall criticism of the asternal union. Some of its 
branches, especially in larger plants, are quite powerful, good at pursuing grievances and innovative in their 
representation tactics. Likewise, the eaternal union at CANBREW hat tome weaker branches. Despite this, 
the amount and quality of assistance given by the staff officer and the esternal union office to the branch at 
' CANM ET left much to be desired. The advice given to the branch was frequently poor or non-esistent, and 
pursuit of arbitration dilatory and sloppy. The efficiency of the eaternal union was most evident when 
diplomatically intervened to help end the long strike. As mentioned earlier, these problems for the eslernal 
union may well have had their origin in swingeing staff cuts made necessary by the loss of members in the 
IVHO-H4 recession.
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years: "We’d never go to arbitration and they [the employer] knew it." A good example is 
the case of the fabrication work group disciplined for walking off the job in response to a 
safety hazard. Safety concerns are one of the only exceptions to the 'obey now, grieve 
later' rule. So a grievance diligently pursued and taken to arbitration may well have 
resulted in exoneration or a smaller suspension. The union would have had nothing to 
lose. Yet the grievance 'died' after the second step. In addition to arbitral remedies, 
health and safety law in the province where our plants are located contains a 'right to 
refuse', provided the workers have reasonable belief that their work is unsafe. In order to 
use this right, however, the workers must have some self-restraint and knowledge of a 
fairly simple procedure (communicating the belief to a manager in a reasonable and 
adequate manner, notifying the union etc.). The union can also have used safety 
committee meetings to raise the issue. This example is especially relevant because in none 
of these avenues could potential employer resistance have been a major factor. Safety is a 
'safe' item, one of the most 'legitimate' areas (Armstrong et al., 1981) of union- 
management intercourse. However, pursuit of any of these three avenues would have 
taken a modicum of coordination, organisation, education and self-discipline on the part 
of the domestic union as well as encouragement and backup support from the ex-plant 
union staff. Save for a few exceptions (such as reporting the company to the government 
employment standards office for breach of overtime regulations and the organisation of 
the I I -week strike) the domestic union is too poorly organised to make use of those 
mechanisms available to it.
A look through the C A N M ET  collective agreement reveals many 'time bombs' ie. 
clauses which are imperfectly worded so that a sharp lawyer for either party could 
construct a case portraying them to mean the opposite of what was intended. For 
instance, the grievance procedure ostensibly allows any complaint to become a grievance, 
while neither of the parties intend it to handle anything but application, interpretation or 
alleged violation of the agreement. Another clause prohibits the arbitrator from
"iubitituting I hi»l judgment for that of the Company in reaped to grievance# anting out of 
layoffs, promotions, demotions and transfers; or to over-rule the decision of the Company in respect 
thereto, unless it finds that the Company acted in violation of the eaprested terms of this
While company managers claim they are unaware of the consequences of this clause (it 
was negotiated many years ago) and have no intention of so restricting an arbitrator, and
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while the union seems oblivious of its import, its effect is potentially disastrous for the 
union, a bomb looking for a place to blow up. The reason that these and several similar 
clauses are in the agreement is that the union seldom puts the agreement it to the test by 
attempting to enforce it. Were it to do so, both parties would soon discover its deficiencies 
and attempt, through collective bargaining, to rectify them. The union has rights, 
obtained both through its own bargaining and the disputes resolution procedure. Yet due 
to its lack of organisation, for the most part it sleeps on those rights. If one of the 
problems of unions is that they react only, then the C A N M E T  union's reflexes are 
exceedingly slow.
Contrast this to CANBREW  where the union, both domestic and external, 'makes the 
most' or at least much more of those mechanisms. Its competent and businesslike handling 
of grievances and its willingness to proceed to arbitration has been reviewed. The 
collective agreement contains few time bombs because it has been well-tested. Yet 
another example of the union's aggressiveness and inventiveness is the campaign against 
the introduction of cans. Reactive, to be sure, it also had its proactive side. Faced with 
the severe limitations of collective bargaining, the union launched an appeal for public 
and governmental sympathy, something akin to the "corporate campaigns” several U.S. 
unions have waged against anti-union companies. The union produced a sophisticated 
video for its members and the press. Union officers learned to 'work the press', lobby 
politicians and get their message across to the public. By playing up the job loss aspect, 
the union was able to play down the fact that its members are 'aristocrats of labour'.
In the end, though, the public campaign had to be judged by what was achieved at the 
bargaining table. Though the union did not win the banning of cans or complete job 
security, it did win one of the most generous 'technological change' provisions in the 
country (discussed in Chapter *) to provide a modicum of income protection for laid-off 
employees.
2.3 Summary
In summary then, because of the rigid constraints of the Canadian apparatuses, the 
amount of force that potentially powerful unions can bring to bear on employers is 
severely limited. The greater the union's potential power, the greater will be the gap 
between what the union and its members would like to achieve and what actually can be
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achieved. This must inevitably lead to frustration and the greater possibility of industrial 
conflict. Given the severe limitations on expression of industrial conflict, that which 
emerges may be all the more explosive.
On the other hand, these same rigid apparatuses act as a safety device, providing the 
weakest of unions with defences against management tyranny. While the basic Canadian 
collective agreement9 does not contain some of the 'goodies' present in mature collective 
agreements, it does provide unions and employees with many of the important protections 
contained in more elaborate ones, such as a grievance and arbitration procedure, the 'just 
cause' test for discipline and seniority provisions for promotion, layoff and recall. What 
is more, those terms and conditions, once in the collective agreement, cannot be altered 
(except by mutual agreement) until the next round of expiry negotiations. Even at expiry 
negotiations, those terms and conditions take on an aura of abidingness. While at expiry 
the agreement is theoretically 'up for grabs' and employers sometimes set out to gut it, 
these terms and conditions more often act as a minimum to be negotiated from. Even 
when the employer sets out to erode the collective agreement, the very word employed for 
this process: "concession bargaining" implies that the union is giving something up. So 
there is a quite firm floor of protection for the weaker unions.
While the actual number of arrows in the quiver of strong and weak unions does not 
differ greatly, the difference appears in the ability and willingness of weaker unions to 
use those arrows it has. It is only in turning to Britain that a gap of qualitative 
proportions between strong and weak unions can truly be seen.
3. The British Plants.
3.1 Strike enforcements
The British law on strikes is presumably known to the reader, so a summary 
shorter than the Canadian one is in order10- The same legal restrictions and protections 
cover all strikes in Britain, whether they arise from interests, rights or adjustments 
apparatuses. No law expressly forbids strikes according to the status of the collective 
agreement. Thus strikes can potentially take place at any time and the question of V.
V. Several province« have introduced ’fir«« collactiva agreement arbitration' wherein cither party to fir*t agreement 
negotiation* can requast the impoaition of term« by an inter**« arbitrator.
I». The «ource* u«ed for thu description of British «trike law are Wedderburn Il'MMU. Salai
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timeliness is irrelevant. But there are several procedural and substantive legal 
impediments which unions must consider when choosing to strike.
While there is no positive right to strike as in Canada, certain immunities against 
tort prevail in the case of a 'trade dispute'. The definition of trade dispute practically 
restricts the legal legitimacy of strike issues. Thus they are confined to disputes 'between 
workers and their employer' so that strikes on general policy (including political strikes) 
and demarcation are ruled out. The courts have interpreted this to preclude strikes over 
contracting out since they involve 'workers' employed by another employer11. While 
restricting secondary action somewhat, the law does provide much more leeway for it 
than is the case in Canada.
Unlike in Canada, common law governs an employee's contract of employment and it 
is deemed broken when he refuses to work. An employee may be fairly dismissed for 
striking unless he is unreasonably singled out. Thus only the good will of the employer 
and/or the stength of the union protects strikers from dismissal.
All industrial action must be authorised by a majority of workers voting in a secret 
ballot, the ballot paper must indicate that the proposed action is in breach of contract and 
the strike must take place within four weeks of the ballot.
Picketing is tightly constrained so that the striking employee is restricted to the actual 
work site and secondary picketing is precluded. Codes of practice and policing seek to 
restrict the number of picketers at each entrance to six. As in Canada, a host of civil, 
criminal and common law governs the picket line.
To enforce the above, the party prosecuting can apply for damages caused by a strike 
and for an injunction to end an ongoing strike. Thus, in theory at least, British unions 
would seem to be faced with at least as full (even if not a similar) array of legal 
impediments to strikes as their Canadian cousins. But this is simply not the case. Due to 
differences in the enforcement ot the law, British strikes in practice are not nearly so 
restricted as Canadian.
First, while the basic structure of strike law has been built up over a century, the 
repressive superstructure (and the economic and social conditions that accompanied it) 
are creatures of only the last ten years. Strike habits learned by both unions and
II. Dimbltby A .Von« Lie. v National Union o f  Journalutt (IVMHRLR  67. CA
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employers over the long preceding period are very much alive. While new tools are 
available to employers, the tendency has been not to use drastic measures unless the 
conditions of industrial relations change drastically. Because high unemployment has 
dampened the militancy of most unions, for the most part such drastic conditions have not 
materialised. Thus studies of the effect of strike legislation (eg. Younson, 1984; Evans,
1987) indicate that the use of strike law by employers, while increasing, "applies mainly 
at the margins" (ibid. p. 429).
Second, the option of dismissing striking employees has always been available to 
British employers and is sometimes used. But it is by far the exception and not the rule. 
Unless an employer wishes to escalate a dispute rather than settle it, it is unlikely to 
dismiss strikers.
Third, as most strikes are short, it is not economical for employers to commit the 
large 'sunk costs' (both financial and psychic) necessary to maintain production in defiance 
of the strike. Thus the picket line is not the critical crucible of conflict that it is in 
Canada, making most picketing legislation irrelevant.
Fourth, while the trade union movement at first opposed strike ballots on principle, 
and many still do (including the manual union at BRITBREW), most domestic union 
organisations now hold ballots regularly on site-wide issues, and many use them 
instrumentally to wring concessions from management short of actually striking. The 
domestic unions at both BR ITM ET  and BRITBREW  have attempted to do this, as 
witnessed by the BRITBREW  'compulsory redundancy' dispute mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Small sectional strikes and walkouts are generally not balloted. But they are 
usually over before any legal action by the employer becomes worthwhile. Such legal 
action is not worthwhile partly due to the next point.
Fifth, most of the strike law must be prosecuted by individual employers (or persons 
adversely affected by the strike) rather than state agencies. The prosecutors have 
recourse only to the courts. The courts have never been especially friendly to labour and 
unions have an abiding and not unjustified hatred in return. But therein lies the problem. 
For the employer to take the union to court assuredly spells a fundamental breakdown of 
the relationship, quite unlike the situation where a Canadian employer brings a union 
before the 'impartial' and jointly respected labour relations board or arbitrator. In the
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absence of such total breakdown, court action by a British employer "is incompatible with 
its primary objective to resolve the dispute and secure its production" (Salamon, 1987, p. 
357).
Sixth, and much more intangible, is the fact that both employers and unions in well- 
established and 'mature' relationships are simply more genteel than their Canadian 
counterparts. Though often tough with the union, at both of our British plants personnel 
and production managers display a far more decorous attitude than their Canadian 
counterparts. Likewise, the union officers exhibit far less bile than the Canadians. One 
sophisticated Canadian personnel officer, veteran of many union relationships (not from 
either plant in this study) insists the 'BOTH ' treatment is the best way to handle unions. 
When questioned whether this means both the carrot and the stick, he replies, "No. Beat 
them On The Head".
A look at the use of strike law in our British plants is instructive about the 
differential use of law by British employers. BRITMET, which had not had a serious 
work stoppage since the introduction of the last of the new strike legislation (1984), 
experienced one shortly after the 1987 pay round (which was settled without industrial 
action). The company had proposed to demote a supervisor to a shop floor position and 
the manual workers' union had objected. The union held a strike ballot (and won a 90%  
majority) which was intended, and was portrayed to the workers, primarily as a show of 
strength, to back up the union's argument in meetings with the company. When the 
company refused to budge and, in violation of 'status quo', actually carried out the 
demotion, a strike began. Even then, the union believed the company would capitulate 
within 24 hours. But by the time of the walkout, the company had decided to 'take on' the 
strike partly in spite of and partly because of the fact that a major 'just in time’ order was 
due to be shipped. That they had fortuitously discovered a new weapon for their arsenal 
was a windfall.
For, in its ballot, the domestic union had made a technical error in not warning 
members that strike action would be "in breach of your contract of employment"12- With 
the counsel of its solicitors and head office personnel advisors in hand, the company wrote
12. Union official« claim th u  ballot wai not intended a« a »trike ballot, but rathar to '»ound out tha member»'
Unaware of this fact, «hop steward» fait they ware legally entitled to pull the member» out on »trike when 
negotiation» with the company broke down.
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to the union's regional headquarters advising, first, that the walkout was not spontaneous 
but organised by the shop stewards and that:
"We hive taken leaal advice and are advieed that the ballot paper which wai used doe* not 
meet the requirement! of the law and the ballot wai therefore not valid.
"The stoppage is causing us substantial financial damage and we are taking further legal 
advice at to the remedies available to us and the further steps we should take."
A similar letter was sent to shop stewards. Though no no outright threat was made 
and no legal action initiated, the letters clearly set out the preconditions for an injunction 
and/or damages suit. Further, informal 'leaks' and tactical rumours (such as a bruited 
damages figure of £3 million) impelled the union's regional office to distance itself 
immediately from the strike and instruct the staff officer to end it forthwith. This he did, 
in a tumultuous meeting, to the resentment of workers and shop stewards. Once back at 
work, support for a strike unravelled and a subsequent ballot failed to win the 2/3 
majority specified by the union rule book.
Despite the use of the law in this case, company managers insist that their action was 
entirely instrumental and not part of a policy of running to the courts to solve their 
industrial relations problems. Says one:
"We're very careful about the use of the law. In this particular esample, we wanted to 
upskuttle [pull the rug from under! strong shop stewards who were overconfident that the company 
would back down...We'd use an injunction to get people back to work, to break the back of a strike, 
but we're glad it didn't have to get to the courts in this case...Note that we carefully avoided directly 
threatening to sue the shop stewards or to tack strikers. We didn't want a witch hunt."
Significantly, the company in the end took no reprisals by discipline or litigation. 
Nevertheless, the welter of rumours, which the employer took few pains to scotch, 
including mass sackings of strikers, created a climate of apprehension about striking 
among the workers and shop stewards which management admits "was not unstrategic 
from a long-term view" and established that the company could be tough if it wanted to be. 
On the other hand, union officers insist the company has gone out of its way since the 
strike to avoid confrontations on the same issue. They also contend that the union's 
mistake came about simply through inexperience and would be unlikely to happen again. 
BR IT M ET  then, is like many British companies in its use of the law. While not committed 
to using the law whenever applicable, it takes an instrumental or opportunistic approach, 
using the law selectively and employing the threat rather than the full weight and, more
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significantly, using the external union to whip employees into line rather than doing this 
itself.
BRITBREW , by contrast, represents another prevalent, and traditional, approach by 
British employers to strike law. It has not used the law at all. Most of the work 
stoppages, in the words of a personnel manager, "are measured in hours". These, he 
insists, are not strikes. True strikes are those stoppages which "seriously impede our 
ability to trade". The draymen’s strike (described in Chapter III)  was just such a one. 
Occurring in the absence of a ballot and lasting two weeks, it was clearly illegal and 
provided a perfect opportunity for the use of the law. Yet the company chose to 'take on' 
the union with no less determination than BRITMET, but using conventional methods. 
Echoing managers on this question, the convenor is somewhat more blunt:
"For the company to to to court an sdmission of failure, that they can’t handle their 
induatrial relatione. If they had tone to court during the draymen'« »trike, the dispute would 
inevitably have escalated."
Ironically, the ultimate pattern of strike ballots at BR ITBREW  is that the union holds 
them when it does not go on strike and does not hold them when it does go on strike.
In summary then, compared to Canada, the strike is an ever-present and potentially 
potent weapon. To use a perhaps crude analogy, management is assumed to be armed with 
the law and its prerogative of ownership. The strike weapon of Canadian unions is locked 
away in a cabinet, the bullets are locked away somewhere else, and the keys to both are not 
always available. In addition, a vigilant and determined sheriff sits waiting to sort out 
any disagreements. On the other hand, the strike weapon of British unions is close to 
hand and loaded and the sheriff lives S00 miles away. Disagreements must be handled by 
the parties themselves.
3.2 Non-strike enforcements.
Yet in this seemingly precarious situation, the British parties are able to survive 
without 'all hell breaking loose'. Brown points out "as political scientists observe, an 
appeal to legitimacy is very economical when compared to the use of sanctions." (Brown, 
1972, p. 55). With their weapons nearby, the parties attempt to reach agreement b> a 
complicated ritual of talk and mobilisation, of bluff and spear-rattling, of appeals to 
reason and calls to arms, which might be called 'showing the colours'. The most successful 
parties are the ones who can keep the troops drilled and ready for battle yet with the
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discipline to prevent their troops from running amok. Because the employer side 
constantly requires organisation simply by the nature of its main task of production, it is 
the organisational ability of the union which is key to variation here. But what is meant 
by 'organisation'?
Brown suggests that the "political awareness of the labour force" is a main factor in 
the ability of the union to translate potential power into real power and defines it as
"the «»tent to which worker» and their repre»«ntative» tee i»»ue» a* involving conflict» of 
intcreit (between them»elv«i and management) and a» negotiable* (ibid., p. 5‘H
Batstone et al. (1977) take this concept somewhat further and describe the 
phenomenon of "mobilisation of bias" wherein 'leader' stewards maintain their troops at 
the ready "by the continual reaffirmation of a body of union principles which serve to 
define members' 'real interests’" (p. 249).
In Canada, as mentioned, it is the system of dispute resolution itself that acts as the 
main enforcement apparatus to 'deliver the goods'. It is highly institutionalised, an 
apparatus with the full backing of the state behind it. And while restrictive, it requires 
little operational effort to maintain. The organisational resources of the union do play a 
role in determining how fully this system can be exploited, but the system sets narrow 
limits.
In Britain, on the other hand, it is the organisational ability of the union itself, its 
ability to keep its troops in high state of alert, yet disciplined, that is the main 
enforcement apparatus. Compared to Canada, this apparatus requires a much greater 
amount of energy to maintain and thus favours only those unions with the requisite 
organisational resources. Yet for those unions, the limits are much wider and the 
potential rewards much higher than for their Canadian counterparts. Likewise, the 
potential for inefficacy is also much higher. Our two British plants illustrate this aptly, 
and the difference between them is nowhere better typified than in instances where the 
unions are faced with the sticky problem of mobilising bias amid a conflict o f interest 
among their members.
As noted, BR ITM ET  is short on leader stewards and the convenor does not have the 
time, organisational resources or motivation to coordinate consistent and effective 
challenges to management. A particularly good example occurred when the employer shut
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down an anodising line in the finishing unit, shedding 15 jobs in the process but proposing 
to find alternate work in the plant Tor the employees concerned.
The company did not wish to disrupt the still-operating anodising line and proposed 
that the jobless group be moved en masse to (less preferable) jobs in the fabrication unit. 
The steward involved, one of the more forceful in the plant, argued that departmental 
seniority should apply so that the more senior of the jobless group (several of them older 
workers) could, in effect ’bump' junior employees on the remaining anodising line. Both 
sides then proceeded in the elaborate ritual of 'showing the colours'.
First the steward put the dispute into procedure, claiming the collective agreement 
supported him. But the supervisor (correctly) pointed out that the agreement said nothing 
about the situation. As in most British collective agreements, the collective agreement is 
extremely vague on such issues. The steward then claimed 'custom and practice' 
supported him but the supervisor called his bluff. The steward then threatened to take a 
straw poll of workers to show the supervisor the degree of support he had. But he soon 
learned that he could mobilise such support only on his own shift by trading on his 
personal prestige. The workers on the remaining anodising line naturally did not want to 
be the ones to move and their friends supported them. There was no small amount of 
sympathy among other union members for the older workers but the steward found it 
difficult to raise this to the level of readiness to fight. He describes the problem:
"Th * problem wa* fighting with other worker*. They would have backed theie bloke* if the 
company had propoied to make them redundant, but not when they were juat being *ent to another
The convenor feared becoming involved in a situation where he would have to support 
one group of workers against another. In the end, he advised the shop steward to drop the 
case. The domestic organisation was unable to sufficiently reaffirm a body of union 
principles to define the struggle as being in the 'real interests' of the majority of its 
members. An appeal to solidaristic principles was highly contingent upon the issue at 
hand. Given a conflict of interest among the workers, it failed.
Meanwhile, sensing that the steward's 'poll' was flagging, the supervisor decided to 
pre-empt him, steal his idea and take a poll of his own. It revealed what the steward 
feared....a work force divided. The issue died, a clear defeat for the union. A significant 
point here is that the supervisor himself engaged in the process of 'mobilising bias', an act
Chapter VI...page 197
not at all uncommon in the British plants, but especially BRITMET, where, as mentioned, 
the employer is never certain to what extent union speaks for its members. In the context 
of industrial relations at BRITMET, (which have been discussed at some length earlier) 
often it is insufficient for management merely to defeat the union. That is easy enough. 
But to ensure that all the fires are out, management must soak the ground liberally.
At BRITBREW, on the other hand, while sectional conflicts of interest abound, these 
are overridden by the 'body of union principles' when it is necessary to 'show the colours'. 
In the 'compulsory redundancy' episode mentioned earlier, the shop steward's meeting at 
which it was debated revealed a tremendous amount of personal resentment against the 
workers threatened with compulsory redundancy when their department closed down.
The negligence of their supervisors had allowed the 'grievors' to get away with atrocious 
amounts of personal absenteeism, so that the issue was one of discipline as well. Several 
stewards suggested that the grievors were flaunting their 'immunity', cautioned that union 
support for them could damage its credibility and jeopardise the sick pay scheme and 
warned that their members would not back the dispute . One steward expressed the 
frustration:
"Wa know there'* fucking malingerer* among*! u*. and we *ay good riddance. The*e bloke* 
have never cared about the union and now they come running to u* for help."
The convenor and several other stewards agreed that the grievors were wretched and 
undeserving recipients of the union's mercy. They agreed that there were several issues 
other than redundancy (what might be called 'micro-issues') involved, but explained that 
the redundancy principle (or the 'macro-issue') was foremost. As the discussion ended, 
several stewards still dithered on how much they would tell their members about the 
'micro-issues'. Some promised they would "tell the members everything and let them 
decide".
Adding to the above difficulty for the union, as the dispute continued, the company, 
sensing the split, insisted that the union include the 'micro-issues' on the ballot paper. So 
the outcome of the dispute seemed, to an outsider, to be 'up in the air'.
Yet within a week, the eventual ballot paper contained the single question referred to 
in the previous chapter and the vote was unanimous. Between the steward's meeting and 
the ballot, the convenor and several stewards had successfully mobilised the official union 
response, not only by diligent interests definition but also by conducting a sort of 'three-
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line whip', a call to arms, as if to say "You had better believe this is a serious dispute and 
you had better back your leaders if you know what's good for you". In fact, the minor 
instigation by the employer may have stiffened the union's resolve. The power of the 
union's response was possible because there existed a residual degree or 'steady state' of 
organisation, a sort of low level alert among the 'troops' as a result of the continual 
reaffirmation of the body of union principles. Three-line whips' or appeals to solidarity 
by the leadership work only if the memory of previous struggles is alive and reinforces the 
need for discipline. Yet, ironically, when the company is aware of this state of alert, it 
must more carefully decide whether a dispute is worth 'taking the union on'. Thus full­
blown disputes are rarer.
So disputes at BR ITBREW  are of two types. There are sectional disputes which, 
though volatile, are conducive to containment and settlement because of their 
particularity. There are also site-wide disputes. These also are conducive to settlement, 
first because the union's call to arms must be seriously by the employer, second because 
the union exercises a high degree of discretion on what disputes it will pursue.
At BRITMET, on the other hand, enterprising stewards find themselves having to 
virtually 'reinvent the wheel' in most disputes. The process of interests definition is 
discontinuous. At the end of each dispute, the troops disperse and stewards have to beat 
the bushes to find them again. Thus when stewards do wish to challenge management, or 
assert 'custom and practice' (for surely custom and practice has as much to do with the 
power to force one's view on an opponent as it has to do with the actualityof past 
practice), they are not usually able to muster the force to be taken seriously. On the other 
hand they lack the discipline over the troops to control when and how strikes occur. The 
highly contentious 1987 pay round, with its drastic changes in work organisation passed 
without a strike, while the seemingly minor issue of a supervisor transferred to the shop 
floor resulted in a three-day walkout. A strike on the first, with many important issues 
issues at stake, might have yielded employer concessions. A strike on the second could not. 
In fact the strike had strong roots in the pay round, as personnel managers and the union 
staff officer agree. In the latter's words "there was going to be a dispute there come what 
may". In the end, there emerges a union with severely hampered effectiveness.
3.3 Summary
Chapter VI.-page 199
In Britain then, unlike Canada, differences in potential power between domestic 
union organisations are reflected ominously in the differences of actual force that can be 
applied at the shop floor. Strong unions can be very strong indeed. Weak unions can be 
very weak indeed, and a so-called 'floor of protections', if it exists at all, will bear very 
little weight at all before it collapses. In Canada, a weak union can always 'fall back on its 
rights' in the collective agreement as it were. In Britain, falling back can lead to a long 
drop. A union continually renegotiates such rights or loses them. At BR1TMET a strange 
phenomenon occurs. There, an employer appreciative of the benefits that can be achieved 
by joint regulation, must actually engage in activities that 'prop up' the union, make it 
look better than it actually is. In Canada, an employer in a similar situation would not 
bother. In the United States, such an employer might well encourage a decertification 
petition and rid itself of the union altogether.
4. Concluding remarks
It is intriguing to compare the above-mentioned disputes at BR ITM ET  and 
BR ITBREW  with what would likely have occurred in the Canadian plants. A s seniority 
provisions are rife in Canadian collective agreements, the first dispute would have been 
easily solved. Both C A N M ET  and CANBREW  agreements are clear that departmental 
seniority applies in the first instance and the temporarily jobless workers with enough 
seniority could have 'bumped' junior employees on the remaining anodising line. In the 
second dispute, the company would probably have dismissed the employees, the union 
would probably have grieved the dismissal and some four to seven months down the road 
an arbitrator would probably have ruled that, in the absence of a proper series of 
warnings, the employees were improperly dismissed. But due to some culpability on the 
part of the grievors, they may well have received less than full compensation.
In the Canadian setting, other than the decision to carry the dispute to arbitration 
(certain at CANBREW , uncertain at CANMET), little or no mobilisation, little or no state 
of readiness, little or no no redefining of interests, little or no reaffirmation of a body of 
union principles would have been necessary.
CHAPTER VII: DISCIPLINE
1. Introduction
The end of the previous chapter spotlighted the case of two previously undisciplined 
BRITBREW  employees with a serious record of absenteeism. Exploiting the opportunity 
presented by the shutdown of their department, the employer attempted to sack them. A 
major mobilisation by the union persuaded the employer to back down.
For the purposes of this discussion, the issue of compulsory redundancy can be faded 
into the background to bring forward a comparison of discipline-handling that 
intriguingly typifies the process in the two countries.
Though a Canadian employer would probably have sacked the workers, arbitral 
jurisprudence indicates they would probably be deemed improperly dismissed and ordered 
reinstated with a lesser penalty substituted.
At first blush, the Canadian solution appears infinitely preferable to any British 
alternative in avoiding industrial conflict. The grievors would have been ill-served at a 
British Industrial Tribunal. Both the standard of employer 'resonableness' considered 
and the inability and unwillingness of Tribunals to order reinstatement would have made 
the grievors' return to work almost inconceivable. Yet the workplace campaign to 
prevent their dismissal raised the collective blood pressure and involved a palpable strike 
threat. Both solutions seem almost guaranteed to raise the level of industrial conflict, not 
abate it.
Indeed, the North American system of arbitral review of discipline appears to be the 
jewel in the crown of dispute resolution there. Several British commentators (Dickens et 
al., I98S; Concannon, 1980) have pointed to arbitral rather than judicial decision­
making, and Collins (1982) has pointed specifically to North American arbitration, as a 
method of disciplinary dispute resolution far preferable to British industrial tribunals.
Appearances may well be deceiving. For not only must the vaunted North American 
arbitral review of discipline be compared to the British disciplinary tribunal system, an 
appreciation of the role of disciplinary structures in the generation and resolution of 
conflict can only be gained by the comparative analysis of the whole system of handling 
such disputes in the two countries.
2. Theoretical Considerations
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If a fundamental dialectic in employer control of production is between the coercion 
of employees and the generation of their consent, then the handling of discipline is the 
most special of special cases. The power to discipline employees is an essential employer 
tool, no matter what system of production or what type of production regime exists. The 
power of the employer to "mobilise sanctions" (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1985) comes naturally 
from the law of property and from the power differential between capital and labour. 
Whether this power is frequently used or merely sits in the background, it is essential 
backdrop to all methods of compelling compliance (Lukes, 1981). But several factors 
make it more and more difficult for employers to wield this tool arbitrarily without 
inviting operational inefficiency, industrial conflict or state sanctions: the increasing 
complexity of work organisation (Gersuny, 1973), the increasing power of trade unions to 
organise resistance to such arbitrariness, the intervention of the state to limit managerial 
discretion and the need, in many sophisticated industries, to obtain not only passive 
employee compliance but active employee cooperation and use of their 'tacit skills’ 
(Manwaring and Wood, 1984) in the production process.
It is by now quite common to describe labour control mechanisms on a continuum 
from 'direct' or 'coercive' on the one hand, to 'responsible' or 'cooperative' or 'hegemonic' 
(Friedman, 1977; R. Edwards, 1979; Burawoy, 1985) on the other. Correspondingly, the 
handling of discipline is widely theorised as ranging from the more 'punitive' or 
'punishment-centred' approaches to the more 'corrective' or 'representative' approaches 
(Gouldner, 1954; Ashdown & Baker, 1973; Anderman, 1972; Adams, 1978). Inevitably, 
the tendency is to periodise the movement from one end of the continuum to the other. In 
less subtle approaches, punitive discipline is seen as almost invariably clumsy, immature 
and autocratic, while corrective approaches are seen as sophisticated, mature and 
democratic.
The stages seem to divide along three essential elements : formality of rules, 
consensuality of the disciplinary process and progressivity of the sanctions themselves. 
'Punitive' discipline is characterised by managerial peremptoriness in the ad-hocery of 
the rules, the quantum of discipline (the use of dismissal in preference to less harsh forms) 
and the degree to which it consults employees or their representatives. Corrective 
discipline is characterised by greater codification of rules, by the involvement, through
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multi-stage disciplinary and grievance procedures, of the employee and his 
representatives, and the use of "an arsenal of calibrated punishments" (Glasbeek, 1982, 
p. 75) up to and including dismissal, with all, except the last, seeking to rehabilitate the 
employee . The corrective approach is theorised as not only humane for the employee but 
also 'good business sense' in reducing costs for the employer. Together with the 
construction of an internal labour market, it serves to increase job security and secure 
employee commitment. By providing clear and reasonable rules and procedural 
involvement, the employer secures legitimation or as Adams puts it:
"voluntary compliance (which! avoid« the coat to management of having to aurveil the 
workplace in an eatenaivc manner and to commit aubatential reaourcea to rule enforcement...(and) 
have a positive impact on workplace morale and productivity" (Adams, 1978, p. 19»
By providing a range of punishments short of dismissal, corrective discipline helps the 
employer avoid "capital losses" which have been spent in recruiting, training and 
accepting sub-optimal productivity in the employee's early days at work. (Adams, 1978, 
pp. 27-28).
Securely based in pluralist thought, the corrective approach is the engine that drives 
most of liberal industrial disciplinary practice and the thinking of governmental agencies 
engaged in overseeing discipline in industrialised countries. But it has met some serious 
criticism from more radical commentators. Mellish and Collis-Squires (1976) suggest 
that the punitive/corrective dichotomy is overly concerned with procedural as opposed to 
substantive reform, takes on board uncritically the advantages of increasing 
formalisation and is almost exclusively management-oriented.
Henry (1983, 1987) proposes a more subtle evolution of styles, with "representative- 
corrective" as only a second stage beyond "punitive-authoritarian". In this second stage, 
the "voluntary compliance" of workers and their representatives is illusory:
"...in spite of its claim to provida fair justice there are considerable grounds for the view 
that juatice by formal procedural equality of treatment delivers less justice than it delivers 
legitimation and less legitimation than is generally perceived. By assuming a formal equality it 
ignores the marked substantive inequalities in conditions and opportunities between employer and 
employee....Because the employer's fundamental power base is never threatened they can concede a 
number of points on procedural matters, allowing union representatives to win what are localized 
and contained victories so long as the substantial and material conflicts of interests remain 
suppressed." (Henry, 198*’, p. ¿91!.
Henry propounds a third style, "accommodative-participative", wherein disciplinary 
outcomes are more truly bargained between management and labour. Management's 
attitude is similar to the earlier stage but because the union's attitude is different "any
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notion of fixed penalties is not feasible since the penalty arrived at is itself the outcome of 
negotiation." (1987, p. 299) At one end, smaller transgressions are tolerated while at the 
other, both management and union cooperate in discipline, engaging in a sort of "mutual 
moral training" (ibid., p. 312)'- One impetus leading to this stage may correspond to 
Burawoy's concept of "hegemonic despotism" (1985, p. 150) wherein the relentless forces 
of international competition compel labour, out of fear for its survival, to take on the 
aims of the corporation.
Edwards and Whitston (1988) take issue with the periodisation implicit in Henry's 
(1983) and others' discussion of these issues pointing out that coercive and participative 
methods of discipline have co-existed across enterprises at various stages of capitalist 
development and even coexist within single enterprises and that in the free labour-market 
regulatory environment of the 80's, more coercive measures are by no means absent.
They correctly criticise Henry for failing to reconcile his macro approach to 'micro 
approaches' of workplace sociology such as Gouldner (1954), Lupton (1963), and Mellish 
and Collis-Squires (1976). Henry himself (1987) appears to be moving away from a 
temporal evolution and suggests that disciplinary styles may appear in combination.
Yet the more competitive atmosphere of the 80's has not made it a simple matter for 
managements to claw back concessions. The justice and legitimation provided by the 
corrective approach may well be illusory but a ratchet effect is at work here. Unions 
often fight hard to keep what they have come to consider their only shield against the 
onslaught. And there is evidence that managements may not deem it necessary to 
introduce a 'new industrial relations' package a la Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) to 
remain competitive (R. Adams, 1988)‘- Despite the temptations of a looser regulatory 
environment and high levels of unemployment, mainstream managements on both sides of 
the Atlantic are still wary of abandoning the legitimising institutions that they and the 
unions have grown comfortable with. Likewise, despite some nibbling at the edges. 12
1. Henry alto postulates a fourth type of discipline called "cdlebrative-collective" a somewhat utopian system, mostly
found in cooperative organisations free of the power of a single employer, wherein 'self-discipline' is taken to 
ita logical conclusion and members of the work community are responsible for adhering to the group's norms. 
This type of discipline does not apply to this study.
2. Adams looks at the industrial relations policies of the Steel Company of Canada which, constrained by a militant
union and its own uneasiness with the 'new i.r.‘ hat pursued productivity increases comfortably within the 
structure of traditional adversarial collective bargaining.
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governments have been loath to make a meal of the institutions t/ieyhave set in place to 
encourage and disseminate more liberal disciplinary approaches.
On the robustness of those institutions, a most interesting debate has emerged 
comparing British industrial tribunal and North American (and particularly Canadian) 
arbitral treatment of discipline. The debate is especially interesting as it is not between 
pluralists insisting their own system is better than the other fellow's but between radicals 
intent on knocking the stuffing out of their respective systems (Collins, 1982; Glasbeek,
1984). As such, the debate revolves around the limitations of the two systems and the 
question of just how restrictive of justice they really are. It will be argued that both of 
these authors overstate their case because they look only at the adjudicatory aspect of 
discipline handling in the two countries and ignore the wider context.
Collins suggests that in the 1960's the British polity was suffering from a crisis of 
pluralism, with unions exercising their market power to wring unacceptable compromises 
from capital and creating much industrial conflict, especially on the question of dismissal. 
The state responded by establishing industrial tribunals, but in so doing "bypassed the 
structures of joint regulations between management and union" (p. 82) by specifying that 
the parties to the dispute would be the individual employee and his employer. Collins 
rejects suggestions (eg. Elias, 1981) that pluralism has been enhanced by the project, 
insisting that the type of regulation employed was "corporatist" in the sense that it 
"marginalizes] the significance of collective bargaining for the regulation of the 
workplace, [establishes] systems of compulsory arbitration of collective disputes and 
[severely curtails] the right to strike-’"  (ibid., p. 82).
Collins insists that the courts and tribunals responded naturally to their order- 
restoration mandate and their neutral 'above the fray’ position by using their powers to 
define a doctrine of fairness which focussed on reviewing management's procedure rather 
than the substantive merits of the discipline imposed. This neglected the power 
relationship between the parties and, in so doing, accepted the status quo of management 
hegemony. From this, it was then a logical step for the tribunals to begin to interpret the 
'reasonableness' of management's discipline in the most conservative way possible.
S. Collin» alio take» much too narrow a viaw of corporation, failing to acknowladga that corporation a o o i on a 
numbar of lavals: macro-. ma»o- and micro- corporation (Rogowiki. not ntcatiarily mutually
incompatibla.
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To this he compares favourably the arbitral system in North America. Not only does 
the North American system provide a higher degree of substantive equity and greater job 
security to employees, he insists, it is also a process firmly rooted in the collective 
bargaining relationship. Rather than a rights apparatus, says Collins, it is an interests 
apparatus, fully accommodating the power positions of the parties.
Collins echoes Concannon < 1980) who, comparing voluntary British arbitrations to 
unilateral industrial tribunals, praises the former for their flexibility, emphasis on 
compromise and acknowledgment of the collective power dimension, in short, for their 
ability to appear legitimate to both parties, calling it "essentially the product of collective 
relations" (p. 15) and "a reflection of the application of the union's power" (p. 16).
Dickens et al. (I98S) sum up the position well:
"the more tribunal! have to treat a dismissal at an itiue between an individual worker and 
an individual employer without regard to the industrial relation! context of the dispute and the 
possible collective implications of it, the less attractive will the system be to the organised sector.
The more reluctant tribunals are to overturn employers' decisions because of the broad nature of the 
'range of reasonable employer responses' test...the less likely are they to be teen as efficient from the 
point of view of dismissed workers." (p. 217-218)
These authors suggest that the introduction of an arbitral system of dismissal review 
will do much to eliminate such deficiencies.
While agreeing with Collins' general approach, Glasbeek (1984) finds that the latter's 
remarks about the North American arbitral system do not correspond to reality and 
berates him for taking the claims of "conventional North American industrial relations' 
scholars" at face value. Using the case of Canada (which, for the purposes of debate is the 
same as the US), Glasbeek submits the North American system of dismissal review to close 
scrutiny (employing some of the arguments advanced hitherto). He insists that that system 
affords employees no qualitatively greater job security , allows employers no smaller a list 
of grounds on which to legitimately dismiss employees, imposes swingeing penalties on 
many employees in place of dismissal, closes off lawful access to the strike weapon, forces 
employees to 'work now and grieve later' rather than arguing their case to the employer, 
forces the union to 'filter' grievances and thereby 'educate' the work force on 'acceptable' 
work conduct and juridifies the entire process of discipline-handling so that, despite its 
pretensions to rough justice, it is "a cumbersome, dilatory, highly technocratised system of 
dispute settlement" (p. 149).
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But while Collins wildly overstates the efficacy of the North American system, 
Glasbeek engages in his own share of exaggeration. While most of his points are incisive, 
he is inaccurate in a few instances where he deals with the practice, as opposed to the law, 
of arbitration. More importantly, in seeking to temper Collins's adulation of dismissal 
arbitration, Glasbeek goes too far and loses perspective. For there is no question that 
a comparison o f British tribunal to Canadian arbitration would inevitably 
compel a dismissed worker with no recourse but to adjudication to prefer the 
latter over the former
In purporting to explore the wider effect of the two mechanisms on pluralism, 
collectivism and industrial conflict, as lawyers, both Collins and Glasbeek make the 
fundamental error of restricting their scope to third party intervention only and ignoring 
its place in the entire context of discipline-handling between the parties. The debate 
between Collins and Glasbeek suffers, as many cross-national comparative exercises, 
from a the discrepancy between a very close analysis of one country and a very 
peremptory analysis of the other.
The present study, as an investigation of workplace industrial relations in which 
third-party intervention has played a part, is in a unique position evaluate this debate 
and correct some of the deficiencies. To assess the efficacy of the conflict management 
properties of the two systems, it is necessary not only to undertake a selective comparison 
of third party adjudicatory bodies, but then to place them in their context and finally to 
explore how various substantive discipline-generating issues are handled by the parties in 
each country and across the industries studied. In light of the preceding discussion of the 
theoretical issues, the following questions must be assessed: to what extent do the two 
systems of discipline treatment advance the legitimation of managerial control, obscure 
exploitation and generate consent; to what extent do the two systems advance or retard 
collective bargaining and collective action; and to what extent do they deliver equity to 
individual workers?
3. An Apposite Case
Before dealing with these questions, it is worth looking at a dispute at CANBREW  
which contrasts with the BR ITBREW  case above and uniquely characterises key
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differences. It involves: a dismissal for somewhat similar cause; industrial action in 
support of the grievor; and third party review of the dismissal.
Alarmed at high lateness and absenteeism rates and its own laxity in dealing with 
them, CANBREW  implemented a 'crack down'. As is common in such campaigns in 
Canada where both management and unions are loath to engage in anything smacking of 
codetermination, the union neither wished to be nor was particularly well-informed of 
the philosophy behind or the procedure connected with the programme. At a time of 
considerable industrial conflict in the plant, what was intended as a non-punitive 
approach was seen by the union as an ominous campaign. When the worker with 
demonstrably the 'worst' attendance record in the plant was dismissed, a wildcat strike 
ensued.
Wary of its 'softer' approach in previous illegal strikes, the company moved quickly to 
crush it. Arranging a court appearance for the next morning, it served all the strikers 
with notices that they and the union would be held liable. The robust employer response 
combined with the disorganisation of the strike spelt its doom4- With company promises to 
reduce the firings to suspensions and assurances that the grievor's case would go to 
arbitration (which it would have done anyway), the staff officer and convenor convinced 
the strikers to return to work.
Mindful of frayed tempers, the arbitration hearing was expedited to two months later 
and an award issued two months after that (as opposed to the plant mean of 7.7 months 
from dismissal to award). A t the hearing, the union argued that it had not been informed 
of the programme and that the company's action had the effect of lulling the grievor and 
everyone else into a false sense of security. The employer agreed that other than 
attendance problems the grievor, a man of 40 with seven years' seniority, was a good 
employee and acknowledged that much of the problem arose after his marriage 
breakdown. While the arbitrator rejected both of the union's initial arguments, he 
decided to hold the company to its commitment to a blameless absenteeism programme.
The company had successfully established a bad absenteeism record but had not proved the 
grievor's prospective unlikelihood of good attendance. Finding the grievor's
4. A humorou» sidelight to the incident occurred when the arievor arrived 45 minute« lata (or a man meeting called 
by the «Inker« to di«cu«> the future of their protect again»! hi» lacking for bad attandanca.
y
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circumstances worthy of compassion, the arbitrator ruled that the company had acted 
precipitously and punitively in light of its declared non-punitive aims and ordered the 
grievor reinstated. Yet the reinstatement was with no back pay, in effect a suspension of 
14 weeks, and with stringent probationary conditions.
The personnel manager distributed a memo to other managers claiming the award as 
an employer victory:
"Although the arbitrator reinstated [the grievor), it is without any compensation, and with 
fairly restrictive terms...
*1 am encouraged by this award, despite the reinstatement (because)...the arbitrator does 
not agree with the union's contention that our Program placet an employee in jeopardy...At no place 
in the award does he challenge our right to use a non-diaciplinary approach...
"According to the arbitrator, we are guilty of professing to use a non-ditciplinary approach 
while at the tame time adding an element of discipline by treating the grievor't last absence as 
blameworthy. Th u  is something we can (earn from and corraet fo r  the future, (emphasis 
added)
This 'management education effect' of arbitration has been seen earlier and will be 
seen and commented upon later.
Contrary to Collins' contention of arbitral sensitivity to industrial action, the strike 
had no effect whatever on the outcome of the case. Yet the failure of the strike had 
profound effects on future industrial conflict. The 26 suspended strikers nursed their 
resentment for both the employer and the union hierarchy for many years afterward, a 
ginger group which was to be behind much of the subsequent industrial unrest in the 
plant.
The above case demonstrates many of the strengths and weaknesses of disciplinary 
dispute handling in Canada. Some of these will become clearer as the third party and 
workplace processes are examined in more detail.
4. Tribunal and Arbitration Comparcd5
4.1 Winning', losing'and the penalties involved
If the results of cases coming to hearing are compared, then Canadian Arbitration 
is by far kinder to the dismissed employee. Slightly over 50%5 6 of dismissals are 
overturned as opposed to under 30%  in British Tribunals. Yet before pronouncing
5. From heraon in, tha tmall-caae word "tribunal" will deacribe both Canadian and Britiah diamiaaal adjudication
forume. Tha uppar-caaa "Tribunal" (or "Induatrial Tribunal") and "Arbitration" will rafar to tha apacific 
forum in aach country.
It. Calculated from tha United Steal worker aurvay cued earlier and from Adama (WW, p. 4(1)
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Canadian arbitrators more liberal than their British counterparts, it should be noted that 
in two-thirds of the Canadian reversals of the employer's decision, the arbitrator imposes 
a penalty of his own. The fourteen week suspension in the CANBREW  case above is quite 
lenient. Over one quarter of the reinstatements carry penalties greater than three 
months off work with no pay (calculated from Adams, 1978, p. 57 & 6 1).
Comparing the instance of complete reversal o f  dismissal, British Tribunals 
actually come out ahead. With reversal in only one fifth of the cases, the Canadians trail 
the British by one-third. If those employees without representation are deducted from 
the British total, resulting in a sample more comparable to Canada (where all grievors 
are represented), the British exoneration rate looks even better. Certainly, with only a 
yes/no choice confronting it, the Tribunal may be like the jury faced with imposing the 
death penalty and hence slightly more careful about 'industrial capital punishment'. Yet 
the difference in reversal rates between the two countries is still wide enough to seriously 
shake Collins' contention that "the standards by which management discretion is 
reviewed" (1982, p. 85) in North America offers greater job security.
By far the greatest difference between the two tribunals is the power over the penalty. 
Canadian arbitrators can and do reinstate both exonerated employees and those found 
culpable but deserving of lesser penalty. This has been arbitral practice since the earliest 
days^-
An order of reinstatement is enforceable by the union in the courts and companies are 
liable for contempt of court for refusal. Practically, Canadian employers have come to 
accept reinstatement. Almost three-quarters of reinstated employees choose to return to 
work and about 6 0%  remain employed (Adams, 1978, p. 63). Adams declares that "these 
results appear to vindicate the corrective approach to discipline forged by arbitration 
tribunals" (ibid., p. 66)
British Tribunals can either find the complainant either . w.»missed or quash the 
dismissal (although some degree of culpability may be recognised in the compensation 
award) but do not have the power to substitute a penalty. While the Tribunal does not 7
7. At the end of the 6U'i, the court! briefly ruled thet erbitreton hed no such power. So great wee the outcry from 
erbitretori and practitioner! (occanoned in no imall part by fear of the dalegitimmnt of arbitration) that 
luitable legiilation wee quickly paiied in moit juriadictiom to allow arbitrator! to reinatate grievor« and alter 
penalties dee Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. v Arthur! IW M I S.C.R. US, "’ll D.L.R. <3d> M M .
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have the power to impose reinstatement or re-engagement, it can recommend such 
remedies but seldom does8 *10(Dickens et al., 1985), preferring a compensatory award which, 
in about 85%  of cases is worth less than one month's pay (calculated from Employment 
Gazette, 1986). Tribunals are supposed to take the employee's and not the employer's 
views on re-employment into account, but because they must also decide on the 
practicability of re-employment, the employer's views (usually negative) prevail.
4.2 Who and What Gets to Arbitration
The parties of record to the British Tribunal are the individual employee and the 
employer. The majority of applicants (68%',> are not union members. Of the trade 
unionist applicants, only half are represented by their unions and a quarter (27%) have 
been refused such representation. The reason for these refusals will be examined 
presently. Unions, then, are marginal to the process.
Moreover, while application to Tribunal is unilateral by the aggrieved employee, 
fewer than a third of all cases submitted ever reach a hearing as the pre-hearing 
assessment process and the involvement of A C AS conciliators results in claimants 
dropping their cases or settling 'out of court' (Dickens et al., 19851“)-
In Canada, the union is central. Dismissal Arbitrations, like all Canadian 
Arbitrations, arise from grievances over the interpretation of collective agreements, and 
while the dismissed employee must ask his union to take up his case, the parties to the 
dispute thereafter are clearly the employer and the union. Application to Arbitration is 
unilateral by the union11- Yet while the Arbitration springs formally from the collective 
bargaining relationship, Collins (1982) is quite wrong to assume that the collective 
bargaining strength of the parties has more than the faintest effect upon the arbitrator.
8. An employer refusing a recommendation of re-employment can be compelled to pay an ‘additional award' of 
compensation (Anderman, 1483. 283-861.
4. All of the figures on characteristics and representation of applicants cited here are taken from the Dickens et al. 
<14851 survey of 1063 applicants to tribunals and 346 complainants whose case was forwarded to a hearing.
10. Statistics on tribunal applications also calculated from reports on tribunal applications in Employment Gazette,
1484, I486,1487, appropriate months.
11. To remedy the delay in conventional Arbitration, several Canadian jurisdictions, have introduced the option of
expedited Arbitration providing for referral to either the labour relations board or a government-appointed 
(rather than bilaterally-chosen) arbitrator and a quick hearing and decision. If this option is chosen, the 
parties must accept the intervention of a conciliation officer. In Ontario settlement officers effect a pre­
hearing settlement in about two-thirds of cases. However, expedited Arbitration accounts for only 2<>% of all 
Arbitrations and for P H  of all discharge Arbitrations (Rose, I486).
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The inapplicability of past practice and bargaining intent has already been reviewed in 
Chapter V. And while arbitrators are usually appointed by mutual consent and can 
become unpopular if they are perceived as biased over a range of many cases12, in the real 
world their decision has virtually nothing to do with an "attempt to aJjust the result in 
accord with the bargaining strengths of the parties" (ibid. p. 90). Concannon (1980) 
contends that "[the] possibility or reality of industrial action is a significant factor in the 
Arbitration of dismissal cases [in Britain]" and this may well be the case where 
Arbitration is voluntary*. But it is most definitely not the case in Canada where 
Arbitration is compulsory and meant to preclude, not solve, industrial action. In the 
CANBREW  case cited above, the arbitrator's eventual award made no mention of the 
strike and it is highly unlikely it was even mentioned in the hearing. Whether a grievor's 
fellow employees are apathetic or burning with anger over his dismissal is totally 
irrelevant to the Canadian arbitrator.
But Glasbeek is mistaken to assume that because the union has carriage of the 
dismissal case, it can take a ruthlessly expedient attitude such that:
"th« pursuit of a grievance is not likely to be undertaken unless the union believes it to be 
important to its long range bargaining position and/or is wmnable." UVH4, p. 14«)
and thereby engages to any extent in "educating] the rank and file into what is 
acceptable or, more importantly, defensible work conduct" (ibid., p. 146). While 
Canadian unions definitely docarry on such filtering and shaping activity in non­
dismissal grievances (see chapter IV), dismissal is perhaps the one area where the grievor 
is almost invariably given the benefit of the doubt. Whether a dismissal grievance goes to 
Arbitration depends not as much on its 'winnability' or union considerations of 
acceptability of the culpable conduct, as on the organisational ability of the union 
(discussed in the previous chapter on Enforcements) and on the relative value of the job 
that was lost.
12. The nine-year turvey of arbitrator» carried out by the United Steelworker» cited in Chapter V wa> »pacifically
directed at identifying arbitrator» who teemed 'more »ympathetic' to union» in an array of i»»ue*. Employer» 
do the »ante type of thing. Yet given the career atructura of arbitrator», thair "employer'' not any one »at of 
partia» but the collective union-management community. And while they cannot help but be »omewhat 
»enutive to their overall 'record' of 'pro-union' and 'pro-management' award» and to the overall power 
' balance of the partiea, «hi» »enutivity doe» not e»tcnd to any »ingle »at of partie».
IJ. In Britain, a» teen in our etample at BRITMET in Chapter IV, where Arbitration i» voluntarily choaen, it la often 
done in e m u  ntuation», »uch a» where a »trike 1» in progre»» and the partial cannot find a face-»aving 
•olution themielvei.
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At CANBREW, practically every dismissal that the union is unable to mitigate in the 
grievance procedure is taken to Arbitration, partly because the union is so diligent and 
partly because union members are unlikely to find a better job anywhere. Even cases of 
misconduct which CANBREW  union members privately view with distaste are taken up 
rather than deprive the employee of his 'day in court’. Thus the union has defended 
employees disciplined for dangerous drunkenness at the wheel of a lorry, for racial slurs 
against other union members, or for widely acknowledged lapses of competence. Several 
of these the union has won as a result of procedural errors by the employer. The union 
does not apologise but sees its role as relentless challenger in a fully adversarial system.
At CAN M ET  a much smaller percentage of dismissals reach Arbitration, not because 
the union agrees with management's decisions any more than the one at the brewery but 
partly because the union lacks diligence and partly because of the two very different 
labour markets in which they operate or . as the convenor says, "because there are lots of 
similar jobs 'out there' to the ones they do in here".
While the duty of fair representation is not so stringent that it cannot readily be 
satisfied by a union which refuses, in good faith, to pursue the case of an undeserving 
member14, unions seldom take such stands. It is far less risky politically to go to 
arbitration. If the union wins, it looks good. If it loses, it was the arbitrator, not the 
union, that agreed with the employer (and there is no provision in Arbitration for costs 
against the union for vexatious claims). Given the union's limited scope of action and low 
success rate with most other workplace issues between rounds of interests bargaining, it 
is one of the only and one of the most important things a union can do to justify its 
existence.
4.3 The Hearing and Procedure
While the hearing in both countries was originally intended to be informal and 
open to the pleadings of lay practitioners, and the more formal trappings of the courts are
M. The author, at a tu ff officer, once recommended that the union not teak Arbitration for the dismissal of a member 
who had aaiaulted hu foreman. The assault was the last of a series of unprovoked 'bullyma' incidents by the 
grievor and had killed what little support remained for him in the plant. Nevertheless, the grievor appealed 
to the union esecutive and won the right to proceed to Arbitration, arguing that the union should not 'act as 
judge, jury end esacutioner' and threatening to sue for unfair representation. The union esecutive decided 
that the trouble and espense the grievor could cause far outweighed any trouble or espense involved in 
arbitrating his dismissal. The above esample shows that, barring financial considerations, there is little 
disincentive for Canadian unions to take all dismissal cases to Arbitration.
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absent, Collins and Glasbeek correctly observe that tribunals in their countries have 
developed into formalistic and legalistic arenas, removed from the ken of most non­
practitioners. Roberts quotes a veteran Canadian union Arbitration 'wing-person' in a 
particularly acerbic attack:
"The whole lyxem hat become to legalistic that a layman ha* to be a linguist. You have to 
know your Latin very well in order to know what'i being Mid. Here'a-an »ample from one caw: 
ejustem generis I tic I rule. Well, who know* what the ejustem generis rule is-'  If you don't know, 
they tell you it'« very much like the noscitura essocius (ticl rule. Now if you have a legal dictionary 
betide you, you might find out what your opposition is talking about, but the poor fellow who's got 
the grievance and who's listening and who's waited su  or eight months to get justice— he doesn't 
know what's going on . And this often drags on for four or five days’. (Roberts, I9KJ, p. ¿0-21, 
emphasis in the original)
While only about half of British Tribunal applicants are represented by lawyers or 
full-time union officials (Dickens etal., 1985, p. 45), virtually all dismissed grievors in 
Canada have such representation. And while the quality of representation is by and large 
excellent, workers are little more than spectators or witnesses to a clash of legal or para­
legal Titans from outside the workplace. Technical and procedural complications abound, 
preparation is often meticulous and cross-examination is frequently withering. Both 
workers and first-line supervisors at CANBREW  tell horror stories about "folding" or 
"making fools of themselves" and thereby "kissing the case goodbye" under cross- 
examination at Arbitration.
Thus Collins is incorrect to imply that North American dismissal Arbitration is in any 
sense an interests apparatus (1982, p. 89) or closer to the shop floor than British 
Industrial Tribunals. While the arbitrator has much greater power to 'second guess' 
management, especially in the quantum of discipline, arbitration as a forum is light years 
removed from the workplace. As Schatz says of seniority rights, so it is of disciplinary 
procedures in North America: they are "collectiveachievements which protect 
individual liberties" (1983, p. 117, emphasis added).
4.4 The Burden o f  Proof
In Canadian discipline Arbitrations the burden of proof is on the employer to 
establish 'just cause' for the discipline15-
IS. Actually, the initial onus is on tha union to prova a faw elementary facts: that a collective agreement between the 
parties ensts, that tha grievor was an employee and that discipline took place. The onuj then shifts to the 
employer to prove just cause. The burden of proof shifts back to the union temporarily to show mitigating 
circumstances, but such circumstances will only be considered by the arbitrator if the employer has fulfilled 
the burden of proving just cause. If the cauM for discharge is akin to a criminal offence, the union may have 
the burden of proving lack of intent by the grievor (Palmer, IVH.1, pp. 2b2-M().
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This used to be the case in Britain. But while the record of applicant success in 
British Tribunals should hardly have warranted their concern, British employers lobbied 
and in 1980 secured a change so that employers now need only prove they had a reason 
(as opposed to no reason) for dismissal which falls within the statute, for the onus to shift 
equally to both parties on the question of reasonableness (Anderman, 1985, p. 107). 
While this may seem a small change, many observers of Tribunals echo the dour 
assessment of the BR ITBREW  union's shop stewards handbook that:
"In  practice, thia ahift* the burden of proof on to the dumiaeed worker and can make it 
harder for him/her to win a claim"
4.5 Procedural Fairness
In both countries, a major concern behind the adjudication of dismissal is the way 
in which the employer went about disciplining the complainant, not just from the point of 
view of equity to the complainant but in the interests of industrial relations as a whole. 
Thus, in Britain, part of the public policy rationale, while not specified in the Act, was 
"the importance of restoring order to industrial relations by insisting that proper 
procedures should be followed by employers before dismissing the employee" (Collins,
1982, p. 87). This includes the right of the employee to know the charge against him, the 
right to answer to it, the right to representation by an appropriate champion and the 
right to be warned that a mode of conduct would lead to discipline. A dismissal executed 
without such procedural solicitude would not only do insult to the complainant, it would, 
more importantly, outrage his fellow employees, and even precipitate (quite unneessarily 
from the point of view of the policy makers and courts) industrial conflict.
However, Collins correctly suggests that even though a preoccupation with 
proceduralism characterised their initial orientation, so managerialist have these bodies 
been in their substantive orientation that even this concern for procedure began to break 
down. Thus in several cases16, procedural omissions by the employer, failure to involve a 
trade union official, failure to warn and failure to give the employee an opportunity to be 
heard, even in contravention o f  a collective agreement, have not kept several 
Tribunals or the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) (in spite of a chorus of legal and
16. Eg. B ritnh Labour Pump Lté. v. Byrne. IRLR <*4. EAT; Bailey v BP O il ¡Kent Refinery! Lté. (NM »
IRLR ¡H". CA; W A J  Watt Lté. v 0inttf IN62) IRLR 283. CA; Ratardaé Children ,  Aid Society ». Day 
(IVnW IRLR  128, CA. A  recent rate Hotkey ». A.E. Dayton Servicet Lté. IIVH7) IRLR Jlkl HL. clawe back 
•ome of the damage done tn procedurali»m in the former caiet.
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academic criticism) from upholding dismissal on the grounds that such procedural niceties 
would not have altered the employer's decision in any case. Not all Tribunals or EAT 
panels have been so cavalier, but the above cases have received much publicity. The 
credibility implications for workers and trade unions of such decisions need only be 
imagi ned.
In Canada, since Arbitration cannot be set in motion without the completion of a 
grievance procedure specified in a collective agreement, many of the preconditions for 
procedural fairness will already have been satisfied automatically before the hearing. 
Depending on whether the wording of a collective agreement in this regard is mandatory 
or directory (and it is most often the former), failure by the employer to follow the 
procedure, except in the case of the most flagrantly gross misconduct, will result in the 
discipline being overturned. Failure to give proper warnings may also result in the 
discipline being overturned. In the CANBREW  case above, the union argued that the 
employee had not been sufficiently warned and the union not sufficiently informed of the 
company's intentions. The arbitrator rejected the union's argument not because such 
warning and informing was unimportant but because he was satisfied that the company 
had communicated such information.
Because Canadian arbitrators have the power to alter penalties, even if the 
procedural defect is not sufficient to overturn the discipline in itself, it may well result in 
serious mitigation of the penalty.
4.6 Substantive Fairness
In both countries, the legislative enabling formulae provide little in the way of 
guidance or standards for tribunals to judge the substantive fairness of dismissal. Other 
than certain circumstances where dismissal is automatically unfair (eg. if the stated 
reason for dismissal is union activity, pregnancy, sex, race etc.), the British legislation 
di rects fairness to be determined by
"whether the diamiaaal waa reaaonable in tha circumatancea (including the aiza and 
admmiatrativa reaourcea of tha organiaation) and in accordanca with equity and tha aubatantial 
marita of tha caae" (Dickena A  Cock burn. IVHft. p. 4il. paraphraama tha Employment Protection Actl.
In Canada, the overwhelming majority of collective agreements specify nothing more 
than "cause" or "just cause"17 as the test of substantive fairness. In fact, some arbitrators
IT  Palmer (IWkl. p. ¿15-2361 indicate» that arbitrator have taken theee phraaea to mean tha aama.
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and courts have found such a provision to be implicit in collective agreements which are 
silent on the matter (Palmer, 1983, p. 234-35).
Yet tribunals in the two countries have gone in very different directions in fleshing 
out these indeterminate prescriptions. While British Tribunals and the EAT have opted 
to give managerial prerogative wide rein, Canadian Arbitrations and the courts that 
supervise them (in the area of discipline alone) have waded in up to their elbows, not, it 
will be argued, to seriously question the right of management to make rules and enforce 
them, but rather to assist management handling a potentially explosive area of concern.
One limit on the British Tribunal's powers to 'second guess' employer action relates to 
the facts upon which the employer based his decision. The employer need not prove on the 
balance of probabilities that the employee was guilty of the alleged misconduct but only 
that it reasonably believed such guilt after as much investigation as was reasonably 
warranted.18 (Anderman, 1985, p. 117).
A second important limit relates directly to deciding the reasonableness of the 
dismissal. The British Tribunal errs in law if it asks itself what it would have done if it 
were the employer. For the test is whether the dismissal falls outside the action that 
might be taken by 'a range of reasonable employers' (Dickens et al., 1985, p. 103; 
Anderman, 1985, p. 149).
Dickens et al. (1985) summarise their discussion of substantive fairness by criticising 
a judge who warned that Tribunals should "not impede employers unreasonably in the 
efficient management of their business". They point out that "by subsuming the interests 
of employees in general under the 'needs of the business' the interests of any individual 
employee in retaining his or her job can be overridden" (p. 106).
Yet it is not merely the consideration of business interests which allows the Tribunal 
to override the interests of the employee, it is the entire context of the forum and 
especially the inability of the Tribunal to substitute a different penalty. The ability to do 
that in Canada allows the arbitrator to fashion a "workable compromise between the 
interests of the individual and the demands of efficiency" (Adams, 1978, p. 29). It has 
been noted earlier that the "business interests" argument seriously works against 
Canadian unions in most cases. But in the field of discipline and especially dismissal, it
18. British Hom s Storts v Burchrll IW H » IRLR J'N. EAT.
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often works to the employee's benefit because the harm to him, the so-called 'industrial 
capital punishment' is seldom outweighed by the harm to the employer. So, with no less 
attention to 'business interests' than in Britain, this rationale in Canada is turned on its 
head. While the occasional arbitrator imports a hands off approach from the rest of 
arbitral jurisprudence, the mainstream view, supported by the Canadian courts, is clearly 
that arbitrators have the right to substitute their judgment for management's:
"...when an arbitrator (elects a penalty different from that selected by an employer, he is 
really saying that the employer has ignored some relevant consideration, proceeded on some 
misunderstanding, acted from some illicit motive, or otherwise affronted the arbitrator's sense of 
what is 'just'...In other words, the arbitrator is not only judging the grievor; he is judging the 
employer as well"19
Because of the leeway of substantive review and the ability to reinstate with lesser 
penalty, the concept of corrective discipline is powerfully cast into workplace industrial 
relations by Canadian Arbitrations and the doctrine of a "culminating incident" takes on 
great importance. Except in cases of gross misconduct, arbitrators will simply not allow 
dismissal unless the dismissal offence has been preceded by several similar transgressions 
and progressive warnings have been given. Arbitrators do not consider this to be 
impinging on management's rights but rather:
"the doctrine simply purports to accommodate the employer's legitimate interest in being 
able to terminate the employment of someone who, but for such a doctrine, could with impunity 
commit repeated infractions of diverse company rules and policies and generally perform in an 
unsatisfactory manner without fear of being discharged, so long as she did not commit a serious 
offence or did not persist in misconduct of the same type." (Brown & Beatty, IVU4, p. 4"5)
The mirror image of the doctrine of culminating incident is the ability of the 
arbitrator to look at the grievor's record of employment and disciplinary history to find 
cause to mitigate any penalty imposed. Thus the following factors will be reviewed29: 
previous good record; long service to the employer; whether the offence was an isolated 
occurrence; whether the grievor was provoked; whether the offence was a momentary 
aberration; the hardship of the penalty to grievor in his circumstances; the uniformity of 
employer enforcement of the rule(s) transgressed; the intent of the grievor; the overall 
seriousness of the offence to the employer; and several other factors including the 
grievor's degree of remorse. IV.
IV. ft« Ltvi S tn u it , -»> L.A.C. «2d» VI. at VJ (Arthurs, IVMII.
2«. ft« S lttl Equipment Co. LU . U  L.A.C. .156. (Rrv.ll«, IV64I, at JS6-H.
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Yet though Arbitration may differ in form  from Tribunals in its freedom to consider 
substantive fairness, more radical Canadian trade unionists find the process still stacked 
heavily against the worker:
" I  have lorn« questions for these arbitrators who adamantly proclaim their neutrality in ' 
judging labour-management disputes.
"How can you, in all honesty, pass judgment on an aggrieved employee who has been 
suspended or even fired for lateness and absenteeism when you yourselves regularly arrive late for 
arbitration hearings'' Or, as so many of you do, let months go by before rendering your decisions’'
"...How can you claim to understand the family difficulties imposed on shift workers and 
families with working mothers when, as recently happened to us, you arrive at a case, late I might 
add, and announce that you would like to leave early as your wife has gone skiing for the day and your 
children will be at home alone’'
"How can you comprehend the financial problems of a discharged, suspended or laid-off 
workers with a family to support when you receive several hundred dollars21 for one day’s work...’»"
(Taylor. NTT, p. W
4.7 Appellate Structure and Power
While tribunals in both countries have become highly legalistic, the courts have had 
a far greater impact upon British than on Canadian tribunals. The EAT has generally 
taken on the role of coordinating and setting standards of fairness for tribunals to follow. 
While it is not a tribunal de novo, and can only review points of law, the EAT has 
interpreted this restriction quite liberally. The EAT is a court of specialised jurisdiction, 
but in the absence of the type of privative clauses that prevail in Canada, its activity 
comes under the scrutiny of the Court of Appeal. The particular combination of appellate 
bodies has resulted in a high degree of restraint by the courts and a limited ability of 
Tribunals to develop their own law (see Dickens et al. pp. 2 09 -212).
While the Canadian courts have shown a fondness to rein in arbitral activity in non­
disci plinary cases, they have left arbitrators relatively free to nurture their own law of 
just cause in discipline. Palmer, marvelling at its comprehensiveness after a mere forty 
years, says:
"...there has been no deemve outside influence which has shaped the work of arbitrators in 
this area. Tha courts have only intruded to a minimum, and then largely on procedural points; their 
intervention has been episodic and. on the whole, of limited duration’ (Palmer, IWU. p. ¿III.
Thus the credibility of Canadian Arbitration as an ’expert’ body and its distinctness 
from the judicial system is far better developed than its British counterpart.
5. The Impact o f  Tribunals and Arbitrations
21. At the time of this study, it
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5. IComparative Use o f Third-Party Adjudication
A comparison of the finer points of Tribunals and Arbitrations, while important, 
can be dangerously misleading. For the impact of each upon workplace industrial 
relations in the types of plants we are investigating is dramatically different. While 
Arbitration is an intimate part of discipline-handling in unionised Canadian plants such 
as ours. Tribunals have only marginal impact upon similar British plants.
While figures are not available for an exact comparison, it can be roughly estimated" 
that, in any year, the number of Industrial Tribunal hearings where British unions 
represent dismissed members is about 10 %  less than the number of dismissal Arbitration 
hearings in Canada, (proportional to the number of unionised employees in each 
country2 3). However, such union activity in Britain is highly concentrated on employees 
in smaller workplaces and very much rarer in workplaces above 100 employees (Dickens 
et a l 1 9 8 S ) . In Canada, on the other hand, dismissal arbitration activity is more evenly 
spread across the range of workplace sizes, and some evidence indicates, as might be 
expected, it is slightly higher in larger workplaces (Gandz, 1978).
A look at the rate of discipline in our four plants24 may help put these figures into 
perspective. It is remarkably similar along industry lines. Expressed as a percentage of 
the workforce per year, both the British and the Canadian aluminium plant dismiss 
approximately 0.7%. Both breweries dismiss 0.4%. Figures on dismissal rates in the two 
countries as a whole are meager. The best estimate for Britain as a whole, obtained from 
survey data, is just above I %  per annum (Brown etal., 1981, p. I 16) with a range 
between .04 for workplaces with more than 1000 employees and 1.8 for those with less
22. Thu  comparison was calculated aa follows: To obtain a number for Canada, the appronmate annual number of
Ontario dismissal arbitrations, derived from the United Steelworkers' survey, was increased proportionate to 
the inverse of Ontario's share of the number of employees covered by collective agreements across the 
country 1*2.8). This produced a figure of approximately 434) Canadian dismissal arbitrations per year. To 
correct for Canada's smaller sue, this figure was further increased by the proportion that Britain esceeds 
Canada in union members <*J> for a figure of approximately 134)0 arbitrations per year. To obtain a figure for 
Britain, the survey of British Tribunal applicants in Dickens et al. (IV83I was employed. The survey revealed 
that appronmately 12* of all applicants appearing at hearings were trade union members represented by their 
unions. This percentage was extrapolated to the toul number of hearings held annually to produce a figure of 
approaimately 1130 Tribunal hearings a year.
23. As mentioned earlier, the number of British arbitrations on dismissal is negligible. Those that arc held are
voluntary and tend to be at the larger employers.
24. Complete figures for discipline over a long enough period for statistical accuracy ware not always easy to obtain,
especially at BRITBREW and CANMET. However, enough information was available to make intelligent
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than 100 (Daniel & Mil I ward, 1983, p. 171). So the range of dismissal rates in our plants 
fit within these parameters25-
The evidence of external dismissal adjudication in our plants shows dramatic 
differences. In the ten years previous to this study, BR ITBREW  faced only two tribunal 
applications and BR IT M ET  faced only one. In the Canadian plants, disciplinary 
arbitration is de rigeur. In the eight and a half years preceding this study, C AN M ET  
faced five discipline arbitrations (four for dismissal and one for suspension) and 
CANBREW  faced twelve (four for dismissal, seven for suspension and one for disciplinary 
demotion).
Unlike British Tribunals however, Canadian Arbitration also deals with complaints 
of discipline other than dismissal (suspensions, demotions and disciplinary notices).
These cases account for slightly more arbitration hearings than those on dismissal, so that 
there is actually more than twice as much third party adjudicatory activity on discipline in 
Canada as in Britain.
The rate of non -dismissaldiscipline is much greater in the Canadian plants. While 
in both British plants it is almost the same as for dismissal, C AN M ET 's  figure is 2.2% 
(more than twice its dismissal rate) and CANBREW 's is 4 .4%  (more than four times its 
dismissal rate). Two, somewhat contradictory reasons can be posited for this: first, it 
reflects a high preoccupation with progressive discipline, in response to the signals given 
by arbitrators and, especially at CANBREW, where a sophisticated management is 
concerned with the cost of depleting an internal labour market in which it has invested 
considerable resources; second, it reflects a less paternalistic, more punitive orientation 
toward the disciplining of the workforce in Canada. To be somewhat glib, the motto of 
Canadian managers might well be "punish them, but be careful and methodical about how 
you do it".
At first glance, it appears as if the corrective approach to discipline is not nearly as 
well developed in the British plants as it is in the Canadian. While there is some concept 
of progressive discipline in BRITMET, with several dismissals coming at the end of a 
series of smaller warnings or suspensions, none of the dismissals at BR ITBREW  are the
25. Similar data ara not available for Canada. Howavar. the author suspects that dismissal rates in Canada might be
significantly higher than in Britain because of less paternalistic employer attitudes and the illegality of unions 
striking over dismissal, but this cannot he proven at this point.
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result of a culminating incident. Those dismissals that do happen are mostly a result of 
gross misconduct, such as theft or dishonesty. But further consideration below will yield 
quite different conclusions.
On a more qualitative level, the differential impact of third-party adjudication in the 
two countries is even more striking.
5.2 Impact on Management
In the disciplinary activity of the British managers, third-party adjudication has 
some discernable impact, but it pales in comparison to Canada. In keeping with a 
pronounced national trend (Millward & Stevens, 1986, p. 169-180; Dickens etal., 198S, 
pp. 232-238), the introduction of Tribunals, the publication of the A C A S  Code of 
Practice and its propagation by the Institute of Personnel Management all promoted the 
growth of disciplinary procedures and the development of published workplace rules in 
our plants. These were reviewed in Chapter IV. But it was also noted in that chapter that 
in our British plants, and especially at BRITBREW , while procedure is in place, it is often 
peremptorily ignored in cases of serious misconduct or where the collective implications 
are ominous.
Procedures aside, while the British personnel managers have a nodding acquaintance 
with some of the broad Tribunal precepts of substantive fairness from professional 
seminars (one manager remarks favourably on the licence that the 'range of reasonable 
employers' test gives him), it has very little to do with the way in which they administer 
discipline from day today. Their personal experience with Tribunals is very limited, so in 
considering discipline, they generally 'play it by ear', as they have always done.
The impact of Tribunals on line management is even more vague, and direct 
familiarity with Tribunals is non-existent. Immediately after the introduction of 
Tribunals and subsequent procedures, both plants echoed a national trend in 
manufacturing (Daniel & Stilgoe, 1978, p. 4 1; Brown, 19 8 1, p. 32; Dickens et al., 1985, 
p. 264-5) for authority for discipline to shift away from line managers to personnel. Yet 
BR IT M ET  has more recently made efforts to pass the responsibility back down and 
BR ITBREW  talks about it seriously.
The situation in Canada is very different. Knight (1984) reports that arbitral 
decisions have considerable impact on the employer administration of disciplinary
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policies including such areas as progressive discipline for absenteeism, the question of 
intent in theft cases, employer procedure in insubordination cases, leniency in alcohol and 
drug abuse cases and the importance of disciplinary procedures. Our plants confirm this. 
Not only do personnel managers have considerable personal experience with Arbitration 
both in their own plants and in those of sister plants, as mentioned earlier they have a 
broad knowledge of the arbitral jurisprudence and the comments of legal and academic 
commentators on it. They often communicate their assessments of Arbitrations to their 
colleagues, including line managers.
The familiarity of line managers with Arbitration is also much greater than in Britain 
and is especially pronounced at CANBREW, where they not only have been called upon to 
testify at Arbitrations but are expected to attend them as part of their training in how to 
discipline.
The following is an example of the impact of discipline Arbitration on CANBREW  
managers, which like episodes cited previously, splendidly epitomises not only this but 
several other aspects of the question before us:
The grievor was a fully-licenced Maintenance Mechanic with four and a half years' 
seniority who, according to the employer, was incapable of performing up "to the high 
standards of craftsmanship expected and required of a qualified skilled tradesman". 
Acknowledging the grievor's lack of intention to do wrong, and employing a 'non- 
disci pi inary' approach, the employer demoted him to the position of production worker 
(which the union estimated would cost him $15,000 per year). The grievor's professional 
mediocrity was widely acknowledged by managers and workers alike so as to be almost a 
legend in the plant. But justifying the demotion was quite another thing, especially when 
the union swung its legal guns around to defend the grievor. Several supervisors testified 
to major and costly errors directly caused by the grievor that had led them to assign him 
simpler tasks or "work around him". He was told about these errors but never warned 
that failure to improve his performance could result in discipline or demotion. The 
union's witnesses testified that the grievor was able to do a wide range, indeed most, of his 
maintenance tasks with acceptable competence. The union argued that
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"elemental fairness demand» certain »tap» to let him know he 1» in jeopardy...If a mechanic 
i< incompetent, that is senoua for the Company in terms of cost. It should be important enough to 
document and tell the employee about."**
The union also argued that the employer was attempting to make the grievor a scapegoat 
for the lack of supervisory competence in his department.
The arbitrator ruled a) that the evidence did not convince him that the grievor was so 
bad at performing the range of tasks expected of him as to be classified 'incapable', b) that 
even if the grievor was incapable, the evidence did not prove he was incapable of 
improving and c) that even if a) and b) were proved, the employer's neglect to warn the 
grievor of the consequences rendered the discipline null and void.
At first the decision hit the employer like a thunderbolt. Fearful of its impact on 
managerial prerogative, top managers sought a legal opinion on the chances of quashing 
the award in the courts. While arguing that the decision would seriously "fetter or 
circumscribe the discretion and mandate that the Management Rights Clause provides to 
the company", he reminded them of the very narrow scope of judicial review in Canada 
(the arbitrator had written his award so that it did not seem 'patently unreasonable') and 
put their chances at "less than even". The employer did not challenge the award.
Yet after a period of reassessment, a top company industrial relations manager sent a 
memo to other top managers, in which he takes a different view of the award's effect on 
managerial prerogative:
" I  think the arbitrator is right. We made the age-old mistake of knowing (that the grievorl 
is incompetent, but being unable to prove it in a just cause sense., (emphasis in the original)
T h e  result o f  the arbitration 1$ not unmanageable but fas usual) it makes the 
process longer end harder to administer, "(emphasis added)
Once again the 'management education effect' is seen. The manager indicates he is 
sending a copy of the memo to all personnel managers (in all of CANBREW 's sister plants 
across the country), recommending they treat similar situations in the future in the 
following way:
I. We will document every incident where an employee completes a work assignment in a manner
which is unacceptable to us, and we will impose appropriate discipline if circumstances 26
26. From the recorded minutes of the final step grievance meeting. Note the way the union craftily moves from a
'protection of incompetence' argument to a 'concern for managerial efficiency' argument, attempting to cast 
its case in a more legitimate guise (see Armstronget al., I9HI).
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2. If the employee ha* * history of such documented incidents and we feel we must remove him from 
h is job, our options are open. If we feel we can prove incapacity we can use the non- 
disciplinary approach, and if we cannot prove incapacity we will simply follow the 
disciplinary approach through to its logical conclusion.
The memo is highly significant in the insight it gives into the interplay between 
Canadian arbitration and management practice. The arbitration had different effects at 
two different levels of management. To many line managers, it was yet further proof that, 
as one supervisor says, "arbitrators won’t let us manage" and that "once probation is over, 
there's a problem getting rid of the poor performer". But to some line managers and to 
those higher up, the arbitration was a slap on the wrists for lazy management and a lesson 
in how to better manage. As one manager says:
~W« triad to Uk* tha ea*y way out and demote him. It would have taken a lot longer to build 
a ca»e againat him and we didn't. We colluded with him by putting him on the eaiy job*. It'« a 
•ymptom o f a larger problem hare."
Thus what at first appeared to be a major victory for the union, an example of the 
arbitrator E n d in g  over backwards for the worker', actually became a great boon to 
management, a learning experience, an opportunity to use the arbitrator's wide 
experience of'good industrial relations' to fin e  tune its practice o f  control. The 
arbitral award undoubtedly does make the "process longer and harder to administer", but 
more efficient in  the end.
The 'management education effect' has thus far been seen when CANBREW  
management in the absenteeism case at the beginning of this chapter and in Chapter V, 
when a burgeoning arbitral jurisprudence on promissory estoppel led it to institute its 
'custom and practice audit'.
5.3 Impact on Workers and Trade Unions
In the comparison of Tribunals and Arbitration, it is the the legitimacyof the two 
forums to trade unionists that is most striking and most determinative of their differential 
impact in the workplace.
In the eyes o f the Canadians, disciplinary arbitration is used and highly regarded not 
just because it is the only method of seeking equity (although that is doubtless a powerful 
impetus). Nor is  it favoured because it actually delivers a high quality of equity. The 
comparison with the dismissal reversal rates of the beleaguered British Tribunals, the 
fact that almost half of dismissals are upheld, and the fact that trade unionists are ill- 
equipped to form evaluative assessments of arbitration's equitable quality in any case.
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makes the whole question indeterminate and irrelevant. Arbitration is favoured because 
it appears to deliver equity, especially compared to its poor record in non-disciplinary 
cases. In over half the dismissal cases put before arbitrators, management is slapped on 
the wrists and the employee earlier seen emptying his locker is now seen returning 
triumphantly to work. In just less than half of the non -dismissal disciplinarycases, 
there is a similar slap on the wrists. Just as this has a demoralising effect on some 
supervisors, it has a stimulating effect on workers and trade union officials who seldom 
consider that the arbitrator has acted essentially as an arm of management's disciplinary 
apparatus and, in their rush to welcome him home, seldom ask the prodigal son if he has 
lost his inheritance.
Yet for all its popularity, disciplinary arbitration is not seen by the trade unionists as 
something integral to the workplace, something they themselves have accomplished by 
their power, mobilisation or ingenuity. It is something apart from them, a sometimes 
benign yet always distant deus ex machina, not the result of collective action. The full 
significance of this relationship becomes clearer when the impact of Tribunals on the 
British trade unionists is examined.
In the British plants, Industrial Tribunals quite simply have little or no credibility. 
Even at BR ITM ET, where the union is not able to consistently mount a workplace 
challenge to management's disciplinary activity, Tribunals are seen as a forum for losers, 
a desperate last resort for the employee in which the union's participation is far from 
certain.
The only Industrial Tribunal to take place at BR ITM ET  within the period 
encompassed by our study involved an employee dismissed for excessive absenteeism. The 
union declined to represent him.
Of the two Tribunal cases at BRITBREW , the union represented the complainant in 
one case only. The convenor explains that this was only because of extraordinary 
circumstances. To set an example, the company was determined to fire a woman canteen 
worker accused of unauthorisedly taking leftovers home. The union felt that, in light of 
the overall high level of pilferage in  the area, there was sufficient uncertainty about her 
guilt to give her the benefit of the doubt. The union won the Tribunal case and the 
complainant received compensation.
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In a second Tribunal case, however, involving pilferage of product by a drayman, the 
union refused to help the complainant, and his case was dismissed.
Whether or not it is true, the BRITBREW  convenor believes that
"th * fir»« qucition Tribunal» aak [when a union member appear» before them) 1» whether 
the union backing the ca»c. If it i»n't, hi» ca»e 1» ai good at lo st”.
Thus the BR ITBREW  union's refusal to represent a claimant is more than mere 
indifference but a conscious act o f  collusion in his dismissal. The difference from 
Canada could hardly be more pronounced. Why is this so?
The union (and of course the company) prefer to handle disciplinary matters within 
the bounds of the workplace. In an unspoken agreement, the union participates in the 
policing of its members while the company keeps discipline to a minimum. In return for 
its willingness to withhold serious support for the few employees who cross the bounds of 
acceptability (especially in cases of egregious absenteeism, theft and larcenous fiddling), 
the union is able to protect the jobs of others by what we have earlier called 'showing the 
colours'. Both management and union have ways of 'signaling' the degree of their concern 
about the issue and to read the other party's signals. Thus discipline at BRITBREW  is a 
shared activity, to an extent that separates it not only in degree but in kind from the other 
three plants.
A look at the disciplinary statistics at the two breweries proves the case. They have 
the same rate of dismissal, showing a similar propensity for ridding themselves of 
employees with unacceptable behaviour. But the Canadian brewery has fo u r  times the 
non-dismissal disciplinary rate of the British one. If the BRITBREW  union were weak or 
not vigilant in defence of its members, the paucity of non-dismissal discipline might 
indicate a less progressive, more punitive model of discipline. But given the union's 
strength, a different conclusion must be drawn ie. that more than any of the other three, 
this union participates in the disciplinary process. This is not simple co-optation but 
rather a process in which the union has much to gain for its members.
This process is repeated in many British workplaces. The Institute of Personnel 
Management reports that in 14 %  of workplaces with over 100 employees and 19%  of 
workplaces with over 500 employees, "all disciplinary matters [are] agreed between trade 
union and management" (1979, p. 96).
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Henry's (1983,87) move beyond the simple punitive-corrective model is useful for 
analysis here. In essence, while the three other plants are at different places on the 
"representative-corrective" approach, B R ITBREW  has advanced into the 
"accommodative-participative" sphere, wherein a) worker participation is not limited to 
"advocacy or appeals roles" as it is in the "representative corrective" approach but b) the 
collective nature of the disputes is fully acknowledged by both parties and c) discipline 
more fully is subject to negotiation. Henry implies that in this approach, management 
"institutionalisels] the collective bargaining process by incorporating representatives 
from both management and unions in a joint disciplinary procedure" (1987, p. 298). Yet 
it can be argued that the process is not quite as overt as this, that the approach works 
better in the British context if, as at BRITBREW , the collaboration is not formalised 
into a joint disciplinary procedure but rather works out that way in practice. The 
implications of this process upon levels of industrial conflict can be inferred.
While space does not permit canvassing the full range of causes giving rise to 
discipline, a brief look at the handling of three of them where orientations and reactions 
vary across the two countries and two industries, especially in the two breweries, sheds 
valuable light on the question.
6. Attendance
Attendance is a major cause of discipline in both countries and the major cause they 
share (Adams, 1978, p. 45; Edwards & Whits ton, 1988,p. 3). Certainly, a common major 
problem in all four plants is controlling lateness and absenteeism by employees. What is 
acceptable attendance? Edwards and Whitston (1988) criticise attempts at simplistic 
construction of differential 'cultures of absence' and, indeed, the attempt to go beyond 
acknowledging the existence of differing rates and weights of absence to more rigorous 
analysis is fraught with problems, not the least of which is irrelevance. Nevertheless, it is 
undeniable that in tackling absenteeism, managements themselves make assessments based 
on a perceived 'acceptable' level of attendance, which differs from work area to work area 
and is closely bound up with the nature of control in those areas. Managements are aware 
of attendance levels in their industry and, having established an acceptable plant norm, 
assess different departments on their deviance from that norm and different employees on 
their deviance from the departmental norm. Thus, for example, BRITBREW
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management, while admitting that the tough manual work of their draymen and staging 
unit workers contributes to high absence, also concludes it has an absenteeism problem. 
On the other hand, B R IT M ET  management points to its casting unit workers as having an 
absence record well below the plant norm.
Management in all four plants, as in most modern industrial workplaces, has moved 
beyond a purely punitive approach to absenteeism. Where once both legitimately 
incapacitated an «/malingering employees might have been disciplined or sacked for non­
performance, collective bargaining and a corrective approach have introduced absence 
indemnity (sick pay) schemes meant to reward otherwise punctilious members of the 
internal labour market. But the following questions must still be addressed: what is to be 
done with malingerers and those whose incapacity, though blameless, does not allow them 
to fulfill their obligations of service; how is the scheme to be managed to prevent it from 
both encouraging absenteeism and becoming too costly; and to what extent can the 
indemnity scheme itself be used to address these problems? The level of participation of 
the union is crucial to the answer.
In Canada, the union is both structurally and attitudinally precluded from 
participating27* The coverage and payout level of the schemes is bargained and set in the 
interests apparatus, and is subsequently 'locked in' as an employee right. The policing of 
attendance is off limits to joint regulation. Neither party would dream of fettering its 
discretion to impose or oppose sanctions as the case may be. Most attempts by 
management to use the indemnity scheme itself to curb absenteeism are resisted by the 
union using the rights apparatus.2” Thus management is forced to use straight discipline 
to compel attendance. At both Canadian plants, then, written warnings, suspensions and 
dismissals are employed (or warnings, counselling sessions and final discharge where a 
'non punitive' policy exists) even as the indemnity scheme continues to give monitored
27. O n* noteable «»caption to the union'» refusal to participate in discipline ■» the CANBREW  rule against alcohol on 
company premia«» (other than in the canteen). For (hany year», the company ha» impo»«d a one-day 
•u»pen»ion for thia offence. The company'» coniutency over »itch a long period ha» led the union to »cldom 
ieriou»ly challenge theie »u»pen»ion» unle»» the company ha» been nmtaken Such acquiescence, though 
paitive, »end» a clear menage to employee» that the union n  unsympathetic to their claim» and thereby 
promote» obedience to the rule.
2k. At one of CANBREW'» sister plants, employees are allowed to 'bank' unused nek leave days and 'cash them out' at 
the end of a period. This is a strong incentive for most employees not to use the sick days, but is very costly 
to the employer and hence very rare among blue rollar workforces.
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employees their day's pay. In the CANBREW  case involving the wildcat strike cited 
earlier in the chapter, the union had warily avoided any involvement in the company's 
absenteeism correction programme, which the company had introduced unilaterally in 
any case (though it did peremptorily inform the union). The union's argument that it and 
the grievor were taken by surprise thus held little weight with the arbitrator. The 
dismissed employee was returned to work not by the strike nor by any collective action by 
the union, but merely by the impatience of the company in improperly following the 
procedure of its own absenteeism reduction programme. According to the personnel 
manager, that could and would be easily corrected.
In the British factories, where bargaining structures are less rigid, there is room for a 
more flexible approach to absenteeism, ie. more room for 'adjustments'. Management at 
both plants has attempted to involve the union in policing absenteeism, holding out the 
promise of a better indemnity scheme if the 'abusers' can be isolated. It does this because 
an ounce of the union's cooperation in discouraging abuse is worth several pounds of 
company-initiated punitive action.
Like the Canadian unions, the BR ITM ET  union is highly distrustful of management's 
initiatives in this area. Significantly though, as mentioned in the previous chapter, unlike 
the Canadian unions, it cannot fall back on its 'rights'. It either continually renegotiates 
them or loses them. For example, management proposed a progressively punitive scheme 
for reducing lateness. When the union refused to negotiate, the employer acted 
unilaterally and, according to a personnel manager:
"we ended up imposing ■  harsher procedure than we had proposed to the union. Because we 
couldn't get their agreement to our proposal or even tome com prom i»«. we had no guarantee of 
compliance. I think the union lost out in thu instance as in many others by its behaviour in 
negotiations".
The BR ITM ET  union was offered improvements in the absence indemnity scheme if it 
would would stop appealing, as a matter of course, all suspensions from the scheme. This 
the union would not do. Says a personnel manager:
"They have two faces. They privately admit the legitimacy of discipline for offenders but 
publicly defend them. The union sect cooperation at telling their members out but their own 
members support our scheme. Why. even the abusers admit they deserve to be suspended from the 
schemel"
A  union steward agrees:
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"W€>e in an uncomfortable (ituation. We're enpected to represent the members. But we'd 
like to act the number of waitint days (an obligatory period of absence before the plan kicks in] down.
It's a job to know how to do it".
Eventually though, after a year of a unilateral company programme of suspending 
acknowledged 'abusers' from the scheme, the union began to accept the company's bona 
fides and agreed to an improved scheme, while tapering off its automatist opposition to 
the treatment of abusers.
The BR1TBREW union, on the other hand, more readily enters into negotiations, not 
only on the payout of the scheme but on the method of weeding out abusers. The jointly- 
agreed procedure involves the following sequence: a) a verbal, then a written warning 
prior to disciplinary action b) a six-month suspension from the scheme and c) dismissal if, 
during suspension from the scheme, the unacceptable level of attendance continues. The 
union retains the right to argue each case on its merits and stops short of joining with the 
company to discipline offenders. But a personnel manager says the company would not 
have it any other way:
" It 'i  the union doina it* job. If the union didn't do it, then it would have a problem of 
credibility with its member* and the whole procedure would *Urt to fall apart”.
On the other hand, says another manager, the disciplinary system works so smoothly 
because the union is seen as "co-authors". Though it can intercede in absenteeism 
disputes, the union seldom does so except to ensure employee representation. The concern 
of shop stewards not to jeopardise the indemnity scheme was clearly evident in their 
comments on the "fucking malingerers" in the previous chapter. Only because the 
voluntary redundancy principle ranked higher in the union's priorities was this concern 
overridden in that case.
By participating in the regulation of absenteeism, the BRITBREW  union may be 
abandoning the defence of some of its members in the short run. But by doing 
management the favour of helping to castigate them, it is building up I.O.U.'s which it will 
expect management to repay at some future date. This the other three unions do not have 
the strength or confidence to do. The BRITBREW union's arsenal contains favours as 
well as industrial action while that of the other three contains only industrial action.
It is pertinent and ironic to note that once the union had achieved its purpose of 
preventing the compulsory redundancy of the four employees concerned, it proceeded to 
help convince three of them that they would be better off taking voluntary redundancy pay
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and leaving the company (which they did). The fourth transferred to a new job within the 
company and was, with union acquiescence, suspended from the indemnity scheme for six 
months.
7. Insubordination
Adams (1978) defines insubordination as a "direct challenge to authority such as 
refusing to obey an order and swearing, fighting and insolence where a supervisor is 
involved' (p. 43, emphasis added). With regard to this cause of discipline, the most 
striking difference between the two countries is in its frequency or lack thereof.
In Canada, it is beyond doubt an issue of gravest importance. Adams' survey of 
dismissal arbitrations (1978) finds it as the chief cause of discipline, ahead even of 
attendance and Palmer insists:
"Unquestionably, insubordination it the most common typo o f  disciplinary action 
found in Hit fie ld  o f  labour arbitration. Equally, it it contidarad by mott arbitrator« to ba one 
of the moat sarioua industrial offentet' The reaaont for thia it that it a trike a at the heart of an 
employer's prerogative!: the right to manage It it felt thet the right to order employees to carry out 
orders without »tended debate and without a loss of respect ia central to the role of management".
(IVU. p. 319, emphasis added)
The seriousness with which Canadian arbitrators' treat insubordination is indicated 
by their comparative reluctance to reinstate employees dismissed for this cause (10 %  less 
likely as the norm of 53.5% according to Adams, 1978, p. 54, who says the figure is not 
lower because insubordination is very often "an isolated event...that arises in the nature 
of a momentary 'flare up'”). But insubordination is a cause that invites among the 
severest penalties overall, with 8 1 %  of grievors either not-reinstated, reinstated with no 
back pay or reinstated with over three months' suspension (ibid., p. 6 1).
In our Canadian plants, while it lags behind attendance, it is a prominent cause of 
discipline, especially at the aluminium plant where management control is tighter and 
several people on both sides considerably less genteel than the industrial norm.
In Britain, however, insubordination ranks farther down the list in causes of 
discipline. In the IPM survey, only 2%  of the employers listed "refusal to obey reasonable 
instructions" as the major cause of discipline and only 25%  listed it in the first four causes 
of discipline (Institute of Personnel Management, 1979, pp. 31-33). Even Tribunals are 
careful in finding "a refusal to obey a legitimate instruction" a reasonable cause for 
dismissal (Anderman, 1985, pp. 158-9).
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Managers and trade unionists in both our British plants are somewhat nonplussed by 
the concept, although those at the aluminium plant are more familiar with it, for the same 
reasons as in Canada. Few cases of outright disciplinary action result from this cause in 
either plant.
The reason for the great difference between the countries on this matter should be 
fairly obvious. In a regime where such great pains are taken to ensure that "the industrial 
plant is not a debating society” and that employees "work now and grieve later", much 
behaviour outside these norms inevitably becomes a challenge to managerial prerogative, 
even i f  it is not specifically intended as such. A certain amount of ’shop talk' 
between employees and supervisors is not only unavoidable but also necessary for the 
smooth functioning of any regime, and Canadian arbitrators have ruled discipline for 
insubordination too severe where swearing did not connote insolence (Palmer, 1983, p. 
336), where the supervisor had not been clear in his order or in the consequences of 
disobedience (ibid., p. 320-322), where there was provocation of the employee (ibid., pp. 
335) and where the order was illegal, dangerous or patently unreasonable (ibid., pp. 323- 
332). Yet in this environment, it could be said that management neglects to discipline for 
insubordination at its peril.
As most of the causes of discipline for insubordination relate directly to the forum of 
(what we have called) job control (Palmer, 1983, pp. 337-38, 340; see Chapter IX  for a 
fuller elaboration), it is inescapable that many of the high number of disciplinary disputes 
in the category of insubordination have been displaced from that forum. Many that begin 
life under job control and cannot find legitimate expression there are serious enough that 
they will not be suppressed. Thus they inevitably find their way through to the 
disciplinary forum. This point will be discussed further in the chapter on job control.
On the other hand, in a regime which not only tolerates but invites debate on the shop 
floor, and where strikes are considered "those stoppages which seriously impair our 
ability to trade", it is little wonder that insubordination per se is of far smaller import 
than in Canada. BR ITM ET  supervisors claim no more than two disciplines for 
insubordination in ten years. One involved general rudeness, unpleasantness and verbal 
aggressiveness to supervisors. The other involved a shop steward telling an employee to 
slow down. The personnel manager says, almost apologetically:
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"We know it goei on but it '* never done openly. In this cate he did it right out in the open.
There wat no way we could let it to."
Discipline for insubordination is even rarer at BRITBREW. From observation, a far 
higher degree of "shop talk", especially by shop stewards toward line managers, is 
tolerated than in the other three plants. With small scale departmental stoppages always 
a possibility, mere argument, even if vigorous, can seem like a blessing. Being confronted 
by an angry steward (or one pretending to be angry) is quite a common occurrence in many 
departments. Almost all cases of insubordination have occurred around the ongoing 
dispute between the distribution unit management and the draymen. One such case is 
illustrative of the general approach taken to discipline by the company.
The new departmental agreement (which ended the strike) specifies that draymen who 
are unable to raise a publican to accept his delivery may lose bonus earnings if they fail to 
telephone a supervisor and accept his instructions (to wait, revisit, reroute or return beer 
to depot). One dray crew refused to obey the supervisor's instruction to attempt 
redelivery and were disciplined by a written warning and the loss of their bonus for their 
entire load. Eventually, the parties agreed to a verbal warning and the loss of the bonus 
for the delivery only (a drop from £9 to £3). The company realised, as it did in the case of 
the 'procedural bonus' discussed in Chapter IV, that punishment for a full load might well 
invite rather than prevent violation of the agreement if workers felt they 'may as well be 
hanged for a pound as a penny'. A  personnel manager says:
"Th* union accepted the final result as just. Neither the company nor the union feels it was 
compromised by the deal. (The company] sometimes toes in higher than it might otherwise in 
discipline if we feel it might be reduced on appeal"
What is unique about BR ITBREW  is not the fact that management often sets 
discipline high and reduces it on appeal. The three other managements do that from time 
to time. Where BRITBREW  differs qualitatively is in the fact, and the readiness to 
acknowledge the fact, that discipline is a negotiable item, even where direct management 
orders have been flouted. Refusals to follow orders then, can seldom be classified as 
insubordination. They are not as much willful challenges to managerial prerogative (as 
they are in Canada) as they are positional tactics in the gestalt of continuous collective 
bargaining.
8. Work Performance
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Adams defines culpable work performance problems as "carelessness; negligence; 
breach of company rules [involving] no direct affront to authority-most cases relating] 
to how the work is done" (1978, p. 44A). Managements in all our plants have used 
discipline where employees, through their negligence, have been found to be culpably 
responsible for substandard or damaged product. Yet again, the Canadian plants use a far 
heavier hand than their British counterparts in the same industry.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the brewing unit of the two breweries, which are 
sim ilar in all major respects. As described in Chapter II, the unit >n both countries 
employs process production in large batches and is capital intensive, with high technology 
prominent. Work tasks are primarily monitoring and intervention at key junctures to 
expedite flow and to prevent disruption or contamination of the process. Morale and self- 
discipline in these areas are higher than plant norms because of the job content and high 
degree of responsibility.
Despite (or perhaps because of) the high degree of automation, errors by operatives 
can result in considerable loss of or damage to product and consequent loss of profit. As a 
food product, quality is of primary concern and negligence a very serious offence.
While it is impossible to quantify the concept of product quality (and no attempt is 
made to disparage Canadian beer), the importance of quality may be slightly greater in 
Britain, especially in the ale (as opposed to lager) market, where consumer loyalty 
depends more on taste distinctiveness and less on marketing techniques.
Yet the number and seriousness of disciplinary penalties handed out at CANBREW  
for negligence and carelessness in brewing is significantly greater than at BRITBREW. 
Verbal warnings, written warnings, suspensions and disciplinary demotions for slip-ups 
have been handed out over a long enough period that its contrast with BRITBREW  is 
noticeable.
In a typical such case, a CANBREW  employee with some 12 1/2 year's seniority was 
disciplined after committing four performance errors, over a two year period, that 
resulted in product loss. The first offence (pumping uncompleted product prematurely) 
netted a three day suspension (reduced in the grievance procedure to two days) and a 
letter indicating:
"...bind on thii incident and your employment record...which n  completely unaccepteble. 
you ahould be fully aware that if you fail to follow procedure* or ditobey Company rule* and
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regulation* you could subject yourself to further progressive discipline up to and including discharge.
As you know, working in the Brew House requires a high degree of diligence. Should you fail to follow 
proper procedures again, you may be removed from the Brewing Department*.
The second offence (allowing the concentration of product to fall below acceptable 
levels) invited a verbal warning. The third (allowing ingredient to drain onto the floor) 
also received a verbal warning. In neither of the latter two was the union formally 
notified. The fourth (overfilling a tank and hence spilling large amounts of product) 
resulted in the employer finding the grievor "unsuitable for work in the Brewing 
Department" and demoting him permanently to the packaging unit.
The union grieved the demotion and carried it through to arbitration. According the 
collective agreement, it argued, the middle two offences were not formal discipline and 
hence incapable of being relied upon in support of the company's claim of a 'culminating 
incident'. The union made other arguments attempting to excuse the final offence.
The arbitrator rejected these excuses but agreed with the union's first argument, 
finding the middle two offences inapplicable to the case at hand. Accordingly, there was 
inconclusive evidence that the grievor was incapable of performing his job and deserved 
demotion. However, finding "the culminating incident was an incident of blameworthy 
conduct", the arbitrator imposed a three-day suspension.
Without making any judgments on the grievor's degree of culpability, there is one 
aspect of this case and most of the others examined thus far that is particularly striking. 
That is the extent to which procedural and technical, as opposed to substantive, 
considerations dominate the union's arguments.
With few weapons available to defend its members other than third-party 
adjudication and trapped by its own and the employer's unwillingness to engage in any 
more active approach, the union inevitably becomes a prisoner o f  proceduralism.
With nothing to 'trade' with, it responds with a passive/aggressive, automatistic 
adversarialism which spins it and the employer into a vicious circle of formal but often 
inconclusive confrontation. Because of the importance of the concept of 'culminating 
incident' in arbitration, each incident becomes a separate battlefield and credibility 
counts for little in the ensuing scrap. Indeed, the union's practice is to challenge even 
letters o f  warning for fear that these will later haunt the employee. In this vortex, both
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conceding that an employee's guilt invites discipline, and using collective action to resolve 
the dispute, ( two sides o f the same coin), are equally unthinkable.
At BRITBREW , on the other hand, the union is able, and far more willing, to bargain 
discipline, within the context of a single incident and overall. Within the incident, it may 
(but docs not always) 'trade' on anything from the threat of industrial action to petty 
blackmail (such as the responsibility of members of management for performance errors, 
drunkenness and other misdemeanours29)- Overall, it may rely on its willingness to 
concede the guilt of its members in certain cases to trade for employer leniency in others. 
Because third parties are mostly irrelevant to discipline, more than a minimum of 
attention to proceduralism (to ensure a fair hearing of the issues) is unimportant and the 
substance of the discipline comes to the fore. In  this setting, it is impossible for the 
union to avoid making value judgments on the incidents provoking discipline thus its 
credibility to management is very important. Th is credibility can only be maintained by a 
process of give and take, by conceding guilt in order to later defend.
9. Concluding Remarks
The beginning of this chapter promised to test the proposition that Canadian 
Arbitration is a 'jewel in the crown' of industrial dispute resolution in that country and a 
major contributor to assuaging industrial conflict, especially as compared to Britain's 
Industrial Tribunals. Contemplation of theoretical debates on discipline helped provide a 
framework for the analysis. More than any superficial win/lose rate, deeper 
considerations of the quality of equity provided, of the legitimation of managerial control, 
of the obscuring of exploitation and of the importance of collective action are necessary to 
answer the question.
A comparison of Tribunals and Arbitration per se indicated a) that the superiority of 
the latter in protecting job security has more to do with its ability to effect reinstatement 
than its propensity to encroach on managerial prerogative to discipline, b) that, as 
compared to Tribunals, the credibility of Arbitration is enhanced by its power to 
reinstate, by its greater flexibility and procedural solicitude, and by its lesser reluctance
¿V. In a caía of drunkannai» by a union mambar. tha convanur mada tha company awara thaï tha union knaw of abuia 
by »orna manapar» of tha ‘»ampia callar'. In anolhar caaa, tha union »uipactad that a mambar of manapament 
»ai ra»pon»ibla for an arror laadinp to «ha lo»» of product m brawinp. Thasa bit» of knowladpa hava »orna 
valúa, thouph limitad, to mitígala «ha diaciplina of union mambar».
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to 'second guess' managerial decisions, c) that collective considerations have little more 
effect on Arbitration than on Tribunals, both of which individualise disputes, d) that in 
'second-guessing' managerial action, Arbitration threatens managerial prerogative little 
more than Tribunals but rather actually restrains, guides and teaches those employers 
sophisticated enough appreciate such assistance and e) that, in substituting its own 
discipline. Arbitration does not usurp, but rather collaborates in management's role.
Notwithstanding this, an investigation of the differential effect of third party 
adjudication in the two countries revealed its impact on unionised workplaces in Canada 
as far greater than in Britain. Because of its minimal relevance in Britain, workplace 
apparatuses take on a far more important role in dispute handling. Where the union has 
the requisite strength and confidence to breathe life into those apparatuses (and where 
management is strong enough to respond in kind), a transition to something like Henry's 
"accommodative-participative" mode of discipline handling results, offering a higher 
degree of collective action and participation and arguably at least an equal degree of 
substantive equity to that which is found in the Canadian workplace. What is more, in 
these circumstances, the apparatuses can a very effective in conflict-management. Where 
the union lacks the requisite strength and confidence, a vacuum results which Tribunals, 
A C AS Codes of Practice and considerations of "good industrial relations" can only 
partially nil.
In Canada, the efficacy of third party adjudication in handling industrial conflict can 
only ever be partial. For within the system itself lies not only a barrier to more collective 
forms of conflict management but the seeds of conflict itself.
CHAPTER Vili: STRUCTURING THE INTERNAL LABOUR 
MARKET
/. Introduction
The end of Chapter V I told of the shutdown of an anodising line in the finishing unit 
at BR ITM ET. The question was whether the workers on that line would be transferred en 
masse into the fabrication unitor whether some of them could use their seniority to 
'bump' junior employees on the remaining anodising line. The collective agreement, while 
briefly specifying seniority as one criterion to be used in promotions', says nothing about 
its use in the case of layoffs or transfers. The ensuing wrestling match was won by 
management and all of the employees, regardless of age or service, had to move to the 
more onerous fabrication work.
By contrast, on this and other questions of layoff, recall, promotion and transfer, the 
procedures outlined in Canadian collective agreements are usually clear and 
comprehensive. Thus, among the several pages devoted to these issues in both the 
C A N M ET  and CANBREW  booklets, provisions appear specifying : that manpower 
reductions in a department are by reverse order of seniority in that department; that in 
the first instance laid-off employees can bump those junior to them in the department; 
and, if this is not feasible (such as when an entire department shuts down), that laid off 
employees can bump junior employees in other departments.
It would seem then, that compared with the confusion, vexation and potential conflict 
in British plants in issues of this type, the Canadian solution is infinitely preferable and 
that, next to 'just cause' in discipline, the seniority provision is the second 'jewel in the 
crown' of North American dispute resolution. Indeed, Palmer says "few concepts are 
more important to the union movement" (1983 , p. 547 ), Gersuny and Kaufmann call it "a 
key facet in the moral economy" of North American unionised workers (1985 , p. 4 6 3 )  and 
Schatz is almost fulsome in calling it:
"•••the greatest accomplishment of the union movement of the IV.tO't end l*MO's. the 
achievement which justifiei it* claim to *tand bend* abolitiomam, civil right* and women'* right* a* 
on* of the great movement* for freedom and dignity in American hiatory* (IWU. p. IP! I.
I. BR IT M ET  it unuaual among unioniaed Brinati plant* in containing a ipecific clauae in the collective agreement on
the u*e of seniority BRITBREW 's agreement, for eiample, contain* no *uch clause. It should be remembered, 
however, that this i* ona of the clauses that B R ITM ET management does not regard a* legitimate and has 
'agreed to disagree' with the union on.
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Is the seniority principle really so great an achievement? Just as in the discussion of 
discipline, appearances can be deceiving. For it is not merely the seniority principle that 
must be explored to gain an appreciation of how conflict is generated and resolved in these 
matters in the two countries. A wider understanding of the joint regulation of the 
internal labour market must be considered in order to competently answer the question.
2. Theoretical Considerations
By now there is a fairly mature theoretical literature on the existence of segmented 
labour markets. The neoclassical notion of a homogeneous labour market in perfect 
competition, with little distinction between internal and external realms except for 
temporary disequilibrium, has been fundamentally shaken. While something like this 
market may operate among firms at the competitive end of the industrial structure, firms 
at the monopolistic end are characterised more or less permanently higher earnings, 
greater job security, as well as "hierarchical job ladders, limited ports of entry, 
inducements to stay on the job [and] job-specificity of skills" (Stone, 1973, p. 75). The 
sum total of these inducements constitutes the so-called "internal labour market" (i.I.m.). 
Many firms and especially unionised ones exhibit i.I.m. characteristics. Indeed, as 
detailed in Chapter II, all of our four plants have thriving internal labour markets.
Outside of neo-classical approaches, Rubery (1978) suggests, there are two main 
explanations for the development of i.I.m.'s.. "Dual labour market theories" (Docringer 
& Piore, 1971; Berger & Piore, 1980) stress the exigencies of technology and the need for 
job-specific skills in provoking appropriate employers to safeguard their investment in 
human capital. "Radical theories" (Stone, 1973; Edwards et al., 1975; Edwards, 1979; 
Gordon et al., 1982) reject the latter explanation as too directly contingent on exogenous 
forces and dispute the effect of technology. They stress the internal logic of capitalist 
control of the labour process and in particular 'divide and rule' strategies.
Rather than leading to a greater and more diverse skilling of the labour force, radical 
theorists suggest, new technology in the hands of oligopolistic employers led to a breaking 
down of skill differentiation, to homogenisation of labour (their argument either 
prefiguring or echoing Braverman, 1974). While this made for more efficient control of 
production, it threatened new problems of industrial conflict by bringing masses of 
undifferentiated workers together in a position to potentially unite against the employer.
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In response, employers contrived intricate systems of job differentiation and complicated 
mechanisms of advancement to divide workers from each other.
Perhaps the leading article on the historical development of job ladders and seniority 
is Stone's (1973) discussion of the US steel industry. She claims that by 1910, employers 
had eliminated the craft unions by a vigorous anti-union campaign and by employing new 
technology that
"diminished the skill requirement! for virtually all the jobs involved in making iteel, to that 
even the molt difficult jobt could be learned quickly. The gulf separating the skilled workers from 
the unskilled workers became virtually meaningless" (p. 45)
To combat problems of worker motivation, discipline and recombination into 
industrial unions, says Stone, employers developed wage incentive schemes, welfare 
policies and elaborate job ladders. Given the actual lack of differentiation, Stone 
contends, these ladders were mere sleight of hand, "a solution to the 'labor problem' 
rather than a necessary input for production itself.” (p. 49). Moreover, they were 
successful in turning worker against worker in cutthroat competition, in what Gordon 
(1972, p. 77) calls a "hierarchy fetishism”.
Stone claims that
"The issues of how work shall be organised, how jobs shall be defined and how workers shall 
be paid are points of conflict and clast struggle between workers and employers. The structures that 
emerge can only be understood in those terms,"
But in her attempt to show management purposiveness, she gives short shrift to the role of 
unions in developing this hierarchy.
While it is undeniable that seniority has been the key operative concept in 
the structuring o f the unionised North American internal labour market fo r  
more than fo rty  years. Stone submits that its consolidation by industrial unions in the 
late 1930's and onward acted merely to limit favouritism in the competition for jobs in 
the hierarchy while not seriously altering its nature. She concludes that seniority only
"helped to rationalize the system by taking it away from the discretion of the foreman and 
bating it on principles of fairness...
"The esistence of job ladders hat produced continual conflict among steelworkers, as it wat 
originally intended to do" Ip. ~'l, emphasis added)'
However, Stone gives no strong evidence of this "continual conflict" other than 
fleeting reference to how the seniority principle has worked against initiatives for 
positive action for women and blacks.
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Burawoy, in his study of a machine shop, does provide some plant-level evidence of 
competition among workers and goes so far as to contend that job ladders and the rules 
governing them "[foster] the same competitive individualism that has been normally 
associated with external labor market" (1979, p. 104). He too asserts that the elaborate 
structuring of the internal labour market works to assuage class conflict in the factory:
"Ju.t ai mobility militate» conflict in a hierarchical direction, it tend» to generate conflict 
in a lateral direction, both among operator» and between operator» and auxiliary worker«." (ibid., p.
105)
Yet Burawoy goes somewhat beyond a disturbing tendency among the radical theorists 
to treat the internal labour market as an out and out shell game fully thought out by 
management and directed at duping the workers. He admits that the workers are offered 
a wide array of real choices
"nor »hould theta choice» be belittled by »eying that one boring, meaninglen job u  much 
the »erne a» any other. The choice gain» it» »ignificance from the material power it give» to worker» 
in the attempt» to re»i»t or protect themielvei from managerial domination." (ibid., p. 107-H)
Schatz, in his study of the US electrical engineering industry (1983) also recognises 
the fundamental duality of the structuring of the internal labour market. Unlike Stone 
and the others, he does not deny that the achievement of joint regulation in this area was a 
great victory for trade unions. It well nigh destroyed "the foreman's empire" and gave 
unions and their members a tremendous boost of confidence, an unquantifiable but 
tangible foothold in the campaign to challenge managerial prerogative on the shop floor. 
Yet Schatz does admit there is a darker side:
"...that victory had it» prica, »ince »cmority rule» dampened worker» »olidarity at the »»me 
lima that thay fortified the worker»' pontion relative to management. In no area, indeed, were the 
achievement» and legacy of the union movement more contradictory and complicated." (I'M.), p. 105)
He gives actual evidence of Gordon's "hierarchy fetishism":
"Worker* quickly formed the habit of memoriimg not only the year and month but often the 
day and preciae hour a» well. Mo»t people would mentally file umilar information about their co- 
worker». When management waa reducing the nze of the work force, worker* would watch for 
opportunities to 'bump' le»> »amor people and thereby avoid being laid off." (ibid., p. IIH)
Yet Schatz too is sketchy on evidence of the degree of intensity of competition 
between workers and of the effect of such competition on overall industrial conflict. Like 
the other U S authors, he merely assumes a general reduction in industrial conflict 
emerging from the structuring of the internal labour market and takes for granted the 
radical conflictual potential of homogenised labour. Why, for instance, should conflict 
between workers inevitably reduce the amount of conflict between workers and bosses? Is
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conflict some sort of finite resource? While he, like Stone, shows how the seniority system 
served to ensconce the already existing racism by giving more job security to entrenched 
whites than to newly-hired blacks, this was precisely because of a historical contingency—  
the large post-war influx of black workers. There is no evidence that it was seniority 
itself that divided the workers or that the absence of seniority would have led to less 
racism. What is more, he admits that all workers, black or white, men or women, 
supported the seniority system for its obvious advantages (p. 131). In a country like 
Canada, in which seniority had the same importance but which did not have masses of 
black workers suddenly entering the industrial workforce, such 'divisive' effects were 
missing.
In contrast to Stone's stable steel industry, Schatz in his electrical industry study and 
Gersuny and Kaufmann (1985) in their study of the development of seniority systems in 
the US auto industry, indicate a somewhat more chaotic internal labour market prior to 
industrial unionisation. In fact, in most mass-production industries, while job ladders 
may have had origins in the first three decades of the century, i t  was only with the 
advent o f industrial unions and the development o f  professional personnel 
departments in the 30's and 40's that job ladders and seniority systems came into 
their own (Gordon et al., 1982; Kochan et al., 1986)). Thus, far from being a fait 
accompli by the time unionisation occurred, in these industries at least, the full flower of 
the internal labour market came about only by a process of struggle between management 
and labour. In Britain, the steel industry also had a steep hierarchy but the industry was 
not marked by the kind of internal divisiveness Stone talks about (Elbaum & Wilkinson,
1979; Hyman & Eiger, 1981). All of this calls into question both the generalisabiIity of 
Stone's steel model and perhaps her interpretation of the data.
In fact most radical theorists pay only lip service to class struggle while saving full 
deference for managerial purposiveness in pursuing control. While Gordon et al. (1982), 
do bring unions into the equation, they are merely passive participants. As Rubert says of 
their view:
"It  it the three! of worker resistance which determines which system of work organisation 
employers choose. Unions play no active part in the development and organisation of the work 
process. ’ (Rubery. IVH. p. 22)
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Gersuny, in fact, takes an opposite view of seniority to that of the radical theorists. 
Rather than dividing workers, he says, seniority
"tervei to buttress the bargaining power of unions by curbing competitive end aggressive 
behavior that pita one worker against another. Instead of fighting among themselves over scarce 
opportunities and currying favor with supervisors— behaviour which enhances employers' capacity to 
divide and rule— employees submit to a hierarchic principle based on institutional age...(This) 
reinforces the bargaining strength of unions, a strength that would vanish if the shop floor became 
the scene of cutthroat competition for preferment.'' II*W2, p. 51V)
Rubery, also, suggests that the structuring of the internal labour market can enhance 
the power of labour:
"...tha distance of a structured labour force, where jobs are strictly defined, and workers 
are not interchangeable, provides a bargaining base for labour against management's attempts to 
increase productivity and introduce new technology. Changes in job ladders, skill demarcations and 
the pace of work become areas for bargaining, whereas a homogeneous work force, interchangeable in 
function would lay itself open not only to competition from the oternal market but alto to further 
declines in workers' control of production and a continuous undermining of bargaining power.
Divisions by custom, rule and status are essential parts of any union's bargaining strategy. Reducing 
the differentiation between workers and developing job rotation may decrease the monotony of work, 
increase class cohetiveness, and create opportunities for workers to control the pace and method of 
work. However, unless they organise to seize these opportunities and to create a bargaining position 
based on this new organisation of work, the development of a more homogeneous work force may 
undermine the basis of workers' industrial organisation.'' <1978, pp. 29-30)
Thus the question of the effect of the structure and the structuringof internal labour 
markets on industrial conflict is not nearly as clear as the American theorists would have 
us believe.
Indeed, that may be one of the problems. The question has been a remarkably 
Americo-centric one. This is probably due to the obsession of U S observers with two 
fundamental questions which take on unusual prominence in that country. For the dual 
labour market theorists: why in an affluent advanced capitalist country have pockets of 
low wages persisted? For the radical theorists: why is the US working class so quiescent 
and why has it never been able to formulate a socialist agenda?
Strange as it may seem, little or no tempering of i.I.m. theory has been undertaken by 
comparing the North American situation to that in other countries. A look beyond the 
North American continent at methods of structuring the i.I.m. in Europe, for example, or 
more specifically Britain, might reveal whether suppositions about conflict and the 
internal labour market were valid and generalisable.
Even British scholars such as Rubery (1978) and Fine (1987) who criticise the 
segmented labour market theorists fail to explore the differences between the two 
countries but rather take the American theories at face value. Jacoby acerbically calls
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these theories "ex post facto rationalizations of postwar American [industrial relations] 
practices" (1985, p. 19) that do not explain "why internal labor markets have always 
existed, if they are so efficient, or why their features are so different in other industrial 
nations" (ibid., p. 9).
The rest of the chapter attempts to fill in some of the glaring gaps in this discussion by 
exploring how quite different apparatuses operate to structure the internal labour 
market in Canada and Britain and considering how they work to generate or resolve 
conflict both among workers and between workers and employers.
For this purpose, the structuring of the internal labour market may be divided into 
three key areas of struggle: a) struggles over the integrity of the i.I.m.; b) struggles over 
exit from the i.I.m. and c) struggles over movement within the i.I.m.. The first two are 
struggles over what Atkinson calls "numerical flexibility"; the last is over what he calls 
"functional flexibility" (1984, p. 28), though as will be seen, sometimes they interlink.
3. Struggles Over the Integrity o f  the Internal Labour Market
For our purposes the cohort of blue-collar employees enjoying the benefits of the 
internal labour market enumerated above will be called the core. While employers and 
unions in i.l.m.'s have allegiance to the i.I.m. in general for the benefits of loyalty, 
stability and predictability it delivers, there are still powerful forces eroding its integrity. 
Employers attempt to gain as much numerical flexibility as possible at its edges both to 
buffer core employees from employment contractions and to have at least part of the 
workforce more malleable and susceptible to arbitrary allocation to jobs and tasks 
(functional flexibility) than the core. Opinions may differ as to how widespread, 
systematised or strategic the drive for flexibility is (Pollert, 1987) but few can dispute 
that the impetus exists.
The union's attitude to this erosion is paradoxical as well it might be. On the one 
hand, union power depends upon the strength, size and degree of integrity of the i.I.m.. So 
it fights to expand or maintain the strength, size and degree of integrity of the i.I.m.. On 
the other hand, the provision of a buffer around the edges of the core, while threatening 
the integrity of the i.I.m., can at the same time safeguard integrity of the core. Core 
workers enjoy their security and perquisites not only because of the secondary labour 
market outside the firm but also that within it. For every temporary or part time worker
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employed by the firm, the job security of the employed core worker is increased but the 
absolute sizeof the core is reduced. This dynamic tension is a permanent characteristic 
of internal labour markets and is a major source of both collusion and conflict between 
unions and employers.
The employer has several tools to gain numerical flexibility. One is the use of non- 
blue-collar employees of the firm to do work of the blue-collar core. Such non-blue- 
collar workers may come from core management (eg. foremen) or from core 
clerical/professional (eg. engineers, work study men). This option is only selectively used 
as such labour is usually more expensive than the blue-collar core. The second and more 
important tool is the construction of a peripheral labour market within the 
employer's purview (the 'periphery') consisting of workers to whom some or all of the
i.l.m. perquisites do not apply. The periphery may consist of non-permanent (temporary, 
part-time and casual) employees of the employer or they may be employees of another, 
contracted employer. The contract workers may do work on site ("contracted-in") or off 
site ("contracted out").
3.1 The Canadian Plants
The key concept in the integrity of the i.l.m. in the unionised Canadian workplace is 
that of bargaining unit.
"Th ii jurisdiction...forms th« basis for the union's power and circumscribes the area where 
the collective agreement operates. Consequently, its preservation and. indeed, extension, is of 
extreme importance to the relevant union’ (Palmer, l*JM, p. 42VI
In manufacturing plants, labour relations boards generally certify unions as sole and 
exclusive bargaining agents for blue collar bargaining units with descriptions quite 
similar to that at CANMET:
"all hourly-paid employees of the Company at (the address of the workplacel. save and 
except watchmen, guards, ...summer students, office staff, foremen and thoae above the rank of
This bargaining unit description is then transposed into the collective agreement as the 
so-called 'scope' clause and thereby binds the parties2- In defining what jobs properly lie
i. The partiea are free, by mutual agreement, to alter the bargaining unit description after certification to comprise a 
different 'negotiating unit', but this is seldom done.
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within scope, arbitrators may also examine classifications, schedules and, to a limited 
extent3, past practice (Palmer, 1983, p. 4 3 1).
While the union has jurisdiction over employees in the bargaining unit, the scope 
clause is not meant to imply any proprietary rights in those jobs by core employees. 
Temporary, part-time and casual employees, though performing the same work as core 
employees, are not included in bargaining units by labour relations boards4 and 
accordingly seldom appear in collective agreement scope clauses unless the union is quite 
powerful and these employees form an important part of the workforce. Thus the union 
usually has no jurisdiction over them. Where such employees are included (such as at 
CANBREW ), their rights and privileges vis a vis core employees are usually drastically 
curtailed.
Even a determination that a task falls clearly within the type of work normally 
performed in the bargaining unit does not imply job ownership:
"To the contrary, in the absence of specific language in the collective agreement providing 
otherwise, it it now universally accepted that bargaining unit work may be subcontracted to non- 
employees. provided that the subcontracting is genuine and not done in bad faith." (Brown k  Beatty.
IWM. p. 215-6»
Arbitrators (and sometimes labour relations boards, where they retain some 
jurisdiction in these matters) may occasionally disallow the subcontracting of tasks from 
the bargaining unit where the new workers are really still employees of the primary 
employer or are under its effective control5, especially in cases of contracting-in. 
However, aside from these rare instances, and especially where the contracting out is ’’for 
sound business reasons...
"...subcontracting will be upheld even to the estent of wholly displacing the bargaining unit, 
in the absence of specific language in the agreement to the contrary. Indeed, even where the 
agreement espressly limits the ability of an employer to contract out. this may not apply to 
emergency situations where bargaining-unit employees are unavailable to do the work." (ibid., p. 2IH>
3. See Chapter V  for the strict limitations on  the use of past practice in arbitral jurisprudence.
4. While the labour relations board in the province housing our Canadian planu and moat other provinces do not
• include temporary, part-time and caaual employees n primary bargaining units, this practice is not common 
to all provinces. A few allow part-time employees into the bargaining unit.
5. See Re. C ity  o f  Ktlownt 25 LA.C. (2d> 344 (Larson. IWHM and R t Ktnntdy Lodge N urung Horn« end Service
Em ploy»«*' Union, Local 204 Ontario  Labour Relations Board Reports, (date unknown!
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So contentious is the issue of contracting and so 'settled' this area of arbitral 
jurisprudence, that unions seeking adjustment here will find little sympathy from 
arbitrators. As a leading case says:
"The wide notoriety (iven to labour'* protests aaaimt this practice, the almost equally wide 
notoriety, especially amongst »penanced labour and management representatives, or the 
overwhelming trend of (arbitration) decisions, must mean that there-was known to (employer and 
union) at the time they negotiated the collective agreement the strong probability that an arbitrator 
would not find any implicit limitation on management's right to contract out"6.
Yet despite this arbitral promotion joint regulation, the use of peripheral workers is 
one of the areas in which Canadian employers most obsessively pursue unilateral 
regulation7. Thus unless the union is able to foresee future problems of subcontracting, 
convince its members that the issue is crucial, overcome vigorous employer resistance at 
the bargaining table and succeed in negotiating a restriction that suitably covers the 
contingencies, it will be entirely helpless to prevent contracting out once the collective 
agreement is signed8*
It is worthwhile looking briefly at the struggle over i.l.m. integrity at CANBREW.
For while the collective agreement contains more than average restriction on managerial 
prerogative in this area, there is also more than the average erosion at the edges of the
Peripheral Employees o f  the Firm. As mentioned in Chapter II, the periphery used by 
this employer is extensive, in fact distinctively similar to the famed Japanese model (Dore, 
1973, p. 38). Between 15 and 50%  of the work force (depending on the season and level 
of demand) is made up of temporary workers, mostly in the packaging and staging areas. 
While there is no legal obligation for the employer to include them in the bargaining unit, 
the union has succeeded in negotiating them in thereby gaining some control over their *1
6. K *  R u t u l i f t l  17 LA.C. 25.) at 256. (Arthurs. 1966».
1• Of Canadian collactiva agreements covering over SOU employees, more than half have no restriction on contractmg- 
out (Kumar at al., 1986, p. W4). In the entire population of collectiva agreements, the proportion would 
doubtless be far less.
H. A leading case on contracting out/in is R* Kennedy tod»« Nurting Home 28 L.A.C. (2d> J88 (Brunner, 19801. The 
union's presentation was on* of the most sophisticated ever made on the question, applying, among other 
arguments, the issues of 'fairness' and 'estoppel'. It argued that by not informing the union at espiry 
negotiations of tha intention to contract part of it* operation, the employer had breached iU  obligation of 
good faith and led the union out on a limb which was later cut off. Had the union been informed of the 
employer's intention before negotiations, it could have used whatever industrial muscle it had to legally resist 
the move. Caught by surprise in mid-agreement, it had no such legal opportunity. Despite these appealing 
arguments, the arbitrator dismissed tha grievance. This case is yet another demonstration of the severe 
limitations of arbitration in adiustmant and as a substitute for the right to strike.
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terms and conditions and does receive checked-off dues for them. But this has been 
achieved at the cost of institutionalising their use, enshrining their second-class status 
and agreeing that they
"•hall have no rights, benefit! or access to the grievancc/arbitration provisions under the 
Collective Agreement escept where specifically stated*.
Hired for periods of no longer than 132 days, they are paid just over half the rate of 
permanent employees, receive no benefits other than specified in employment standards 
legislation and cannot bid on overtime unless core workers have refused. While the 'best' 
may at the end of this period be taken on as probationary and then as permanent 
employees, no more than about 5%  have made the transition. They can be and are 
dismissed for offences which might warrant a verbal or written warning to core 
employees. Compared to the care that must be exercised in successfully disciplining core 
employees (see the previous chapter), supervisors are able to exercise a great amount of 
power over them. Given their precarious position, these workers tend to be docile and 
considerably more productive in low-skill jobs than core employees9' Another peripheral 
group are probationary employees (the period is 90 days) who have access to grievance 
and arbitration f o r  dismissal and non-payment o f wages only and to whose dismissal 
the 'just cause' test does not apply10*
The union's attitude toward periphery workers is highly ambivalent. On the one 
hand, union officials admit that they act as a buffer against layoff of core workers and the 
union plays an active part in negotiating their relative disadvantage. On the other hand 
union officials are uneasy collaborating in the "exploitation" of this group while collecting 
its dues. They cannot avoid the profound suspicion that as the periphery grows, the core 
shrinks. Through a combination of good luck and good management, CANBREW  has built 
up the periphery as the capacity of the plant grew. Thus the worst fears of an absolute
V. At on« of CANBREW 's sister plants, union and management. in response to union worries about lb« erosion of the 
bargaining unit, had devised the concept of 'super temp' 1«. temporary employees with better wages than 
ordinary temps, some benefits, some rights to grieve, preferred status for permanent openings. Th is is an 
«sample of the internal labour market becoming even more segmented, with the institutionalisation of several 
'classes' of worker.
10. The relevant letter of agreement clause reads: ’On a discharge case, the standard cause for arbitral review of the 
Company has acted (sic) in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner or in bad faith. It is agreed that the usual 
'just cause' test shall not apply*.
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decline in the core have not been realised. Yet in proportional terms the core has 
decreased and continues to decrease.
There is also a legitimate fear that the more temps that management can direct at will 
and the more flexibility this allows, the more it erodes bargained rights and union's 
potential power to resist or regulate changes. This is especially salient in work areas with 
high levels of periphery staffing. Complaints about working conditions can only be aired 
as grievances. But peripheral workers cannot formally file grievances and it is 
questionable whether the union could successfully pursue a "policy" grievance on their 
behalf to arbitration. A particularly apt example of this awkwardness occurred when a 
group of temporary workers felt aggrieved over an abrupt shift change. They submitted a 
formal grievance but each deliberately garbled his signature to avoid reprisal. The 
convenor, impatient with their diffidence, withdrew the grievance after the first step.
Theories that anticipate only rivalry and disharmony between workers divided by
i.I.m. structures are far too simplistic. Because peripheral workers work alongside core 
workers, friendships and solidarity inevitably evolve. Several years previous to the study, 
CANBREW  workers held (yet another ultimately unsuccessful) wildcat strike to protest 
the sacking of a peripheral worker they felt had been unfairly evaluated precisely because 
of the lack of access to the grievance procedure. This illustrates that human boundaries 
between the core and periphery are much harder to draw than institutional boundaries 
and that far from reading off labour quiescence from worker division, increased conflict 
can be a result. When core workers work alongside peripheral workers, bonds and 
allegiances inevitably form. While there will be discrimination, there will also be 
commiseration. A personnel manager admits that "the downside of having so many temps 
is lower morale among union employees".
Contracting In/Out. Unlike most Canadian collective agreements, that at CANBREW  
contains some restriction on the contracting of work, but only in the transportation unit:
Tha Company agrees nol to u h  outside truck* for any delivery which i* normally made by the 
Company'* truck* and while an employee on the *emority liat (who it qualified to drivel it on lay-off.
But a look behind this clause reveals that the employer regularly contracts out at least 
20% of its transportation requirements to common carriers. Says a transportation 
manager: "We size our fleet to the lowest period and the rest goes to outside firms". The 
key in circumventing the spirit but not the letter of this clause is the preservation of the
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status quo ie. not allowing the layoff of a driver to result directly in contracting out. Here 
is another example of expanding capacity and the status quo working in favour of the 
employer.
As might be expected, contracting out and in is quite common for work claimed by 
both equipment and vehicle mechanics. This is especially true with specialist repair and 
capital projects. A common employer practice was to allow employees to assist in the 
performance of contracted-in work. Yet when the union claimed 'ownership' of this work, 
as seen in Chapter V, the employer put the union on notice that it intended to 'claw back' 
the privilege and henceforth distribute it at discretion.
Thus even the relatively powerful union at CANBREW  is highly constrained in its 
ability to resist the erosion of the integrity of its bargaining unit. To a limited extent, the 
vigour of its resistance is tempered by acknowledgement of the advantages of the 
periphery. Yet there is little or no evidence that these advantages are instrumental in 
permanently reducing conflict.
Though there is little use of peripheral workers at CANMET, several incidents bear 
attention. The Company contracted-in a janitor, not under its direct control, to clean 
toilets on weekends. Discovering this, the convenor became angry, threatened the janitor 
and raised a fuss with the employer. While an arbitrator would have upheld the 
company's prerogative here, the company acquiesced and agreed to use one of its own 
employees in the future. In another case, the Company employed a truck driver under its 
direct control but purposely and blatantly neglected to include him in the bargaining unit 
where he properly belonged (ie. did not deduct union dues for him and did not feel bound 
by the collective agreement in regard to his conditions of employment). Arbitral 
jurisprudence indicates the union could have successfully grieved this affront because 
the action was in bad faith and served no discernable legitimate business purpose. Yet at 
the time of the study, the union had not come around to filing a grievance. This is yet 
another example of the phenomenon stressed earlier about the Canadian system ie. a 
certain amount of protection is institutionally available and need not be created by the 
union; but the union must have a degree of vigilance, initiative and self-discipline to claim 
that protection. The CAN M ET  union is neither systematic nor consistent nor predictable 
in claiming those rights available to protect the integrity of its bargaining unit. If
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confronted with an affront, it may explode in response. Yet it may allow a more serious 
and combatable affront to go unchallenged.
3.2 The British Plants
Unlike Canada, no agency external to the parties either delimits the borders of the 
core blue-collar work force or purports to regulate the degree of their erosion. Nor do 
collective agreements offer much guidance. Much of the regulation is left to the day-to- 
day commerce between the parties. Thus the union need not commit itself in principle to 
the use of peripheral workers in order to achieve some say in their use but rather retains 
the ability to react on a contingent basis. This means that the employer at one and the 
same time has more potential freedom but must be more circumspect in its introduction 
and use of such workers.
Other than a strong union general commitment against it, the use of peripheral 
workers at BR ITBREW  is not extensive for two reasons. The first involves unskilled or 
semi-skilled departments such as transportation and staging where the use of temporary 
workers might provide flexibility. These work groups are strongly solidaristic and would 
resist the use of peripheral workers in any case. But a large proportion of earnings in 
these areas is based on payment by results and in order to optimise p.b.r. earnings, it is in 
the interests of these groups to help the employer adjust the labour force quickly to 
changes in external demand. If demand goes down temporarily, the employer carries 
unneeded core employees. If demand goes down permanently, these employees and the 
union will help in labour shedding (to be discussed presently below under 'exit from the
i.I.m) so that p.b.r. earnings are not diluted. If demand goes up temporarily, the workers 
will simply work more hours and make more bonus. If demand goes up permanently, the 
workers and the union will cooperate in taking up labour (because earnings are so good, 
there is an internal waiting list) so that p.b.r. earnings are spread to a greater group 
without dilution. Manning and effort bargaining will be dealt with more thoroughly in 
the next chapter but they are important here for the following reason: Because there is so 
much to gain (and so much to lose), it is the workers and the union themselves who act, 
through a continual round of negotiation, to provide all the numerical flexibility the 
employer needs to cope.
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The second reason involves high skill departments such as maintenance, where 
contracting-out might provide added flexibility. Here p.b.r. earnings are not so 
important because 'results' are harder to quantify. Management deliberately overmans 
this group, giving it some flexibility to respond to emergencies. Yet these workers have 
resisted much of what contracting occurs, especially when they are not consulted. 
Sometimes they will *black' the machinery constructed or repaired by the contractors. In 
serious cases, they may down tools until the contractors leave the site. In response to such 
actions, a joint agreement has been drawn up whereby the company agrees to inform the 
union of the contractors it proposes to use and the union is able to agree or disagree. 
While this process does not always result in agreement, it does reduce conflict. What is 
more, the activities of the engineers invite some resentment from other workers. This 
resentment is summarised by the convenor who is not hesitant to suggest that the 
engineers
"ar* their own wont enemies. Thay have no right to complain...They're among the best paid 
in the plant (thouah not as high as draymen or stating workers)...They've been successful at resisting 
the reductions the company would like to make and are now topheavy compared to most other 
breweries. But they alto refuse to cooperate in innovation so they're almost inviting contracting in’
Thus, rather than promote internal solidarity, the ability of some work groups to 
wage sectional struggles can promote a certain amount of disunity.
The use of peripheral workers is more extensive at BR ITM ET, where up to 16% of 
the work force can be classified as 'temporary'. Yet these employees are not nearly as 
segregated and disadvantaged vis a vis the core as those at CANBREW . They receive 9 0%  
of the pay of the lowest permanent classification. While the BR ITM ET  union is not 
aggressive in fighting discipline at the best of times, there is no outright impediment to 
access to procedure for these workers as in Canada. Where once these employees retained 
temporary status for 18 months, the union has managed to reduce this to I 2 months and 
finally 9 months, whereupon they advance to permanent salary and admission to the sick 
leave plan. After I 2 months, they are admitted to the pension plan. What is more 
important, however, is that all of them, almost without exception, have been taken on as 
permanent employees. Perhaps more efficacious in permitting numerical flexibility, 
however, is the tremendous amount of overtime worked by core employees.
3.3 Summary
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In struggles over the integrity of the i.I.m., a greater use of peripheral workers, a 
greater intensity of differentiation between classes of workers and a greater institutional 
leeway for employers to so differentiate has been observed in Canada. Yet this 
institutional division does not necessarily result in a corresponding degree of interest 
differentiation among workers. In Britain, on the other hand, some workers may be 
divided from others by the very intensity of their efforts to maintain their own sectional 
internal labour market. And unlike their Canadian counterparts, strong work groups 
have powerful tools to resist the erosion of the internal labour market where they wish to 
do so. But unlike Atkinson's (1984) simple model of numerical flexibility invariably 
undermining the power of core workers, it has been seen at CANBREW  in many instances 
that not only is numerical flexibility negotiated but often works in the interests of these 
core groups. While it is important conceptually to consider internal labour market 
questions separately, in the British workplace, these can only be fully understood in the 
context of wider shop floor politics.
While it is difficult to predict resulting levels of management-labour conflict, it 
cannot be read off that Canadian workers are any more acquiescent toward employers 
than British workers on this issue. Moreover, there is evidence of greater diversionary 
intra-union conflict in Britain which may act to dampen collective conflict in the very way 
predicted by the radical theorists.
4. Struggles Over Exit from  the Internal Labour Market
In achieving numerical flexibility, the other side of the coin to expanding the 
periphery is contracting the core. If the employer is fortunate enough to be doing this 
over a long enough time period, or while expanding capacity (as CANBREW  has been), 
then redeployment within the workplace11 or attrition, ie. reduction by ordinary ex it, can 
suffice without the necessity of more provocative measures. Often, however, the 
employer is not so lucky and core employees must be selected for extraordinary exit.
Extraordinary exit can be subdivided by its permanence: short-term and 
indeterminate exit, which can be called 'layoff; permanent exit which can be called
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'redundancy'12. A further subdivision can be made by size into 'mass exit' (where a large 
proportion of the workforce is involved) and 'limited exit' (where small groups of workers 
are involved).
Extraordinary exit inevitably involves the picking of 'losers' and 'winners' and as such 
is one of the most contentious and 'political' of union-management issues. Layoffs and 
redundancies in both Canada and Britain have resulted in strikes and plant occupations 
(Hardy, 1985; Grayson, 1985; White, 1987). Unlike struggles over the integrity of the
i.I.m., the consequences here for the union can be starker and less ambiguous. These are 
not marginal adjustments but intensely human dramas and those selected to leave may 
well respond with despair, anger and resentment. Those not selected may feel relief and 
complacency, but often also have strong feelings of solidarity with the unfortunate ones, 
of "there but for the grace of God...", and about the legitimacy of industrial action. For 
these reasons, it is not prudent for employers, whether unionised or not, to regulate 
extraordinary exit unilaterally or arbitrarily13. It is thus one of the issues most disposed 
to joint and systematic regulation.
Given the contentiousness of the issue, our test of joint regulation and the political 
apparatuses employed will be the extent to which they 'depoliticise' the issue of 
extraordinary exit, either by defusing conflict itself or channeling it away from the 
labour-management interface.
4.1 The Canadian Plants
Theconflictual potential of this issue in Canada is underlined in reviews of 
arbitral jurisprudence:
"Aside from discharge, no concept in collective bargaining he« a more emotional 
connotation than lay-off. To earlier generations it brought viaiona of the dole. To preaent day 
worker«, especially those in their later year«, the possibility of no further aamful, worthwhile 
employment must be in the back of their minds.“ (Palmer, I9H3, p. 55MI
By far the most common method of dealing with extraordinary exit in Canada is 
seniority. Literally, the rule is 'last in, first out’. At first glance, it is simple, providing 
two paramount virtues— equity and predictablity. 'Bumping' is the practice to seniority's 
theory. Jobs, not employees, are what the employer eliminates (for otherwise the
12. These terms ara an amalgam of the colloquial terms actually used in the two countries.
Id. For this reason, the Employment Protection Act, S. 99, W 5  obliges companies to consult with whatever trade 
unions represent their employees, no matter what level of collective bargaining eaists.
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dismissal would be disciplinary). So though the job of a senior person may be eliminated 
or claimed by someone more senior, he merely 'bumps' an employee with less seniority in 
order to retain employment.
But the seniority rule is never that simple14» It is nearly always tempered by the need 
of the employer for minimum disruption to its operation. This requirement is met by 
collective agreements in several ways: First, they specify in some way that qualifications 
of the remaining workforce are adequate to the tasks at hand. Second, they restrict the 
application of seniority in the first instance to the department and only later to the plant 
as a whole. Third, they limit the number of bumping iterations allowable. Most struggles 
over exit from the i.I.m. arise here, from the tension between the principle of seniority 
and the practicality of managerial efficiency.
The question of seniority versus qualifications is the major battleground, both here 
and in promotion. Having made the exception in the last chapter, we return to the rule: 
simply said, the scope of arbitral review of managerial prerogative is exceedingly small.
"...it has been generally accepted that the standard of arbitral review of any managerial 
decision which includes an assessment of the abilities of various employees is less rigorous than in 
the case of disciplinary decisions effected by the employer. On this understanding, it has been said 
that unless there is evidence of discrimination, bad faith, las for esample, bias in a selection 
committee) or the employer exercised its judgment unreasonably, arbitrators should be loath to 
interfere with management's decision." (Brown & Beatty. IVH4. p. 2*#0
Yet, remembering that the onus in seniority cases is on the union, even proving bad 
faith is not easy:
"To sustain a challenge that the employer's decision was arbitrary or discriminatory, 
however, is likely to prove much more difficult. In such circumstances, the employee is generally 
required to prove either that the employer did not apply its standards consistently, that it made 
unfair or injurious distinctions, that it showed an unjustified favouritism to one employee, or that it 
had exhibited an undue prejudice against the grievor" (ibid., p. 306)
When C AN M ET  laid off almost 100 employees in the economic slump of 1982, a 
large (in the context of this plant) flurry of grievances claiming ''layoff out of seniority" 
resulted. With characteristic diffidence, the union took only one of them to arbitration as 
a sort of test case. It is a good example of the limitations the union can face in translating 
the principle of seniority into the actuality pf job preservation.
The collective agreement provides that:
14. Of Canadian collective agreements covering 34KI employees or more, only 17.6ft have lay off clauses specifying
seniority as the only criterion (Kumar at al., 1*166. p. .W5>. In the entire population of collective agreements, 
the proportion would doubtless be far less.
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...whenever a decrease in the working force becomes necessary...an employee who has acquired 
seniority ahall exercise his displacement rights (by first displacing junior employees in his 
department and then)...displacing! a more junior employee on the Plant-wide seniority list...whose 
job he is qualified to perform’
It also contains a provision common to most collective agreements, that seniority applies 
only:
...where skill, knowledge, ability and physical fitness are relatively e<(ual.
The grievor was laid off along with 14 other employees and claimed that there were at 
least four employees with less seniority still working whose jobs he could perform. All of 
these employees were in labour grades higher than his own. Of three jobs, the grievor 
could perform at least some aspects. Of a fourth, he could perform all aspects if the job 
content were arranged in a particular way.
While the arbitrator rejected the company's argument that no employee could 'bump 
up' to a higher rated position, he ruled a) that in order to be "qualified", the grievor would 
have to prove a level of performance in the job 'relatively equal' to the incumbents, which 
he could not, b) that the agreement did not require the employer to train a senior 
employee to displace a junior employee (the Company had claimed, to union incredulity, 
that training could take from six weeks to three months, depending on the job) and c) that 
the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to "second guess" the company's organisation of 
production:
"...tha Company it not requirad to raarranga the job contant of any aatablixhad position xo 
as to provida work for a sanior employee''
The grievance was dismissed.
Upon receiving the award, the company's lawyer evaluated the case in a letter to the 
personnel manager. Like several internal communications viewed earlier, his 
interpretation is perhaps even more interesting than the award itself in that it indicates 
how management's thinking would come to be conditioned on the issue:
"...thsrafora it is not only nacasaary that a candidata ba 'qualified' to do a givan job; it is 
also nacessary that a candidata ba 'ralativaly equal' to the incumbent in the job ha seeks to fill, I 
would expect that that would vary seldom, i f  aver 6a the case.
“...I hope this award clarifies your lay-off procedure and gives you tha flexibility you 
need in fu ture  umiler situations’ (amphaaia added)
That the lawyer was confident of the unlikelihood of a grievor meeting the test says 
volumes about how collective agreements really work. Although it may not necessarily 
have been the best test case, the message to the workers and the union was clear: "don't
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bother using arbitration to fight layoff out of seniority". With the award issued more than 
four months after the layoff, the workers involved were, in any case, long gone15- In fact, 
although layoffs continued, no further arbitrations were attempted. Is this a sign that the 
issue was resolved and workers were satisfied with the result? Not likely. Layoff without 
compensation and in the middle of a recession is a painful thing. At its best, seniority 
merely apportions the pain and (more importantly) is seen to apportion the pain fairly. 
When the expectation and the appearance of fairness is shattered by the exigencies of 
management interests, then the pain and humiliation may well be more acute, not only to 
the one leaving (who may be recalled to bring his sense of injury back16 17) but to those left 
and the union that represents them as well.
There is no evidence that this employer made any attempt to deliberately flout 
seniority or ignore relevant data on employee qualifications in these or other layoffs.
Had it demonstrably done so, an arbitrator would have corrected the error (if the union 
were vigilant enough to pursue the case). In general employees are selected for exit in 
reverse order of service. But whenever there is any clash between seniority and 
'legitimate' business interests, the latter automatically prevails. This can and often does 
so seriously disrupt the exercise of seniority that, especially to the individuals concerned, 
it is rendered meaningless.
Two interconnected questions inevitably arise: is the 'legitimacy* of business interests 
an absolute or a relative concept; and what does the employer owe the senior employee?
In answer to the first, while 'legitimacy' is clearly a relative concept in normal parlance, 
and also within British industrial relations (Armstrong et al., 198 1, pp. 167-8n>. it 
becomes an absolute concept when attached to the words 'business interest' in Canadian 
arbitral consideration. By definition, 'illegitimate' business interest is synonymous with
15. Thu  arbitration was quick by uaual atandardi. Goldblatt (IV74I indicate» a median wait from grievance to award of
¿00 to ¿¿4 day» in non-disciplinary arbitration».
16. In fact, »ince »emority doe» not accumulate during a layoff. tho»e employee» who were recalled have nurted
reaentinent over thi» i»»ue for year». According to the convenor, the i»»ue of their lo»t »emority i» raited at 
every »et of Intereit* negotiation». Of Canadian collective agreement» covering SIN) employee» or more, ¿K.6% 
do not ipecify the accumulation of »eniority during layoff tKumar et al., IVH6, p. ,W5I.
17. "...the »ubject matter of induitrial relation* conventionally begin» only when ...generalised management preaaure
encounter» resilience from the worker» mediated by their tense of legitimacy. On i»»ue» within the latter 
zone, and to the eitent that power is articulated through the available legitimising resources, there normally 
eaiata something approaching a balance of power” (Armstrong et al., I*MI, p. IMM
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arbitrariness, discrimination and bad faith, in other words nobusiness interest at all. 
Practically then, the employer must show only that its interest is related to production 
and not related to getting rid of the employee out of seniority order. The point is proven 
by the answer to the second question. In terms of order of layoff, the employer owes the 
senior employee nothing that would in any way discomfit its production process. It is 
evident from the arbitral jurisprudence (Palmer, 1983, p. 5 16 -5 18) that barring explicit 
language in the collective agreement on compulsory training periods (and these are rare), 
the employer is under no obligation to offer the employee training in a new job. It is also 
evident from the above C A N M ET  case that the employer is under no obligation to alter its 
work process one iota to accommodate the senior employee, even if such alteration would 
have no discernable effect upon productivity or profitability. Any attempt to use a 
grievance on job allocation as a back door into job control is thus blocked. As will be seen 
in the British plants, managerial discomfiture is not in itself a bar to issue settlement in 
that country.
When the North American seniority system works well, it is under conditions of 
expanding industrial capacity, where extraordinary exit is limited to short-term layoffs as 
firms retool or make marginal changes in manpower. Junior employees are young enough 
to find other jobs and may well be recalled in any case when production picks up. But 
when expansion slows, job hierarchies rigidify and it becomes more difficult for new 
employees to find a foothold to avoid being bumped (see also Herding, 1972, pp. 24-28). 
On the other hand, the more seniority is restricted to separate departments and the more 
bumping iterations are limited in number, then the more employees with accumulated 
seniority may find themselves at risk as in the C A N M E T  case described above. To be 
sure, the most senior employees (over 30 years seniority) are reasonably well protected in 
the Canadian system, short of total closure. Not only do they have a great deal of 
seniority. In most cases, they also have a vast reservoir of skills that would render them 
able to pass most tests of qualifications. But as exit becomes more widespread and the 
younger group disappears, it is the group just below them (with 10  to 25 years' 
seniority) that is particularly imperilled as they start to be bumped by older workers and 
as their age and enterprise-specific skills render them unattractive for employment 
outside the i.I.m..
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Statutory protections across Canada against job loss for senior workers are meagre, 
providing only compulsory periods (to a maximum of 16 weeks in mass exit and much less 
in individual layoff) of notice of termination (Kumar etal., 1986, p. 2 60 -61). Provided 
the employer gives such notice, no payments are required. Extra-statutory redundancy 
payments are usually non-existent or niggardly"4 (ibid., p. 389 -91). Some company 
pension plans make provision for early retirement but most of these impose swingeing 
reductions in benefits. CANM ET, for example, though part of a large transnational 
company, is little different than other employers in its industry in offering no 
supplementary unemployment benefits, redundancy payments or special early retirement 
schemes.
Only the very wealthiest employers with strong unions, such as automobile 
manufacturers, offer such perquisites. Breweries are among these. For redundant 
workers over 60 only, CANBREW  has an early retirement scheme which pays up to about 
I /3 of the employee's earnings per year (depending upon years of service) until retirement 
age. For redundant workers under 60, a one-time lump sum payment from the 
guaranteed wage scheme of up to about 3/4 of one year's pay is available. These are 
excellent benefits by Canadian standards. But compared to similar payments at the 
British brewery (where lump sums can amount to 2 1/2 times a year's pay in addition to 
monthly payments), they are ungenerous. Even the British aluminium plant offers better 
redundancy payments than the Canadian brewery14!
But regardless of the level of payments offered, voluntary redundancy of older 
CANBREW  workers or older workers in any Canadian workplace is simply not part of the 
culture of structuring the internal labour market. And because the inverse seniority 
provisions of the collective agreement are so powerful, older workers cannot be forced to 
leave.
This has created a major industrial relations problem at CANBREW , what might be 
called 'the middle-age squeeze'. Because of the lack of growth in the product market and
IK. Of Canadian collective agreements covering SOU or more employees in 1066, only about half had severance payment 
schemes for layoff. Only H.2% offered two weeks or more per year of service (Kumar at si.. 1086, p. .WO). In 
the entire population of collective agreements, the proportion would doubtless be far lass.
10. Where CANBREW does escel most is in paying supplementary benefits to employees on ih o rt-ltrm  layoff.
Employees with 16 or mora years' service will receive up to "H weeks pay at about 70H of normal earnings.
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the existence of the peripheral work force20, few young workers enter the CANBREW  
core (only about 11 %  are under 35 years of age). Thus the median worker age is rising. 
But because it is a relatively new plant, there are few workers over 55 ( I 1 %). The vast 
majority (78%) are between 35 and 55 years of age with about 60%  between 40 and 55. 
The threat to employment presented by further reduction in demand for beer and the 
possible introduction of cans has this middle-aged group extremely worried. Even if all 
workers over 55 took early retirement, the middle-age group would be squeezed, but the 
voluntary redundancy of older workers would relieve at least some of the pressure.
On top of any other problems mentioned in earlier chapters about the reasons for 
militancy among CANBREW  workers, the middle-age squeeze cannot be avoided as a 
prime factor in industrial conflict in this plant. This large group of disaffected workers 
was one of the main reasons that CANBREW  workers were practically the only ones in 
the expiry negotiations most recent to the study to reject a revolutionary (by Canadian 
standards) "technological change" clause.
This clause provides that in any technological change occasioning ten or more 
redundancies, the company will give the union 60 day's notice of the consequences in 
manpower and proceed to:
...canvass [eligible) employees ...*» to their willingness to elect special early retirement...and if they 
choose to take early retirement...(they) will receive a Technological Change Bonus ITCB).
If not enough eligible employees elect to take early retirement, then selection for exit 
will be by the usual means and those selected may, in addition to the separation pay 
mentioned above, be eligible for an extra eight weeks' benefit. Yet neither this nor the 
TCB brings the redundancy payment of either group within the range available at either 
British plant (both proportional to average income and in absolute terms). Despite the 
CANBREW  union staff officer's remonstrance that the deal was among the best in the 
entire country, the middle-aged majority of CANBREW  workers voted against the 
settlement and shut the entire industry down. High among their fears of mass exit was the 
improbability of older workers 'doing the honourable thing'.
CANBREW  is an exception that helps to prove the rule. If its redundancy 
arrangements which are so obviously superior to the Canadian norm do so little to
¿0. Not« that challangaa to tha integrity of the i.I.m. work together with problem* of emt from the i.I.m. to esacerbate 
industrial conflict in Cunuda. In Britain, they work in the other direction.
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alleviate conflict in this area, it can easily be imagined that in most other unionised 
Canadian workplaces, the system of seniority has actually very little depoliticising 
potential. Indeed it has very high conflictual potential in anything other than limited 
exit21.
4.2 The British Plants
The British model for effecting extraordinary exit, especially in unionised plants such 
as ours, is very different than in Canada. The most popular measures by far are 
voluntary redundancy and early retirement, followed at some remove by compulsory 
redundancy (Daniel &Stilgoe, 1978; Booth, 1987; Turnbull, 1988). When compulsory 
redundancy is used, seniority (or 'L IFO ' ie. last-in, first-out) is employed as a criterion in 
only about half the instances (Booth, 1987, p. 406). Employers consider seniority a crude 
and inefficient means of forceably shedding workers (Turnbull, 1988, p. 16) and even 
trade unions, though seniority provisions do appear in many of their collective 
agreements, do not consider it of primary importance in managing extraordinary exit 
(Booth, 1987, p. 405-6). Thus, while seniority is one method among others of handling 
exit, unlike North America, it is not the method, nor even an important one.
Before 1965, redundancy was met by a mixture outright union resistance (Salmon,
1988) and seniority. But the Redundancy Payments Act in that year marked a distinct 
change. Following on from several pace-setting redundancy agreements22, the Act was 
introduced at a time of high employment and was intended to enhance labour mobility 
from dying to expanding industries. Lump sum statutory payments were provided to 
workers who left voluntarily. While the payments were not large23, many employers 
began to 'top up' the amounts with extra statutory redundancy payments (ESRP 's) so as to
21. Several Canadian province! eg Manitoba, Brituh Columbia and the federal jurisdiction have recently paned
legislation allowing collective agreements to be opened in mid-term for negotiation on technological change. 
However, the union cannot strike on the issues raised. In some cases, an interesta arbitrator can be 
appointed. Thus far. the use of such provisions has been minimal. The presence of technological change 
clauses in collective agreements is minimal too. O f Canadian collective agreements covering over 500 
employees, only about 5X specify notice of layoff due to technological change or contain a 'tech change' 
reopener clause (Kumar at al., 1986, pp. .M2 A  M l.
22. Information obtained in an interview with Harry Urwin. former top official with the Transport and General
Workers Union. See alto Booth. lOH"». p. 404.
23. In 1986, statutory redundancy payments provided I.S week's pay per year of service to a maaimum of 20 years
service to workers over 40 (Booth. I‘XT’, p. 4021
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provide added incentives for certain target groups of workers to leave"’4- Daniel and 
Stilgoe found that in about half of the firms offering ESRP ’s:
"schemes...I were) commonly designed to attract older workers to volunteer, and secondly to 
attract the less fit and those with poorer health records* <1978, p. 181
While not designed for a period of high unemployment, and prophesied by some to be a 
disincentive to labour shedding, redundancy payments proved, in hindsight, to be 
remarkably well-suited to the recessionary exigencies of the 1980's. In fact, Atkinson 
indicates that from 1981 to 1986:
"the number of men aged between 55 and 64 who retired early more than doubled...Almost 
half of all the men aged between 60 and 64 arc currently in early retirement.* <1986. p. ¿21
Not only did statutory and extra-statutory redundancy payments relegate seniority to 
a little more than footnote in British industrial relations, they were extremely successful 
in depoliticising the issue of extraordinary exit, by "undermining individual and therefore 
collective resistance to redundancy" (Turnbull, 1988, p. 10)25. All of the other authors 
cited above and many others (cited ibid., p. 24, ff. I I ) echo this view strongly.
Though some trade union leaders would like to believe they were at least partly 
responsible for the development of what is, at best, a humanitarian system of industrial 
adjustment (but at worst takes the issue of job retention and creation off the agenda 
entirely), the truth is that trade unions have been swept along by the tide of events:
’ Whatever their initial feeling« might have been, trade union« toon found them«elvea to be 
powerleas in the face of the growth of voluntary redundancy scheme«. If they tried to challenge and 
oppose the need for redundancies, they were undermined by individual members eager to accept 
voluntary redundancy terms. In consequence, caught in a pincer movement between managerial 
strategy and individualist opportunism upon the part of members, trade union representatives had 
no alternative but to adopt two stances in relation to voluntary redundancy. The first was to insist 
upon. ‘No redundancy other than voluntary redundancy'. The second was to bargain over the 
inducements to volunteer and. in particular, to try to bid up the sixe of the employer's supplement to 
the statutory minimum payments.’ <Damel, 1985. p. 74»
Unlike their Canadian counterparts, who oppose it, British trade unionists remain as 
ambivalent toward extraordinary exit as both groups are toward erosion of the integrity 
of the i.l.m.. Provisions in the Redundancy Payments Act and the subsequent 
Employment Protection Act to compel employers to involve unions in redundancy
¿4. According to Booth 11987, p. 4081, tha sis top-paying industries had payments ranging from 159« to ¿95«  of the 
statutory payments Iwhich amounts to between 80« and 170« of a year's salaryl.
¿5. While the Employment Protection Act does provide some protection against ‘unfair redundancy', this is a very
minor part of its operation compared to unfair dismissal for disciplinary reasons. Moreover, indications are 
that tribunals are not overly eaacting in their review of employers' activities in this regard <Anderman, 1985. 
p. 424-'’! or that employers are inhibited in any significant way by tha Act (Daniel A Stilgoe, 1978, pp. .C-HI
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discussions served to bolster the appearance of union cooperation in labour shedding 
exercises.
But what is even more remarkable than the usurpation of union initiative and the 
depoliticisation of the issue, is the way that the phenomenon has acted to enhance 
employer job control. Turnbull (1988) shows that the system acts to increase both 
numerical and functional flexibility. Like the concept of "technological change" which 
Daniel (1987) has shown acts as almost a talisman upon which aquiescence to change can 
be conjured, the mere phrase "voluntary redundancy" is often enough to induce 
compliance not only to redundancy but to the attendant changes in working 
practices which under other circumstances workers might oppose fiercely. Even 
the resistance of a radical union leadership ideologically committed to fight redundancies 
is seldom able to break the spell (Wood & Dcy, 1983).
A particularly good example of the above points was the contraction in the casting 
unit at BR ITM ET, which involved the introduction of both redundancy and new 
technology. The new continuous casting machinery and other equipment promised a 
manpower reduction of up to 50%  in a unit previously staffed at 9 1 manual workers. 
Decided well in advance, the technical change gave management ample time to plan the 
industrial relations strategy to accompany it. Consultation and negotiation with the 
unions began quite early and in good faith. But management had already decided its main 
objectives in a breathtakingly comprehensive agenda: to reduce manpower in the unit to 
an 'acceptable' level; to remove all of the workers in the unit over 55 but none under 55; 
to restrict redundancy eligibility to older workers in that unit only in order not to dilute 
the localised scope of the operation (despite the existence of workers in other departments 
over 55 desiring voluntary redundancy); to restrict redundancy to only those older 
workers whose services were really redundant (thus engineers would be unlikely to be let 
go); to bring about a flexible workforce willing and able to do physically demanding work 
and perform many interchangeable tasks in the unit (including the handling of molten 
metal which some had previously avoided) under a single job classification; and finally, 
but not unimportantly, to obtain the union's full cooperation in the operation rather than 
its usual mute but stubborn resistance.
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After briefing the local supervisors and giving a carefully prepared presentation to 
the unions, in which 'no compulsory redundancies' was promised, the personnel managers 
withdrew to allow working parties (one for production, another for maintenance) to 
negotiate. The idea was to keep negotiations as informal as possible. "We didn’t want to 
be seen as involved," says a personnel manager, "It would stand a much better chance if 
they [the 'men of molten metal'] were seen to 'do it themselves'. Who knows, they might 
well have come up with something useful that we hadn't thought about".
Management had decided that the union would have a say in manning levels. It 
deliberately suggested a figure below its real intention to allow the union leeway to 
bargain. "We were prepared to be talked up by the union on our declared manning 
targets," says the personnel manager, "In  the end they negotiated two more men per shift 
but they were actually right. Our proposed manning would have been too tight." In fact, 
the negotiating teams did come up with "something useful"--the concept of an extra small 
team to do specialty casting.
Despite a policy commitment from the external unions against redundancies and 
instructions to that effect, all of the domestic organisations cooperated in negotiating the 
redundancy26- Says the general union convenor:
"There '* a discrepancy between union policy and site policy. But the (esternall union itself 
is split on the issue. I was at a meeting of the Confederation of Engineering land Shipbuilding!
Unions and even some of the netional officers were saying 'you can't stand in the way of progress'.
M's're resigned to the fact that modern technology means lower manning levelt even though 
we ley the opponte  in public. "
Spurred by its older members outside the casting unit, the domestic union insisted on 
site-wide eligibility for redundancy, but this demand crumbled quickly in the face of 
management obduracy. The union insisted on two job classifications but this also fell.
Far from eliciting conflict, the affair was surreally popular in the casting unit. The 
capital stock had been allowed to run down for 20 years and workers had been insecure 
about the future of the operation. The sudden infusion of £1 million of investment lifted 
their spirits. 'There 's a new interest now among the workers and a curiosity about the 
new labour processes, an interest in learning. Even those leaving see it as progress," says 
a manager. The convenor phlegmatically agrees. Though the workers in the rest of the
¿6. Th* engineering amployoai union >laff officer gave ngnt of »ariouily blocking voluntary redundancy of hi*
member*. However, the high value of all ikilled worker* reduced th* likelihood of the company wanting to let 
any of them go anyway.
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plant were curious and the older workers were resentful of not being offered redundancy, 
they had been well-trained in the British tradition of sectionalism to keep their noses out 
of a private affair.
While negotiations proceeded, every casting unit worker over 55 received a bundle of 
information on redundancy and was invited to apply for it. Those that wished received 
individual counselling on the exact nature of the redundancy package. Calculated on 
years of service, age, weekly pay and pension entitlements, this package included a lump­
sum redundancy payment, an optional lump sum payment from the pension fund, an 
immediate pension and a different pension to begin at age 65. The lump sum in most cases 
(for they all had considerable age and service) was 2 I /2 times a year's pay. The 
immediate pension amounted to about I /3 of salary per year. It is little wonder that the 
response from eligible workers was enthusiastic. With the actual deployment of these 
seemingly abundant new resources over the rest of their working lives (see Martin & 
Fryer, 1973) merely a hazily distant problem, they perceive themselves, temporarily at 
least, as rich men.
The exercise was a smashing success. T h is  whole episode," says one manager,
“...wee on« of our industrial relation! pluies. Tba union ■■ happy because it was able to take 
care of its people and negotiate manning levels. The company is happy because we handled it wall.
Wa ware helped by the fact that there ware significant numbers of workers over SS who weren't 
adverse to voluntary redundancy, especially when the terms are so generous. But really, we didn't 
aspect anything different'*.
In fact the company achieved everything it wanted and more. Not only had it shed 
labour successfully, it had also achieved considerable functional flexibility. It had done 
this by a) targeting exactly the portion of its workforce it wanted to be rid of (who were 
not only superfluous numerically but who might be expected to most strongly resist 
change), b) built a new set of working practices on the back of the redundancy and 
technological change and c) secured the union's commitment to the changes while at the 
same time 'making the union look good'.
A strong caveat is in order. While a good part of this exercise was planned by this 
employer and while new technology and voluntary redundancy are doubtless employed in 
this way by many British managements, it would be a mistake to think that the logical leap 
can be made to theorising an overall purposive managerial imperative of control in the 
i.I.m.. Voluntary redundancy developed not as a completcly-thought-out system of
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control for the 80's but rather as a piecemeal response to certain economic and political 
contingencies of the 60's and early 70's. That it worked so well in the 80's is partly due to 
fortune and partly due to many sets of employers and unions finding it instrumental^ 
useful to their problems.
4.3 Summary
In terms of conflict-resolving and -generating potential, several contrasts to the 
Canadian situation should be almost too obvious for further comment.
Impressionistically, a system which purports to pick losers fairly (but which also has many 
painful exceptions) contrasts with one in which everybody appears to emerge a winner. 
But several specific points bear mentioning.
First is the connection between the integrity of the i.I.m. and exit from it. In Canada, 
except where capacity is expanding, an increase in the number of peripheral workers can 
directly result in compulsory exit of core workers. This makes the erosion of the 
boundaries of the i.I.m. a particular potential flashpoint o f conflict. In Britain, on the 
other hand, the existence of peripheral workers can actually act to smooth the way for 
voluntary redundancy. As seen at both of our British plants, the preparation for a large 
redundancy is a highly complicated allocation project that would do honour to an 
operations research expert. Having peripheral employees available to temporarily plug 
shortfalls in manpower eases the process of adjustment to new manning levels and helps 
older workers out the door.
Second, with compulsory redundancy an ever-present threat if not enough volunteers 
for redundancy are found, the union in Britain is almost forced to participate in rounding 
up likely candidates for exit. This profoundly compromises the union in its ability to 
oppose redundancy.
Third, if the British union attempts to seriously question aspects of the voluntary 
redundancy or to take a stand against it (thereby delaying the process), hostility by 
workers against the union can result, deflecting conflict into the union ranks. Militant 
union leadership can become unpopular quickly (see Wood & Dey, 1983)27. There can 
also be conflict between those staying and those leaving. *
X1. Evan before the days of redundancy payment!, it was difficult for uniona to rally worker* to oppoae redundancies 
on principle lace Salmon, l‘*HM).
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Fourth, even in Canadian plants with redundancy payments like CAN BREW , middle- 
age workers can be left with little protection and little incentive to leave. In our British 
plants, workers in their thirties and forties (with sufficient years of service) can still cash 
out with payments in five figures or up to a year's pay28-
Fifth, while short-term lay-off (and subsequent recall, by seniority) is the norm for 
limited exit in Canada, voluntary redundancy is used in all sizes of manpower reductions 
in Britain (Daniel & Stilgoe, 1978, p. 17). While reassuring older workers, this 
revolving door inevitably weakens the internal labour market bond between young 
Canadian employees and the employer and hence their commitment to the enterprise. It 
also makes middle-age workers nervous. The opposite obtains in our British workplaces, 
where younger employees know that older workers will leave before they do and older 
workers know that they will 'be taken care of. What is more, once gone, they do not 
return to haunt the employer.
Finally, the difference between the two countries has much to do not only with who is 
made redundant but also with entirely different political apparatuses employed to achieve 
the result. Because there is virtually no possibility of addressing the issue of 
extraordinary exit during the term of the agreement in Canada, the C A N BR EW  union 
was forced to use the absurdly unwieldy mechanism of interests negotiations to handle the 
vaguely perceived threat of future mass exit. In order to rally its troops, it had to vastly 
exaggerate the threat. When inevitably confronted with a compromise, the troops 
revolted. How conflict is avoided in such situations is the real mystery. In the British 
situation, however, in addition to the cash sweetener, the apparatuses help dcpoliticisc 
the issue. The parties address the problem as and when it arises (with proper notice 
imposed by law). If  manifest conflict does arise, it is more an opportunistic response to an 
immediate problem than an ultrazealous response to the unknown. Moreover, the 
inevitable compromise addresses specific surmountable grievances rather than a general 
insuperable conundrum. What all of the above has done, of course, is to disarm British 
trade unions on the larger question of redundancy and unemployment.
5. Struggles Over Movement Within the Internal Labour Market
2M In fact, ai teen in the lad chaplar. ihc worker» that the BRITBREW union had tone io far to protort from 
compuUory redundancy c.entually caihed out with £M,000 to £10.000apieca.
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While the previous two struggles in this chapter occur at the interfaces between the 
internal and external labour markets, struggles discussed in this section occur within the 
internal labour market in its own right. Where the former explore the joint regulation of 
general worker movement in and out of the internal labour market, the latter explores 
the regulation of job locations and of worker movement from one job location to another.
Remembering that radical theorists have posited that within the structured internal 
labour market
"just •» mobility mitigates conflict in a hierarchical direction, it tcndi to generate conflict 
■ n a lateral direction...* IBurawoy, IV79, p, I05>
a comparison of how the hierarchy is constructed and how workers move within it in the 
two countries may help to test the proposition. Accordingly, three aspects of the issue will 
be addressed: these concern hierarchy construction <how the job locations are arranged), 
upward mobility (how workers move up through the job ladder) and horizontal mobility 
(how the employer maintains operational flexibility within the job ladder structure).
5.1 Constructing the Hierarchy
Windolf, observing West German structuring of i.I.m.'s insists that compared to 
Britain, they are "unstructured" (1986, pp. 251-2). Yet compared to their British 
counterparts, the degree of vertical gradation of the internal labour market within our 
Canadian plants is formidable, confirming what internal labour market theorists have 
said about job ladders in North America. This is especially striking in the two aluminium 
plants. Both plants have much the same technical complexity, multiplicity of labour 
processes and horizontal divisions of labour (see Chapter II). Yet while BR IT M ET  has 
only six basic vertical labour grades throughout production and maintenance, C A N M ET  
has 16 separate vertical labour grades in production and a fu rther 10 in 
maintenance. Combined with the horizontal divisions, this amounts to no fewer than 72 
separate job classifications in the collective agreement, or approximately one job 
classification for every five manual workers!
However, an even more remarkable contrast emerges when differentials in basic rate 
between the lowest and highest production grades are examined. The gap in pay between 
the fo u r  production grades at BR ITM ET  is 2 2 %  (or an average rise of 7.3% in pay for 
each grade jump). Yet the equivalent differential for the 16at C AN M ET  is only 6.6% (or 
an average of only .44% in pay for each grade jump). Thus the payoff for a production
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worker from advancing to the next labour grade at BR ITM ET  is 17 times higher than at 
CANM ET. In light of such limited returns to progression, it might well be concluded that 
whatever competition exists between C A N M ET  production workers for advancement up 
the job ladder is quite trivial.
At BRITMET, aside from a few "skilled chargehands", maintenance workers are in a 
single vertical labour grade and, since the move to multi-skilling (where the distinction 
between mechanical and electrical fitters was effectively abolished) a single horizontal 
classification (fitter/electrician) exists. At C AN M ET , on the other hand, there are such 
diverse classifications as "Electronic Electrician", "Electrician (Grades I & 2)", Mechanic 
(Grades I & 2)", "Plumber...", "Carpenter...", "Welder...", 'Tradesman's Helper", with a 
further six classifications in the toolroom alone. Yet the pay differential between the 
highest and lowest classification of licensed tradesmen within the separate trade 
groups (for workers cannot jump between trades) is a mere 1.6%. So again, the returns 
to progression are limited.
The breweries present a different but even more intriguing system of hierarchy 
construction. In the plants in both countries, the unions have similarly fought for and 
won an extremely flat job ladder despite significant differences in skill levels among 
employees. In essence, a single production grade prevails. This is due to the looseness of 
the product market and the almost perverse importance of unskilled workgroups 
employed in units with ancillary technologies (see Chapter II). Both combine to make 
construction of a hierarchy less urgent. At BRITBREW , except for a few chargehands 
who are paid a small premium, the spread in basic pay among seven grades of production 
workers is a mere 4.3%. Among licensed tradesmen there is a single rate. At CANBREW, 
there is a single grade for most production workers (with .3% less paid to a few packaging 
labourers and 1.5% more to a few articulated lorry drivers) and two grades for licensed 
tradesmen with a differential of 4 %  between them.
Yet despite appearances, the unions themselves have constructed hierarchies. At 
BRITBREW , differing abilities to boost p.b.r. earnings have resulted in distinct pay 
differentials among job groups and even between different work groups in the same basic 
job. The differential between the lowest and highest earnings is 52%. These differentials 
have played havoc with internal skill distinctions. Thus, while the basic pay of licensed
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tradesmen is 12% more than that of labourers in the staging unit, the latter actually make 
43%  more in total earnings! The effect of p.b.r. and effort bargaining will be discussed in 
the next chapter. Here it should be noted that while all workers at BR ITBREW  are paid 
higher than they would be outside the brewery, these internal differentials cause a 
considerable amount of ill will between work groups, which may exacerbate small 
sectional disputes and militates against solidarity and more widespread labour- 
management conflict. Given that the highest paid groups tightly regulate entry to their 
sub-internal labour markets, this effect is even more pronounced.
At CANBREW, where no p.b.r. or other bonus system exists, all production workers 
are paid the same. Nevertheless, a limited hierarchy has still developed. Since jobs in the 
brewing unit are far more attractive than those in the packaging and staging units, a move 
from the latter to the former is considered a promotion despite (or perhaps because of) 
the fact that they pay the same. Even a move from one section of the brewing unit to 
another is considered a promotion.29-
Thus in Canada, hierarchy has developed in spite of attempts to eliminate it. 
Nonetheless, there is little evidence of a conflict among workers over these positions. 
CANBREW  workers exhibit a noticeable commonality of interest. As will be seen though, 
there is considerable conflict between labour and management over the allocation of 
what job locations exist.
In general then, looking at our plants, the effects of "hiérarchisation" (Herding,
1973) are problematic. The mere existence of even an elaborate hierarchy does not 
necessarily promote rivalry between workers. In fact, in one case, it is the 
hiérarchisation brought about by the exercise of sectional union power that may promote 
such rivalry. In another case, the high degree of division within a limited range of pay 
may in fact reduce rivalry by reducing the incentive to compete. On the other hand, while 
hiérarchisation need not turn worker against worker, the greater the number of job 
locations and the greater the activity of movement within them, the more opportunities
2V. In ■  leading arbitration, involving a brewary, "the arbitrator eapreuly ree ogni »eld I that a promotion need not 
oece»»arily entail baing paid a higher rate of pay. Rather, it (waa ree ogni ted) that certain jobe. because of 
their level of reeponeibility, could be conceived of ae promotion» by employee» even though they would not 
•ecure additional remuneration.'' IBrown <■ Beatty, IVH4, p. 2”7l-2>
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may exist for grievances to enter the dispute resolution system. If that system does not 
handle them efficiently, the amount of labour management conflict may well increase.
5.2 Upward Mobility
The Canadian Plants. The key principle in deciding promotion in Canada is seniority
ie. the senior applicant gets the job. But just as in extraordinary exit, management's need
for a qualified workforce strongly impinges on the free exercise of seniority30! resulting
in much controversy. In looking at job ladders and seniority unproblematically, radicals
have ignored the many struggles that emerge in the contradiction "between the union
desire for job security and the company need for change and efficiency"31. Herding
summarised the same phenomenon found in his studies:
'Contrary to many sweeping statements on tha firm entrenchment of seniority in unionized 
Industrie*, the day-to-day working mechanics of seniority in half our sample plant* are not even now 
affording the worker the minimum job 'protection' and predictability..." (IVT1. p. 155)
The battle is carried on across several political apparatuses of production in Canada. 
In Interests negotiations, unions often fight tenaciously to improve on the phrase "where
skill etc... are relatively equal" (often known as the 'man against man' test). Such a test
allows management to disregard seniority unless applicants are equal in qualifications. 
Consequently, training can be haphazard, with the senior applicant automatically 
rejected due to lack of it. In the worst cases, management may give favoured employees 
chances to gain experience on higher-rated jobs so that they will be "shoe-ins" at selection 
time. Although the union at C AN M ET  has tried to address this problem by negotiating a 
clause in the agreement stipulating that
"skills or job knowledge acquired through a temporary transfer cannot be used as criteria on 
job postings or layoffs"
it claims that supervisors find many other ways to surreptitiously train favoured 
employees. The production manager lauds supervisors who keep their eyes open for "guys 
with potential" to train and promote but acknowledges that the lack of systematisation in 
this regard can and does facilitate favouritism in spite of the spirit of the seniority clause, 
a source of great frustration for workers.
JO. Of Canadian collective agreements covering 500 employees or more, only ,t%  concern a promotion clause in which 
seniority is the only criterion (Kumer et al., IVH6, p. J‘>5)
il. Ho Attorno Stool Corp. Ltd. IV L A  C. 2J6 (Weiler, IVMO.
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The strongest unions have wrestled, against strong management resistance, to move 
from a 'man against man’ to a 'man against job' test in the application of seniority. The 
'old' C A N BR EW  promotion clause read as follows:
Promotions and allocation*...shall be based on merit, ability, and the efficient operation of the 
Company, but with other things being equal, the employees with the greatest seniority shall be given 
preference. In the event that a senior employee lacks tha necessary training, the Company will 
arrange to give the employee the necessary training wherever, in the opinion of the Superintendent, 
this it practicable.
Somewhere between 1973 and 1980, the parties at CANBREW  hammered out a new 
clause. Yet the qualified nature of its wording reveals just how tortured the negotiating 
sessions that produced it must have been.
On posted jobs, promotions and transfers shall be based on seniority provided that the applicants 
ere sufficiently qualified end considering the efficient operation o f  the Company. The 
Company will arrange appropriate training wherever practicable, (emphasis added)
Despite this advance in interests definition, or precisely because of it, the ensuing 
struggles over Rights definition have bred what the convenor calls "ongoing irritation 
and frustration”. In obvious ways, a 'man against job' clause surpasses a 'man against 
man'clause. But in one perverse way it does not. In the man against man test, the 
employer's attention is focussed more on the several applicants than on the job vacancy 
itself. Able to pick among several candidates, the employer may not be very worried about 
the job description. In the man against job test, however, with much more obligation to 
choose the senior applicant, the company's attention swings full force onto the job. The 
employer must be extremely careful, perhaps too careful, in considering the 'sufficient 
qualifications' required. On several occasions, CANBREW  has refused promotion to the 
senior applicant for a job in the brewing unit based not on his qualifications but on 
undesirable aspects of his work behaviour in another unit.
One such case, which was arbitrated, has much to say about both seniority and the 
problem of absenteeism (discussed in the previous chapter). The employer acknowledged 
that the grievor was qualified but found that his absenteeism record in the packaging 
department rendered him unacceptable, and awarded the job to the most senior employee 
below him with acceptable qualifications. The manager responsible reported that even if
Chapter VIII...page 273
the grievor had been the only applicant, he would not have been accepted32- As reported 
in the arbitration award, the brewing unit shop steward acknowledged that
“there is e higher degree of employee responsibility in the (brewing unit) where mistakes are 
coatly as to the loss of product and efficiency...There is more onus on the employee to make sure the 
job is completed.“
but also testified that two completely different cultures of absence and individual 
responsibility characterised the two units, saying, "people who are transferred into [the 
brewing unitj, in his opinion, become more mature in performing that work." The 
supervisor who rejected the grievor admitted that this was true but that he had not 
considered it when making his decision.
Another brewing unit employee with a previous bad absenteeism record in packaging 
testified that his
“...absenteeism record improved 100*  because he enjoys the work, as everyone else docs in 
that (unit).*
The union argued that the Company's test of qualifications was unreasonable. If 
absenteeism were a factor, then the cultures of different units could not be discounted. 
The union suggested that
"...if these (inordinately) high standards were maintained, then the Company has amended 
the operation of the collective agreement by inferring a competition type clause amongst applicants 
where the Company could pick the best rather than apply the specific terms of (the promotion 
clause)"
The arbitrator acknowledged that a previous award (in fact a leading reported case) 
adjudicating almost the same circumstances with the same parties some ten years previous 
with the 'old'promotion clause had ruled in favour of the employer. Yet the new 
clause did not lead to a different result. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance. In so 
doing, the arbitrator basically applied a limited test of procedural fairness, holding that 
the employer had satisfied him that:
“Ths same standards wart used by tha Company in considering all of the applicants with 
regard to absenteeism and performance records, both of which are relevant in such an assessment."
The arbitrator gave little attention to the unions' arguments about inferring a 'man 
against man’ test, thereby effectively confirming those arguments. In the union's eyes, 
after all the vexation of negotiating the new clause, of grieving alleged violations and of
S2. Arbitral jurisprudanca holds that in tha 'man against job' test, an employer can reject all applicants if they have 
insufficient qualifications and go outside the firm to recruit (Brown 4  Beatty, l*M4, p. Wh-"1»
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running cases through arbitration, the clause proved only to raise and then dash 
expectations.
The British Plants. O f the several salient differences between Canadian and British 
industrial relations, some are more important but none is more striking than the weight 
given seniority in promotion. For, compared with the near obsession with which it is 
regarded in North America, in the British plants studied (and in British workplaces 
generally) seniority is next to irrelevant. To state it in less categorical terms would do 
the phenomenon an injustice.
While a few cases at BR ITM ET  involved the issue of preference for senior employees 
to fill vacancies, ("it does give the promotion process some consistency and predictability," 
says a personnel manager) most promotions were left to management's discretion, with 
little apparent hostility by the workers or the union. Sometimes seniority would be a 
major factor, sometimes not. Indeed, the union had, in the collective agreement, explicitly 
forfeited the right to any say in promotion to the charge hand position which it otherwise 
represented. At BRITBREW , the situation was even more dramatic as convenor, 
stewards and workers alike expressed no concern that senior applicants be awarded job 
vacancies. In fact, many otherwise militant trade unionists were perplexed by the 
question. As one steward said, "Of course the most qualified person should get the job. 
What's the point otherwise?" In both British plants, the unions displayed a nonchalance 
about the necessity for posting of vacancies which would have shocked their Canadian 
counterparts.
This presents a serious puzzle. After the high degree of attention radical theorists 
have given seniority and upward mobility in labour-management relations in North 
America, could it be that these features are mere insignificant games played by unions 
otherwise restricted in their ability to bargain the more important things? Or could it be 
a mere accident of history that they developed as significant features in one country and 
not the other? In fact, there is no evidence that seniority is as strong a concern of unions 
anywhere in the world outside North America. There is some truth in both answers. 
Nonetheless, the phenomenon does seriously undercut (though not destroy) the power of 
the radical theorists' arguments on this point. If seniority is so important a weapon in
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management control of the labour process, why did it not spread to Europe like many 
other American fads and inventions?
Perhaps some reasons can be suggested for the cross-Atlantic emergence of two quite 
different concerns about promotion. First, as witnessed dramatically in our two 
aluminium plants, the structuring of the internal labour market is not nearly as well 
developed in Britain as it is in North America. Thus the opportunities available for 
upward mobility are limited in any case. This might be explained by the late emergence of 
large workplaces, labour homogenisation and mass industrial unionism (aspects of what 
has been called "Fordism") in British industry and the late demise of craft control 
(Lewchuk, 1983) as compared to North America.
This late development of aspects of Fordism and the retention of craft control partly 
explains a second possible reason— the retention of multi-unionism. This does not explain 
the phenomenon in our particular plants (BRITBREW  has a single union; B R IT M E T  has 
three but a single union represents all semi-skilled workers), but in many larger 
workplaces such as automobile manufacture or shipbuilding, which set powerful 
paradigms for the rest of unionised industry, the semi-skilled internal labour market has 
long been divided into distinct vertical swaths represented by different unions. The 
number of advancements possible within each swath before a worker bumps up against an 
inter-union demarcation line is quite limited.
Third, with the internal labour market so highly divided (as opposed to North 
American industry) into distinct occupational/union groupings, British employers tended 
less to use a single entry port at the very bottom of the i.I.m. and more to hire distinct sets 
of workers at every swath. Thus, an unskilled worker might be hired from the outside into 
the Transport and General Workers’ rank; a sheet metal worker might be hired from the 
outside into the Sheet Metal Worker's rank; a skilled vehicle builder might be hired from 
the outside into the Vehicle Builder's Union swath (before it merged with the T&G in 
1972); and a more highly skilled worker would be hired into the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union and the Electrician's Union.
Fourth, while the craft unions were virtually eliminated by employers in US mass 
industry at the beginning of the century and then bypassed by the new industrial unions 
thirty years later, British craft unions, and especially the Engineering union (the second
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largest in the country), have had a much larger influence throughout the century. If the 
Engineering Union did not represent a sizable group of workers in a company, its 
presence would still probably be felt by its recognition for mechanical tradesmen (as at 
BRITMET). The craft union mentality is powerfully directed toward skill, not seniority 
and in fact treats the latter with contempt. This would inevitably rub off to some extent 
on the other unions. A good example is available from BRITMET. When a vacancy 
opened in the finishing unit, the general union pushed for applications to be accepted by 
seniority plant-wide while the employer invited applications from within the unit only, 
arguing that this would make a mockery of in-unit training. Faced with a third stage 
grievance meeting where convenors of all the unions would appear, one personnel 
manager could hardly contain his anticipation.
"Th u  grievance it ridiculout. I can't wait until the craft union« hear it. I'll put the 
company'« argument« to them and I know they'll enjoy aeeing u i tear (the general union! to piece« 
logically on this."
Knowing the craft union's attitude to seniority disputes, he intended to divide and 
conquer, at least on this issue.
For all of the above reasons, the importance of seniority has not developed in Britain 
to the extent it has in North America. What effect may this have had on industrial 
conflict? In fact, the existence of rigid occupational/union demarcations in Britain may 
well have a more highly insidious effect upon worker solidarity than competition among 
workers for spaces on the job ladder in North America. While worker-against-worker 
competition may have some negative effect on the community of interests in the Canadian 
workplace, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, human boundaries are much more 
difficult to draw than institutional boundaries and solidaristic feelings can often 
overcome divisions imposed from  above. On the other hand, when the boundaries are no 
longer between workers but between work groups and/or unions, and therefore 
legitimised from  below, their corrosive effect upon solidarity is strengthened 
immeasurably.
One more important point needs to be mentioned about upward mobility. When the 
parties in Britain do concern themselves with the issue, it is far less likely to centre 
obsessively around considerations of managerial efficiency. When BR IT M ET  had a 
vacancy for a "grade 3 paint line operator", the union supported the application of a
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grade 4 operator with 27 years' service. It did this partly from concern for his long 
service but also because he was popular and it was 'the right thing to do'. Since the new 
job entailed a certain amount of report writing, the employer, citing this applicant's low 
literacy, declared him unsuitable. But in the end the employer backed down, partly 
because it was such an emotional issue, partly because it was counterproductive fighting 
the union on it at a time when greater overall flexibility was being sought. As one 
personnel manager says:
"T h * company backed off on this ona. If there'« «orne writing to be done, the bloke« on the 
*hift may help him but there won't be much of it. We get what we want through negotiation«, not 
confrontation. That particular dupute formed on the wrong thing— peraecutmg a long-«ervice 
employee rather than on flenbility a« a general iiiue."
Thus, the employer was willing to take a longer-term view of the immediate challenge 
to flexibility. In order to do this, it was prepared to accommodate the job to suit the 
senior employee, unlike the CAN M ET  arbitration case cited above. Such action on the 
part of a Canadian employer might well be considered an egregious abdication of 
managerial prerogative and, remembering the riposte to Weiler in Chapter *, a dangerous 
precedent. Certainly, as has been seen, few if any Canadian arbitrators would require it.
5.3 Horizontal Mobility
The ability to have workers move from one job to another, at least temporarily, 
without regard to job classification or seniority is a tool to achieve functional flexibility 
coveted by many employers. The debate about horizontal mobility has been fiercely joined 
in the US. Several commentators (Kochan et al., !986;Piore, 1986; Bluestone &. 
Harrison, 1982) have observed that the high differentiation and hiérarchisation of jobs 
and regulation by seniority that served the 'old industrial relations' so well now stand in 
the way of the flexibility needed by US industries. They both describe and prescribe a 
move by employers to break down so-called internal labour market rigidities. While the 
extent and necessity of these changes may indeed be debatable, especially as it relates to 
Canada, (see Adams, 1988), it is undeniable that many employers all over North America 
and Britain are attempting to achieve them and that unions are resisting.
The imperative to change is less pronounced in high-tech, highly capital intensive 
industries, with high variation between driving and ancillary technologies (see Chapter 
II), such as our breweries. Within separate units, workers have for some time been well- 
integrated into teamwork. Between units, different skills and labour processes militate
i
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against horizontal mobility. This is one fairly peaceable point on the frontier of control 
of these plants.
In more labour-intensive industries, however, where the bundle of technologies is 
more homogeneous and skill levels less distinct, and where organisation inertia can have 
high costs, the imperative to change is much greater.
A look at our two aluminium plants shows these tensions in operation. Ironically, 
despite the general rule about collective agreement verbosity in the two countries, it is the 
British plant's collective agreement which more specifically limits horizontal mobility. In 
the BR ITM ET  agreement, after some general platitudes about the need for "flexibility 
and mobility" within and between pay grades and across the plant, and after the reminder 
that
When an employee is allied to temporarily transfer to another job he will co-operate in that tranafer.
comes the clause that most of the more militant shop stewards remember:
However, if the employee wuhei to stay on his job and if it is working he should be allowed to 
continue to work on that job.
Yet despite this clause, the employer has developed, and not without union 
compliance, an impressive degree of functional flexibility13- The clause was used much 
more frequently before 1979. But even before recent moves to multi-skilling among non­
craft workers, though the union still retains it like a security blanket, the clause had 
begun to fade in importance. There are several reasons for this, many of them in common 
with other British manufacturers. First, the low number of job grades obviously permits 
far greater leeway of lateral movement. Second, the early 80's recession seriously shook 
workers' confidence in the company's survival and put them in a frame of mind more 
conducive to change. Third, the more recent productivity and profitability successes have 
afforded the employer several palliatives, not the least being money. Says one senior 
manager:
T v *  taken many seminars on flesibility. Nina out of tan companiei have dona it from a 
position of crisis and most haven't succeeded. Our problem is coping with success*.
Fourth, there is now a high number of younger employees who relish variety and have 
few ingrained notions of inflexibility (made possible in part by voluntary redundancies of
33. This is another of the few esamples of 'managerial end supervisory custom and practice* (Armstrong A  Goodman. 
W79> to be found at BRITMET (sae Chapter VII.
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older workers, who had quite opposite attitudes). Fifth, managers discovered that 
excessive mobility can disrupt, not enhance production. The quality assurance manager 
insists that stable teams turn out much better product and one foreman says:
"We don't want to move people too much once they've »farted work. It get» them frustrated 
and we don't get the best out of them. The ration  we have such good flexibility  is chat we do it 
as little at pom ble. Alto. I remember who has agreed to move and then I remember to do them 
little favours like letting them leave early for a football match.
The sixth reason is the enormous amounts of overtime. O n  overtime, a worker must 
be ready to do any job required of him. Thus highly-trained press drivers may be assigned 
to wrapping product in the packaging unit.
The C A N M E T  agreement, on the other hand, is more ambiguous on the employer's 
discretion to transfer employees. The seniority clause ("where....are relatively equal”) 
includes "transfer" in the matters to be decided by seniority. But this refers to the ability 
of an employee to use his seniority to voluntarily transfer to another job in his pay 
grade. Another clause stipulates that a transfer of less than 30  days is temporary (and by 
implication, need not be posted), but it is not of much help. A s  might be expected, no 
arbitration has ever examined the issue. However, arbitral jurisprudence is fairly clear 
that:
"Generally, the employer has an inherent right to transfer employees within a 
classification..." (Palmer, 1 *0, p. 54KI
so long as it is done in good faith and for a legitimate business reason (ibid., p. 548-9).
However, a problem arises when the employer proposes to transfer the employee to a 
job in a job grade higher or lower than his own. The former is a promotion and is subject 
to the seniority clause. The latter is a demotion. If disciplinary, it can be grieved. If non- 
disciplinary, according to the agreement, C AN M ET  must first follow the bumping 
procedure. Thus, when an employer has a multiplicity of job grades such as C A N M ET  
has, it can theoretically be severely restricted in its ability to transfer. But theory is one 
thing and practice is another. One manager insists the employer has had little problem in 
the past in transferring employees when it wishes.
"There's quite ■  lot of mobility her«. If a machine breaks down or wa need someone 
somewhere alsa, they move. It's probably the greatest asset of this workforce."
With a more fractious workforce and a stronger union, however, he admits he would 
be in trouble. The more radical union leadership worries him. But he insists he would 
confront the problem in true Canadian style: "I'd  take a strike to hold onto the mobility we
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have". This is exactly what happened in the long strike most recent to the study on the 
question of extended working hours. When the union fell back on its rights in the 
collective agreement and employment standards legislation, the employer had no choice 
but to go on the offensive to change the collective agreement. Given the high potential for 
conflict in Interests negotiations (Chapter III), a strike was inevitable.
While both Canadian and British managers, then, have been able to circumvent 
collective agreement (or jurisprudential) restrictions on operational flexibility, only in 
the British case can the employer rest assured that the situation is stable. The Canadian 
situation is much more explosive. Either the union refrains from exercising its rights 
under the collective agreement or it faces a major management confrontation.
6. Concluding Remarks
As in the previous chapter, the beginning of this chapter promised to test the 
proposition that the seniority system was the second 'jewel in the crown’ of industrial 
dispute resolution in Canada particularly and North America generally. But rather than 
viewing seniority in a vacuum, theoretical considerations allowed it to be placed in the 
context of the wider debate on the nature of the internal labour market. Engaging with 
radical labour market theorists (who posit that hierarchy and seniority fetishism devised 
by American employers to divide and conquer American workers), two interconnected 
questions emerged: to what extent does the structuring of the i.I.m. divide or unify 
workers and to what extent does it generate or mitigate labour-management conflict? 
Noting the paucity of serious comparative work on this aspect of the i.I.m., especially at 
workplace level, it was suggested that such work might test the robustness of the radical 
argument.
Upward mobility is only one aspect of the structuring of the i.I.m.. Struggles also take 
place over the integrity of the i.I.m., over exit from the i.l.m. and over lateral movement 
within the i.I.m.. On challenges to the integrity of the i.I.m., unions are highly ambivalent 
since the existence of a periphery is at the same time a threat and a protection for the 
core. Despite and because of more rigid political apparatuses, Canadian employers have 
greater institutional leeway in eroding the integrity i.I.m.. But this can generate much 
frustration among workers and unions and thus much labour-management conflict. Yet in
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Britain, the very intensity over protection of sectional i.I.m.'s can drain away conflict at a 
more general level.
Struggles over exit from the i.I.m. remain highly politicised in Canada. The need of 
the Canadian employer for efficient operations can seriously undercut the efficacy of 
seniority, frustrating many of the aspirations built into the concept. The awkwardness of 
the Canadian system in addressing the problems of 'middle-age' workers is another source 
of potential friction. The British system of voluntary redundancy, on the other hand, has 
dramatically depoliticised the issue.
On struggles over movement within the i.l.m., the intricate hiérarchisation in Canada 
and the Canadian obsession with seniority, both of which bespeak continual abrasion, 
contrast conspicuously with employer and union nonchalance and the consequent 
flexibility in regulating these issues in Britain. On the question of horizontal mobility, the 
very hiérarchisation and the web of seniority rules in Canada virtually invites 
confrontation while their relative absence in Britain does the opposite.
Thus, any conception that the traditional North American system o f i.l.m. regulation 
has absolute or comparative conflict-mollifying superiority is overly simplistic and guilty 
of implying too much power and purposivencss on the part of employers and too little 
power and resistance on the part of trade unions.
Rubery comes closest to the truth in suggesting that regulation of the i.l.m. "provides 
a bargaining base for labour against management's attempts to increase productivity and 
introduce new technology" (1978, p. 29). The idea that a "homogeneous work force, 
interchangeable in function" would have more potential to resist management 
manipulation or greater revolutionary thrust denies the tortuous path that labour treads 
in the quest for emancipation.
This chapter has seen the question of i.l.m. structuring, at several points, touch 
obliquely on issues of of control of the production process, issues such as job content, pace 
of work, the effort bargain and the introduction and use of new technology. It is to these 
issues that we turn now in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IX: JOB CONTROL
/. Introduction
The last two chapters have dealt with two issues of great importance in union- 
management regulation of factory life. Indeed, together they take up the greater 
proportion of commerce between the parties. But compared to a third issue which 
receives less explicit attention, they may be described as contextual, rather than 
substantive, affecting the environment rather than the essence of shopfloor industrial 
relations. The third issue is work itself—-what work is done, how it is done, how fast it is 
done and whether specific monetary rewards flow directly from these components'- The 
regulation of this third issue will be called job  control.
The definition of job control is thus circumscribed by the exclusion of discipline and 
structuring of the i.I.m.. Yet this is no simple matter. In fact, most scholars who have 
used the term ’job control' either combine the three issues purposely or are not precise 
about excluding the former two. This has greater negative consequences when looking at 
North America for reasons to be explained presently. Herding (1972), attempting to 
show the erosion of American union power in the postwar era, defines job control as
"•II devices of labor union influanca on tha emtcnce of, tha accaia to and tha performance 
of operational (1973, p. 21
and specifically includes discipline and seniority issues in his remit along with those 
concerned with work itself. Tolliday and Zeitlin (1982) purport, at the outset, to deal 
with "manning, workloads and the introduction of new technology" (p. 3), but later expand 
their field to encompass discipline and seniority.
Scholars looking at Britain alone have perhaps greater justification for neglecting the 
distinction since the main apparatus used to negotiate job control— custom and practice—  
tends to blur the distinction somewhat. Hyman and Eiger (1981), discuss the ebb and flow 
of worker job control. Yet by attempting to depict the historical extent of so-called 
"restrictive practices” and their subsequent erosion in several industries, they inevitably 
touch on questions of discipline and of limits to entry and exit from the internal labour 
market. Belanger (1985) and Belanger and Evans (1988) examine struggles over control I.
I. Iiauaa of pay ara ihua included in job control, but only »bara thara it a apacific and diract link batwaan work 
parformanca and raMunaration, auch aa in incarniva achaaiaa.
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of the labour process in British engineering shops. Yet, in defining job control, along with 
"effort bargaining" they include "work allocation" and "job mobility" (ibid. pp. 162-167) 
and also cannot avoid discussion of discipline (eg. p. 170).
Edwards & Scullion go so far as to argue that,
’The effort berg*in [a part of what we have defined at job control! cannot be divorced from 
other aspects of the frontier of control* (NN2, p. lb’’»
Indeed, the distinctions between any two of the three issues can be hazy, as has been seen 
in the previous two chapters. The issue of movement of workers to jobs within the i.I.m. 
cannot be divorced entirely from the content of those jobs or whether job content can be 
changed to accommodate candidates. The issue of labour accumulation and labour 
shedding cannot be entirely divorced from the issue of the output and incentive-based 
earnings of the group concerned. And the issue of discipline for anything connected with 
work itself can surely not be divorced from work itself.
So in one sense, treating the three issues separately risks ignoring how they articulate 
with each other, how control of discipline and of the structuring of the internal labour 
market conditions the performance of work itself, and how victories in the first two can 
provide the floor of confidence for workers to attack the third (Rubery, 1978). Once 
these connections are acknowledged, however, blurring or eliminating the distinction 
invites imprecision and jeopardises analytical rigour in the discussion of the political 
apparatuses of production, especially where comparative work is being undertaken.
There are three main reasons for this. The first involves workers' temporal 
perceptions. While instances of formal discipline, and entries into, exits from and 
movements within the i.I.m. are discrete stochastic events in workers' consciousness, the 
question of what work to do, how fast and hard to do it and what rewards or sanctions2 
will be forthcoming are continuous concerns, during every minute of every working day. 
By merit of this alone, job control would require special attention.
The second reason involves the differential contribution of the issues to conflict or the 
lack of it. An analogy can be made to Herzberg et al.'s (1959) theories of motivation. It is 
arguable that the presence of job control is more closely linked with job satisfaction
2. The dutinction between ’sanction»" and formal discipline 11 an important one. The former are the opposite of 
production incentives and include all unpleasant consequences to the workarfsl arisin i from production 
performance unsatisfactory to management, ranging from ridicule and verbal reprimands to the withholding 
of 'good jobs' or bonuses.
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while the absence of control over pay, discipline and internal labour market allocation is 
more closely linked with conflict. In other words, job control is a positive 'satisfier' or 
'motivator', while discipline and i.I.m. regulation are merely 'dissatisfiers' or 'hygiene 
factors'. Baldamus (1961) too, provides a useful paradigm in a somewhat similar vein, 
when he talks about aspects of effort (such as "impairment", "tedium" and "weariness") 
being "deprivations" which are mitigated by "relative satisfactions" ( such as "inurement", 
"traction" and "contentment"). Thus, in his terms, job control can be thought of as a 
relative satisfaction.
One problem with Herzberg's and Baldamus's theories (and also of Wall and 
Lischeron, 1977, who insist that causality in the strong participation/satisfaction 
correlation is indeterminate) is that they base their assumptions on individuals or 
collections of individuals rather than on unionised work groups for whom there is a 'logic 
of collective action' as discussed in the treatment of "cultural" theories in Chapter I. It 
can be argued, therefore, that for unionised work groups job control is an even more 
powerful satisfier than for individuals. More concrete evidence of this will appear near 
the end of the chapter.
With regard to the distinction between our three issues, when general pay rates are 
being negotiated, wages may be foremost in workers' minds. But once that issue is decided, 
when asked what they strive for, unionised work groups are less likely to answer "A  say in 
discipline over our fellow workers" or "A say in the who's taken on, released or moved 
about the plant" unless a specific incident of perceived inequity is current. From minute 
to minute, however, they are more likely to answer "A say (or some sort of autonomy) in 
the work we do". The extent to which this say is available then, has a hidden but powerful 
connection to their overall sense of grievance or well-being.
The desire for job control in work groups is not absolute but rather strongly 
conditioned by the type of work performed and management's attitude to control of the 
labour process. While employers who require only shovel fodder may see 'direct control' 
(Friedman, 1977) as their primary means of getting workers to carry out required tasks, 
many more are subject to the essential dialectic that wherever workers are required to be 
more than mere automatons, to actually freely offer their skill and intellectual initiative 
in the labour process, management must, in the often-quote words of Alan Flanders,
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"regain control by sharing it". In fact, "real subordination of labour” is unachievable so 
long as not only labour desires but management requires participation (Cressey & 
Maclnnes, 1980).
The third and perhaps most important reason to distinguish the other two issues from 
job control relates to the fact that in one of our countries this distinction has already 
been made. Some important differences in handling discipline and i.I.m. structuring in 
the two countries have been seen thus far. But these pale in comparison to the differences 
between the two countries in the area of job control. While there is no explicit 
boundary drawn in the British system o f workplace dispute resolution between 
the three issues, the genius o f  the Canadian system o f dispute resolution is how 
it so dramatically separates disputes over discipline and i.I.m. structuring from  
those over job  control. Thus even though victories in the first two can give workers 
confidence to struggle for the third, in actual fact the barrier erected by the North 
American system between them over the past forty years is formidable. For a cross­
national researcher to ignore this fact is folly.
2. Comparative Theoretical Considerations
A cross-Atlantic debate has arisen in recent years on the issue of the comparative 
degree of shopfloor bargaining and the extent of union job control and restriction of 
employer prerogative in the United States and Britain. The intention here is not to cover 
ground already well traversed by the authors involved, but to use the debate to illuminate 
several new issues and those important to this thesis: the place of Canadian workplace 
industrial relations in the debate; the relevance of the question to levels of industrial 
conflict; some empirical probes on just how far the erosion of British unions' job control 
has gone; and investigation of differences among British workplaces in this regard.
Perhaps the strongest spark to the debate has been the contrast between the pre-war 
and wartime militancy of American labour and its long post-war slide. Several historical 
studies of US workplace industrial relations in mass industry'1 have indicated that in the 
period roughly between the first stirrings of industrial unionism in the early 30’s and the 
historic General Motors strike of 1945-46 (and the Taft-Hartley Act a year later), 
American workers stormed the citadel of entrenched managerial prerogative. At the
.V Sc« Brody IIVMH. L.chtcnttcin (l<NUH. Jeffery* <!•«*>. Harm  (IWU». Sc halt (I 'M ).
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policy level, not only were workers and unions intent on obtaining grievance procedures, 
seniority and adjudicated discipline, but many militant trade unionists were also seeking a 
say in a much wider range of issues in their factories. At the shopfloor level, militant 
shop stewards backed by their members were struggling with supervisors on job content, 
work speedup and incentive job rates. General Motors may be thought guilty of some 
exaggeration when it warned in 1945 that unions were out to
"•■ ■pry their way into the whole field of management. It leads surely to the day when union 
bosses, under threat of strike, will seek to tell us what we can make, whan we can make it." (quoted 
in Brody. IWU). p. P6 I
Yet the aspirations of some union leaders were not far removed when they stated that 
unions "must be conceded the right to bargain respecting all functions of management” 
(quoted ibid., p. 182).
Lichtenstein (1980) shows how automobile workers prior to the 1950's carved out 
domains of shopfloor militancy and job control. This was especially true for the majority 
of workers, off the assembly lines in skilled jobs and on piece rates, and especially during 
the war (when much of the previously routinised work gave way to individually-paced, 
task-oriented, small batch production).
In the immediate postwar years, however, management went back on the offensive to 
repulse the onslaught and to claw back many of the shopfloor rights and much o! the wage 
drift conceded during the war4. This was done by a) generally conceding unions the right 
to exist with security and bargaining rights, thereby smoothing out class animosities 
enflamed by basic recognition battles, b) strenuous lobbying to change the law (eg. Taft- 
Hartley) to reverse or constrain advantages gained under the Wagner Act and its judicial 
interpretations, c) providing generous general wage and benefit increases to 'buy out' 
resistance to loss of job control, d) increasingly using the formal collective agreements to 
delimit the job rights available, but specifically excluding most references to job control 
issues, e) pursuing and winning from the unions drastic curtailments on the right to strike 
during the term of the collective agreement and union agreement to police such 
restrictions by repudiating wildcatters, f) establishing professional personnel 
departments to administer those agreements and attend in an organised way to the needs
4. To lh« author, luted in footnote3, add Herding (l>f.»l, Aronowitx (IVJ). Brachar (l«P2>. Tomlin» (IW«S). Edward» 
(IWthl on the employer revanchamant.
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o f labour, and g) upgrading foremen to full managerial status, thereby forestalling 
unionisation by them and reversing whatever fraternisation had developed between them 
and their subordinates.
The unions, for their part, other than a few minor hiccups, conceded readily to the 
employer offensive, for in return they received union security, stability and relief from 
the draining effort of establishing and re-establishing their legitimacy. By the mid-50's, 
then, the limitations to American collective bargaining had essentially been drawn and 
pattern set for the next 30 years.
As for Canada, intensive historical studies of workplace industrial relations in this 
key period are sparse. It can be assumed however that no greater amount of job control 
was won on the shopfloor than in the US and that no smaller amount of employer 
retrenchment followed after the war. There are several good reasons for this assumption 
based on some significant differences between Canadian and U S industrial relations.
First, while there is evidence (Abella, 1973; Lipton, 1973) that the upsurge of 
industrial organising throughout the 30's and 40’s was no less intense than in the US (and 
in several cases, Canadian organising efforts provided inspiration for US unionists), 
Canada had nothing comparable to the 1935 Wagner Act that provided a similar degree 
of legal and moral encouragement to trade unions. In fact, until almost the end of the 
war, other than provisions for the investigation and conciliation (and some argue 
suppression5) of industrial disputes in the limited number o f  cases where unions 
were already established, most Canadian governments actively abetted employers in 
resisting union recognition. Thus, in an economic period increasingly favourable to 
labour, while US unionists were consolidating themselves and extending their influence on 
the shop floor, Canadian industrial unions were still struggling for recognition.
Second, even the spate of legislation that substantially improved the bargaining rights 
of Canadian unions (beginning with PC 1003 in 1944, incorrectly dubbed 'Canada's 
Wagner Act') was considerably less generous to labour than its American counterpart. It 3
3. The Trad« Union« Act 11872) and tha Industrial Dispute« Investigation Act (1407) were the only major pieces of
Canadian legislation purporting to regulate industrial relations until just before the war. While mainstream 
' Canadian industrial relations scholars eg. Woods 047.0 cite the latter as an advance, several Canadian labour 
historians, notably Craven <I4M)> B Palmer 04HJI and Waman (I486) have insisted that it 'gave no protection 
to unions, stripped organized workers of the ability to esploit the timing of a dispute, and provided no 
guarantees that workers would not be dismissed before or after the process of negotiation." IB. Palmer, 14(0.
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has been argued that only in the post-war period and into the 50's were Canadian unions, 
through waves of strikes, able to gain the basic rights that US unions had enjoyed for more 
than a decade and a half (Warrian, 1986). Thus, rather than 'coming to terms' with 
unions, most large Canadian employers continued to resist them until a period when 
economic conditions were more in the employers' interest.
Third, and most importantly, the legislation that did finally guarantee Canadian 
unions recognition rights firmly prohibited all strikes within the term of the agreement.
In the context of job control, this point is significant. Several authors, including Herding 
(1972) and Tolliday & Zeitlin (1982) indicate that one of the mechanisms that aided US 
shopfloor bargaining in the beginning and then kept it alive long after bureaucratic, 
higher level bargaining had become the norm was the right (though extensively bargained 
away) of workers to strike within term. While the US courts moved to tighten up the right 
to strike while negotiable issues were in arbitration in the late SO's and early 60's, there 
has always been some lawful leeway for shopfloor groups to press their claim by striking6- 
And US workers have used it (Herding, 1973, p. 30) both to make sectional gains and to 
press the larger union into a more militant stances. In Canada such legal rights were 
snuffed out entirely at the same time as recognition rights were granted.
Canada, then, was subject to the same, if not greater, restrictions on challenging 
managerial prerogative than those developed in the US in the postwar period. That 
Canadian unions in the 80's have been better able than their US cousins to resist the 
wholesale erosion of what rights remained, is another story7-
In contrast to the hemmorhage of shopfloor bargaining and job control in North 
America, several of the US authors have looked longingly toward what they consider a 
last bastion of those features— Britain. Brody compares the strong control exerted by US 
union headquarters and master collective agreements and the last gasps of U S  workplace 
militancy to Britain,
"where union contrecu did nol penetrate down to the factory floor, (andl the «hop stewards 
carved out a bargaining realm quite independent of the union structure." (IV80, p. 2061
6. See Chapter *. page * for a brief description of US law on strikes during the term of an agreement.
Haiven argues that the high degree of decentralisation of Canadian unions, their aggressive recruitment and
their relative lack of illusions about managerial and governmental animosity, at well at some legal, corporate 
and public policy differences between the two countries have thus /er allowed Canadian unions to more 
successfully resist the new employer onslaught.
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Lichtenstein compares the heyday of US union militancy to
...what came to characterise large section* of British industry in the postwar era. There a 
militant, semiautonomous shop stewards movement won a central role in the life of the unions 
representing car workers. While [external unions) still negotiated periodic pay adjustments, these 
company-wide arrangements were little more than a platform from which stewards could legitimately 
seek to win improved conditions in direct confrontations with plant management" (I'MtO, p. ¿Mi)
lolliday and Zeitlin (1982)correctly criticise these overly simplistic and idealistic 
models of British industrial relations. They show that in many parts of British industry, 
the model of union job control took shape only in the late SO's and early 60's and has been 
subject to erosion by management ever since. Where it reached its fullest flower and 
management effectively abdicated control, they contend, the unions seldom responded by 
imposing their own rationale upon production. In fact, unions became locked into a 
vicious spiral of sectionalism and pettiness, riding a treadmill to nowhere"*
Where Tolliday and Zeitlin'scase falls apart is in their attempt to so magnify the 
extent of US shopfloor job control as to actually reverse the common wisdom and prove 
that US unions constrained managerial prerogative more than British in the postwar era. 
Edwards (1986) does a good job destroying their argument (pp. 185-192) while tempering 
Brody's and Lichtenstein's romanticism with facts gleaned from several empirical studies. 
But a further point needs to be added. Tolliday and Zeitlin make the fatal error of judging 
the US and Britain by two different standards. In Britain, they gauge the extent of job 
controls as we have defined them above and as imposed by unions at the shopfloor. But 
presumably finding little evidence of either in the US, they turn to restrictions upon 
management imposed by collective agreements and in the area of discipline and seniority 
only. In light of what has been said above, they miss the point entirely so that what seems 
to be an important and novel thesis dissipates.
They quote Piore on how seniority rules, which were once easily tolerated by US 
employers, now restrict their flexibility. But even ignoring the severe caveats about the 
efficacy of seniority expressed above in Chapter V III, they vastly overstate the extent to 
which such restrictions impede managerial prerogative. Restrictions on internal labour 
market flexibility affect job control tangentially, not directly. And in any case, the 
restrictions are not the products of active shopfloor responses to current managerial 
initiatives but forty-year old fossils calcified by fear into collective agreements. Likewise,
S«« also Hyman 4  Elgar, IVHI; Edwards. IVM>; Belanger 4  Evans. IWtHI.
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they drag out the old chestnut of high union "win” rates in discharge arbitration (counting 
a win as any altering of the penalty), unmindful that the figures they themselves use show 
a 75%  management success rate in upholding discipline (p. 30). Again, even ignoring the 
severe caveats expressed on discipline arbitration in Chapter V II, they provide no 
substantive evidence to conclude that disciplinary procedures are a significant direct 
constraint on managerial prerogative^. 30).
Where they can point to restrictions in the area of job control, the pickings are thin 
and the evidence sketchy. They cite a UAW -GM  provision providing that workers could 
meet production standards working at a "reasonable pace". Though this is a unique clause 
by North American standards, our discussion of the limitations of CANBREW ’s "fair day’s 
work" clause suggests that it is dangerous to read off substantive restriction of managerial 
prerogative from collective agreement language without exploring how it has come to be 
interpreted by arbitrators and how it actually works on the shop floor.
As well as indicating that US and British unions were seriously limited in their 
challenge to managerial authority even at the best of times, Tolliday and Zeitlin conclude 
with the popular pessimism that defensive systems of control in neither country
"have...proved affective in remting determined managerial counter-offensive» in the 
haraher economic and political climate of the IV701« and HOY’ Ip. 341
However, this ignores the essential difference between the countries (and between 
Britain and Canada also). In Britain, job rights were won by shop floor militancy and 
those that persist have been maintained by shop floor militancy. In North America, they 
were also won by shop floor militancy but those that persist have been maintained only as 
imprints of that militancy, unreceptive of the breath of life to respond to the problems of 
a different era. This has severely limited the ability of unions in resisting employer 
offensives. As Panitch and Swartz have said of the Canadian approach:
”(it]...did not juat weaken the apparent importance of militant organization, but directed 
the effort» of union leader» away from mobilizing and organizing toward» the juridical arena...In thi» 
conteit. different »kill* were nccesaary; it wa» crucial above all to know the law-legal righu, 
procedure», precedent», etc. Theae activitie» tended to foater a legaliatic practice and con»ciou»ne»» 
in which union right» appeared a» privilege» bellowed by the itata rather than democratic freedom» 
won and defended by collective »truggle." (I‘»H5, p. M -V; see alao Tomlin», IWtSI
It is to the present-day legacy of these historical processes that we now turn.
3. The Canadian Plants
3.1 Job Control in Collective Agreements
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The Relative Scarcity o f  Job Control Language. The general rule of Canadian 
dispute resolution has already been thoroughly discussed: where a collective agreement is 
silent, managerial prerogative prevails. While arbitrators have been seen in Chapter V 
to have limited power of 'adjustment' in some areas of the agreement, job control is the 
area in which they will, and are expected to, exercise it the least. For it is in this area that 
arbitrators perceive "legitimate business reasons" to be at their highest and potential 
employee injury at its lowest. The only exception is where collective agreement language 
clearly challenges managerial prerogative. But Canadian collective agreements contain 
little or no language on job control. In their survey of contents of agreements covering 
500 employees or more (reproduced in Kumar et al., 1986), Labour Canada lists only a 
few items that might come under this heading. The following are the listed topics that 
might conceivably involve job control and some practical qualifications to their 
effectiveness:
Collective agreement 'reopener' clauses for technological change are extremely rare 
(fewer than . I % of the agreements listed have one) and are in any case usually meant to 
deal with questions of exit from the i.I.m., not job control questions (ibid., p. 382). More 
importantly, seldom, if ever, do they allow the right to strike’*- Statutory provisions to 
reopen agreements for technological change (mentioned in Chapters 111 and VI11) in some 
provinces have similar limitations.
The right to refuse overtime appears in about half of the collective agreements (ibid., 
p. 388). While gaining this right cannot be said to be a major restriction on managerial 
prerogative (since employers can usually find enough willing candidates for overtime), 
not having this right can be quite prejudicial to employees:
"Arbitrators have consistently recognized that, uniats overtime is made explicitly voluntary 
in the agreement, employees will be obliged to work overtime if requested. An tm p lo y r  is not 
rtquirtd  to be able to show the! overtime is  n tc tiitry" . (Palmer, IVHJ, p. 6.W. emphasis added)
What is more, any collective refusal to work overtime on the part of even a few 
employees, and even where it is voluntary in the collective agreement, can be deemed an 
illegal strike (ibid. p. 635).
<*. Even if such agreements did allow for the right to strike, such provision would be rendered null and void by the 
labour relations lagislation of the appropriate jurisdiction.
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While the law in many provinces makes workplace safety committees compulsory and 
in some provinces gives workers the ’right to refuse' unsafe work, it is interesting to note 
that more than a quarter of the agreements contain no safety provisions (Kumar et al.,
1986, p. 401) and more than 9 3%  contain no environmental protection provisions (p. 
402). Safety, however, is one area where job control issues are vented, as will be seen 
presently.
Yet in contrast to the scarcity of language on job control is the abundance of 
management's rights clauses. They appear in over three-quarters of the agreements 
(ibid., p. 393), even though arbitrators generally agree that such provision is implicit (see 
Chapter 111) and therefore not required. Canadian collective agreements are as much 
normative documents as collections of terms and conditions of employment. Unlike their 
British counterparts, they are meant to be read and taken to heart.
Explicit provisions fo r  job control. Those few agreements that do have explicit 
provisions on job control immediately capture attention when they reach the arbitral 
forum. One such well-known case is York University0 wherein a university bookshop 
secretary grieved her boss's order to fetch him a coffee. This case is highly significant 
because it is the exception to the rule of absence of job control provisions in Canadian 
collective agreements. How it was treated, then, can and does say much about the issue.
So it deserves to be discussed in some detail.
Hailed as a great step forward for Canadian trade unionists and women workers, it 
owes little to arbitral progressivism and much to the collective bargaining perseverance 
of the union for this advance. But for a quite unique provision in the collective 
agreement, the grievance would surely have failed:
If an cmployaa i* required to perform any dutie* of a personal nature not connected with the 
approved operations of the University he/she may file a grievance
The clause was sought and won precisely because the vast majority of the union 
members were women and precisely to avoid the indignity of such servile 'women's' tasks 
as fetching coffee. Confronted with an order she though directly contravened the spirit, if 
not the letter of the agreement, the grievor (presumably reluctantly) followed the 'obey 
now and grieve later rule'. When the grievance finally came to arbitration (almost a year IO.
IO. ft«. York U n i v m t r U  L.A.C (Jd> 80 (Brunner. ITV).
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later), the union requested that the arbitrator retrospectively declare requests to fetch 
coffee 'illegal' and enjoin the employer from so demanding in the future. The union 
further requested a ruling on whether a secretary could be required to fetch coffee for 
meetings between her supervisors and their suppliers and/or customers. Only because the 
employer raised no objection did the arbitrator agree to engage in this second, 
hypothetical, exercise. In argument on both issues, the union relied on the specific 
agreement clause and the fact that coffee-fetching did not appear in the grievor's job 
description.
The employer made an immediate preliminary objection, claiming that, in allowing 
the grievor merely to "file a grievance", the clause offered no injunctive relief. The 
arbitrator disagreed, stating that injunctive relief flowed from the definition of 
"grievance" elsewhere in the collective agreement.
On the main question, the arbitrator did find the requirement to fetch coffee for a 
supervisor to be a violation of the collective agreement and enjoined such activity in the 
future11- But on the second request, interestingly, he ruled against the union, stating
' * •  have no heaitation whatever in stating that a request addressed to the secretary of the 
director of bookstores to purchase coffee at the University's cafeteria and/or serve the same at a 
meeting or conference attended by her supervisors and buyers and sellers of books or other printed 
materials normally handled by the bookstores, is not a requirement to perform a duty of a personal 
nature not connected with the approved operations of the University, within the meaning of those 
words in (the relevant collective aareement clause).
"...It is obviously in the interest of the University to obtain the most favourable terms it can 
for the purchasing and selling of books." (p. M-B4)
Thus began the arbitrator in his circumscription of the impact of the award. On the 
question of job description, the arbitrator reiterated the standard jurisprudential attitude
" It  has long been recognized by arbitrators that a job description does not and cannot in a 
living and growing enterprise, include every duty and usk that an employee may be required to 
perform. There are, in our view, of necessity, certain duties which are ancillary or incidental to the 
main or major dutiea that are normally delineated in a job description "  Ip. H5I
This makes perfectly clear that in the absence of the special language, the grievance 
would have failed entirely. Even where job descriptions exist, they do not constrain 
management's right to assign tasks. The effect of job classifications on job control will be 
discussed in more detail presently.
II. Though tht arbitrator enjoined such activity in tha future, this would not, of court«, release a future gri«vor from 
tha "obey now, griava later” rule (sea Chapter VI).
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The significance of the above case lies not in the union victory, for such collective 
agreement language is indeed rare, but rather in just how tightly the arbitrator 
circumscribed his ruling. Despite or perhaps because of the symbolic importance of the 
case for 'human dignity at work', the arbitrator chided the union (and the employer) for 
bringing the case before him:
"...w# deprecate the fact that a grievance of thia type hat proceeded to arbitration."
He also took pains to qualify the precedent-setting impact of his award:
"We do not think that tupcrvitort should be discouraged by this award from asking their 
secretaries to purchase coffee from time to time and we hope that secretaries will not be inclined to 
stubbornly refuse to comply with reasonable requests of this kind."
Moreover, the arbitrator also took pains to limit the strength of the award's challenge 
to managerial prerogative, as seen in his response to the written dissent of the employer's 
nominee on the arbitration board. In her opinion, fetching coffee, though clearly a duty of 
a 'personal' nature, could not be considered unconnected to the 'approved operations of 
the University’. To this the arbitrator replied that because the relevant clause was so 
clearly intended to abridge general management's rights, to read it otherwise would be to 
make a mockery of it.
For that very reason, however, this particular arbitration case may have an effect 
quite opposite to that for which it is hailed. Rather than advancing the cause of union job 
control, it may actually further constrain the narrow purview of arbitrators in these 
matters. Our old friend expressio unius (encountered in Chapter V) is applicable here.
If the York University collective agreement contains a clause expressly limiting 
managerial prerogative, then the vast majority of collective agreements, which do not 
contain such a clause automatically grow weaker. A  clever management lawyer could 
make a convincing argument as follows: 'The particular parties in York University 
wanted to limit managerial discretion in task assignment so they negotiated an explicit 
clause. In the absence of such a clause, we must assume that parties to an agreement 
in tend to leave managerial discretion unfettered." Nothing, of course, could be farther 
from the truth. Yet the argument has a perverse and compelling logic.
The CANBREW  agreement has a similar express provision on job control— the 'fair 
day's work' referred to earlier, which the union has attempted to enforce several times 
unsuccessfully. One arbitration case on the issue is a fine example of the limitations of
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such provisions in collective agreements. But even more interesting than the actual result 
of the case is what it says about the process of struggle between union and management 
over job control issues in Canada.
The case involved truck drivers and a maintenance employee who, among other 
duties, washed their vehicles. Management had transferred a deceased employee's duties 
to the 'vehicle washer'. The union's first grievance cited the failure of the employer to 
post the deceased's job. When the vehicle washer, with his new duties, found it impossible 
to complete his washing tasks, several drivers voluntarily washed their own vehicles. 
Their supervisor followed eagerly by asking all drivers to 'voluntarily' do this task. 
Concerned about the creeping augmentation to their job content, the union instructed 
drivers to resist:
Dear Brothari:
At the special meeting held on April Y1, the following motion was overwhelmingly approved:
'N o  driver will waih his unit nor run it through the truck wash unless given a direct order 
to do so by the Company. In the event that such an order is given, the work is to be done 
under protest!*
As a result, this is now official Union policy and it it expected that each member will comply with
this rule.
Faced with such a direct challenge, the employer responded quickly so as not to set a 
precedent (see Estoppel, Chapter V). The transportation supervisor issued a memo to all 
drivers explicitly ordering them to wash their trucks. Obeying 'now' under protest, the 
union grieved later, alleging violation of the 'fair day's work' clause12*
The two grievances proceeded jointly to arbitration. Acknowledging the 'fair day's 
work' clause as a "unique provision" the arbitrator celebrated the novelty of the matter in 
the first sentence of his award, declaring, 'Th is is an interesting case". On the issue of 
posting the deceased's job, he turned to the jurisprudence, which allows management 
sizable leeway in deciding whether a vacancy exists. In the words of one case cited.
U. To save the reader from flipping back to Chapter III, the 'fair day's work' clausa reads as follows:
Clause *A*: The Company shall supply adequate manpower in all operations in all 
departments at all times so that an employee will not be required to perform more than a
Clause *B*: Clause 'A *  shall not be construed to mean that the manning of all operations is 
a at present exactly adequate or that all employees are presently assigned exactly a fair day's 
work and accordingly changes in an employee's work load may be made so long as the 
resulting situation is not a violation of Clause *A*.
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" It  •* well eatabhahed that a vacancy need not be poated amply because an exiating job in a 
classification 1a not filled. Rather the company muat firat initially determine if they require a 
person to do that job...However...the company's opinion must be exercised on the basis of a 
reasonable view of the objective facta as they exist..
The arbitrator Found when the time spent per day by all drivers washing their trucks 
was aggregated (2 I /2 hours), it did not justify the creation of a vacancy (arbitrators have 
required almost a full day's continuous work to exist before they will overrule an 
employer)13 4. Thus, barring any further express language to the contrary, the case would 
have failed.
But such language did exist in the 'fair day's work' clause and to this the arbitrator 
turned his attention. Although drivers worked an average of 53 to 55 hours per week, the 
union argued that the small amount of extra vehicle washing work, (eight minutes per 
driver per trip), was "the straw that broke the camel's back". But when none of the 
drivers testifying claimed that the 53 to 55 hours per week "put them in a position of 
performing more than a fair day's pay", the arbitrator declared the extra work ”de 
minimus"  (a trifle) and dismissed the case.
To the arbitrator, to any other outside observer and by any objective standard, the 
case may well have been de minimus. But it rubbed the noses of the employees concerned 
in their powerlessness to assert job control. Baldamus correctly observes that
"in  th* worker'! definition of the xituation. minute detail* are often very important for hi* 
evaluation of cuatomary effort level*." (IVbl, p. 99-KX»
Like the "man against job" seniority clause considered in the previous chapter, the 
pains taken in interests negotiation to improve collective agreement language had yielded 
frustration in rights adjudication. Moreover, having won the clause in the collective 
agreement, and with little other outlet than insubordination or sabotage15, the work group 
concerned and consequently the union, is obliged to use it. So a vicious circle emerges. 
Alert, even supersensitive, to affronts, work groups and the union seek redress by the 
limited means available. Defeat dissapoints but renders them even more sensitive and 
driven to assert the rights they think they have. And so it continues. In the relative
13. He Horton Stool Work. 3 L A  C. (2d) S4at 5h IRaynar, IVU).
14. Ho. Horton Stool, *upr*.
15. Sea Z*b*la, I9K3 for an axponlion of th* u*a of aabotag* by U S car factory workar* frustrated by thair inability to
•xarciM job control. Whil* Zabala find* *oma ability to baraam with thi* activity, h* admit* it i* limited and
th* affect moatly negative
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absence of control over work itself, the work group and the union become obsessed with 
the notion of a 'fair day's work'. Hyman and Brough suggest that,
"the notion •ervei primarily to contain and »ublimatc a potential conflict between thoie in 
manaaerial and thoie in subordinate positions. Its use is to sustain a sense of work obligation among 
those whose work offers little or no intrinsic motivation to high performance and to denounce those 
who fail to meet managerial espectations. This is to imply that the concept is ideological*. IIV»5. p.
»1
The process of defining a 'fair day's work' and thus of "contain!ing] and sublimating] 
conflict" is far more advanced in our British plants, and especially at BRITBREW, where, 
coincidentally a very similar set of events to those just discussed took place. At the outset, 
it is important to note that, unlike at CANBREW  where drivers are paid a flat rate, 
payment by results at BR ITBREW  means that the price of nearly every aspect of 
draymen's work is negotiated. Whenever management proposes to add or subtract tasks, 
whether they be marginal or not, the change is a potential subject for negotiation, as is 
manning. However, this does not necessarily mean that every work change results in a 
monetary change or that management and labour always agree. It simply means that it is 
a legitimate area for negotiation. In fact, because 'everything is negotiable', work groups 
may occasionally take on ex gratia extra tasks. BRITBREW  employed a man to pump 
diesel fuel into the lorries; but when he proved incapable of doing his job as quickly as 
draymen required, many of them pumped the fuel themselves. Management did not feel 
constrained to respond by institutionalising the new tasks as its Canadian counterpart did. 
Nor did the work group or the union feel bound to refuse to do the work. This is not to say 
that disputes do not break out over such issues, merely that they are not bound to break 
out as they seem to be in Canada. Lupton describes this very process as it operated in his 
piece work shop:
"The itrcngth and aolidanty of lha worker«, and tha flexibility of the management tyitem of 
control, made a form of adjuatment poaeible in which different values about a fair day's work, and 
about 'proper' worker behaviour, could aaist side by side*. (IV72, p. I3V>
If the relative lack of language on job control issues in Canadian collective 
agreements were taken as an indication that such issues are not important to Canadian 
workers and their unions, the notion should easily be dispelled by the above examples.
The fact that strong and/or highly-motivated unions do bargain such clauses despite the 
odds against them demonstrates the desire is alive. But there is a good reason why 
language on job control is scarce— the interests apparatus is the worst possible forum for
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the handling of such issues. In order to be handled by this apparatus, the job control issue 
must be reduceable to a set of words that will cover eventualities within the term of the 
agreement. But this is almost impossible. More than remuneration, discipline and i.I.m. 
structuring issues, job control issues are difficult to predict in advance, because they 
emerge from the exigencies of production itself. If the wording is too general, two 
problems emerge: either it is so vague a statement of intent as to be useless or it is so 
comprehensive that no employer in its right mind would allow itself to be so restricted 
(unless equally comprehensive wording qualifies the working of the clause, as in the 
CANBREW  'fair day's work' clause). When a union attempts to introduce new language 
into a collective agreement using the interests apparatus, the employer will demand to 
know its reasons. Unless the union can point to a specific instance of past injury, the 
employer will naturally resist. Likewise, union members will not readily be mobilised to 
fight for such language. On the other hand, if the union can demonstrate a precise motive, 
and language is negotiated to cover it, the wording may be too particular, risking 
unenforceability unless the exactly appropriate set of circumstances arises within term. 
Arbitral conservatism in this area, as seen in the York University case, makes the risk of 
overparticularity even more acute.
It should be obvious from previous discussion that the adjustment apparatus is the 
most appropriate vehicle for handling job control issues. But, as seen, that avenue is so 
embryonic in Canada as to render job control almost totally hors de combat.
3.2 Tangential Approaches to Job Control
Given the scarcity of agreement language directly on job control and the unfledged 
development of shop-floor bargaining, the main way of approaching the issue in Canada is 
obliquely, through tangential issues such as pay, discipline and i.I.m. structuring. Unions 
can, sometimes without directly aiming to, involve job control in a dispute by combining it 
with or masking it with another issue. Likewise spontaneous resistance to changes in 
work practices can emerge in other guises.
Job Classifications and Work Assignments. When management adds to, subtracts 
from or changes the tasks involved in a job, unions sometimes launch grievances. Where 
no job descriptions exist, the arbitrator has little to work from except verbal evidence, 
which may do little to pin down the exact job content, especially in the rarified
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atmosphere of the hearing room so far removed from the shop floor. But even where job 
descriptions are explicit, the general arbitral rule is quite rigorous:
"A n  employer ha« the ri(ht to institute new work processes end new classifications for 
them, or to redistribute tasks amona or within existing classifications in order to reorganize his work 
force. There is no implied proprietary right of an employee in the job duties he is actually 
performing and specific provisions of the agreement must be relied on to restrict managerial 
initiative. 7>te existence o f  en egread-to wage structure is not such e restriction on 
menagerie/ work assignments since it mere/y gives the employee to whom the work is given e 
possible rig h t  to grieve about the propriety o f  the wage ha is given fo r  the work ha is 
doing,lft"  (emphasis added)
In the italicised portion the arbitrator is saying that where job content has changed, 
the best and nearly the only claim is for a change in pay. Yet even such a claim is very 
difficult to make:
‘Job content of a classification is unaffected by an increase in work load and a person 
cannot claim a different classification simply because the amount of work has increased” (Palmer,
IVM, p. 477»
And even if a "real and substantial change in job duties and responsibilities" (ibid., p. 478) 
is found, in the absence of appropriate collective agreement language, the arbitrator may 
well lack the jurisdiction to set a new wage, leaving such determination to managerial 
discretion until the next round of collective bargaining.
In the absence of a wage-change claim a grievance may successfully challenge the job- 
content change only where the union (given that the onus is on it) is able to prove that the 
change was undertaken without legitimate business reasons cither with the intent and/or 
the result of subverting other rights in the collective agreement such as seniority. But this 
is rare.
Some sets o f parties (especially in the very large bargaining units in steel and auto) 
provide for joint input into job evaluation and wage-setting, engaging in 'cooperative 
wage study' schemes. But these schemes are often highly constrained by job rating and 
pricing systems developed and monitored by compensation consultants. Yet trade 
unionists attempt to become involved in even such limited exercises, another example of 
the latent desire for some job control. The CAN M ET  convenor has attempted for some 
time, unsuccessfully, to persuade the employer to agree to a joint project of this type.
‘Oftan whan tha company introduce« naw equipment, worker!1 job* become let» «killed.
Sometime« they become more «killed. The company ju«t decide« unilaterally how to rate the naw 
job«. We've luaaaated cooperative wage ttudy for many year« but the company «hoot« it down. They 
don't teem to want ui to have a «ay in thi«.*
Ih. He. Algoma Steal, IV L.A.C. 236. at 243(We.ler, l%H).
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Incentive Schemes. Payment systems providing bonuses for work performed lend 
themselves much more readily to job control by work groups and unions than straight 
compensation systems, especially when unions have managed to obtain negotiating rights 
in these matters. Job content, task assignment, manning and work speed all become 
potential subjects of co-determination. To British observers (Lupton, 1963; Brown,
1973), it is well known that piecework bargaining provides the "hothouse conditions” 
(ibid., p. I ) for job control.
Roy's (1952) and Burawoy's (1979 ) descriptions of piece work in (the same) Chicago 
machine shop and their comments on its effects on inter-worker relations have become 
well known in the academic literature. Yet because of the (deserved) popularity of these 
works, an incorrect impression may have been given about the popularity and ubiquity of 
piecework in North America. Compared to Britain, payment by results schemes are 
relatively unpopular with North American labour and management alike and have been 
for some forty years. Where they still exist, managerial prerogative is jealously guarded.
Stone (1973) claims that US steel companies brought piece work systems in at the 
turn of the century over the militant opposition of unions,
"to break up any community of inUrett that mi(ht lead worker) to «low their pace (what 
employer« call ‘reatriction of output') o r unite in other way) to oppo>c management" (p. 44)
Schatz (1983), however, claims that such schemes were highly popular among pre-war 
and wartime electrical engineering workers and that their union eagerly participated in 
rate-setting. Lichtenstein (1980) maintains that pre-war and wartime autoworkers on 
piece rates were the militant leaders of automobile unionism.
Whatever the case, after the war, a managerial imperative away from piece rates 
emerged, picking up steam through the fifties and sixties. Schatz (1983) relates that:
“The hutory of worker)' >trugglc> regarding piecework and money ■> a record of advance 
followed by retreat. Unionitation and economic recovery ao greatly changed the balance of power in 
encounter) between worker) and auperviaora that by the early IVSO'a management had begun a aearch 
for alternative) to incentive pey." (p. 160)
As Slichter et al. found in the late 50's, piece rates were more and more restricted to 
"piece rate industries" at the competitive end of the spectrum such as clothing and labour- 
intensive engineering (1960, pp. 522-5). Employers in the more sophisticated industries 
found truth in the comment of Slichter et al. that "piece rates are in some degree 
substitutes for refined management methods" (ibid., p. 523), which then became part of
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managerial ideology. Indeed, managers in both our Canadian plants echoed this sentiment 
proudly, though an incentive plan had existed at C A N M E T  up to 1978. A C A N M E T  
supervisor insists that the incentive plan was rough on equipment, as workers drove 
machinery to its limit, and that workers took on a 'devil take the other guy' attitude. The 
more quality became a concern of production, the less beneficial the incentive scheme 
became.
Certainly in Canadian unionised workplaces, incentive schemes are rarer than in 
Britain. To illustrate the trend, while only 20%  of collective agreements in the Labour 
Canada survey had incentive schemes in 1973, by 1986 this number had been cut in half. 
Incentive plans are somewhat more popular in unionised manufacturing plants, with 40%  
of agreements in the survey containing them in 1986 (Kumar et al., 1986, p. 401,422)). 
Incentive schemes also tend to be offered only where individual worker input forms a 
large part of value added and where worker output can be accurately measured'7-
Whatever their initial feelings, North American unions have by and large come to 
distrust payment by results. While C A N M ET  management may have lost a strong 
commitment to the scheme by 1978, consistent union pressure against it, culminating in a 
strike, brought about its end. The C A N M ET  convenor, echoing the situation in Burawoy's 
(1979) machine shop, remembers that
“the incentive scheme only created friction among the work forca. Everyone wanted better 
tool* and didn't get them. They used to bribe the foremen for the best jobs and do other things to 
please them."
The management of the CANM ET scheme was indicative of Canadian managerial 
attitudes to incentives (and perhaps Canadian managerial attitudes in general). In 
contrast to much of the British system, the plan was tightly run, with keen vigilance and 
almost obsessive tightening of the standards upward. The union had little say in the 
running of the scheme and work study engineers were distrusted by the workers. What 
records are available prior to 1978 indicate an inordinately high number of grievances on 
the subject of incentives. One steward describes the frustration:
"The standard, got tougher, wiping out the increase in earning« we presumed in 
negotiations. After negotiations, the company would send in the time study men who would jack up 
the standards. When I started in I972, we had to build J  1/2 (units! per shift to go into bonus 
earnings. By 1978, when the plan ended, we had to build S  (units). But nothing about the building
P. As opposed to Britain, as will soon he seen, where payment by 'results' estends to many groups of workers where 
results is virtually unmeasurable.
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process had chanted. So worker* took shortcut* on safety. For one whole year. I never made any 
bonus to I said 'Fuck it"*.
The move to measured day work, however, can bring other problems. While monetary 
incentives contain their own whip, measured day work requires more active discipline by 
the employer. A particularly apposite case is Great Atlantic and Pacific* wherein the 
employer used a non-incentive piece system to measure employee productivity. When an 
employee consistently failed to meet the standards set, he was disciplined. The arbitrator 
noted that
"tht union has not disputed at any time the reasonableness of the programme which was 
instituted to raise the performance level of its employees in these facilities and which obviously was 
done for e proper business reason and not to discriminate against any of its employees''.
naturally failing to note that the union was in an especially disadvantaged position to 
raise such objections until such time as an employee was disciplined by which time 
it is probably too late (see Chapter V on the inefficacy of hypothetical challenges to 
employer rules).
The effort bargain, then, is one more aspect of job control in Canada where union 
participation is minimal. Because of the nature of the bargaining system, it is a case of 
'damned if you do and damned if you don't'. Where incentive plans exist, lack of control by 
work groups and union make them a potential source of great frustration. Where they do 
not, the self-expression of workers is further restricted, inviting conflict.
Job Control and Sqfety. Armstrong et al. (19 8 1) have asserted that workers will 
attempt to couch demands of questionable legitimacy in the most legitimate terms 
available, even if this involves exaggeration of some order. In Canada, job control is a 
very 'illegitimate' concern while safety is a very 'legitimate' one. With few other outlets 
available, it is here that job control concerns, often clumsily, often explosively, 
occasionally emerge.
This is especially evident at CANMET. Several wildcat strikes, as described in 
Chapter V I, have had safety as their spark. Yet further questioning about them reveals a 
buildup of tension in these work areas over a number of issues of work speed and job 
content, with safety complicatedly ravelled up in them. In another instance, a militant 
C A N M ET  steward took it upon himself to "shake things up”, in the words of the convenor. 18
18. Re. Greet Atlentic and Pacific Co. Ltd., J LA.C. (.id) 40.) (Brown, 1982).
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in  a particularly sleepy department. This he proceeded to do in an aggressive way. To the 
employer's annoyance, a flurry of safety grievances on previously uninvestigated matters 
(problems of heat, dirt, dust, noise and fumes) ensued. More than complaining about 
safety, though, he was in effect disrupting the process which Baldamus (1961) has called 
"inurement”. One day the steward complained to his foreman that his press was turning 
out faulty product due to poor maintenance (two bolts had sheared off). The foreman 
dismissed the steward for a coffee break while he fixed the machine. After a quick repair 
job, the foreman placed a (more quiescent) relief worker on the press but soon the bolts 
sheared again causing an arm of the machine to fall away. Back from his coffee break, the 
steward surveyed the new damage and erupted in anger, excoriating the foreman for 
shoddy supervision and "almost killing me”. When the foreman complained that the 
steward was blowing the safety issue out of all proportion, the steward is alleged (by the 
employer) to have grabbed the foreman by the collar and punched him. When the steward 
was suspended (and later discharged on another, minor, incident), the union angrily 
claimed victimisation. At the time of the study, a year and a half had elapsed since the 
suspension and neither grievance had been resolved, making for a festering sore point in 
relations between the parties. The incident illustrates a major problem in 'legitimacy 
transfer': while it is one way of venting job control problems, it almost invariably leads to 
more conflict and frustration.
Job Control and Discipline. The above story serves as well as any other in the study as 
an illustration of a point made earlier in the discussion of discipline: what emerge as 
disputes over job control and cannot find legitimate expression there may find their way 
through to the disciplinary forum as insubordination. It is difficult to prove this 
conclusively. Yet the inference begs to be drawn from the evidence. Arbitrators have 
dealt with enough cases of insubordination to list the most common causes for discipline in 
this area:
i) refusal lo perform normal work
ill refusal lo work outside of normal classification
hi) defiant slowness to respond to sn order
iv) refusal to perform work in the manner requested by management
v) refusal to attempt to meet production standards, whether rtatonablt or not
vi) refusal to buy and wear safety equipment
vii) refusal to perform contracted-out work
viii) refusal to accept promotion
(Palmer, IVM. pp. X V-* , emphasis added)
Chapter IX...page 304
as well as refusal to work 'reasonable' amounts of overtime (unless the collective 
agreement makes it voluntary) (ibid., pp. 340). Clearly, the majority are job-control 
issues.
Indeed, CANBREW  employees have been disciplined (usually short of discharge) for, 
among other things: refusing to carry a large amount of cash (for fear of being mugged); 
for taking a break at shift-end though ordered to go straight into overtime work; and for 
yelling and swearing at a supervisor when the latter phoned the employee at home to 
request extra hours. CANM ET  employees have been disciplined for, among other things: 
refusing to carry a pager, refusal to work overtime, shoving a foreman in an argument; 
harsh words to a foreman; and changing shifts without permission.
3.3 Summary
As can be seen, job control issues in Canada are seldom addressed directly, either 
through explicit collective agreement language or through appeals to arbitral adjustment. 
Employers jealously guard their prerogatives in this area, arbitrators tread warily and 
unions exercise extreme caution. But the impulse still burns brightly. Left to their own 
devices, shopfloor work groups and individual stewards attempt to use what vehicles are 
available to vent their concerns. But these are of limited usefulness as arbitrators seldom 
allow them to intrude on the terrain of job control. What is lacking entirely is the sense 
that joint regulation in this area is in any sense a legitimate preoccupation of unions. This 
becomes much clearer when compared to the situation in Britain.
4. The British Plants
A fair amount of space has been devoted to describing what may have seemed an 
obvious assumption: that the amount of bargaining, at higher or shop floor levels, on job 
control in Canadian workplaces is minimal. This was necessary because actually little 
empirical work and theoretical literature has accompanied the assumption. But it was 
also argued that the urge for job control was no less strong among Canadian workers than 
any others, so a certain amount of searching about was necessary to track down the outlets 
available and used for venting concerns here. Also, Tolliday and Zeitlin's (1982) 
exaggerated claims about the vibrancy of US shopfloor bargaining throughout the postwar 
era begged answering. Turning to Britain, a much greater body of literature covers this 
ground, so less space needs be taken to describe the situation. The questions that need to
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be answered are: to what extent do struggles over job control in our plants reflect what 
has been written about the fate of job control in the late 1980's in Britain and what are 
the consequences for comparative industrial conflict?
By the 70's union shopfloor job control and rampaging stewards in Britain had 
become the stuff of legend both at home and abroad. Much of the blame for poor British 
industrial performance was directed at union 'restrictive practices', even by left-of- 
centre authors (Kilpatrick & Lawson, 1980). Yet after only a few years of Thatcherism, 
the decline of shopfloor union power and the rise of the "macho manager" had become the 
new folklore. Several academic observers have insisted that both images are distortions 
of the truth. A line of authors (Brown, 1973; Hyman & Eiger, 1981; Tolliday & Zeitlin,
1982; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Edwards, 1986; Belanger & Evans, 1988) have 
together shown that in the 'pre-'79' period a) union shopfloor job control was not as 
widespread as popularly believed, with uneven development across industries and even 
within industries, b) it was often more a product of management laxity and attempts to 
secure production at any cost than of union strength, c) at its best, the system of job 
control was susceptible to disorder d) even at their strongest, the constraints upon 
management were task-oriented rather than challenging larger management investment 
and planning decisions, e) job control, residing in small work groups, engendered a 
sectional consciousness that barely transcended the boundaries of the factory and D even 
where considerable job control was exercised, it was more friend than foe to British 
capital. Hyman & Eiger's comment about craft workers' control is meant to apply even 
more broadly:
"Th« displacement of managerial control onto tha craft group was compatible with an 
acceptable rate of profit, in part because of the world hegemony of British capital, in part because of 
the power of notions of ‘a fair day's work': in the absence of detailed managerial discipline, workers' 
job controls contained an important element of se//-discipline...Paradoxically then, workers' job 
controls can serve the interests of capital by reinforcing workers' commitment to profitable 
production." (I9KI, p. 119)
Yet Hyman & Eiger insist that this working arrangement between labour and capital 
was always highly unstable, liable to break apart when the exigencies of capital 
accumulation altered, as it began to in the 70's. Examining four industries, they document 
management attempts to regain lost control of the labour process beginning in the 70's 
and picking up speed into the 80's as economic and political conditions changed and 
international competition intensified. Several of (heir tentative predictions about
Chapter IX...page 306
sweeping changes in working practices in railways, newspapers, steel and automobiles 
have come true.
But even a general prediction of the erosion of shopfloor controls must be qualified. 
Debates over the ascendancy of the "macho manager" (Edwards, 1985; Marchington,
1985; Mackay, 1986) continued through the 80's. Though there was copious evidence of 
managers clawing back union gains, there was also copious evidence of managerial caution 
in 'takingon' shop stewards (Terry, 1986; Batstone, 1984). Many managers echoed the 
one who told the U M IST  survey
"M y philosophy is that you get the IR you deserve anyway, and, while it might be easier at 
the moment to go and kick the unions, my view is that their turn will come back again, and they'll 
come back and kick you" (Mackay. 1986, p. 25»
As well as variations in managerial attitudes, Edwards and Scullion (1982), looking at 
seven plants, show just how huge a variation in job controls persists across and within 
industries and just how difficult it is to make sweeping generalisations about the 
pervasiveness or diminution of job control. Quite simply, it is impossible to construct 
with any degree of certainty, as in Canada, a single model of union job control in Britain. 
Our study bears this out.
At BRITMET, while job control was never as high as in 'typical' engineering plants 
(Batstone etal., 1977), the decline si nee 1981 has been dramatic. Yetat BR ITBREW , 
despite attempts by management to tighten up working practices, the union still exercises 
a degree of job control more associated with an earlier era.
But reflected in the mirror of comparison with Canada, certain features of British 
industrial relations emerge as pervasive despite these disparities, and they temper any 
discussion of differences among British workplaces. The first of these is what can be 
called mutuality, the ever-present prospect that change is negotiable, that bargaining 
about all aspects of work is neither precluded nor illegitimate. This is almost self evident 
at BRITBREW, but it also applies at BRITMET. There management control of the labour 
process is firm. Yet, as seen in earlier chapters, i f  and when the union is able to mobilise 
discontent, it is able to push the frontier of control back at certain points. Moreover, 19
19. The term mutuality has baan used to describe the system in the engineering industry and especially some auto 
plants in the days of piecework, wherein every change in job content or working conditions waa cause for 
bargaining It is the spirit, not the letter, of this phenomenon, that the present redefinition is attempting to 
catch.
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management must always second-guess the union and actively mobilise consent in order 
to be assured of "bringing the union along", quite unlike its Canadian counterpart.
A good example of this dynamic occurred in a dispute over "laundering" (tapping and 
transferring molten aluminium from a main furnace). As in Canada, safety issues served 
to 'legitimise' an issue which had heavy job control implications. The workers concerned 
(experienced and proud 'men of molten metal') had traditionally had considerable 
discretion in how laundering was done and how many men would be involved. Because of 
the danger of explosions, fire and metal spillage (see Chapter II), more than one worker 
would often participate in the process. A new casting unit manager (whom the workers 
insisted was trying to make a name for himself as 'the new broom') insisted that physically 
the job only required one man. Without consulting the union steward, he ordered the 
workers to comply . Unused to such peremptoriness, the non-consultation outraged their 
sensibilities as much as or more than the order itself. The dispute having entered 
procedure, both sides argued that 'status quo' supported their position. When the 
workers refused to comply with management's view, the new manager proceeded to 
suspend the dissidents, along with the steward who, though not involved in the laundering 
process, represented them.
Amid fraying tempers, higher management stepped in to cool things out. Although not 
given the apology the union demanded, the dissidents were paid the wages lost in their 
suspension. The whole issue went into a state of suspended animation, or a process the 
researcher observed in several disputes, which can be called 'fudging the issue. When 
pressed, management still insists that one-man laundering is necessary. The workers still 
insist the opposite. Both sides are coy about what actually takes place. According to the 
steward, "It's up to the discretion of the fireman. Sometimes we do it with one man if we 
think it's safe." According to management, new methods of work have obviated the safety 
problem (though there is some indication that this was done partly to address the 
industrial relations problem). One thing both management and union agree on however, 
is that the issue was badly handled by the new manager. A foreman is quite blunt about it:
"Management Wa* p|ain wrong. They ihould have apologned for tending the worker* home.
. It was (the new manager'll fault. He ihould have had the fellow* in and eaplained it. That'* what I 
try to do. It cut* out the animoiity. The whole i**ue of introducing change i* very touchy and ha* to 
be handled very carefully.*
The foreman puts his remarks in context:
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" I don't always go along with all that management does; I've got to work with the men."
The disciplined shop steward assesses the dispute:
T d  aay we're very moderate and there aren't many diaputea in thia part of the plant. But 
when we're riled we stick together. This all started with increases in production about two years 
previously. The men thought these increases in production would be a dangerous practice. People 
will cut corneri to get more production; t f  the workers ere heppy. they'll go elong with it.
But in thit cese, when the new broom didn't consult, the men resisted.
As suggested before, even though B R ITM ET  management has power to coerce the 
union without too much fear of outright industrial conflict, the ethos of mutuality is still 
strong, so much so that a breach of it is considered more serious than any substantive 
change. This ethos is fed by both a general tradition in British industrial relations that 
unions consider almost inviolable and a kind of pragmatic instrumentalism dear to the 
heart of British management.
4.1 The E ffort Bargain and Payment by Results
A second pervasive feature of British industrial relations that overrides the 
disparities among workplaces is the tradition of payment for effort and payment for 
change. So pervasive is this tradition that 'effort bargaining' persists even where piece 
work systems are absent. Edwards and Scullion (1982) note that under measured day 
work, stewards often "[concentrate] their bargaining pressure on the effort side of the 
wage effort bargain." In both our plants, the piecework paradigm was the reference point 
from which all ambitious shop stewards worked.
British textbooks on compensation management stress the importance of this 
remuneration system:
"Incentive schemes hive proved popular in lb* United Kingdom, more 10  than in any other 
industrial nation, and in lonu industrie» represent a considerable proportion of the task of managing 
remuneration...Research and surveys in the late sistics suggested that more than three quarters of 
firms in Britain used incentives and more than one third of the nation's labour force was covered by 
some sort of scheme." (Smith, IYM. p. I F l
Little has changed. More recent surveys indicate over 60%  of manufacturing firms 
have p.b.r. for manual workers (Brown, 1981), that 40%  of manual employees in the 
country are on p.b.r. and that these earnings make up almost 8%  of their gross weekly 
earnings (Department of Employment, 1987). Even more strikingly indicative is the 
proliferation of such schemes into work groups and sectors where worker output cannot 
be accurately measured, such as maintenance engineers and groundskeepers in factories
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and manual workers throughout the public service. A personnel manager at BRITBREW  
attempts to explain this to a foreigner:
" It 'i  part of the corporate and union philosophy in the brewing industry and many other 
industries across Britain, but especially in this area. It's part of the heritage handed down from the 
engineering industry. Even my brother who works as a lawn mower mechanic in local government 
gets incentive payments."
BR ITM ET 's  anguished experience with p.b.r. schemes is illustrative of how employers 
and unions wrestle with this tradition. The company had a small-group-specific incentive 
system until the mid 70's, which suffered the curse of many British schemes— poor design 
and insufficient vigilance by management leading to standards that were either too tight 
(leading to worker discouragement) or too loose (leading to earnings 'drift'). This gave 
way to a site-wide productivity scheme. But when productivity increased as profitability 
decreased, the employer found itself "throwing good money after bad". A subsequent 
change to a profit-sharing scheme bore no relation to productivity and resulted in much 
worker discouragement when no bonus was paid out in lean years in the early 80’s. For 
two years, without any incentive scheme, the situation drifted uncomfortably. A 
personnel manager analyses that period, adding some very prescient observations about 
why incentive schemes are so popular in Britain.
"Thar* wet a general duaatufaction on tha ihop floor with basic pay rataa...We needed a 
•yitam linked to job •atufiction. It waa very difficult under that ayetem to link pay to 
performance...For its part, tha company needs to be eb/e to mora finaly regulate worker 
output. For thair part, tha workers distrust both management and tha union. They'd like to 
tat aome control over thair earninga outside o f  what tha union can negotiate in pay rounds 
or what management decides to give them ex gratia. "
More than remuneration then, the issue is one of control, for all parties: for the 
employer to gain a more subtle touch in manipulating the levers of productivity; for the 
workers to gain input into the production process and increase job satisfaction; for the 
union to stabilise its institutional strength. The manager appreciates full well that the 
employer must "regain [or improve managerial] control by sharing it". The big question 
is exactly how much control to cede to the workers and what level of involvement the 
union should have. Although he is sagacious in noting some conflict of interests between 
the workers and the union, the relationship is complicated. At the time of the study, the 
employer had introduced yet another new scheme, developed by a compensation 
consultant. Despite the best intentions, however, it was not achieving either of these 
power of objectives well. Based on productivity rather than output (so that many factors
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outside the direct control of workers were crucial), and on large work group and site-wide 
performance rather than smaller groups, it is difficult for workers to understand and has 
led to considerable resentment (from groups who do not receive bonus) or bewilderment 
(from those who do). Moreover, while the union is formally involved in discussions to 
implement and maintain the scheme, it has little input and consequently little commitment 
to the substance of the scheme. So the struggle goes on to find the right balance of 
control between the potentially wide limits of choice offered by a weak union and the rigid 
constraints imposed by the product market and production technologies (see Chapter II).
BRITBREW , with more forebearant product market and technologies and a stronger 
union, has a much more traditional British payment by results programme. Each 
department negotiates its own incentive scheme, based upon general company principles. 
The process begins with analysis of job content by work study engineers (themselves 
company employees and members of the technical and clerical section of the same union as 
the manual workers). Unlike in Canadian plants, shop stewards and work study engineers 
have a fairly good working relationship. Occasionally there is friction and non­
cooperation from workers and stewards can result in a more compatible engineer 
carrying on the study. From the work study, manning requirements are put forward. The 
proposed bonus is calculated on a standard time to complete the task or group of tasks. 
Based on this input, union and management representatives in the unit sit down and 
hammer out a 'unit agreement' which can cover, in addition to an exact blueprint of the 
incentive scheme, hours of work, job loads, manning requirements (often as related to 
throughput), job content, working arrangements, and substantive and procedural rules. 
Thus aspects of job control undreamt of in Canadian workplaces are jointly regulated as a 
matter of course.
In reality, the operation of incentives can be divided between 'live' schemes and 'dead' 
schemes. The latter applies to the majority of production units, where the relation 
between worker input and output is more or less indeterminate (eg. maintenance, 
brewing, packaging). Although several aspects of job control are still jointly regulated, 
there is little agitation over the incentives themselves. Bonus paid is much the same in 
every pay period, being either the maximum attained in a long-moribund unit agreement 
or an average of the bonus earnings of several units. The former applies to the few
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production units where the input/output ratio is readily calculable (eg. transportation and 
staging). In these units incentive earnings fluctuate depending on throughput, worker 
effort and micro-changes in work organisation. It is in the departments with 'live' 
schemes that the fuss over these issues occurs, especially over macro-changes in work 
organisation.
An interesting cross-national insight into general problems with these schemes comes 
from a report by a senior manager of a Canadian brewing company (not CANBREW ) on a 
visit to BR ITBREW  to compare industrial relations in the two countries.
"Thar* »re a number of problem» associated with such scheme»:
tot There tend» to be eitabluhed » minimum bonu» for the achievement of Sunderd performance 
which can be a» high as "’S *  of the manmum payment. Thu», the real incentive payment 
not large enough to provide a major effort to increase production above the standard.
lb) The minimum bonus tends to be paid even when performance falls below standard.
(cl Whan the job content changes due to (altered production conditions or technological change), it 
is necessary to restudy a job. There is some U n ion  resistance to this in that the bonus tends 
to be treated as part of one's normal earnings and there is a great reluctance to see such 
reduced. As well, the Union feels that iU  members should share in the benefits resulting 
from capital espenditure-derived productivity increases.
<d> There are areas (such as Maintenance) in which the direct effort required to increase 
productivity is difficult to measure.
<e> The schemes must be manipulated in such a way as to maintain relationships between various job 
groups..."
He predicts some of the problems that might be encountered with such a scheme in 
Canada:
"In  the Canadian environment where line efficiency and manning levels are set by 
Management, it would be difficult to pay an incentive bonus in (one part of the country) in order to 
achieve efficiency levels which are reached in (other parta of the country) without any payments 
beyond the base rate. Such a program could backfire into our efficient plants and we would end up 
paying more for the same effort and levels of production."
Provocatively, he concludes:
"The general response by the Management group (at BRITBREWI was that we (Canadians) 
should not begin a programme of incentive schemes unices we absolutely have to."
A look at the operation of the incentive scheme in the transportation unit and the 
dispute surrounding its alteration is illustrative o f  the problems and the utility of such 
schemes. The original incentive scheme was drawn up in 1967 and provided for payment 
by the number of items (beer containers) per load carried on the back of the lorry and by
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the number of miles driven. As in most schemes, a ceiling was placed on bonus earnings’’"- 
Typical of much of British industry, the rates were not amended regularly and workers' 
output quickly surpassed that required to meet the ceiling. At that point, further effort 
yielded no more pay. The cleverest draymen soon found that if they deliberately tarried, 
they could maximise their bonus andovertime earnings. Naturally, productivity in beer 
delivery fell.
In 1974, the scheme was altered to raise the ceiling. This rectified matters for a 
while, but soon the workers reached the new ceiling. Over the years the old agreement 
operated, the job content of beer delivery had changed quite drastically. Lighter 
aluminium and steel kegs and casks replaced wooden ones, so that draymen could carry 
more product and expend less effort. New motorways cut down on trip  times making 
mileage payments less relevant. Yet job restudy was not undertaken for eighteen years! 
Until beer consumption fell and the market became more competitive, successive 
transportation and company managers declined to engage in the discomfort of negotiating 
a new scheme. The workers did not complain because some of them were making more 
than 175%  of the average plant earnings with 'fiddles'.
The fiddles included the following, individually or in combination: finishing deliveries 
quickly with no call-backs for previously undeliverable items; building up as much 
mileage as possible without increasing delivery time; and building in as much time as 
possible for allegedly 'legitimate' delays (eg. breakdowns). The best combination of these 
required no small amount of ingenuity.
At long last, the employer decided to 'take on' the work group on this issue. At first, 
this involved tightening up surveillance of delays and failures to deliver product and 
discipline. Next came the larger (but still limited) confrontation and industrial action 
described in previous chapters.
BRITBREW 's readjustment above worked out relatively smoothly despite the strike. 
This is because management, though less than tyrannical in its "detailed control", still 
exercised a requisite level of "general control* (Edwards, 1986). The union too, was 
essentially temperate in its exercise of power. A fundamental trust between the parties.
¿0. A BRITBREW personnel minster readily admits that ‘placing a ceiling it an admission o f a bad incentive scheme in 
the first place.*
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though shaken, was never broken. So the system 'worked' to provide for a relatively 
orderly readjustment. One contributor to moderation on both sides was undoubtedly the 
memory of the notorious brewery dispute in 1981 at Ansell's (as well, of course, as the 
recently concluded miner's strike). At Ansell's the 'system' had gone awry. There for 
several years, management had more precipitously ceded both detailed and general 
control, leaving the union with an reciprocally exaggerated sense of its own power and 
invulnerability. A fundamental breakdown in trust between the parties ensued. When the 
economic imperatives of the early 80's forced their way onto the scene, and the company 
finally 'took on' the union, disaster was almost inevitable. When management called for 
compulsory redundancies, new conditions of employment and swingeing changes in 
working practices, the workers walked out. The parent company responded by 
permanently closing the plant (a move that is reported to have been preconsidered). The 
external union finally abandoned the strike. (For a more detailed account of the strike, 
see Waddington, 1987.)
Returning to the discussion of incentive plans, the flip side of worker resistance to job 
restudy in live' incentive schemes is the expectation that when change finally does come, 
workers will be 1>ought out' or compensated for earnings lost for a set period (usually two 
years)21- In looser times, workers were known to ratchet up their earnings to maximum 
under new schemes while still on compensation for the 'loss' of earnings in the old ones. 
Management had tightened this up somewhat. Yet under the new scheme eventually 
negotiated in transportation, the employer promised to maintain the average earnings of 
the draymen group as a whole. While some dray teams stood to gain, several stood to lose 
up to 15%  of their annual earnings.
But as much as the drop in pay, it was the relative loss of control that rankled these 
workers22- Only partly hyperbolically, one drayman gripes:
"The old scheme kept you aliva, it did. It mada work mora interesting. Sura it wat 
•uacaptibla to abuaa, which wat moatly tha fault of poor management. But it waa a challenge 
mentally It waa competition."
The transportation supervisor does not disagree but insists:
21. Thia 'payment for change' a tradition in evidence at BR IT M ET  alto, at witnessed by the buyout of furnacemen for
working over the shift break, described in Chapter VI.
22. It must be remembered that compared to Canada and to many British plants such as BR ITMET, the new scheme
still entailed a formidable amount of job control for workera.
“Th« old scheme was an incentive for craftiness, not for work."
The 'fiddle' then, is as much a way of enriching work as it is a way of making money 
and certainly more than deliberate sabotage or shirking of production responsibilities. 
Edwards (1988) and Burawoy (1979) have pointed out that the significance of such 
activity is complex. It cannot be read off as automatically injurious to the employer's 
interests. Moreover, managers, both low and high, often cooperate in such activity. 
Lupton gives the classic description of this phenomenon, just as relevant at CANBREW  
today as it was at 'JAY 'S ' in the early 60's. In fact it sums up much of what can be said 
about the efficacy of job control in conflict generation and resolution:
"...th« 'fiddle' war an effective form of worker control over tha job environment...I have no 
doubt that, if management control* had been made leaa flexible, and management planning more 
effective, the 'fiddle' would havt been made more difficult to operate and probably output could have 
been ilightly increased. But this might have destroyed the balance o f  the social adjustment 
between management and tha wo'kers, and tha outcoma might have been lost in work 
satisfaction. Tha shop would no iongar have been a 'comfortable', may ba not avan a 'happy' 
shop. And in turn, this might have *. roduced higher labour turnovar, absenteeism and tha 
hka." (1962. p. 129. emphasis added)
4.2 Manning
In British workplaces, the issue of manning sits on the border between structuring the 
internal labour market and job control. In the previous chapter, it was seen how 
departmental manning levels are a quite legitimate subject for negotiation between union 
and management. This is most fully developed at BR ITBREW  where, as seen, responses to 
short and long term fluctuations in demand were smoothly engineered within the context 
of the incentive scheme. Since the sectional union interest is to keep incentive earnings as 
high as possible, the union cooperates in adjusting manning levels to the level and 
permanency of product market conditions. Yet even in those units with dead incentive 
schemes, such as maintenance, the union has active, if indirect, input into manning levels.
Yet as also seen, allowing the union to co-determine sectional manning levels does not 
necessarily work against management's interests. In many cases, it keeps manning levels 
lower than they might otherwise be. And because strong sectional interests are so 
concerned with manning in their own areas, less concern is focused on overall manning 
levels or those in units with weaker union organisation. The 33%  reduction in manpower 
at BRITBREW  between 1979 and 1987 was achieved with very little conflict or, more 
importantly, lingering resentment. Thus the ceding of detailed control in this area has 
effectively increased the general control of the employer.
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4.3 Work Load and Work Pace
The control of work load and work pace is another area where the British plants 
differ substantially from the Canadian. The joint regulation of work loads (where such 
can be quantified) has already been seen in the negotiation of formal departmental 
agreements. But even where quantification is not possible, work groups and the union can 
have tremendous input.
An apt example is the staging unit at BRITBREW . The job of one relatively small 
group of workers is to collect beer barrels from the warehouse and load them onto the 
shipping bays ready for the draymen to load onto the lorries. The existence of the 
incentive scheme, their strategic placement in the production flow and the high degree of 
solidarity among these workers has made them almost legendary in the plant. They have 
become like entrepreneurs, wheeling and dealing to combine work loads and work pace to 
maximise their earnings. Over the years, wherever management has been lax or other 
workgroups less than vigilant, they have gladly taken on extra tasks. Those that can be 
measured by work study have become part of the incentive scheme. Those that cannot, 
provide flat-rate payments.
They are also legendary for their pace of work. Their formal work day is 8 hours.
But operating on a "job and finish" basis (they can go home when they have completed 
their daily duties), they effectively work little more than 3 112 hours. During that period, 
the level of their activity is truly formidable. The researcher is told he is "in for a treat" 
and is not disappointed. For just over three hours, sweat, sinew and beer barrels form a 
blur.
While managers acknowledge this group is highly cost-effective and hesitate to do do 
anything to upset its morale, there are several actual and potential problems. First, the 
group's earnings are so high as to make a mockery of internal comparisons. One worker 
in the brewing unit refers to their "licence to print money". Second, the group resists any 
technological change (in a low tech area, this means the use of new equipment and work 
methods) that has even the vaguest hint of reducing its earnings. Third, faced with 
inevitable change, the group demands compensation for lost earnings due to change. 
Fourth, like high performance thoroughbreds, they are very highly strung. Any small 
annoyance can set them off on a wildcat strike. Such strikes can wipe out the benefits of
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their efficiency. It boils down to a trade off between the morale of this group, and the 
morale of the workforce as a whole as well as between management regaining control and 
sharing it. The key for management (and the site union) is to be able to bring about 
enough change to mitigate these problems without breaking the morale of this group.
5. Concluding Remarks
Up to this chapter, the aim has been to show how aspects of Canadian dispute 
resolution that can appear effectual actually are no more so than their British 
counterparts. The task has been to highlight subtleties and paradoxes not readily 
discernible where processes seem similar.
It is ir. the area of job control, however, that the divergence between the two countries 
finally becomes dramatic and full-blown. In Britain, the difference between job control 
and other areas of dispute along the frontier of control is a subtle one. In Canada, the 
difference is striking. And the remarkable thing is that by so neatly dividing job control 
from discipline and from the structuring of the internal labour market, the state, 
employers and unions have effectively traded the appearance of consent in the former two 
for the cold reality of coercion in the latter.
British employers are no less concerned about concessions made to work groups and 
the union in this area than are their Canadian counterparts. The tightening up of 
working practices in both British plants and especially BR IT M ET  is proof of that. And 
Canadian employers are no less concerned about giving workers some say in the work 
they do in order to improve productivity than are their British counterparts.
CANBREW 's employee survey and the plethora of 'quality of working life’ and quality 
circle programmes now popular are proof of that. The difference is that job control 
is an institutionally negotiable item in one country while it is almost totally 
precluded from  union -management discourse in the other.
What is entirely lacking in Canada is the institutional counterpush from the union 
that constrains managerial discretion. As Streeck (1985) and Nolan (1988) point out, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, this counterpush can be a blessing for management 
while too much flexibility can be a curse.
In Britain, as has been shown, union and work group job control, if appropriately 
managed within the contingencies of the product market and technology, can and does
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contribute to a harmonious 'working relationship' between labour and capital whereby 
capital accumulation is more readily obscured and secured. Conflict, though not 
unavoidable, is instrumental and circumscribed within the limits of work groups, tasks 
and a concrete effort bargain.
In Canada, on the other hand, it is argued that on job control may hinge a prime 
difference between the countries in the generation of unresolved conflict. Some of the 
conflict generated in this area, as mentioned earlier, is displaced to the disciplinary 
forum. Some of it surfaces in mid-term strikes, either as a direct cause or as an indirect 
influence. And some of it emerges as a major residual irritant contributing to the high 
number and bitterness of Canadian end-of-term strikes. While it is doubtful that this can 
ever be proven conclusively, the inferences are compelling.
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION
In The Politics o f  Production, Michael Burawoy attempts one of the only 
comparisons of industrial relations at workplace level in a British and a North American 
factory. In a fortuitous coincidence, his experiences at the American machine shop, 
Allied, are comparable with Lupton's experiences in the British machine shop, Jay's 
(1963). So Burawoy proceeds, exactly as this thesis has done, to draw inferences from 
"two workshops with similar labour processes...situated in similar market contexts but 
different national conditions." (Burawoy, 1985, p. 128).
He finds (as found in our previous chapters), two very different sets of 'political 
apparatuses of production' in operation. He notes that "the continual bargaining and 
renegotiation at Jay's contrast with the broad adhesion to a common set of procedural 
rules at Allied" and that "bargaining over 'custom and practice' rather than consent to 
bureaucratically administered rules shaped production politics at Jay's." (ibid., p. 132). 
Burawoy concludes with a potent truth, about what we have called 'job control’:
"worUr* at Jay'« had more control ovar tha labour proco**, and therefore more bargaining 
power with management, than at Allied*, (ibid., p. 132)
Yet this is an extremely broad statement of result and as heavy-handed as the 
discussion of the causes that lead to it. While the present study owes a great deal to the 
bravado and elegance o f his overall analysis, it is obvious that Burawoy's attempt at 
operationalising his theory in a transatlantic set of workplaces leaves much to be desired 
and begs for further work to be done.
Serious questions could be asked about the validity and generalisabiIity to the 
present-day situation o f a comparison of studies by two different authors with two 
different research agendas, carried out more than a decade and a half apart, with one as 
early as 1958. Moreover, Burawoy is on shaky ground in analysing a single industry only, 
with the resulting failure to consider the effect of differing technologies and an 
idiosyncratic concentration on piecework which, as has been shown, is marginal as a 
method of ordering employment relations in North America. His treatment of the 
political apparatuses of production in the two countries is peremptory, as in the 
throwaway reference to "continual bargaining" and "custom and practice”.
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The majority of his efforts are directed at the workings of the internal labour market 
in the two countries. But this gives cause for considerable concern. Similar to our study, 
in contrast to the hiérarchisation and competition for 'advancement' at Allied, he finds 
little of the same at Jay's. Yet in defining the internal labour market strictly in terms of 
what has been called "vertical mobility" in our Chapter V III, and in ignoring the other 
important questions of the integrity of, entry to, horizontal movement within and exit 
from the internal labour market, he facilely dismisses its effect in the British factory. He 
goes from noting that "...at Jay's the distinction between internal and external labour 
markets was harder to discern" (ibid., p. 134) to effectively assuming that there is no 
system of selection, training, pay, placement, protection from arbitrary discipline and 
redundancy within Jay's that binds employees to the firm, that helps legitimise the 
expropriation of surplus value by the employer as it does at Allied. And, like most of the 
American radical commentators reviewed in Chapter V III, he overstates the case for the 
divisive effect of job ladders and seniority schemes in North America. Yet if in the 
scrabbling for position on the American job ladder "the possessive individualism 
associated with the external labour market is imported into the factory" (ibid., 133), then 
in fact the British internal labour market should be more, not less, hermetic than the 
American.
His summarising of the two national systems of bargaining and his suggested 
conclusions about the effects of these on industrial conflict give cause for the greatest 
concern. Contrasting the American situation with that in Lupton's and Maitland's ( 1983) 
British factories, he boldly states:
"Th# result! are clear. Whereat the triavanca machinery at Allied dampened collective 
struggles by constituting workers as individuals with specific rights and obligations, grievances at 
Jay's wera the precipitant of sectional struggles which brought management and workers into 
continual collision." (Burawoy. IVHS. pp. I.1S-.M»)
In essence, Burawoy looks at conflict quite one-dimcnsionally, as a mere aggregate of a 
series of "collisions" between labour and capital in the two countries. Although the aim of 
his book is to examine differential patterns of subordination and resistance in factory 
regimes, and thus of conflict generation and resolution, his view of conflict is strangely 
unproblematic.
In drawing his model of patterns of state intervention and their relation to production 
(ibid., pp. 137-48), and in suggesting the rise o f a new "hegemonic despotism" (ibid., p.
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1 SO) wherein in an era of unparalleled international competition capital in all 
countries demands concessions from labour based on their so-called 'common' interests, 
Burawoy suggests that the American pattern of postwar industrial hegemony has left 
American labour particularly vulnerable. While he is careful not to make predictions 
about how British labour will react to the new imperative, the implication is clearly that 
because hegemonic factory regimes have not established themselves as strongly as in the 
U.S., British labour has been left much less vulnerable, that it will have some conflictual 
tools in its bag with which to resist.
But is this so? Is industrial conflict in a factory, industry, or society merely the sum 
total of the collisions between labour and capital at the workplace or is a more 
complicated calculus at work? And have the larger domains of shop floor control carved 
out by British unionised workers and their greater experience of day-to-day "collisions” 
really put them in a better position to resist the management onslaught of the eighties?
It is to these gaps in Burawoy's otherwise exciting and compelling intellectual exercise 
that this study has felt itself inexorably drawn. A modest attempt has been made to refine 
one part of his analysis by opening up the black box of the "political apparatuses of 
production” to reveal the inner dynamic of two differing "factory regimes". Contextual 
factors such as labour markets, technology, product markets and managerial organisation 
have been carefully analysed and their effect considered. A stab has been made at 
specifying several "political apparatuses of production” and at analysing how these 
apparatuses interact with several key flashpoints of potential conflict on the frontier of 
control. Most adventurously, an attempt has been made to use this analysis to push at the 
barriers of theory in cross-national variations in industrial conflict.
An anecdote from one of our case studies adds considerable insight here. The 
BRITBREW  convenor went on a joint union-management trip to the United States to 
examine industrial relations at several American breweries and beer distribution 
companies. Throughout the trip, he and the other union representatives travelled and 
often ate and drank with their British management counterparts. At several points in the 
trip, the British shop floor union representatives met privately with groups of American 
workers and shop floor union representatives. The Americans expressed surprise and
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some shock at the degree of fraternisation between the British managers and workers.
Says the BR ITBREW  convenor,
"The  Americans found it incomprehensible that labour and management were cooperating 
in the project. They said they would never do such a thing*.
Yet according to the convenor, the scepticism of the American workers seemed to 
arise not from self-confidence but from a profound sense of insecurity. They exhibited a 
much more adversarial attitude toward management than the British workers and also 
viewed their parent unions with suspicion. They tended to view any management moves to 
'participation' as part of an overall management attack on the union and suspected the 
union of capitulation. What is more, says the convenor, they were probably right. He did 
notice much more highly developed participation programmes in the United States, but 
these were all directed at workers as individuals. They were attempts to weaken or 
remove the union. The convenor attempts to interpret the U.S. unionists' attitudes:
" In  th« U.K., we m « th« union as th« branch. In fact, tha union i« part of the company.
Not that w«'r« under management'» thumb; far from it  But the worker! identify with th« union at 
branch level. I think th« American« tee their union« a« «omethmg from the ouUide, ‘facele«« 
wonder«' who negotiate the national pay deal *
And the irony of the American trade unionists querying his cooperation with 
management is not lost on him:
*Th«r«'» a real contradiction in th« S u m « between union weaknesi on the one hand 
combined with thu rigid adversarial attitude they have toward management on the other...whereat in 
BriUin we have «Monger union« but a lio  a meaiure of agreement and cooperation between company 
and union. In  the SUM«, management 1« management. They «ay to the union ‘we'll take the deemon 
and you butt out'. In BriUin it'« not the tame."
The convenor's comments about the contrasting cultures of industrial relations 
adversarialism in Britain and the U.S. could perhaps better apply to Canada, where 
adversarialism has continued unabated, even intensified through the 80's. As mentioned 
in the introduction, with the density of U.S. unionism declining rapidly, Canada more and 
more takes on the mantle of the 'North American' model of industrial relations. Standing 
back in this conclusion and looking with some detachment at our case studies, what 
general observations can be made about differing patterns of industrial conflict in Britain 
and Canada?
Our two Canadian plants clearly exhibit a union-management relationship in which 
adversarialism and distrust are deeply ingrained and perpetuated. On the one hand, both 
plants regularly have major and bitter strikes involving all workers. The expiry strikes at
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C A N M E T  have followed a typical Canadian pattern (long, drawn-out affairs of mutual 
intransigence on both sides, with management attempting to maintain production 
throughout, and finally resolved through mutual fatigue). Those at CANBREW  and other 
breweries have been somewhat shorter, but this is due to several unique factors, not the 
least of which is the very high amount of (alcohol tax) revenue that the provincial 
governments stand to lose in a shutdown of the beer industry. More than in most 
Canadian private sector industrial disputes, it is crucial to governments that disputes end 
relatively quickly. Yet despite this, long brewing strike/lockouts are not uncommon, with 
a seven month conflict in Alberta in 1980 -8 1 and a six and a half month conflict in 
Newfoundland in I98S!
In fact, brewing is a high conflict industry in Canada, with over twice the average 
number of working days lost per year and over four times the average number of strikes 
(proportional to workers employed) compared to Canadian manufacturing as a whole1-
In our British plants, a radically different pattern of industrial conflict can be 
observed, also in line with the patterns observed in Chapter I. At BRITM ET, there have 
been only three work stoppages in ten years, all three involving the majority of 
production workers but extremely short: two lasting a day and one lasting five days. None 
of these strikes occurred at a pay round. At BRITBREW  there have been no strikes 
involving a majority of production workers and no strikes at a pay round in the same ten 
year period. As mentioned, sectional work stoppages are common but are not treated by 
management as 'serious' disputes. In the ten years, only one dispute has earned the 
management label of "strike" in seriously impairing the employer’s ability to trade. That 
episode, involving the negotiation of a new draymen's incentive scheme, lasted an 
unprecedented 14 days but involved only about 40%  of the workforce.
British brewery strike figures appear to have a somewhat more complicated 
relationship to those in manufacturing as a whole than is the case in Canada. While 
brewery strikes are about 1.5 times more numerous than those in British 
manufacturing, volume is almost half1 2- While figures for British breweries were not
1. The figure! are for the ten yean from I**"'' to l'*H6 mcluaiva and have been calculated from raw data supplied to the
author by Labour Canada.
2. Figure* on British brewery strikes in the similar time period to the Canadian figures were unavailable. They have
been interpolated from Smith at al (W hl and Employmtnt Gazette (various years).
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available for the same period as our Canadian breweries, it can be inferred that strike 
volume (proportional to employed workers) in Canadian breweries is three to four times 
the level in British breweries. A more dramatic variation in industrial conflict across the 
countries is hard to imagine. While British brewery strikes are more numerous than the 
manufacturing average, they cause far fewer working days to be lost. The picture then 
conforms to what has been seen in our case study plant-many, very small strikes, few all- 
out confrontations. On the other hand, Canadian brewery strikes heavily exceed the 
manufacturing average in both incidence and volume. This picture also conforms to that 
seen in the case study plant.
In the vast majority of British strikes observed, the issue causing the strike is clearly 
discernible and the settlement squarely addresses the issue. In all of the Canadian expiry 
strikes observed, a burden of unresolved issues and a body of disappointed workers is 
invariably carried forward as a legacy to the next dispute. Both of our Canadian plants 
have also had their share of wildcat walkouts in a typical Canadian pattern (short-lived, 
rather desperate affairs, with management force and the weight of law combining to crush 
them). These have invariably left a similar legacy of bitterness behind them.
Compared to the sheer volume and "total war" character of the Canadian strikes, the 
striking feature about the British work stoppages is not only that they are relative 
exiguous but that they are eminently containable and contained. And while the number 
of micro-incidents of industrial action at BRITBREW  is far greater than at BR ITM ET, it 
is in the workplace with the stronger union that industrial relations is more predictable. 
While the British system may provide for far more discernible "collisions" between labour 
and management at one level, it also seems to provide for a lower degree of conflict at a 
more general level.
To help explain this, it is important to realise that dispute 'resolution' is merely one 
side of a coin. Even those with a more radical inclination fall too easily into a pluralist 
trap of concentrating on how dispute resolution mechanisms resolve conflict. Yet there is 
a continuous dialectic between conflict generation and resolution at the point of 
production and even in the 'dispute resolution' procedure itself. Certainly the study of 
our four workplaces shows that both labour and management alternate between the two as 
they see fit to further their interests and that conflict generation and resolution are so
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bound up together as to be almost inseparable in an analytical sense. Hence, they must be 
looked at as a package.
In fact, this may be an important analytical tool in explaining different patterns of 
industrial conflict in different workplaces, industries, sectors, countries or groups of 
countries. When it is realised that conflict itself is an important method o f con flict 
resolution and conversely that the process o f con flic t resolution itself can actually 
generate conflict, then it is possible to move beyond somewhat simplistic, unidirectional 
conclusions about conflict and see that conflict operates in different ways at different 
levels of analysis. Burawoy makes just such a mistake in attempting to compare the 
British and American workplaces. In fact, as has been seen, many of the radical and 
Marxist scholars, especially the Americans, have the problem of thinking in a simplistic 
manner about industrial conflict. Maitland suggests there is:
"an unspoken assumption that the relationship between aggregate outcomes and micro­
decisions is fairly direct and unproblematic. That being assumed, it is a straightforward matter to 
infer from the results of workers' actions what their states o f mind must have been...Marxist 
approaches to understanding industrial disorder arc especially prone to this confusion of levels of 
analysis." (IVM, p. IOH-V)
Maitland ascribes this problem to something inherently wrong in the Marxist or 
radical approach itself whereas this study appreciates that the failure to problematise 
conflict is due to the overwhelming pressure on radicals to work at a broad level of 
analysis. Yet employing some of the reasoning on the manufacturing of consent provided 
by Burawoy himself, the picture may well be rendered more subtle. Realising the complex 
interplay between conflict generation and resolution and between coercion and consent 
and comparing Canada and Britain, it can be seen how factory regimes and forms of state 
intervention that seem to o ffe r more opportunity for conflict and labour militancy at 
a lower level might just end up producing less conflict and less resistance at a higher one.
In the study undertaken here, it is fairly clear that the British workplace industrial 
relations environment presents greater opportunity for the parties to engage in 
conflictual behaviour from  day to day and on a much wider array of issues. But whether 
those opportunities are taken up and whether shop-floor or sectional conflict translates 
into wider workplace, sectoral or national industrial conflict is somewhat more 
problematic.
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With that in mind, this is an appropriate place to recapitulate what has been learned 
from the study to explain the working of conflict at different levels. In fact, much of this 
explanation should have started to come clear as the account progressed for this study has 
been organised in a deliberate fashion. Most treatises based on the case study method 
deliver their findings in an anecdotal fashion, presenting descriptions of their subjects 
sequentially and waiting to the end to draw the insights together. An attempt has been 
made in this study to treat the material thematically and to proceed in a more or less 
logical progression of ideas engages in theoretical discussion as well as description within 
each subsection, thereby, it is hoped, advancing the overall argument step by step. To the 
extent that this has been done then, a recapitulation of the material should help to answer 
the questions posed above. Of course, the danger is summarising a complex study such as 
this one is that abridgement and synoptisation will trivialise the findings. What is 
attempted then, is a review of the material to find and present the conceptual arrows that 
point in the same general direction.
In Chapter I, the need for workplace micro-studies was illustrated. Too much of the 
literature on cross-national variations in industrial conflict, in both institutional and 
'political economy' approaches, has dealt with macro-level institutions and political 
relationships and has thus missed how institutions and politics at that level are refracted 
by the prism of the workplace. Defining the workplace as a forum in which the parties 
employ micro-institutions to engage in a political (rather than a merely economic) 
struggle for control in the production process, there emerges the possibility that both 
institutional and political economy approaches can be reconciled and some insight can be 
gained about how regimes of state intervention result in factory regimes. In fact, this new 
approach might well be called a microinstitutionalone. The institutions employed for 
the political struggle for control were redefined as Burawoy's "political apparatuses of 
production" and these were conceptually subdivided into interests, rights, adjustments and 
enforcements. Three key loci on the frontier of control with which these apparatuses 
articulate were delineated as Discipline, Structuring of the Internal Labour Market and 
Job Control.
In Chapter II, the workplaces were introduced. While they were chosen to provide a 
clearly-defined demarcation across the industries, they were also chosen to provide as
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much comparability across countries as possible. The dimensions chosen for cross­
industry variation were technology, stability of product markets and labour costs, 
profitability and the attendant 'style' or militancy of trade unions. While it is clearly 
impossible to 'hold constant' for the many variables that might intercede to cloud the 
comparison, it can be said with some satisfaction that the chosen workplaces fit well into 
the above prerequisites.
Several key features contributing to the climate of industrial relations in the 
workplaces were considered in the same chapter. Labour markets were examined. 
Evidence was presented that external labour markets have indeterminate influence on the 
system of pay and the industrial relations climate in any particular firm. Most firms 
constr ict an internal labour market that shields them from the effect of the external 
labour market. The regulation of this internal market would be examined later in the 
study.
Size of workplace chosen was a crucial factor, and it was proposed that somewhere in 
the 300 to 800 employee range, a threshold was breached whereby union organisational 
power (measured by such indices as full-time convenors, regular steward meetings and 
persistence in pursuing claims) could increase dramatically. Just where that threshold 
lies is determined by several other factors, among them features of the technology and 
product market in the subject plants.
Aspects of technology (labour costs, degree of technical control over the labour 
process, variation between the 'driving technology' and 'ancillary technologies) were seen 
to interact with aspects of the product market (interfirm competitiveness, volatility of 
secular demand, pricing, profit potential) in a complex amalgam to effect different 
climates of industrial relations. It was suggested that the essential ingredient of this mix 
was 'controllability'. This is what most clearly separates our aluminium plants from our 
breweries, with the latter at the high and the former at the low end of the controllability 
continuum.
The above contextual factors to some extent give rise to and to some extent combine 
a more intrinsic factor-two distinct sets of power relationships between union and 
management: the aluminium plants presenting hardheaded management against unions of 
low power; the breweries presenting somewhat more indulgent management against
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unions of high power. However, given these two distinct sets of power relationships in 
the two countries, the case study plants are seen to divide into four clearly distinct 
factory regimes along a scale of union power and influence, with the British brewery at 
the high end of the scale, the British aluminium plant at the low end of the scale and both 
Canadian plants (with the brewery somewhat higher) squarely in the middle.
The contextual factors looked at above then, only provided minimal explanation for 
these variations in factory regime. It is only by looking at the differing national systems 
of generating and resolving conflict and the way these systems operate in certain loci 
along the frontier of control, that explanations for the differences in factory regime can 
be advanced. The next four chapters dealt with different sets of political apparatuses of 
production. It was suggested that these apparatuses in and of themselves can be either 
therapeutic or dispose the parties toward conflict depending on how well they reflect 
notions of democracy in society at large, deliver a quantum of equity and engage the union 
and its members in a collective 'busymaking' exercise.
The set of interests apparatuses, wherein the parties meet formally to negotiate 
written agreements differs across the two countries not so much in form but rather in 
variety and significance. While the Canadian interests apparatuses are few in number but 
extremely important in workplace industrial relations, making for a great rigidity and 
potential for overloading, the British interests apparatuses are highly diverse, eclectic 
and of far smaller significance, making for much more flexibility. Canadian managers, 
stewards and workers live by "the bible"— the bi- or triennially negotiated collective 
agreement document covering the entire workplace. Given the limited nature of the other 
three sets of apparatuses in Canada, these negotiations take on a 'make or break' 
atmosphere and are inevitably highly conflictual. In fact, it can be said that the apparatus 
for /land/ingconflictherecanbeamajor contributor to conflict itself. In Britain, on 
the other hand, the parties move relatively smoothly between different interests 
apparatuses at different levels at within different timing sequences. Disputes that cannot 
be handled within pay rounds may be handled within the negotiations for various central 
thematic agreements or within the bargaining over departmental agreements and vice 
versa. If a dispute must come to conflict, it will, but it will not do so because of the nature 
of the apparatus itself.
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R ights apparatuses in the two countries were seen as mechanisms through which 
claims of violation of terms and conditions of employment are processed. Again very 
different systems were observed in the two countries. The Canadians were seen as willing 
captives of procedure, which acts like an efficient vacuum cleaner, sweeping very low, 
allowing a minimum of informality. Yet the scope of the grievance procedure is severely 
circumscribed by the contents of the collective agreement so that many very real 
complaints go unanswered. Once 'locked into' procedure, grievances were seen as taking 
on a life of their own, distinct from the causes which provoked them and often becoming, 
not easier, but more difficult to solve. Canadian managements are loath to engage in 
'horse-trading' with unions for fear of losing managerial prerogative. The impact of 
arbitration on Canadian workplace industrial relations can scarcely be overemphasised 
and the parties put a high premium on predictability so that 'winners' and 'losers' among 
grievances can be predicted early on. Yet precisely because of this predictability, both 
unions and employers tacitly agree to cooperate in the charade of 'the prosecution of lost 
causes'. Nevertheless, employees are almost inevitably let down with a crash when their 
grievances are abandoned or suffer arbitral reversal at the end of these exercises and the 
union's policing role is a subtle and pervasive one, built comfortably into the system 
rather than requiring the union to participate actively. The success, settlement and 
consequently submission ratios of Canadian grievances and arbitrations are highly 
contingent upon the subject matter of the grievance, with discipline and internal labour 
market regulation issues far outweighing any others, especially those concerning job 
control. A Canadian lawyer who regularly presents union grievances to arbitration 
tribunals tells the author, "It's a system designed to make people mad."
Formal disputes procedures in Britain, a relatively new phenomenon, were seen as 
complicated and multiplicitous. Yet despite often detailed prescriptions of method for 
handling disputes, the British parties treat procedure cavalierly. In fact, two types of 
procedures are readily observable, the formal and the informal with the parties 
comfortably slipping between them according to their needs. So powerful is the tendency 
to informality that it was seen to persist in the face of even the most elaborate provisions 
to punish it and reward formality. Yet despite the seeming lack of form and restriction on 
the subject matter of grievances, the parties construct very definite bounds of
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acceptability and powerful domestic unions exert a strong and explicit policing role on the 
claims of their members. In fact, this was one of the most important differences in trade 
unions discovered between the two countries. The stronger the British union, the more 
willing it appears to be to (in the words of a transplanted English trade unionist in 
Canada) "kick ass”, or sort its members out. This effectively reduces the claims of the 
union to an instrumental few and also builds credibility with management. Among an 
highly-trade-union-conscious membership, this policing role is acknowledged as one of 
the prices of success. And a corollary of the policing role is the ability of the union to 
demand solidarity at appropriate crises.
In contrast to Canada, the British rights apparatus where stronger unions prevail is 
most definitely a trading exercise, one in which the parties expect to give and receive. 
Again, just as with interests apparatuses, in Canada the rights apparatus may not only 
often be ineffective but in itself be a catalyst to conflict. Whether it is or not will depend 
on the substantive area on the frontier of control that it purports to handle.
While interests and rights are familiar terms in industrial relations, adjustments has 
been coined to denote a distinct and vital apparatus between the two and to shed light on a 
major institutional difference between our two countries. This apparatus was defined as a 
method of filling in the spaces between interests and rights, where terms and conditions of 
employment are either vague or non-existent and where circumstances demand joint 
regulation of a problem. The apparatus is extremely limited in Canada, constrained 
particularly by the tacit rules "in the absence of collective agreement language, 
management's rights prevail" and "obey now, grieve later". While the parties can and do 
make adjustments, the union has little power to hold the employer to them. Also, though 
the rigidity of the Canadian interests apparatuses leaves a large vacuum in joint 
regulation, arbitrators (who are the only recourse for the union between distant bouts of 
expiry negotiations) have little power to fill that vacuum. In discussing adjustments it was 
necessary to seriously take on and refute contentions that arbitration is in any way a 
substitute for negotiations (suitably enforced by the right to strike). Thus the potent 
claims of liberal arbitrators about their power to effect adjustments were considered 
carefully and, it is hoped, exposed as without substance. Moreover, it was pointed out 
that arbitrators are powerfully constrained by the concept of "legitimate business
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interests" which operates over the whole of arbitral consideration and also operates 
differentially between types of grievances, being weakest in discipline and strongest in job 
control matters. The point here is that the concept of legitimacy is externally constructed 
by a third party and does not arise from the parties themselves.
In Britain, the adjustment apparatus is a particularly robust one, depending for its 
strength on the dual notions of "everything is negotiable" and "status quo" (which prevail 
even in our aluminium plant with low union power). The vehicle through which the 
apparatus operates is "custom and practice" which both parties use to their advantage as 
the case may be. While "legitimate business reasons" obviously do influence how strongly 
management may resist union claims, it does not preclude them. Moreover, despite what 
seems a far more disorderly apparatus than that which exists in Canada, there exist 
strong bounds of acceptability tacitly agreed by both management and union. The sense of 
legitimacy arises from the power relationship between the parties and is socially 
constructed by them alone. In order to make some claims, the union must forego others.
In order to exploit some opportunities to engage in industrial action, the union must 
forego others. Management too, cannot afford to ignore industrial relations at the point 
of production. Unlike its Canadian counterpart, it must have its ear to the ground 
constantly and continually make decisions about what will or will not 'carry' on the shop 
floor. Thus, unlike the Canadian situation where managers may be confronted with 
resistance of unexpected ferocity, in the British plant there are few surprises.
Enforcements was the final apparatus considered, involving the efficacy with which 
claims are pursued and resisted and the the sanctions that can be applied in so doing. In 
essence it is the ability of the parties to exercise the potential power they have. The use of 
strike sanctions is severely curtailed in Canada by the presence of a body of restrictive 
law and by the willingness of employers to use it. Expiry strikes, occurring a specific 
intervals, rarely coincide with periods of union strategic advantage and picketing is 
severely restricted so that these strikes become "rituals of polite attrition" (Kuttner,
1984). Wildcat strikes are typically desperate, ad hoc explosions of frustration and 
seldom address a specific resolvable issue. The use o f strikes to back up "fractional
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bargaining" (Kuhn, 19 6 1) is virtually non-existent'*- Moreover, compromise to end such 
strikes is strongly resisted by management to discourage their use and discipline and the 
law are frequently used in their suppression. There is a dramatic division between strike 
and non-strike enforcements, with strikes as major disruptions of collective bargaining 
and arbitration as the only means to the latter. Yet arbitration is of limited use as an 
enforcement even when there has been a clear violation of the collective agreement. The 
"obey now, grieve later" rule forces employees to postpone the search for equity (often for 
many months), an especially galling exercise when the offence is flagrant o r  when the 
collective agreement provision has been hard fought-for or when the issue is "perishable" 
(Clegg, 1979, p. 121). Moreover, even a dear arbitral decision against an employer 
practice does not in itself enjoin its reoccurrence. A new grievance and a new arbitration 
are required, with all the attendant frustration. In fact, the Canadian system as a whole 
plus the conservatism of arbitral jurisprudence act as great levelers, ensuring that 
however great the differential in power potential between domestic union organisations, 
the differential in the exercise o f that power will be small. Weaker domestic unions 
have a substantial floor of institutional and legal protections through which it is difficult 
to fall. But by the same token, potentially powerful domestic unions are confronted by a 
strong ceiling which restricts their ability to apply their power. What differences do exist 
are not so much in the application of industrial muscle as in the assiduousness with which 
the union uses the procedures available to it. Potentially powerful unions feel acutely the 
gap between their aspirations and the limits to what they can attain. This, it is submitted, 
is a major cause of industrial conflict. Stronger Canadian unions then, are like sorcerer's 
apprentices, unable to harness, apply and direct their power, but able to do considerate 
damage when the few opportunities to do so arise.
Britain now has a panoply of strike legislation that rivals Canada's. But employers 
have been loath to use it. Where unions are weaker, the law tends to be used, but 
tentatively and opportunistically. In more traditional, stronger union situations, 
employers tend to be much more hesitant. There is much less separation between strike 
and non-strike enforcements, with strikes being used, especially by the more powerful
.1. It ii luipected that the incidence ol fractional bargainma unca Kuhn'* tune hai declined drastically in the U.S. 
deipite the eautance of leeway to »trike within the term of the collective agreement.
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unions, as a tactical extension rather than a disruption of collective bargaining. As 
Batstone et al.say,
"Strike ection 11 a continuous possibility in our system of industrial relations and mertes 
into other forms of collective action and work behaviour...Strikes therefore constitute simply one 
means by which the 'frontier of coi trol', the relative power of management and workers over the 
work situation, is changed or mainti ined” (I1)"«. p. ¿IK)
In this situation, the differential in the application of union power much more closely 
resembles potential union power than in Canada. The ability to exercise power depends 
upon the ability to mobilise resistance and weaker domestic unions are at a severe 
disadvantage, for unlike their Canadian counterparts, they cannot 'fall back on their 
rights'; they must continually organise to renegotiate them or lose them. Stronger 
domestic unions, on the other hand, have far more leeway than their Canadian alter egos 
to exercise their power. Where management is weak or has abdicated shop floor control, 
then the result is disorder such as plagued selected British industries through the three 
decades prior to the 80's. For the union, as a reactive organisation, cannot and will not 
replace management's rationality with its own but merely attempts to preserve the status 
quo. Where management is of requisite strength, however, and especially when conditions 
are more favourable for management as they are in the 80's, then, it is submitted, strong 
unions more fully participate in the regulation of the enterprise.
The above formulation goes some way toward explaining the industrial relations 
conundrum of the 80's. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many British 
commentators are wrestling with the question of whether on the many shop floors across 
the country (and not the few sensationalised in the press) 'macho managers' have indeed 
'conquered' the unions. From our limited observation, it seems that there has indeed been 
substantial change. But, as suggested in Chapter I, it has been one in which management 
has not sought to drastically alter the institutions of industrial relations, as they have, 
say, in the United States. In fact, it has left existing insitutions remarkably intact and 
rather used them to alter the outcomes. Management having grabbed the reins more 
forcefully in more hospitable conditions, industrial relations have taken on a new flavour. 
The system has taken not a wide swing but rather one of a few degrees. Yet while little has 
changed, everything has changed. While the fo rm  of industrial relations has changed 
little (ie. union organisation, numbers of stewards, presence of full-time convenors, the 
trappings of collective bargaining), the content has changed substantially (the
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introduction of new technology, swingeing redundancies, new working practices and 
numerical and functional flexibility). So rather than the scenario painted by Bassett 
(1986), Maclnnes (1987) and Batstone (1984), we have one more like that painted by 
Terry (1988). It is also possible that in the 'new reality', the very institutions that 
resulted in so much industrial unrest in the I960's and 70's may well make for industrial 
quiescence and effective labour co-optation in the shrinking unionised sector. Whether 
this amounts to a British variation of 'enterprise unionism', as suggested by Brown (1983) 
is open to debate but the drastic divergences in strike patterns between Canada and 
Britain in the 80's adds to the impression. While Canadian employers have also found 
existing institutions more amenable to the production exigencies of the 80 's than U.S.- 
style union-bashing, the persisting volatility of Canadian industrial conflict patterns 
makes the future less easy to predict.
Just how the existing insitutions in both countries have been used to bring about 
change can only be appreciated by examining how the political apparatuses of production 
articulate with the three major concrete issues in the regulation of the workplace: 
discipline, structuring the internal labour market and job control. And this the study has 
attempted to do. These exercises included refutations of several specific and commonly- 
held misconceptions about the efficacy of British versus North American systems of 
dispute resolution and explorations of just how and how effectively several state-imposed 
mechanisms actually operate at the level of the workplace.
The discussion of discipline how conflict in this potentially volatile terrain on the 
frontier of control is managed. The state-imposed North American arbitral system, 
which at first appears as the jewel in the crown of dispute resolution, was contrasted not 
only with the British state-imposed industrial tribunal system, but with the British 
discipline-handling system as a whole. It was found that not only is Arbitration much 
more limited than supposed, but that the parties in the British workplace, especially 
where stronger unions prevail, have very effective ways of managing discipline and 
reducing its conflictual potential. Issue was taken with radical commentators who see the 
systems of disciplinary adjudication in their own countries as invariably and 
unproblematically operating to the detriment of labour and to the benefit of capital while 
they see the systems of other countries in a romantic haze. State-prescribed adjudicatory
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tribunals can be a great boon to trade unions in curbing the more intemperate of 
management actions and to individual workers who fall afoul of collectivist solutions.
They have also forced managements in both countries to regularise procedural, if not 
substantive, justice in discipline. But the tribunals help management as well. In several 
instances, the management education e ffect of Canadian disciplinary arbitration was 
observed, wherein arbitrators act, in effect, as coordinators and establishes of 'good 
management practice’. They do not prevent employers from disciplining employees 
(contrary to the belief of some junior managers), but rather teach employers how to more 
effectively discipline employees. Canadian arbitrators can do this so effectively because 
arbitration is the sole recourse for unions in appealing employee discipline and where 
arbitrators have wide powers to second guess and substitute penalties for management. In 
this context, at worst, a vicious circle is set up wherein unions strenuously abstain from 
any involvement in discipline, encouraging what may already be a tendency among 
Canadian employers to harsh discipline. And once the discipline is handed out, the union 
concerns itself almost solely with procedural considerations to the exclusion of 
substantive ones. This results in a kind of disciplinary 'multiplier effect', so that the 
mechanisms prescribed to defuse conflict here actually act to exacerbate it. In Britain, on 
the other hand, the state-prescribed apparatus is in fact quite marginal to the disciplinary 
forum. The handling of discipline is much more of a collective exercise and unions, 
especially stronger ones, participate to the extent that Henry's "accommodative- 
participative" model may well apply. Again, self-policing by unions enhances bargaining 
power so that a very effective system of equity can operate. What is more, overall the 
British system appears to be much more effective in assuaging conflict than the Canadian.
The structuring o f  the internal labour market is another area in which North 
American unions seem to have advanced much further (either toward emancipation or co­
optation depending on one's view) than their British counterparts. But again the situation 
was seen as not so simple. First, there was seen to be no straightforward connection 
between elaborate job ladders and the use of seniority to advance up them, which are 
almost unique to North American industrial relations, and internecine conflict among 
workers or weakening of worker solidarity against management. Second, it was 
maintained that 'vertical mobility' is only one aspect of the effect of the internal labour
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market on industrial conflict. In other aspects, especially maintaining the integrity of the 
i.I.m. and exit from the i.l.m., it is the Canadian system that may actually heighten union- 
management conflict and the British which may effectively discourage collective 
resistance, not by intensifying individualism but by intensifying sectionalism. It is in this 
substantive issue that the concept of conflict operating at different levels first comes into 
focus. The structuring of the internal labour market is a forum with considerable conflict 
in Britain, but it is one in which the conflict is not general to the work place but strongly 
localised. Strong work groups within domestic unions actually help construct internal 
labour markets within the internal labour market. Several examples of this were given in 
both British plants. Only where the domestic union is strong and only when the issue is 
especially crucial to all workers is the union able to overcome the divisive conflicts of 
interest among work groups which the British system encourages. Third, the concept of 
seniority was seen as particularly inappropriate to the issue of large-scale redundancy. 
Seniority, so strongly ingrained into the Canadian system, was seen to politicise 
redundancy and strongly encourage labour-management conflict in that country while its 
absence in Britain allowed the parties to find a far more effective palliative in voluntary 
redundancy and early retirement. So structuring of the internal labour market is one 
more area where conflict appears to be more endemic in Canada than in Britain.
While the differences between Canada and Britain in the above two areas required 
some subtlety of argument to tease out, it was in the area of job control that the 
limitations of the Canadian system of dispute resolution were most clearly seen. While 
there are problems in dividing this area conceptually from the other areas on the frontier 
of control, the Canada-Britain comparison enhances the theoretical distinction. Job 
control, as defined here, was seen as almost entirely missing from Canadian collective 
agreements, being an area of interests negotiations where employers most strenuously 
protect their prerogative and where trade unions are loath to promote direct 
confrontation. Where collective agreement language does exist, it was demonstrated how 
profoundly uncomfortable arbitrators are in handling the weighty issues that emerge, 
invariably attempting to minimise their significance. Yet the issue is far from absent from 
the hearts of Canadian workers who will use ingenious and devious methods for self- 
expression. But these attempts are doomed to failure. In both of the above situations, a
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vicious circle, similar to that encountered in discipline results. The interests apparatus is 
so clumsy, the rights apparatus so inappropriate and the adjustment apparatus so 
ineffectual in handling these issues that arise from the exigencies of production itself that 
any attempt to consciously use these apparatuses to address problems in this area 
inevitably invites frustration. Yet precisely because they arise from the exigencies of 
production and the need for new truces to be drawn along the frontier of control, it is 
impossible for workers and their unions to ignore them. So new attempts are made and 
frustrated. As seen in the discussion of the adjustment apparatus, adjustments are always 
made in the Canadian workplace. But they are almost totally under the control of 
management. It was suggested that conflict over such issues, unable to find expression a a 
lower level, will submerge to inexorably surface in three ways: first, in the disciplinary 
forum as cases of insubordination; second, as a direct cause or an influence on wildcat 
strikes; third, as a residual irritant contributing to the high number and bitterness of 
expiry work stoppages.
This study has had two objectives: first, to compare the systems of 'dispute resolution' 
in Canada and Britain by constructing a distinct analytical framework and using 
empirical data from case studies; second, to draw some conclusions about the reasons for 
variations in industrial conflict between the two countries.
There is some confidence that the first has been accomplished. The microinstitutional 
approach has posited four discrete political apparatuses of production and three 
substantive areas on the frontier of control with which these apparatuses articulate.
Such a framework can be employed in the analysis not only of Britain and Canada but of 
any set of advanced capitalist countries.
About the second objective there is still some hesitancy. The recapitulation above has 
been a selective exercise, attempting to gather from the study as many arrows pointing in 
the same direction as possible. As a necessarily qualitative project, this is all that can be 
done. Yet as can be seen, within the intellectual framework employed, many arrows do 
point in the same direction. It is hoped that this study has avoided two pitfalls in this 
regard: that so many arrows point in the same direction that nothing more than the 
obvious has been longwindedly revealed; and that a specious analytical framework has 
distorted the facts so that the arrows cannot help but point in the same direction. As for
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the first pitfall, it is hoped that the long list of intuitive predictions presented in the 
introduction and their subsequent refutation will dispel apprehensions. As for the second, 
while the framework was developed to make particular sense of the actions of the parties 
in the two countries involved, its theoretical applicability to other countries must be the 
test.
A key to the analysis in this study and one which has seldom if ever been used in cross­
national studies has been the deliberate differentiation between plants with stronger and 
weaker unions. And one of the key findings is related to the fact that strong British 
domestic unions have far more leeway to exercise their power than their Canadian 
counterparts. What does this tell us about industrial conflict? Every study involves an 
infinitesimal number of logical steps, like the synapses between nerve endings along a 
neural pathway. The author hopes to have so constructed the pathway that the transitions 
are almost undetectable. But some synapses are too large to bridge without a logical leap 
of faith, as it were. One such logical leap of faith has been between the innumerable 
"collisions" between labour and capital over specific issues in the workplace and more 
general conflict involving work stoppages in that workplace. There is some confidence 
that that gap has been traversed. However, the largest logical leap of faith in this study is 
between work stoppages in four workplaces and industrial conflict in four industries and 
two countries.
Another look at the pattern of strikes in breweries might help in this regard. 
Compared to strikes in manufacturing, the British brewery pattern has much higher 
incidence and much lower volume, indicating many short stoppages and very few longer 
strikes (or those which, in the words of the BRITBREW  manager "seriously impair [the 
employer's] ability to trade". This is the pattern of many BRITBREWs, where relatively 
strong unions use the strike weapon instrumental^ but sparingly and in which little 
residual frustration, resentment and adversarialism-for-its-own-sake is built up. 
Contrary to the picture presented of stronger British unions in the sixties and seventies, 
these unions are not the architects of "disorder" but rather apply their own rigorous 
standards of industrial behaviour in self-policing activity. While they fight to maintain 
gains made in better times, they are hardly immune to the economic and political climate 
and the new managerial imperatives to move back the frontier of control. What they
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engage in is a relatively orderly retreat in which change is patiently but firmly negotiated. 
This, it is submitted, in its own way has fit in extremely well with the impetus to British 
industrial restructuring and, as mentioned earlier goes a long way toward explaining why 
the form of British industrial relations has changed so little.
The Canadian brewery strike pattern is quite different, with much higher incidence 
andvolume than in manufacturing as a whole, indicating in the context of the Canadian 
system, both long classic battles of attrition and numerous short wildcat walkouts. This is 
the pattern of many CANBREWs, where relatively strong unions, confronted by the 
evidence of their own impotence, locked into a blind adversarialism, engage in periodic 
bouts of undirected conflict. Change is (justifiably) distrusted and resisted. Thus far, the 
stronger Canadian unions have resisted many of the swingeing concessions to which their 
American cousins have succumbed. But the future, especially in light of moves to free 
trade with the U.S., is not certain.
In fact, it might be said that industrial conflict in the two countries is of two entirely 
different types. In Britain, it tends to be more focused, more strategic, more purposive, 
what might be called instrumental conflict. In Canada, it tends to be more diffuse, 
more undirected, more desperate, what might be called reactive conflict.
Pains have been taken to criticise some scholars for an overly romantic view of 
British workplace industrial relations so it would be embarrassing for this study to be 
guilty of the same misdemeanor. It would also be unfortunate to ignore the strengths of 
the Canadian system. It is important to see the situation in both countries not static but in 
transition. There are many indications that studying industrial plants in the late 1980's 
may be like studying a species on its way to extinction. Yet there is much for either 
country to learn from the other.
There is much for Canadians to learn from the British system, especially for those 
who, as Canadian industrial conflict continues at its high level, see more and more formal 
regulation as the answer. On the British side, there is much to learn from the Canadian 
situation. As the nature of British industry changes, as the average workplace shrinks in 
size, as the typical work group moves from masses of blue collar workers to small crews of 
white collar or service workers and as the old model of British workplace trade unionism 
undergoes the tremendous attendant strain, the advantages of this model will start to
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disappear. Unless it can be replaced with a floor of protections such as exist in Canada, 
available to even the least powerful work groups, then British workers and British unions 
may find themselves thrown back into the last century.
APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY AND METHOD
Perhaps only in a scholarly project concerning itself with North America would an 
apologia for the use of case study and qualitative methods be necessary. Such projects 
have a long and honoured tradition in Britain, especially at Warwick University's 
Industrial Relations Research Unit, where the author resided throughout the study and 
whose members' work and thoughts formed the intellectual harbour from which 
conceptual and empirical expeditions were launched.
Yet as explained in Chapters I and II, the use of case studies and qualitative 
methodology is not a mere whim but an essential requisite to address many of the 
problems inherent in the subject matter. On the one hand, much of the work on cross­
national variations in industrial conflict involves the analysis of macro traits of a large 
sample of countries (eg. Clegg, 1976; Korpi & Shalev, 1979), treating either institutions 
of joint regulation or the political interaction of unions, employers and governments as 
unproblematic black boxes where certain inputs invariably yield certain outputs. It has 
therefore been necessary to narrow the purview of study to a pair of workplaces in a pair 
of countries.
On the other hand, some studies have involved the analysis of quantifiable 
questionnaires on individual worker attitudes in different countries (eg. Gallie, 1978,
1983; Lash, 1984). But these run the risk of ignoring black boxes entirely and of giving 
short shrift to distinctive patterns o f behaviour of collectives of workers which exist, 
are observeable, and can be so useful in analysis of the problem. It has therefore been 
necessary to ask questions and examine documents about, and closely observe, these 
patterns of behaviour rather than concentrate on the attitudes giving rise to them.
The particular methodology employed then, has been a difficult but potentially 
rewarding one. Rather than collect quantitative data about individual attitudes or 
aggregates of institutional traits and characteristics and present statistical relationships 
between these factors, and rather than merely describe a set of behavioural sequences, 
the study has set out to interpret unquantifiable sets of actions, by defining them as 
micro-institutions and relating them to the balance of political resources available to 
and capable of being used by the parties. In fact, it is doubtful that the parties 
interviewed could have described (without an outrageous amount of prompting by the
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researcher) what was being sought. For instance, the use of the terms "political 
apparatuses of production" or more particularly "interests", "rights", "adjustments" and 
"enforcements", as theoretical concepts defined herein were only arrived at after 
considerable reflection upon the author's own experiences in the Canadian industrial 
relations system and a kind of intensive pilot study at BR ITM ET  undertaken early on in 
the project. The process is described by Glaser and Strauss:
"in  ducovennf theory, one generates conceptual catcgori«« or their properties from 
evidence; then the evidence from which the category emerged is used to illustrate the concept. The 
evidence may not necessarily be accurate beyond a doubt (nor is it even in studies concerned onbly 
with accuracy), but the concept is undoubtedly a relevant theoretical abstraction about what is going
While the fact that the two-by-two matrix of case studies allows for greater richness 
of analysis than single case studies and hence a greater propensity to generalisation, the 
sample can by no means be taken as "typical" in the statistical sense. But, as explained and 
demonstrated in Chapter II, the workplaces were carefully chosen first, to avoid, as far as 
possible, atypicality and second, to reduce areas of difference between them and hence 
theoretical considerations necessary, to a controllable number. Thus the workplaces were 
not only generally in line with industrial norms in the two countries, but adequately 
"comparable" with each other in the same industry across the two countries. In the end, 
however, they were chosen "in terms of [their] explanatory power rather than for [their] 
typicality." (Mitchell, 1983, p. 203).
And, as Mitchell says of the logic employed:
"...th* procc,» of inference from c»»e ttudiei it only logical or cautal and cannot ba 
statistical and ...estrapolability from any one case study to like situations in general is based only on 
logical inference. We infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider 
population not because the cate it representative but because our analysis is unassailable.'' (ibid., p.
200)
The exercise in extrapolation was aided immeasurably by a body of empirical work 
available in both countries. Of course, with a long tradition of workplace industrial 
relations study, Britain afforded the bulk of such resource. Thus it was possible to 
compare any set of features in the British workplaces to the data contained in such works 
as Daniel & Millward (1983), Millward& Stevens (1986), Brown (1981 ) and Government 
Social Survey ( 1968). Unfortunately, such a body of data has not been collected in 
Canada (and needs to be done). However, because of the high degree of regulation and 
formalism in that country's industrial relations, the presence of data on the contents of
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collective agreements (eg. Kumar, 1986) and reports of arbitration awards (eg. Brown & 
Beatty, 1984) provide a 'next best’ resource.
One of the best things about the case study method backed up by the availability of 
such data, is the ability to explore "exceptions to the rule" use them to deepen the 
explanatory quality of the studies. More quantitatively-oriented methods must needs 
ignore such exceptions or statistically level them. As Mitchell says:
"It  frequently occurs that the way in which aeneral esplanatory principles may be used in 
practice is most clearly demonstrated in those instances where the concatenation of events is to 
idiosyncratic at to throw into sharp relief the principles underlying them." II9H3, p. 204)
The study had a number of such exceptions which helped to "prove the rule". One, 
where C A N M E T  management atypically tabled a proposal for an extended working week, 
aptly illustrated how easily the Canadian interests apparatus can overload and predispose 
to conflict. Another, where the BRITBREW  collective agreement contained a quite 
atypical "procedural bonus" and provision for conciliation and arbitration to discourage 
strikes out of procedure, splendidly demonstrated that the tradition of informality 
persists in British dispute resolution despite the strongest formal prescription. Yet 
another, where an exceptional early retirement provision at CANBREW  proved 
unsatisfactory to middle age workers, showed just how conflictual structuring of the 
internal labour market in Canada can be.
One incalculably helpful contextual resource is the fact that the author worked in 
several blue collar jobs in Canada, and served in the capacity of shop steward, staff officer 
and general secretary in several Canadian unions over a period of twelve years. Among 
his experiences were stints as a "man of molten metal" in a foundry and smelter. These 
experiences helped the author not only to understand instinctually many of the industrial 
processes and patterns of behaviour observed, but also to gain a measure of credibility 
among both managers and trade unionists in the workplaces studied. As Nichols says of 
Baldamus's insights into the nature of work:
"It  ii pcrhapi became Baldamui had himielf worked on the ihopfloor land, ai he put it, 'not 
ai a participant observer') that he wai »o acutely aware.." <NhO. p. 13)
Yet as with Baldamus, the value of this resource should not be overstated and 
reference to the author's experiences was deliberately avoided in the body of the study.
The empirical data in the study were meant to be substantial enough stand on their own 
(and, it is hoped, they succeeded in so doing). Moreover, while the researcher made no
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secret of his industrial experience to the subjects and did not hesitate to make suggestions, 
broach interpretations and invite comparisons based on this experience, he made a studied 
attempt not to identify with any group, to maintain a strict attitude of objectivity and 
impartiality. And except for an initial reserve, all the subjects cooperated 
enthusiastically and candidly. Unlike Belanger (1985), the author had notebook and pen 
out at all times, even on the shop floor1 and did not find that this inhibited the subjects to 
any significant extent.
Participant observation, while providing a certain richness of data, can present 
problems in qualitative research. It is not bias per se that is the problem but rather that 
participant observation involves a huge investment of time and effort by the observer and 
this may overemphasize the importance of the research locus and/or obscure its 
uniqueness. Just such a problem may have led both Roy (1954) and Burawoy (1979) to 
exaggerate the importance of piece work in American industry.
Another very useful resource was the acquaintance by the author in both countries of 
several representatives of management, unions and government and legal or para-legal 
industrial relations practitioners. These people provided a sounding board against which 
impressions and theories were projected. While their contributions did not form an 
integral part of the study, some are mentioned in it.
Acquaintance with practitioners was especially important in Britain, where 
"knowledge” of the very complicated system of industrial relations as a whole had to be 
somehow acquired in three years. A strategic decision was made early on to live in 
Britain for that entire period (except for the few research forays to Canada). So, in 
addition to the specific information garnered in the case study plants, much was learned 
by steeping in the industrial relations atmosphere in that country. The author attended 
several union and management conferences, assiduously read and photocopied articles 
from journals, magazines and newspapers, and paid close attention to television and radio 
reports of British industrial relations. No mere academic study could have provided this 
background. Again, while not specifically used in the study, such material was invaluable 
for making sense of new phenomena.
I. A tap* recorder wa* not u*ad ae it wai found that nola takin( allowed for adequate tranacription of intarviawa or 
meetings. Moraovar, tha lack of a tapa racordar conveniently allowed for raquaata of interviewees to rapaat 
and alucidata important poinla.
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As in all case studies of industrial plants, the question of getting into the workplaces 
in the first place was problematic. The problems increased manyfold due to the binational 
character of the project. While the question of access was naturally considered in the 
selection of the case study industries, access was at no point guaranteed. This was 
especially true in Canada, where little tradition of workplace study by academics and 
considerable distrust of them exists. In fact, on several occasions, it appeared as if the 
project would have to be abandoned. But the timely intervention of several individuals 
saved the day, and to these persons much is owed. The author considers himself quite 
simply remarkably fortunate in gaining access to such a pair of "matched sets" of 
workplaces. Having gained such access, an interesting and rewarding study was almost 
inevitable.
Three distinct methods were used in gathering information about the case study 
plants: interviews, examination of documentary evidence and observation.
In each of the four factories, people or groups in the the following classifications were 
interviewed. On the management side: at least one manager, usually in charge of human 
resources, at a level higher than plant-level (where possible); at least one plant-level 
general or production manager; the personnel/industrial relations manager of the plant 
as well as other personnel/industrial relations officers; several first-line supervisors 
(foremen); other managers (such as quality control, engineering and special operations).
In addition to these, the author deliberately sought out and found it very helpful to 
interview marketing managers in each of the companies, a resource few industrial 
relations researchers bother about. Marketing managers invariably present a view of the 
production process and a dispassionate appraisal of the role of industrial relations in the 
entire context of the business that i.r. and production managers sometimes lack. 
Nevertheless, the bulk of information from management representatives in all cases came 
from the interviews with the personnel/industrial relations managers and/or their 
immediate subordinates.
On the union side, the following people or groups were interviewed: the 'staff officer' 
(external union representative from outside the plant) with responsibility for the domestic 
union; the convenor (chief shop steward, local union president etc.) in charge of the major 
domestic union in the plant, as well as some convenors of smaller unions where
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applicable; and a selection of shop stewards. In each plant, the author also made a point 
of formally interviewing a selection (usually agreed between management and union) of 
five or six "ordinary workers" (ie. those who had been employed for some time but were 
not necessarily union activists). These interviews were important to supplement more 
informal, and hence fleeting, contacts with workers on the shop floor. The bulk of the 
information from the union side came, in all cases, from the convenors.
Considerably more time was spent both in interviews and observation in the British 
plants. As mentioned earlier, BR ITM ET  was the first plant studied and it acted as a kind 
of pilot project. Approximately four months was spent at this plant in a time period 
ranging from the Spring of 1986 to the Spring of 1987. Approximately three months was 
spent at BRITBREW  in the period from the autumn of 1986 to the autumn of 1987. Both 
Canadian plants were studied in an intensive two-and-a-half month blitz in the spring of 
1987.
For most interviews, and especially those in the Canadian plants, the author used a 
structured set of questioning areas. However, where time permitted, and always with the 
primary interview subjects, the discussion was allowed to digress when the topic seemed 
material to the study.
In each of the plants, access to agreements and documents concerning disputes and 
general industrial relations was sought. While very useful documents were obtained in all 
of the plants, unlike the interviews, the number and quality of documents varied from 
plant to plant. As mentioned in Chapter 11 and IV, records of specific disputes were 
especially accessible at BR ITM ET  and CANBREW , somewhat less so at CANMET, and 
relatively inaccessible at BRITBREW . However, where information on past disputes was 
scarcer, more effort was made in interviews to reconstruct them and considerably more 
effort was made in observing ongoing disputes. Because of the longer observation span ( I 
year) and greater attendance at both British plants, the author was able to observe 
several disputes begin, enter procedure (formal and/or informal) and be resolved. While 
this was not possible at the Canadian plants, the presence of written arbitration awards 
(which go to some length to describe the same thing) provided almost the same result.
Finally, the author spent time "on the shop floor", both in the company of union or 
management representatives and alone, observing the production processes and the
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interaction among workers and between workers and management. The author also 
attended several random grievance meetings and discussions between management and 
union, both to chart the progress of specific disputes and to gain general impressions of 
the tenor of the relationship between the parties.
In addition to those conducted at or about the case study plants, some additional 
interviews provided information useful to the study. Especially fruitful were matched 
interviews with an A C AS conciliator and his direct counterpart in the Department of 
Labour in the province of the Canadian plants. The A C A S  officer had been involved in a 
BRITBREW  dispute and the Canadian officer had been involved in one at CANBREW . 
Also interviewed were practising Canadian arbitrators and labour lawyers in both 
countries. In one particularly auspicious coincidence, the author was able to interview 
the arbitrator who had adjudicated one of the more significant cases at one of the 
Canadian plants. (For reasons of confidentiality, the identity of neither the abitrator nor 
the case is made explicit).
Inevitably, while the initial fear was of not getting enough information, the ultimate 
problem was in getting too much. The transcribed interviews filled almost 400 pages.
The photocopied documents filled an entire filing cabinet drawer. Boiling down this 
amount of material and fitting it into the thematic (rather than anectdotal) form which 
the study takes was aided greatly by transcribing the material into a form readable by a 
computer database programme which was able to sort it according to pre-selected "key 
words" such as "labour markets", "seniority", "discipline", "strikes", "job control" and so 
on. While the author searched for a programme with the ability to actually write the 
thesis, such could not be found and recourse was necessary to old technology to accomplish 
this task.
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